
Max G. Geier
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Author

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Photo Caption

On cover (front and back)—two panorama views of Lookout Creek drainage and surroundings on the Willamette National Forest, as seen from Carpenter Lookout in 1963 (top b&w) and the same view, six decades later (bottom color). Originals in Forest Science Database.
Abstract


The H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest) is both an idea and a particular place. It is an experimental landscape, a natural resource, and an ecosystem that has long inspired many people. On the landscape of the Andrews Forest, some of those people built the foundation for a collaborative community that fosters closer communication among the scientists and managers who struggle to understand how that ecosystem functions and to identify optimal management strategies for this and other national forest lands in the Pacific Northwest. People who worked there generated new ideas about forest ecology and related ecosystems. Working together in this place, they generated ideas, developed research proposals, and considered the implications of their work. They functioned as individuals in a science-based community that emerged and evolved over time. Individuals acted in a confluence of personalities, personal choices, and power relations. In the context of this unique landscape and serendipitous opportunities, those people created an exceptionally potent learning environment for science and management. Science, in this context, was largely a story of personalities, not simply a matter of test tubes, experimental watersheds, or top-down management sponsored by a large federal agency or university. Ideas flowed in a constructed environment that eventually linked people, place, and community with an emerging vision of ecosystem management. Drawing largely on oral history, this book explores the inner workings and structure of that science-based community. Science themes, management issues, specific research programs, the landscape itself, and the people who work there are all indispensable components of a complex web of community, the Andrews group. The first four chapters explore the origins of the Forest Service decision to establish an experimental forest in the west-central Oregon Cascades in 1948 and the people and priorities that transformed that field site into a prominent facility for interdisciplinary research in the coniferous biome of the International
Biological Programme in the 1970s. Later chapters explore emerging links between long-term research and interdisciplinary science at the Andrews Forest. Those links shaped the group’s response to concerns about logging in old-growth forests during the 1980s and 1990s. Concluding chapters explore how scientists in the group tried to adapt to new roles as public policy consultants in the 1990s without losing sight of the community values that they considered crucial to their earlier accomplishments.

Keywords: Andrews Forest, LTER, IBP, watersheds, adaptive management.
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Research Programs and Key Researchers

Persons whose names are in boldface appear in the text as leading figures in the Andrews research group.
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<td>Fred Glenn, George Lienkaemper, Cam Jones, Gordon Grant, Craig Creel, Julia Jones, Duan Jutlin, Beverly Wemple, Road Perform, Ken Brinkmeyer, Kristin Vanderlip, Road Peak Flows, Low Flows, Roads, Ecology/Hydrology, Hydrology, Small Watersheds</td>
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Chapter One: Building an Experimental Place for Science and Community, 1948-1955

On a late September day in 1997, nine people climbed out of stuffy vans into the clear summer air high in the Cascades. Their path wound through high-elevation stands of noble fir (Abies procera Rehd.), across mountain meadows, and over rocky outcroppings. They continued upward, past the treeline, to a windswept, summit building known as Carpenter Lookout, the highest point of the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest). Most people in the group had known each other for more than three decades and spent much of their professional lives within sight of that mountaintop. One of them, Roy Silen, was returning to the peak for the first time in more than 40 years. The Lookout itself was a rickety old structure with splintered railings dating back to the 1930s, but it commanded a panoramic view of forested and logged slopes in the Willamette National Forest, including the 16,000 acres of the experimental forest to the south and west. The group included people who had variously managed, studied, and criticized logging and reforestation practices on that landscape. They were there to remember...
the past and to go on record with their memories. Their combined experience at the Andrews Forest spanned from before that research facility was first established through that day in 1997.

The oral history exercise that began that day at Carpenter Lookout was an ongoing, casual conversation that demonstrated how a science-based community functioned at the Andrews Forest. The exercise continued in the afternoon on a gravel bar along Lookout Creek, followed by a dinner at the headquarters site and a concluding, evening session in the Andrews conference room. The way these scientists and forest managers connected as human beings, on this and other occasions, was at least as important as the ideas they expressed about their work at the Andrews Forest. As a group of leaders and thinkers, they listened to each other, volunteered ideas, asked questions, and challenged ideas that didn’t seem to fit known facts. The view from Carpenter Lookout inspired but did not limit the range of their conversation. They disagreed on many points, but those disagreements led to more discussion, reconsideration, and revised ideas, rather than recrimination.

The day ended in a tragedy that underscored their humanity and their spirit of community. When the group reassembled in the Andrews conference room after dinner to begin their third oral history session of the day, they learned—with Roy Silen—that his wife of 43 years had died in an automobile accident. For the rest of the night, everyone in the group struggled to provide comfort, sympathy, and respectful support to a friend suffering an inconsolable loss. It was an unforgettable day that stripped away the façade of scientific detachment and forced people to think about how their lives intersected with their work and with each other in this remarkable place.

Discovering Life in a Place of Work

People connect with human beings for varied and often mysterious reasons, and in that sense, this book is the product of a collaborative effort to explain how a particular place inspired a community of people who built a common ground for communication between scientists and managers struggling with public lands issues in the late 20th century. The 50-year history of the Andrews Forest shows the importance of individuals acting in a confluence of personalities, personal choices, and power relations. The unique mix of people and serendipitous opportunities at the Andrews Forest created an exceptionally potent learning environment for science and management. Science, in this context, was largely a story of personalities. It was not simply a matter of test tubes, experimental watersheds, or
top-down management sponsored by a large federal agency or university. Ideas flowed in a nurturing environment that eventually linked people, place, and community with an emerging vision of ecosystem management.

This book is primarily but not exclusively an oral history of the Andrews Forest and the community associated with it. The group meeting on Carpenter Lookout in September 1997 was one of several oral history interviews during 1997 and 1998 in which people met to discuss their memories of a past they helped create. These and other people also discussed their memories of the past in individual interviews, and before the end of 1998, more than 40 people contributed their memories in an oral history project to commemorate the 50-year anniversary of the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest. The book also extends beyond that date to consider more recent developments. Hundreds more people have contributed to the collective knowledge from their experience as managers and scientists on this landscape. This book also relies heavily on their written accounts, as preserved in an assortment of archival records and other primary and secondary published works that provide interpretive context for oral accounts of the Andrews Forest. This documentation is especially important for the chapters dealing with the early years (1930s-1970s) because relatively few people survive to substantiate, refute, or illuminate other oral accounts from that period. In later years, the surviving voices of people associated with this place are more numerous, and they provide a...
wider variety of perspectives and perceptions of causality, consequence, and significance. People who participated in both group and individual interviews often emphasized different issues, events, or people, depending on whether they were speaking alone or in a group. The chapters of the book dealing with later years (1970s-1990s) draw on a wider array of oral history interviews and, therefore, are less dependent on archival records.

This book explores the inner workings and structure of a science-based community widely recognized—and sometimes criticized—for its visible role in many controversial issues about management policies for public lands in the Northwestern United States. The oral history project was prompted by the 50th anniversary of the Andrews Forest, the rapid pace of change at that facility in the late 1990s, and the realization that many of the original players in the Andrews story were still available for interviews. This project was an opportunity for people in the Andrews group to consider their accomplishments and evaluate their methods in critical hindsight. It was also an opportunity to regroup and think about the future.

Sidebars in each chapter outline the group’s perspectives on major science themes that weave together many different strands of work at the Andrews Forest. Each sidebar begins with a brief outline of a perceived management or science theme, various science-based insights into that theme, and the evolutionary stages of an emerging synthesis of scientific theories related to that theme. Science themes, management issues, specific research programs, the landscape itself, and the people who work there are all indispensable components of a complex web of community, described in this book as the Andrews group. The book, however, is not designed to demonstrate the broader significance of the science or management initiatives linked with the Andrews group. It primarily follows the threads of people and place through the web of activities at the forest. It is intended to convey the perceptions, priorities, and accomplishments of people in the Andrews group, rather than perceptions of the group by people who were not part of that community. Meeting minutes, internal correspondence, oral history interviews, newsletters, and published writings generated by people in this group provide context and insight into the assumptions and priorities of scientists and managers associated with the Andrews Forest. These sources also convey, to various degrees, the personalities of the people who made this community work.

The linkage of the Andrews Forest with the USDA Forest Service complicates the history of this research facility and community because, in recent years, many
historians have pointed to that agency as an example of misguided bureaucracy, challenging other, more positivist studies. Since the days of Gifford Pinchot, the Forest Service emphasized its commitment to “scientific” forestry, and it offered secure employment to scientists from many different disciplines. Paul Hirt has argued that the Forest Service, wittingly or unwittingly, embraced a *Conspiracy of Optimism* (1994) in which even well-meaning management practices wreaked ecological catastrophe on the national forests after World War II. Forest managers optimistically assumed “scientific management” would improve conditions on the national forests and produce more timber for a longer period. However, too often, Hirt argued, the optimistic dream of sustained-yield, scientific forestry turned into a nightmare reality of cut-and-run logging. Nancy Langston’s *Forest Dreams, Forest Nightmares* (1995) argued along similar lines with a narrower perspective on the Blue Mountains of eastern Oregon. These and other authors, in noting the long record of management practices that Forest Service managers devised over the years with advice and support from prominent scientists, emphasize the unintended but no less disastrous ecological consequences of those practices. Numerous authors have detailed the historical geography of American forests (e.g., Michael Williams, 1989), the evolution of forestry priorities in the United States (e.g., William G. Robbins, 1985) and the implications of American policy and culture for forest ecology in the United States (e.g., Char Miller, 1997). Many others have examined the ecological implications of federal and corporate policy in forests of the Pacific Northwest (e.g., William Dietrich, 1992), and even for specific forest stands in that region (e.g., Jane Claire Dirks-Edmunds, 1999).

This book focuses on one experimental forest and the people who worked there as a way of understanding how and why people generate new ideas about forest ecology and related ecosystems. It examines how people who worked together on a particular experimental forest generated ideas, developed research proposals, and considered the implications of their work. It explores how individuals functioned in this particular science-based community and how that community developed and evolved over time. It examines how and why people followed unique paths of research and to what end. Some, but not all, of their work challenged common assumptions about forest ecology and standard practices of scientific forestry. A related book provides a journalistic account of science discoveries at the Andrews Forest (John Luoma, 1998).

The idea of a common, if unstated, set of core values runs deep in the Andrews group, and this book explores how that idea originated and evolved into
The book is arranged in chapters that first explore the various building blocks of community and then examine the functioning of that community. Its present form. As a historian who studies resource-based communities in the North American West, I am particularly concerned with how people reconciled their ideas about science and natural resources with the landscape and people they encountered at the Andrews Forest and how that dialogue among people, place, and natural science evolved over time. The book is arranged in chapters that first explore the various building blocks of community at the Andrews Forest, and then examine the functioning of that community. It begins with the origins and background of the Forest Service decision to establish an experimental forest in the west-central Oregon Cascades in 1948. The first four chapters explore the people and priorities that transformed that little-used field site into a prominent facility for interdisciplinary research in the coniferous biome of the International Biological Programme in the 1970s. Between 1948 and 1970, the few scientists who worked at the Andrews Forest were preoccupied with laying out roads, planning “experimental” clearcuts and watershed studies, and otherwise making the facility more accessible for field research. They struggled against numerous efforts to curtail research on the site and open it to more commercial logging.

Figure 3—Roy Silen, pictured here during the group interview at Carpenter Lookout, was the first research forester in charge at the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest) from the time it was first established in 1948 until he married Ethel Arthur in 1954 and accepted reassignment in Corvallis, Oregon. This 1997 visit was Silen’s first return to the Andrews Forest since his marriage. Among other accomplishments during his earlier career managing the landscape he viewed from this site, Silen laid out the road structure that later encouraged the retention and study of old-growth forest stands at the Andrews Forest. While meeting with the interview group in the library conference room at the headquarters building later the same evening, Roy Silen learned that Ethel, his wife of nearly 50 years, had died in an automobile accident in Corvallis.
The original voices of the group, as preserved in the oral history recordings, convey the contagious enthusiasm of people who learned how to share their own ideas and to listen when other people presented alternative views. The group plans to make their original voices accessible via the Internet. They are committed to the principle of making their work accessible to other people as they continue their efforts to encourage multiple dialogues and the free flow of ideas. These are adaptable people who prize individual autonomy but have learned how to work closely and collaboratively with other people. This book is their story. It is a portrait of their community, and it explores links connecting individual experience with group initiatives and collaborative insights. The book is not primarily about science or about the ecological transformation of a particular landscape, although those concepts do play a role in the narrative. It is mostly a story about people connecting with a place and with each other to build a community. That community was inspired but not contained by its connection with the Andrews Forest in the Cascade Range. The community functioned well beyond the mountain sanctuary of the Andrews, and it survived the departure of many close friends and associates. In the end, the people, science, and place adapted to new circumstances and challenges in ways that no one in the group could fully understand.

Early Perceptions of Place and Opportunity at Lookout Creek

The landscape that visitors to the Andrews Forest saw in the late 1990s was a managed forest that other people had painstakingly constructed over the preceding 50 years, but it was a patchwork landscape where unanticipated processes blended human actions and intents with unrecognized realities and unpredictable events, yielding unintended outcomes. The experimental forest was first an idea, later a place. Before linking the idea with the Lookout Creek drainage, people passed it back and forth, tweaking it into shape according to their personal and professional priorities. The idea evolved as people drew connections between the places where they lived and worked in the Pacific Northwest and the landscapes they valued. On the timbered slopes of the Cascade Range, people who worked for the Forest Service and the Army Corps of Engineers implemented the public policies that governed land use priorities in that region, and that effort influenced the personal and professional values people brought to that landscape. Public policy imposed limits and created opportunities, but people accomplished things because they acted in concert with other people. When his work on a Forest Service survey...
of resources in the Cascade Range took Forest Service forester Phil Briegleb to Carpenter Saddle in the early 1930s, he got the idea that the Lookout Creek drainage was a good site for an experimental forest. Action on that idea, however, originated with a suggestion from the Army Corps of Engineers and a negotiated agreement within the Forest Service between the Willamette National Forest and the Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Experiment Station (later shortened to Pacific Northwest Research Station and, hereafter, PNW Station). That agreement defined the territory and mission of the experimental forest, translating the idea into policy. Converting the idea of a research forest into reality on the Lookout Creek drainage required human effort and individual initiative.

The Andrews Forest includes all of the area drained by Lookout Creek, a tributary of the Blue River north of its confluence with the McKenzie Fork of the Willamette River. This Andrews Forest is a triangular drainage on the west slope of the Cascade Range near the town of Blue River, Oregon, in the Willamette National Forest, within a 1-hour drive from Eugene and a 2-hour drive from Corvallis. On
the western point of that triangle, Lookout Creek flows into Blue River. On the eastern leg of the triangle is Carpenter Saddle, located between Carpenter Mountain on the north and Frissell Point on the south. The northern and southern legs of the triangle rise toward Carpenter Saddle in diverging ridgelines, embracing the drainage of Lookout Creek and its tributaries. The PNW Station and the Willamette National Forest jointly administered this federally managed land, beginning in 1948, and in cooperation with Oregon State University since the early 1970s. It is a 16,000-acre landscape filled with small details that people can touch, smell, see, hear, and taste.

The mountainous terrain is an essential starting point for understanding both the Andrews Forest and the group centered on that landscape. Most of the attributes people examine at the place build on the geological features of the drainage. Rocks of volcanic origin, some formed from eruptions as recent as 4 million years ago, provide the foundation for the watershed that ranges from lower than 1,300 feet along the valley floor to more than 5,000 feet along the ridges rising toward the eastern boundary of the drainage. Since the volcanic episodes that shaped the rough outline of this drainage, glacial, alluvial, and mass-movement processes formed the modern topography of the Andrews Forest. At one point in its glaciated past, for example, ice dams may have blocked Blue River and flooded the lower 0.62 mile of the Lookout Creek valley, resulting in sedimentary deposits in that portion of the experimental forest. The modern landscape includes a flood plain and terraces with numerous, small, alluvial fans accumulated from tributary watersheds. Deep and shallow mass movements are common in the Andrews Forest, particularly in the steep headwall or midbasin regions of the many small watersheds that drain into Lookout Creek. In this respect, it is a landscape that resembles many others in the western Cascades.\footnote{Frederick J. Swanson and Michael E. James, “Geology and Geomorphology of the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest, Western Cascades, Oregon” (Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Experiment Station, Res. Pap. PNW-188, 1975).} Fires, floods, and the vagaries of climate shaped the landscape in more recent years, influencing human perceptions of potential uses for this drainage. A series of major fires of unknown origin swept through the area.
about 500 years ago, leaving behind a charred landscape on which various species gained a foothold and spread across the drainage over the last half of the millennium.²

Looking at that landscape from the early 1930s through the mid 1940s, Briegleb, his boss Horace J. [Hoss] Andrews, and other scientists and administrators with the Forest Service perceived a place they described as best suited for experimenting with how to most efficiently transform old-growth timber into a managed forest, by using clearcut logging and other methods of removing aged timber, and then studying how those changes affected water runoff and the process of growing new trees on cleared slopes. To that end, they established the Blue River Experimental Forest (the name of which was later changed to the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest) on the Lookout Creek drainage in 1948, the year a major flood struck the western Cascades.²

Published guides to the experimental forest describe a place of “relatively steep” slopes with “frequent outcroppings” of bedrock. They report mean temperatures ranging from 35 °F in January to 65 °F in July. Precipitation is concentrated from November through March and ranges from 89 inches per year in the lower reaches of the drainage, mostly in the form of rain, to more than 140 inches per year at higher elevations, including a snowpack that lasts into late spring. Streamflows usually peak from November through February, particularly when warm rainstorms melt the snowpack. Unusually high streamflows in 1948, 1964, and 1996, for example, flooded the Lookout Creek drainage, caused landslides, washed away big trees, and carried much debris downstream. Those floods inundated creek channels, riparian-zone vegetation, and flood plains. The resulting landscape is complex and diverse, but the big trees initially attracted the most attention.

Before the Forest Service opened the area to timber harvest in 1950, Douglas-fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii (Mirb.) Franco) trees older than 400 years cloaked 65 percent of the drainage in old-growth conditions. Much of the remaining 35 percent included younger stands regenerating from fires since 1800. One guide to the Andrews Forest, published by the Forest Service in 1959, identified Douglas-fir as the “predominant forest type,” found “in a complete range of size classes—from seedlings to large, overmature timber.” Other tree species prominently identified on the experimental forest by that time included silver fir (Abies amabilis Dougl. ex Forbes), noble fir, and white pine (Pinus albicaulis Engelm.). A later guide published in the 1990s identified the most common tree species at lower elevations: in order of mention, they were Douglas-fir, western hemlock (Tsuga heterophylla

² Ibid.
Sidebar 1.1: Old-Growth Forest

The Issue: What is old-growth forest? In the 1930s-1960s, old growth was mapped as "large saw timber" and referred to somewhat disparagingly as "decadent" and "over-mature." But little was known of its ecological properties; clearly the structure of old growth was different from younger forests, but were its composition and function the same as forests at other stages of development? Are some species and processes characteristic of old-growth forests? These questions were raised in scientific circles long before old-growth preservation, conservation, or cultivation became headline issues.

Left: Old-growth forest stands in the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest. Note abundant wood on the forest floor, large trees, and multiple layers of understory. Photo by Tom Spies, USDA Forest Service.


The Roots: One important root of the Andrews Forest work on old growth comes from Jerry Franklin's love of big trees, dating from his early years growing up in Camas, Washington. Old growth was neither an ecological nor a social consideration elsewhere in the academic world because so little old growth is found near traditional strongholds of ecological academe. In the early 1970s, people sensed that old growth was being rapidly liquidated, so its lessons should be gleaned before the record was erased. But what gave the Andrews Forest group the opportunity to study old growth was funding for basic research in the International Biological Programme through the National Science Foundation. Forest Service research and university funding emphasized more practical matters.

The Approach: Study methods changed through time as the sophistication of science, management, and policy questions evolved. The initial question was, "What is old-growth forest?" The answer was approached through descriptive studies; vegetation plots were established in old forests of various structure and composition, and studies of associated organisms and processes began (Denison 1973, Franklin et al. 1981). Next, scientists asked, "How does old-growth develop?" They established vegetation plots representative of a succession of stages leading to the development of old-growth conditions, and they developed computer models to simulate change in forests as they aged. Another question arose from political debate about what was at stake in competed arguments about the fate of old-growth forests: "How much old growth is there and where is it?" These questions were approached through remote-sensing techniques that had to be developed and tested (Cohen and Spies 1992). In the 1990s, the central question became, "Can we speed development of old-growth characteristics in plantations or young, natural stands through silvicultural practices?" This question has led to a series of field and modeling experiments to examine the early history of today's old growth and alternative silvicultural approaches in previously clearcut stands.

Results: The work on old growth dramatically transformed approaches to forest management in the region, but also around the world, including New England, Scandinavia, and England, where all but the tiniest vestiges of old growth were lost long ago. The implications for science have been to sharpen understanding of similarities and differences of structure, composition, and function of stands of varying stages of development under both natural and managed conditions. The complexity of old-growth forest has given great richness to this inquiry—certainly more so than if studies had been restricted to younger forests.
Necessary Work: Discovering Old Forests, New Outlooks, and Community on the Andrews Forest

(Raf.) Sarg), and western redcedar (Thuja plicata Donn ex D. Don), with noble fir, Pacific silver fir, Douglas-fir, and western hemlock as the tree species prominent at higher elevations.¹

Much early work at the Andrews Forest focused on large trees, but scientists gradually developed a composite portrait of the Andrews Forest that included other details compiled from many different studies. By the late 1990s, scientists had accumulated lists that identified and described about 500 vascular plant species, more than 3,000 invertebrate species, and an extensive list of vertebrates, notably including the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina), pileated woodpecker (Dryocopus pileatus), osprey (Pandion haliaetus), black bear (Ursus americanus), bobcat (Lynx rufus), mountain lion (Felis concolor), coyote (Canis latrans), black-tailed deer (Odocoileus hemionus), and Roosevelt elk (Cervus elephus roosevelti). Studies of riparian zones listed cutthroat and rainbow trout, Pacific giant salamanders, and other vertebrates, invertebrates, and streamside vegetation, including many deciduous, coniferous, and herbaceous species.² Even this detailed cataloguing of species, however, was incomplete. It was the limited result of research that focused mostly on species closely related to specific studies. Even after a half century of intensive study, much about the Andrews Forest remains a mystery. Detailed records supported research in that place, but people who went there seeking answers to questions about forest ecosystems usually discovered more work was necessary to unlock the forest’s secrets.

Origins of the Experimental Forest Designation

An interagency movement to expand the number of outdoor laboratories, or “experimental plantations” in the Pacific Northwest took root during the depression years of the 1930s. The focus of forest research shifted during this period from earlier studies of stands regenerating from wild “burns” to forests managed for a 100-year rotation of timber production. The regional influence and practical, field orientation of the forestry school faculty at Oregon Agricultural College (OAC) encouraged this trend, leading to the development of a school forest. Close professional ties and administrative links with the OAC School of Forestry encouraged

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² Ibid.
similar trends at the Pacific Northwest Research Station (PNW Station) in the same period. George Wilcox Peavy, a Michigan native who worked for the Forest Service in California, first joined the OAC faculty to head the forestry department in 1910 and served as dean of the new school of forestry, beginning in 1913. Peavy gained direct influence at PNW Station after 1929, when he took over as chair of the Forest Research Council. Station Director Thornton Munger had founded the council 3 years earlier to guide priorities at PNW Station. Weyerhauser executive C.S. Chapman chaired the council for the first 3 years, with the support of an executive committee consisting of Peavy and Munger. The larger committee included leading foresters from state and federal agencies, private industry, and regional forestry schools. On the advice of this committee, PNW Station had established experimental plantations near Bend, Oregon, and at the school forests of Oregon State College (OSC), Washington State College, and the University of Washington. Peavy, as chair of the committee after 1929, gained further influence after 1932 when he accepted appointment as president of the renamed Oregon State College.

The PNW Station, operating under guidance from Peavy’s Forest Research Council during the early 1930s, also established several experimental forests and a natural area program during this period. These trends strongly affected how people perceived the Lookout Creek drainage. The place clearly had aesthetic appeal for

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6 June A. Wertz, “A Record Concerning the Wind River Experiment Station, July 1, 1913 to June 30, 1924 and the Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Experiment Station, July 1, 1924, to December 30, 1938, with Supplements 1939 through 1943.” Unpublished typescript, History Files, Portland Office, PNW Station, 10 April 1940, pp. 19-20, 30.


8 In October 1932, the Chief Forester approved establishment of the Wind River Experimental Forest, about 10,000 acres in extent, with extensive stands of Douglas-fir and western hemlock. Two years later, Cascade Head Experimental Forest was established on 6,500 acres of spruce-hemlock stands in the Siuslaw National Forest on the Oregon coast. The natural area program was closely related to the experimental forest program, which had greatly expanded because of emergency-funding support. The Metolius Natural Area was established in June 1931, followed by five additional natural areas established by 1936 and six more under consideration that year. Selection and official designation of experimental forests and, especially, natural areas, was subject to a prolonged review process, including final review and approval by the Regional Forester and the Chief Forester. Former PNW Station Director Cowlin observed virtually no scientists made use of the natural areas designated during this period. Robert Cowlin (n.d.) Federal Forest Research in the Pacific Northwest: the Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Experiment Station. Unpublished typescript, in the Portland Office History Files, 101-102, 119-120, 139-140.
campers, day hikers, and horse riders by 1930, but it inspired more pragmatic visions for Briegleb, a PNW Station employee who first encountered the drainage that year when Andrews, who headed the forest survey for PNW Station, sent his subordinate, Briegleb, into the western Cascades of Oregon. From the crest of Carpenter Saddle, Briegleb gazed down the Lookout Creek drainage, observing an extensive expanse of old-growth Douglas-fir. Briegleb privately considered the place ideally suited for an experimental forest in old-growth Douglas-fir, but his official report on the drainage instead emphasized its value as a source for timber. The survey data provided, for the first time, a quantified profile of timber resources in the drainage: 3,005 acres of large, old-growth Douglas-fir; 4,375 acres of small, old-growth Douglas-fir; 2,425 acres of second-growth Douglas-fir; 2,030 acres of small second-growth Douglas-fir; 2,685 acres of large mountain hemlock; 65 acres of small mountain hemlock; 265 acres of meadows; 80 acres of burns; and 60 acres of rocky, noncommercial forest land, with an estimated total volume of 802,150 thousand board feet of timber.  

Alternate visions of the Lookout Creek drainage vied for attention against the survey’s depiction of the place as a cluster of economic potential. A photographic panorama taken from Carpenter Mountain in 1933 (see cover photo, top), as part of a national effort to document the views from every fire lookout in the United States, for example, depicts a landscape fading away into the surrounding forested slopes and rocky outcroppings of the Willamette National Forest. This panorama view reveals virtually no visible evidence of human activity, boundaries, or borders. The photograph itself, however, is evidence of the human hand on that landscape. During the early 1930s, the Forest Service constructed two fire lookout stations on what eventually became the Andrews Forest: one on Carpenter Mountain and one on Lookout Mountain. Carpenter Lookout was a permanent structure, but the one on Lookout Mountain was a temporary facility with a tent, rangefinder, and other portable equipment. These structures were intended to facilitate early location and suppression of forest fires. Firefighting priorities created the need for access roads and trails, and depression-era programs supplied the labor force needed to build that infrastructure.

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9 Cowlin, 70-76. Interview with Roy Silen by Max Geier on 9 September 1996 as transcribed by Jeff Fourier, 24; “Blue River Experimental Forest: Representing the Old-growth Douglas-Fir Type.”

The PNW Station and other Forest Service units directly benefited from several New Deal programs. In addition to a large number of new employees hired through the Unemployment Relief Act of March 1933 to support research programs at the Station, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) delivered other workers housed in camps on the national forests.\textsuperscript{11} The CCC projects gave thousands of people a chance to live and work in the forests of western Oregon. The CCC located work camps in areas where their charges could experience the virtues of hard work that many Americans associated with rural life. In essence, however, CCC camps were places where people lived in large groups and worked for wages, and CCC crews supplied the labor the Forest Service needed to build trails and other facilities. In the McKenzie Ranger District, which included Lookout Creek, CCC crews worked to make the Willamette National Forest more accessible for other people. More than 200 crewmen worked out of Camp Belknap, currently the site of the McKenzie River District Ranger Station. Roy Engles, District Ranger at the time, reported that in addition to their other duties in camp, workers completed 14,108 hours of forest work between June and October 1933. They built 29 miles of telephone lines, 17 miles of roads, 35 miles of horse trails, six lookout houses, four firemen’s cabins, two horse shelters, a garage, and five bridges. Near Lookout Creek, CCC workers from Camp Belknap built trails from McKenzie Bridge to Carpenter Mountain, and up the Blue River Ridge to Carpenter Mountain. These trails were the first improved-access routes into the immediate area of Lookout Creek, and as late as 1948, they were the only regularly maintained trails reaching that drainage. The CCC operations at Camp Belknap ended in 1938, but camp facilities continued to house seasonal Forest Service workers connected with the McKenzie District and the nearby experimental forest through the next three decades. The first person assigned to the new experimental forest, Roy Silen, for example, lived in the CCC cookhouse in his first years at Blue River, and other Forest Service people using the facility through the 1950s included Don Wustenberg, Jay Gashweiler, Brit Ash (then district ranger at McKenzie Bridge), and Mike Kerrick, then a college student on a fire-control unit based out of McKenzie Bridge.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Cowlin, 113-114.

The CCC labor improved access to the Lookout Creek drainage just as frequent flooding along the Willamette River began to attract public attention. Concerns about flooding prompted a renewed focus on watershed studies at PNW Station about the time the Forest Research Council began to press for an expanded network of experimental forests. Lookout Creek subsequently emerged as a likely site with good potential for supporting the priorities of PNW Station and other agencies engaged in flood-related research. During 1936 and 1937, Horace J. Andrews headed initial efforts at PNW Station to coordinate a flood-control survey with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in a joint program funded under the Flood Control Act of 1936. The next year, Acting Station Director Andrews assigned E.G. Dunford to head the flood-control survey program at PNW Station. The Portland District of the Army Corps of Engineers subsequently issued a report (House Document 544, 75th Congress, 3rd Session) predicting a major flood in the Willamette Valley once every 5 years, on average. That report stressed the need for storage reservoirs to avert damage to property and loss of life in the valleys. World War II and related concerns, however, diverted public attention from flood-control concerns from the late 1930s through 1948. The major flood that devastated Vanport, Oregon, in spring 1948, refocused public attention, and the PNW Station secured additional funding to support flood-control research.

The renewed emphasis on flood studies at PNW Station complemented an earlier initiative near Blue River. The winter before the 1948 flood, the Army Corps of Engineers designated 5,000 acres of the Blue River valley immediately north of Lookout Creek drainage as a snow laboratory for gathering data on potential flood levels. Army Corps of Engineers selected that location because it was an area with a “good range of elevations and … virgin timber.” The Corps also encouraged PNW Station and the Regional Forester to develop an experimental forest nearby to promote logging so they could “… start getting some of the answers on the effect of logging on run-off.” These actions encouraged a closer look at the drainage Briegleb recalled as an ideal site for an experimental forest in an old-growth forest.

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13 The Flood Control Act of 1936 asserted that flood control on navigable waters or their tributaries was a proper activity of the federal government in cooperation with states. It provided for “investigations and improvements of rivers and other waterways, including watersheds thereof, for flood control purposes …in the interest of the general welfare.” Heritage Research Associates, 142-145. Cowlin, 151-152, 155.


15 “Blue River Experimental Forest: Representing …,” 7-8, Cowlin, 270-271.
The Blue River valley suddenly became a major center for flood-related research in 1948, mostly because PNW Station, the Pacific Northwest Region (Region 6), the Army Corps, and the OSC School of Forestry had begun to take some tentative steps toward closer cooperation a decade earlier. Those efforts initially focused on the effects of logging on timber and watershed production. At least in this arena of applied research, these state and federal agencies had a common interest in finding practical answers to common questions.

On other matters, relations were often more contentious, particularly between PNW Station and Region 6. Thornton Munger, for example, favored clearcutting over selective cutting in old-growth Douglas-fir. In a paper he presented before the Puget Sound Section of the Society of American Foresters meeting in Seattle on 6 January 1939, Munger criticized Region 6 managers for their tendency to use selective-cutting methods where he thought clearcutting was more appropriate. The Regional Forester reportedly attempted, unsuccessfully, to block publication of Munger’s paper.\(^\text{16}\)

Hoss Andrews wove his career carefully around the rivalries that tended to discourage interagency and, as in the case of Munger’s conflict with the Regional Forester, intra-agency cooperation. As of 1948, Andrews’ professional background included multiple assignments in the research and management branches of the Forest Service and in academia. He not only worked as Munger’s close associate at PNW Station, including a brief stint as acting Station Director, but he also served in various administrative capacities with Region 6, and held an appointment as a research scientist at the University of Michigan. His broad professional networks were especially useful during the flood control survey, an interagency initiative that he helped lead. Relations between the PNW Station and Region 6 also reportedly began to improve after a new regional forester, Lyle F. Watts, recruited Andrews from Michigan late in 1938 to serve as his assistant regional forester in Portland. Five years later, Andrews succeeded Watts as regional forester, a position he held for the rest of his life. When the 1948 flood stimulated a renewed interest in watershed studies, this regional forester could draw on a full career of interagency experiences and professional networks.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{16}\) Munger’s conference paper was entitled “The Silviculture of Tree Selection Cutting in the Douglas-Fir Region,” Cowlin, 193-199.

From the end of World War II until 1948, Forest Service administrators at PNW Station and Region 6 negotiated a compromise arrangement for managing the Lookout Creek drainage. Those negotiations produced a memorandum of understanding between the PNW Station, the Willamette National Forest, and Region 6 that created the Blue River Experimental Forest in July 1948. Regional Forester H.J. Andrews approved the intra-agency agreement on July 7; on July 28, Acting Forest Service Chief McArdle announced the establishment of the experimental forest. McArdle’s brief statement was appended to an establishment report that outlined the mission and goals of the new facility. That report, to which McArdle referred in his announcement, observed of the old-growth Douglas-fir forests in the southern and central Cascade Range, “The need for study of problems in this virgin area, relatively untouched by research, is great. Therefore, the conversion of these overmature forests to managed young-growth stands in the most orderly manner with the least delay and most complete utilization of existing material has become one of the primary objectives of the Station.” One criterion for selecting a site for the new experimental forest, the report noted, required that it be “large enough so that it will give the answers needed for managing entire watersheds or cutting units.” The experimental forest primarily would be used “to test logging methods and techniques on commercial-sized operations.” The report, however, also confirmed the interagency origins of the agreement, noting, “An additional objective is to provide a suitable area for the study of forest influences on streamflow, run-off, snow melt, and other hydrology, in cooperation with the U.S. Army Engineers.”

Plans for cooperatively administering the Blue River Experimental Forest required representatives of the Willamette National Forest and the PNW Station to meet on the forest at least once each year to review accomplishments and plan future programs. The report specified that the new experimental forest would be devoted primarily to “large-scale experimental cuttings.” That managerial mandate was the joint responsibility of PNW Station, the Regional Office, and the Willamette National Forest. The agreement stipulated, however, that any management plans “should specify the removal of approximately 20 million board feet of logs per year for the first 15 years … to fit in with the cutting budget for the Blue River drainage as established by the Willamette National Forest.” Signatories to this agreement, in

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chronological order, were J. Alfred Hall, PNW Station Director (21 June 1948); J.R. Bruckart, Willamette National Forest supervisor (6 July 1948); and H.J. Andrews, Regional Forester (7 July 1948). Under the terms of this agreement, PNW Station would determine what to cut and in what order, provided the total cut met these minimum targets. Responsibility for laying out the sales initially fell to Roy Silen, a Research Branch scientist with little seniority in the agency and limited experience laying out sales.\textsuperscript{19}

Initial efforts to make the experimental forest a reality at Lookout Creek forced one man into intimate dialogue with the landscape. Silen spent long hours alone in the woods between 1948 and 1953 laying out logging roads and timber-sale units on the Blue River Experimental Forest. By the time Silen arrived at the experimental forest in 1948, production-oriented, scientific forestry was in full swing in western Oregon. In the postwar era, the Forest Service opened public lands to private timber contractors who cut timber in accordance with Forest Service guidelines to implement large-scale clearcuts in old-growth timber, as Munger had previously advocated. Silen followed those guidelines on the Andrews Forest, in keeping with the mandate in the original memorandum of understanding to “test logging methods and techniques on commercial-sized operations.” The intent of this policy was to replace slow-growing, older trees with younger and more “productive” stands of scientifically managed timber. Silen had to balance his manager’s mandate to produce timber against his scientist’s ethic to conduct research and his private ethic as a citizen. As he grappled with these sometimes conflicting priorities during his 5-year career as forester-in-charge at the Blue River Experimental Forest, Silen laid the foundation for a future of cooperative relations among researchers at PNW Station, scientists at OSC, and foresters with Region 6 and the Willamette National Forest.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} “Blue River Experimental Forest Establishment Report,” 7; “Agreement between the Regional Forester, Forest Supervisor, and Experiment Station Director …in the administration of the Blue River Experimental Forest,” H.J. Andrews Memorandum of Understanding Folder, H.J. Andrews Files, File Box F, Storage Vault, Corvallis FSL, PNW Station, Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture, 5.

\textsuperscript{20} “Blue River Experimental Forest Establishment Report,” 1 June 1948. In their early 1990s history of the Willamette National Forest, Lawrence and Mary Rakestraw quoted then-Supervisor of the Willamette National Forest, Mike Kerrick’s recollection of the postwar years as “… the years of confidence, when we had our laws and manuals [and were] rapidly converting the forests; we knew what we had to do; we were experts in doing it. The public, for whatever reason, had not got involved. It was fun; we didn’t have the controversies you have now—at least that is my recollection.” Lawrence and Mary Rakestraw, “History of the Willamette National Forest” (Eugene, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Willamette National Forest, 1991[?]), 93.
Silen filtered Forest Service plans to cut and grow trees on the experimental forest through his own, personal ethic of reverence for the landscape, respectful stewardship over the old-growth Douglas-fir, scientific professionalism, and a sense of duty to the agency and its mission. Silen recalls very few personal reservations as he translated the Forest Service mission to revitalize the postwar timber economy of the Pacific Northwest onto the landscape of the new experimental forest. His low-level position with the Forest Service and the terms of the establishing agreement limited Silen’s options for managing the experimental forest, but he did experiment with road location and design, as well as the size, shape, and placing of cutting units. He struggled with severe shortages of manpower, equipment, and supplies, but he also discovered the value of community support. Interpersonal and professional networks helped Silen work around the institutional limitations he faced, and he thereby left a legacy that redefined priorities for subsequent generations of scientists and managers at the experimental forest. Chief among those legacies was an innovative “ladder” road system that made the place more accessible with less disruption to the landscape than the “standard” design for Forest Service roads. He also discovered the value of communicating his ideas.

Figure 6—From the beginning, research foresters with the Pacific Northwest Research Station took a hands-on approach to fieldwork. This 1954 photograph shows Roy Silen working with two assistants (Chew and Gretz) seining a hole below the concrete bridge in Lookout Creek.
directly to forest managers who visited sites on the experimental forest. By the time he left the experimental forest in 1954, Silen had substantially converted the place into an accessible site for applied research. It was a humanized landscape where people could test scientific theories about forests.

Silen could not, ultimately, control the future of the place he had transformed. The Forest Service detached Silen from the experimental forest, renamed it, redrew its boundaries, initiated paired watershed studies, and redefined the mission of the facility between 1953 and 1954. Even as paired watershed studies got underway on the Lookout Creek drainage, Silen moved on to other places and different responsibilities at PNW Station. With his departure, the future of the experimental forest temporarily became an institutional concern rather than a personal priority. Perhaps as much as any other single person, Silen shaped future patterns of land use on the experimental forest, and he established the precedent of rigorous, pragmatic field research that shaped the community culture of future scientists and land managers at this forest. That legacy, like the man and the place, was at once straightforward and complex, but it is perhaps best explained by Silen’s simple observation: “I was in love for the place.”

**Personal and Institutional Traditions Intersect at the Blue River Experimental Forest**

Community culture at the experimental forest built on the foundation of personal experience and institutionalized traditions spanning more than half a century, from 1948 to beyond 2000. In one person, Silen brought to the forest local traditions of timber-dependent communities that he absorbed growing up in western Oregon, an emphasis on applied research derived from his training in the OSC School of Forestry, close ties with New England academies of higher education, and the progressive ethic of applied research and scientific management that he absorbed on his first professional assignment at PNW Station. His personal background was deeply rooted in the interwar years of economic development in Coos Bay, Oregon—the logging and shipping community where he was born and raised through high school. He graduated from North Bend High School in 1937, and then worked for 2 years with a logging company as a bookkeeper. The timber

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industry, he recalls, was an obvious career choice for a young man of his background: “[There] couldn’t be any other job.” After an abortive effort to pursue secondary studies elsewhere, he went “back to woods” in Oregon, where he attended OSC, majoring in forestry.  

Silen’s forestry career took an abrupt detour into federal service during and after World War II, and he secured a position with PNW Station by 1946. The work environment at PNW Station encouraged relatively close, daily interaction among senior managers and staff, and this raw recruit worked directly with the former Station Director, Thornton Munger. Silen credits the camaraderie of coffee-room gatherings for promoting an atmosphere of informal exchange among junior and senior colleagues at the Station in those postwar years. He carried that style into his interactions at the experimental forest when he was assigned there as “Research Forester-in-Charge” after working barely 2 years at the Station. As a person who grew up during the depression and served with the infantry in Europe, Silen brought a pragmatic ethic of “making do” and “toughing it out” to his career as a scientist with PNW Station, and he built that ethic into the community culture at the experimental forest from 1948 to 1954. In his Army reserve days near North Bend, early in the war, for example, Silen recalls how an ill-conceived Forest Service effort to economize on the cost and weight of field equipment placed him with a colleague on a mountain peak in experimental sleeping bags. The bags were made of paper, and they generated more noise than warmth. Late at night, as the temperature dropped at high elevation, Silen and his friend improvised: They taped the bags together so they could keep each other warm and survive the night.

The war diverted funding and labor to military programs, even as it created new markets for construction-grade timber from the forests of the Pacific Northwest. The Station struggled through a major labor shortage as workers were called away for military service and depression-era programs ended. More than 85 percent of the remaining resources at the Station went to support projects directly related to the war effort. Amidst wartime rhetoric warning of a need for improved forest protection, Station personnel diverted their energies to a “Douglas-fir job

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23 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 1.
26 Cowlin, 219-228.
27 For examples, see the Oregonian, 17 May 1942, 02 May 1943, 03 May 1943.
classification study.” That work identified more than 188 distinct job classifications in the logging and timber industries of the Pacific Northwest considered vital to securing timber resources for the war effort. Station scientists also cooperated with colleagues at the Oregon State College School of Forestry and the Oregon State Board of Forestry to publish *Forest Resources of Oregon*, including an assessment of forest protection and management issues. Despite these concerns, however, funding shortfalls during the war forced administrators at PNW Station to temporarily close experimental forests at Blue Mountain, Port Orford, and Pringle Falls.

By the last year of the war, plans for postwar building ran up against limited supplies of lumber, and public attention focused on the valuable timber resources on the national forests. As the war ground to a close, the Forest Service faced a host of forest management problems. The Sustained Yield Forest Management Act of 29 March 1944 revised the federal mandate for the agency, and administrators at PNW Station responded by reassessing research needs and potential uses for experimental forests. As the ongoing war continued to drain human resources and distort budgets, the Forest Service retrenched, and between 1944 and 1946, a new Station Director, J. Alfred Hall, reorganized the PNW Station. Hall refocused Station resources on research centers committed to the principle of field-testing experimental theories with commercial-scale logging. This model prioritized applied research and required Station administrators to establish or identify large experimental forests that represented a specific forest type. They expected research programs at each facility to address management concerns related to commercial-scale logging in forests of that type. The PNW Station research priorities in 1947, for example, called for studies on how best to manage second-growth Douglas-fir in western Washington, old-growth Douglas-fir and spruce-hemlock in western Oregon, and ponderosa pine in central Oregon. These plans required Station

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29 The stated purpose of the Sustained Yield Act was to promote “the stability of forest industries, of employment, of communities, and of taxable forest wealth through continuous supplies of timber.” In the Pacific Northwest, which had emerged as a vital source of timber during the war, this mandate to manage for continuous supplies implied the need to study how PNW forests responded after harvest. Cowlin also notes that scientists at PNW Station also benefited from a general climate of renewed respect for professional expertise in the postwar era, as wartime experiences displaced depression-era suspicions about the industrial economy. Cowlin, 243; McPhail, “The Supplements to the Station History, 1944 through 1953,” 1.
administrators to locate new experimental forests with large acreages of the appropriate species within a larger expanse of national forest lands that were accessible to logging. The PNW Station lacked sufficient experimental forests to support this model when the reorganization went into effect in 1947, and Station administrators adopted a two-pronged, fall-back strategy. On the one hand, they negotiated cooperative agreements to establish long-term studies on private, state, and other federal forests. On the other hand, they escalated plans to establish new experimental forests administered directly by the Station. During this period of readjustment, the Station reopened three experimental forests closed earlier in the war, and Hall also negotiated the intra-agency agreement to establish the experimental forest at Lookout Creek.\textsuperscript{30}

Cooperative arrangements among PNW Station, Region 6, and Oregon State College, in the context of the postwar priorities of 1948, built from the premise Munger first laid down in 1924: forest research should address issues of immediate economic importance, and the national forests should be managed for efficient timber production. Bob Tarrant, a soil scientist who joined the Station the same year as Silen, was the Station Director who had to confront the environmental legacy of this policy some 30 years later. He recalls that through World War II, “the bulk of the research” had to do with “What’s in the nation’s woodpile? How much is there?” In later years, Tarrant argues, the ecological implications of that outlook took the Station leadership, including himself, somewhat by surprise.\textsuperscript{31}

In this period of shifting federal mandates, administrative changes at PNW Station, and interagency initiatives, Silen drew on the resources of his research colleagues as he worked to transform the experimental forest from an agreement on paper to a reality on the ground. Despite his relative inexperience, Silen brought impressive credentials to the new experimental forest. He had recently returned to PNW Station from an educational leave to attend Yale, where he earned a master of forestry degree from the premiere forestry school in the country. Perhaps more importantly, however, PNW Station offered expert advice. Under the new administrative structure, Silen’s immediate superior was Robert Aufderheide, who transferred from the Siuslaw National Forest in November 1946 to head the newly

\textsuperscript{30} Cowlin, 255-259.
\textsuperscript{31} Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 24-25.
established Western Oregon Research Center at Corvallis. Aufderheide was one of several people who joined the Station that year and later became prominent leaders in the Forest Service. This leadership cohort supplied crucial support at a critical stage in the development of the experimental forest and the research community linked with that place. Briegleb, for example, rejoined the Station in 1946, after a 3-year stint in Chile and at the Northeastern Forest Experiment Station, to head the PNW Station Division of Forest Management.32

Aufderheide’s philosophy of immediately applicable research, Silen suggests, directly guided his own early efforts at the Blue River Experimental Forest. As cutting escalated on the Willamette National Forest after 1946, Silen recalls, the forest supervisor and his staff shifted management priorities from fire to timber management. The problem, Silen notes, was that the Forest Service “was very ill prepared for this level of cutting.” Up until this time, agency managers generally laid out only the rough boundaries of staggered-set units in a timber sale, and the contractor who successfully bid for the sale handled the details of road design, landings, and extraction of timber, with very little oversight from Forest Service officials. Aufderheide, however, was convinced that the Forest Service should not let the loggers lay out the cutting pattern, because, as Silen recalls, “they had no idea what silviculture really meant.” Aufderheide argued that the location and design of roads and landings were vital to silvicultural planning.33

The production quotas stipulated in the establishing agreement for the experimental forest, together with the Station’s emphasis on studies of commercial-scale logging, meant that Silen was primarily a forest manager at Blue River. He adopted as his operational guide the philosophy that Aufderheide brought over from the Management Branch: long-term planning and careful implementing of a comprehensive logging plan would shape the entire future of a forest. In keeping with that management philosophy, Silen developed a system of roads and logging units that eventually distinguished the Lookout Creek drainage from other experimental forests managed by the Forest Service in this period (see sidebar 1.2). Silen also worked with Robert H. Ruth, his counterpart at Cascade Head Experimental Forest, and Aufderheide to incorporate their ideas into a PNW Station publication, *Getting More Forestry Into the Logging Plan*. That publication, he recalls, “was the best seller in the Station for several years.”34 Silen stresses, however, that Aufderheide


33 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 3-4.

34 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 4.
was the driving force behind his efforts to implement those ideas on the Blue River Experimental Forest, and that his position at the forest had more to do with his practical training at Oregon State College, and 1 year of experience working under the tutelage of Leo Isaac, than with his own ideas or theories about silviculture. He also notes that the ideas he used at Blue River Experimental Forest in the late 1940s and early 1950s were not unique and resembled those guiding Bob Ruth at Cascade Head Experimental Forest during the same period. Ruth, however, had to contend with the legacy of more than a decade of management activities and an existing road structure at the Cascade Head facility. Silen enjoyed the relative luxury of laying out the original road system at the Blue River site. He recalls that his initial planning for management activities included a personal commitment to long-term involvement in monitoring those activities over 30 to 50 years: “I felt that I would have a rather permanent spot here. I was prepared to do it.”

Silen began, in 1948, his own gradual, personal journey from a jobs-and-recreation Forest Service employee who actively pursued social ties with the local community in Blue River, to a professional steward of aesthetic, physical, and scientific resources at the Blue River Experimental Forest. That personal transition happened in an era when institutional support for long-term, commercial-scale, place-centered, field-oriented research at PNW Station was both recent and eroding. Initial plans for the Blue River Experimental Forest virtually ignored those aspects of local community that Silen recognized as helpful, and plans for the facility casually ignored any potential effects on local residents. Public sentiment about the new experimental forest was not explored, or invited. The Forest Service acted on the assumption the local community would naturally support an experimental forest, or at least would not oppose it.

The agency’s characterization of the physical and biological resources of the forested slopes was similarly impressionistic and dismissive. The initial establishment report for the new experimental forest, for example, explicitly addressed both recreational and wildlife matters, and rejected them as insignificant concerns. It claimed, for example, “There is no recreational development on the proposed area nor is any contemplated. The only recreational use this area has ever had is a small amount of trout fishing in Lookout Creek and in the fall an occasional deer hunter.”

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Sidebar 1.2: Roads in the Watershed

The Issue: As roads were first developed in Forest Service lands of the Pacific Northwest in the late 1940s, they were viewed as a practical, engineering matter. The early issues were about how to develop the road system efficiently while minimizing water runoff, sediment from landslides, and erosion of bare soil associated with road building. Managers' experience and systematic study showed that improving road location, design, and maintenance could reduce the adverse effects of roads on watersheds.

The Roots: Water supply was the primary concern in the Organic Act that established the Forest Service. That the bare soil created by road building should raise concerns in watersheds previously entered only on foot and horseback comes as no surprise. Roy Silen recognized the importance of these issues, making them a major theme of his work at the Andrews Forest in the early 1950s. As the road system grew and was tested by major storms, the issue of the roads' effects on the watershed was repeatedly rekindled. The decline of timber harvests on federal lands over the 1990s has triggered a synthesis of knowledge about roads and a reassessment of Forest Service road policy and management.

![Road patterns and map]

Above, Two road patterns: a. Random development; b. Single climbing road with others on levels roughly parallel to valley bottom road.

Right, Systematic road pattern used on the north side of Lookout Creek. Road levels are distinct, and climbing roads are minimized. Road density is lower and yarding improved relative to a random road pattern. Figures from Silen 1955.

The Approach: Early work on roads included designing road-network layouts to find efficient, environmentally cautious patterns (Silen 1955). The first real test of the road network by a big storm came in the December 1964 and January 1965 floods, which triggered dozens of landslides. Ted Dyrness (1967) used an inventory of slides in forest and road areas to assess the extent of road effects on soil erosion and landslides. In the late 1990s, road studies took a landscape ecology perspective to address more rigorously how road location affects the watershed, including water supply and quality, erosion, and movement of exotic plants into the landscape (Jones et al. 2000, Wemple et al. 2001, Wemple and Jones 2003). Simple observation and sketches of alternative road layouts have given way to emphasis on highly quantitative studies of processes, experimentation, hydrologic modeling, and use of geographic information systems.

Results: Information needs for management and policy formulation have provided major impetus for new research. Roads were first approached as an engineering issue, but by the mid-20th century, watershed and ecological aspects of roads became prominent. As emphasis shifted from developing roads to reducing road mileage and to watershed restoration, the balance tipped from engineering to ecosystem perspectives in managing road systems. More recent studies have influenced plans for modifying road systems with a strong emphasis on restoring watersheds and reducing costs of maintaining roads. A "science" of roads began to emerge in the late 1990s, evidenced by a set of international symposia on road ecology and road hydrology and a major book, Road Ecology (Forman et al. 2003). Important advances in science come from studies of hydrological and ecological processes associated with road networks and their interactions with forest landscapes and stream networks.
Cascade Mountain region although neither is abundant.” Finally, at a time when the Forest Service did not even have detailed descriptions or maps of Lookout Creek drainage, the establishment report nevertheless concluded, “The deer population is very light due primarily to the lack of suitable forage in dense timber stands. … Getting logging operations underway will greatly improve forage conditions.”

The Forest Service saddled the new experimental forest with a contradictory mandate. The agency’s stated goal of modeling commercial-scale logging efforts was in direct conflict with its fledgling natural area program. Forest Service policy in 1948 called for designating a portion of each experimental forest as a natural area, but the establishment report for the Blue River facility noted a lack of “sufficient detailed examination” to make such a determination. It further observed that the Willamette National Forest “has under consideration other proposed Natural Areas in this locality. The establishment of the Blue River Experimental Forest will probably make it unnecessary to have any additional natural areas in this general vicinity.” The accompanying management plan for the new research forest, however, specifically required an annual production of 15 to 20 million board feet of logs from the Lookout Creek drainage over the first decade of the experimental forest (1948-1958).

Silen notes that the contradiction in purposes at the Blue River facility was more apparent than real. Everyone knew which mandate took priority for onsite implementation. Where plans to log the experimental forest at an accelerated rate conflicted with the claim that this research facility negated any further need to designate natural areas on the Willamette National Forest, Silen’s mandate was clear. He recalls that Bruckart, the Willamette forest supervisor, was “going after the record for cutting more timber than any other National Forest,” and he refused to relinquish control over the Lookout Creek drainage until the Station agreed to log the maximum allowed under the management plan. Silen argues that, as a relatively inexperienced forester with less than 2 years with the Station, he could do little other than follow orders.

Roy Silen’s modest assessment of his accomplishments at the experimental forest understates the theory and methods of progressive forestry in the postwar era. Research foresters of that period diligently generated data that supplied professional forest managers with the details they needed to represent extensive timber

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37 “Blue River Experimental Forest,” 1a, 6.
38 “Blue River Experimental Forest,” 8.
39 December 1992 discussion with Roy Silen, 1.
harvests as “scientific” forestry. The stated goal was to convert “degenerate”
forests of old-growth Douglas-fir into “productive,” managed stands of second-
growth timber. Few professional foresters questioned this characterization of old-
growth forests in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and both Silen and Tarrant agree
with Ted Dyrness’ later observation that scientists at PNW Station accepted this
premise without qualm or question, well into the 1960s.

In an era when the job-conscious concerns of the depression years still burned
fresh in the memories of these scientists, the forest was a place for productive
work that would transform and improve both man and nature. At Lookout Creek,
between 1948 and 1955, Roy Silen led a skeletal staff on a mission that combined
the managerial impulse to change the face of the land and the scientific compulsion
to study the consequences of those changes. The unrelenting work ethic and
energetic enthusiasm that Silen brought to his mission, however, also introduced
him to the forest on a more intimate level. By the end of his assignment there in
1954, he found himself more attached to the forest he had first encountered than
to the forest he helped re-create. By 1954, he recalls, he was selling timber all the
way up Lookout Creek, “almost to the head of McRae Creek and up to the head
of Mack Creek.” Describing his decision not to go back after he left the place,
he observes, “It’s kind of a personal thing. You get to where you love a piece of
country and you don’t want to see it hurt, you know. I love that piece of country.”
In his mind, Silen remembered the place he first encountered as a “forest prime-
val”: “I don’t know how many people have actually been in primeval conditions,
but here’s an example of what you could find on the Andrews: The crew that
surveyed the access road had worked as far as McRae Creek, so that area had
been fished some. Beyond McRae Creek, I remember one time going down to a
fairly deep hole coming in from the south side and looking over this bank 4 or 5
feet into this hole, which had a lot of logs in it fairly deep, I took a little twig and
tossed it out there. It looked just like a fish hatchery as fish streaked toward the
spot from all directions—you don’t see that anymore. I don’t know where in the
world you would see that anymore.”

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40 December 1992 discussion with Roy Silen, 2-3, 4-5; interview with Roy Silen 9
Work and Community at the Blue River Experimental Forest, 1948–1953

The Blue River Experimental Forest was as much vision as reality during the first 2 years Silen worked alone at his job at the site. During those years, Silen lived as a bachelor in a trailer at Belknap Camp, and he walked to work in the Lookout Creek drainage. At the time, no improved roads or trails led into the valley of the experimental forest. The closest access road in 1948 stopped just short of the south side of Lookout Ridge, where a timber sale brought a road almost to the top of the ridge near the sites later designated watersheds 1, 2, and 3. Silen recalls that the 4-mile hike to Frissell Point from McKenzie Bridge was a grueling climb on a steep, hot, dry, south-facing slope that exhausted even his dog, Rusty, who he acquired to keep him company in the field. Silen ate breakfast and supper with the family of a plumber who lived in McKenzie Bridge, and his local renown as “the plumber’s friend” was a more likely basis for recognition in the community than his work on the forest. McKenzie Bridge was a close-knit community with an extended, seasonal pattern of rotating invitations to dine with local families through most of Silen’s tenure at the Blue River Experimental Forest. He recalls, “I got plenty from the community. … we were all waiting for school starting and the roads, particularly when the roads closed over the pass. And then the social season started. Everybody visited everybody else. …”

The snow-bound isolation of McKenzie Bridge in winter cemented Silen’s ties with local residents, but people in that community were largely oblivious to his purpose on Lookout Creek and the town was remote from the forest. Even official visitors from the upper echelons of the Forest Service seemed mostly interested in the local color at McKenzie Bridge in the early 1950s, which included evening poker games in Silen’s trailer and fishing on the McKenzie Fork. Silen recalls, “Oh yeah, … I had numerous Washington Office visitors wanting to see this wonderful work that was going on on the Andrews Experimental Forest as long as it involved opportunities to fish and play poker.”

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44 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 15.
Silen himself largely avoided the experimental forest during his off-hours, preferring recreational pursuits, especially fishing, closer to McKenzie Bridge, and effectively maintaining a distinct separation between work and leisure.\textsuperscript{46} He reserved the Blue River Experimental Forest as a site for productive work in the woods, and it was the locale for his strenuous efforts to lay out timber sales between 1949 and 1954. Silen’s solitary work, however, was a central part of his life, and forays into the forest were often prolonged expeditions that offered their own rustic rewards. On a typical Monday morning, he would “go out with the pack. Pack all the way out to the falls, and walk across the canyons on windfalls.” Then he would set up a 9- by 12-foot “silkolene” fly, roll out his sleeping bag, take the food down to the creek, and place it underwater in big pots with rocks piled on so bears would not get into it. He concludes, “You could say I spent some of the best days of my life out there.”\textsuperscript{47}

Working conditions at the experimental forest were dangerous and lonely, even after Hank Gratkowski joined Silen in 1951 to assist him in laying out the timber sales. Silen and Gratkowski often spent the entire day apart, each alone in the forest and far from assistance. Silen recalls one harrowing experience when Gratkowski got lost near Carpenter Saddle while working with an analog barometer and air photos, in an effort to develop the first detailed contour map of the Lookout Creek drainage. The process involved pinpointing a location on the air photo, going out there to record 15 minutes of barometric readings to correlate with concurrent barometer records at a base camp, and then repeating the process at other points around the valley. Silen directed Gratkowski to a point on Blue River Trail where he could follow a ridge out to a good picture point, but Silen mistakenly sent him out on the wrong ridge where the photo reference point didn’t match the actual terrain. Gratkowski figured out the problem after about an hour and a half of confusion, but the delay put him behind schedule for the rest of the photo points that day, and he missed a planned rendezvous with Silen in the late afternoon. Silen became increasingly concerned as the daylight hours slipped away. He recalls, “We were supposed to meet at this little lake in this basin down here. … I came all the way up to Carpenter Mountain and back down, and reached the lake about 5 o’clock . … I expected Hank to be there before me, because he had a shorter leg [of scheduled hiking]. No Hank. And it got more and more nerve-wracking to think that he might

\textsuperscript{46} Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 16.

\textsuperscript{47} December 1992 discussion with Roy Silen, 1-3; interview with Roy Silen 9 September, 16-17; Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 16.
be injured out there.” As darkness descended, Silen decided he would have to wait until morning and then go out and search for Gratkowski. He headed up out of the basin onto the trail on Blue River Ridge, and was just beginning to head down the trail in the direction of Blue River, when he gave “one last yell.” Gratkowski responded from way down at the bottom of the Lookout Creek valley, and Silen waited for him to climb up to the trail on the ridge. As Silen recalls, “It must have been after 7 o’clock when we started down the Blue River Trail, and it got quickly dark. … we just had to make our way in the dark. You could feel the trail. … 7 or 8 miles! … all switchbacks and everything. We made it!”

Science and Community at the Blue River Experimental Forest, 1951–1955

Gratkowski’s dogged determination to find the correct photo location and then complete the full cycle of readings despite the impending gloom of twilight epitomized the spirit of these early years of effort at the Blue River Experimental Forest. His 8-mile stumble through the dark with Silen as they struggled out of the wilderness into the primitive comforts of a base camp is also an apt metaphor for the nature of forest research in that time and place. They were engaged in a process of redeeming a usable resource from a landscape Silen describes as a “forest primeval.” Mapping, delineating, and cross-referencing the landscape was the first step in the journey from a perceived wilderness to a managed forest, and these early research foresters mostly operated in a vacuum of professional interest from colleagues in forest management. Their primary directive was simply to “get the cut out.” As motivation, they relied mostly on their own blind faith in the long-term value of the work and on their professional commitment and passion for research. In the short term, Silen paints a picture of unrelenting, hard work that was largely unappreciated: “We were aiming our research to be used by the Forest Service, and … they weren’t a very ready customer.”

Silen’s close ties with former Forest Supervisor Aufderheide, however, eventually ensured that the experimental forest was drawn closer to the center of management concerns in Region 6. That was especially true after Aufderheide resumed his career in forest management, first as forest supervisor of the Umpqua National Forest in 1950, and later as Forest Supervisor of the Willamette National Forest.

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49 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 43.
from 1954 until his death in 1959. Both Silen and Aufderheide, a graduate of the Oregon State College School of Forestry who spent his entire Forest Service career in the Pacific Northwest, were avid fly-fisherman who frequented the McKenzie. Their personal connection established a tradition of close relations between PNW Station scientists who worked at the experimental forest and this forest supervisor.  

One of the practical research issues that began to interest forest managers in the immediate postwar era involved problems with reforesting after clearcut logging. As timber harvests in the region advanced southward from the Columbia River and into higher elevations in the Cascade Range, forest managers noticed a dramatic increase in the percentage of logged land that did not naturally regenerate. The failure to regenerate stands of marketable softwoods by natural means meant that broadleaf species rapidly displaced conifers. People and their actions reshaped forest succession. Silen observes that early forest researchers assumed that a logged stand would re-grow in natural succession, starting with annuals, then perennials, then broadleaf brush, then conifers. On about 30 percent of the acreage of Douglas-fir forest logged after World War II, however, broadleaf brush was a lasting stage. This concern, together with watershed issues highlighted in the aftermath of the 1948 floods—and Silen’s college training in forest management and forest engineering—guided early efforts to develop a comprehensive logging plan for the Blue River Experimental Forest.

Given the scale of expected timber yields from the Lookout Creek drainage, one of Silen’s more important decisions was not what to cut, but in what order to schedule logging of existing stands of old-growth Douglas-fir. Timber cutting plans set one goal for the entire Blue River watershed for the period 1949 to 1964, but the Army Corps of Engineers’ snow laboratory, which encompassed drainages in the Blue River watershed adjacent to the experimental forest was exempt from any cutting between 1947 and 1957, as specified in the Army’s cooperative agreement with the Willamette National Forest. The Blue River Experimental Forest was expected to make up the difference. The cooperative agreement governing the establishment of the experimental forest spelled out how it would happen and how it would be enforced: The PNW Station Director agreed to subordinate research interests to production goals and to acknowledge that “… to fulfill obligations


incurred in accepting access road money for opening up the Blue River watershed it is necessary that the full cut for the next 15 years come from the Lookout Creek drainage according to the plans contemplated prior to the designation of this area as an experimental forest.” The Director further agreed to develop “… experimental cutting plans for the Blue River Experimental Forest so that this planned rate of cutting can be maintained in an orderly fashion.” In the event PNW Station failed to meet those goals, the agreement authorized the supervisor of the Willamette National Forest to make “regular timber sales,” completely bypassing the PNW Station’s protocols, if necessary.52

Through 1959, the research forester-in-charge at the experimental forest was responsible for planning and initiating management activities but lacked the power to control or enforce guidelines governing how to implement those plans. The supervisor for the Willamette National Forest wielded final control over all management activities on the Lookout Creek drainage, including negotiations on sales or permits, but he could designate “some properly qualified member of the Station staff” to fulfill this function, subject to his approval. In a small concession to PNW Station, the agreement required the forest supervisor to furnish the Station Director with a copy of all agreements and plans. The agreement also included restrictions on control over receipts from timber sales, which were to be “collected by and credited to the Willamette National Forest.” In addition to timber sales, this restriction extended to all receipts from the sale of grazing permits, firewood, or other special uses. Research personnel were responsible for initiating and supervising all experimental work, but requests to make timber sales or issue permits for grazing or other special uses were to be routed through the Station Director to the Forest Supervisor.53 Silen adapted to this combination of responsibility without authority by developing and nurturing a network of support among forest managers, loggers, and the local community, to supplement his links with PNW Station.

52 “Agreement between the Regional Forester, Forest Supervisor, and Experiment Station Director … in the administration of the Blue River Experimental Forest,” H.J. Andrews Memorandum of Understanding Folder, H.J. Andrews Files, File Box F, Storage Vault, FSL, Corvallis, 3.

53 “Agreement between the Regional Forester, Forest Supervisor, and Experiment Station Director [1948].”
Experimental Priorities for Roads, Watersheds, and Regeneration

Personal and professional networks enabled Silen, in a span of less than 5 years, to design and implement a system of roads and landings on the Lookout Creek drainage. The system he implemented included experimental culvert designs, routes, and locations intended to minimize erosion and sedimentation in streams adjacent to cutting units. One important advantage of this strategy was that it often minimized the miles of road per square mile because all timber harvests could be done from parallel, level roads. He based this “ladder-road” system on what he had observed from other logging road sites, where runoff problems were most serious on climbing roads, and where the level, connector roads had fewer problems. At Blue River Experimental Forest, where he had the luxury of designing all the roads, he could locate them anywhere he wanted, and he designed a plan that simply avoided the steeper parts. He also initiated experimental cutting units of

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54 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 10.
larger and smaller acreages and in unusual shapes to study the effect those variations had on natural regeneration. Some of his other studies measured seedling mortality in areas subject to slash burning after logging. He developed close working relations with a logging contractor who successfully bid on virtually every experimental sale, and his road system won grudging respect from initially hostile forest managers and loggers, as well as later scientists at the experimental forest. Logging contractor Mike Savelich was one of six contractors who toured the proposed site before Sale 1, but Silen recalls Savelich outmaneuvered other bidders and effectively secured a working monopoly on experimental sales at Blue River Experimental Forest: “He contracted with Associated Plywood, and as I understand it, he had quite a thing going on.” Silen explains that when Savelich bid against other contractors on various timber sales, “He was a good poker player, and he’d never get stuck with the sale, he would always bid the price up a little higher than … some [bidders] really wanted to pay, and then he got out of the bidding.” To avoid the higher costs that Savelich was forcing them into, Silen recalls the other contractors made a deal with Savelich that he would get all the sales out on the experimental forest, provided he stopped bidding against them on sales elsewhere on the ranger district.

The research that Silen accomplished while pursuing his management goals was the product of a prolonged effort to reconcile elegant theory with ugly fact. Silen observes, for example, that Aufderheide’s idea to complete the logging plan for the entire drainage before opening the first sale was unrealistic, given the governing agreement and its imperative for immediate returns from timber. Silen’s effort to lay out an initial sale in 1948, moreover, failed to attract a single bid. He argues that this failure was fortunate because he was able to adjust the logging plan to minimize the effect on watersheds near the confluence with Blue River. The proposed sale would have interfered with the paired watershed study later implemented on the three small watersheds there. The initial failure delayed Silen’s first

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successful sale until his second year at the experimental forest (1949). This later success, which Station records designate “Sale #1”, required the logger to build the road system into the area up to 3,000-feet elevation. Silen adhered to the spirit, if not the letter of Aufderheide’s vision. He notes, “We actually laid out about 80 million board feet of … area to get 20 million board feet [for harvest], because we … would have a complete layout of the sale for the entire area before we sold the units that would go out first. … we cut one unit out of four, … so that you were completely surrounded by timber each time.”

Any hopes Silen harbored that foresters would translate his applied research into management policy on the Willamette National Forest depended on opening channels of communication with lower level administrators like McKenzie District Ranger Brit Ash. Some administrators higher in the Willamette National Forest and at Region 6 were openly hostile to ideas Silen introduced at Blue River Experimental Forest. He observes, “It was a relationship that started off badly with [Forest Supervisor Bruckart] watching that cut [the failed first sale]. He was not friendly to the effort there and they watched every move I made.” Personal and political issues aside, the elegant ideal of laying out 100 percent of the drainage before initiating sales collided with the ugly fact of limited fiscal and human resources at the McKenzie Ranger District. Forest managers viewed the plan with some skepticism because safety considerations prevented them from requiring their people to work alone in the field without support, as Silen often did. In practice, Silen and Gratkowski laid out timber sales on the experimental forest with far fewer human or fiscal resources than district crews typically deployed for sales of similar scale, but they struggled with difficult working conditions that imposed limits on the accuracy of their work. Sale layouts were always well beyond the last road into one of the watersheds on the experimental forest, and Silen or Gratkowski had to walk in at least a mile or more before they began to lay out the sale. They prepared packs supplied with everything they needed for a week in the field and then carried those packs 2 or 3 miles into the forest before establishing a base camp for that week. They organized their equipment to do everything in one-man crews. Using a stapling gun and aluminum tags, they ran a survey line by stapling a tag to a tree, and then tilting it so the reflection could be seen from a distance. That system permitted them to run a “p-line” (preliminary line) without the usual surveyor’s assistant. At the end of each leg of the p-line, they stapled

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58 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September, 7.
up a tag and began the process for the next leg. Rather than using a chain, they surveyed the 10-chain lines with a 10-foot pole for a rough estimation that, Silen concedes, was “a little off in places.”

This system was sufficient for Silen’s needs, but the national forests held district rangers to a stricter standard, and implementing Silen’s 100-percent proposal while adhering to those standards would have required about three times as many people to lay out each sale.

Silen often struggled to reconcile his scientific impulse to be precise with his mandate to efficiently and expeditiously manage timber sales on the experimental forest. His work with Gratkowski demonstrated ingenious strategies and methods for minimizing both time and expense, but his road standards taxed the patience of forest managers hard-pressed to simply “get the cut out.” He could count on himself and Gratkowski to maintain strict quality controls, even while using rough methods and tools. District rangers who managed a large staff with a more diverse commitment to quality control could not expect that all of their employees would successfully implement Silen’s methods without close supervision. Silen concedes, “It wasn’t that there was anything wrong, it was just they were objecting to a slowdown. I was starting strip clearcuts and small clearcuts to try to find more reliable methods for natural regeneration, but it was interpreted as the way future cutting was proposed.”

Silen did manage to implement the ladder system of roads despite some initial friction with Ash, who regularly reported Silen’s activities to the Regional Forester. Silen commonly complicated his sale layouts with requirements that carefully kept any activity out of the “leave” units between clearcuts. Any salvage sales within those leave units required logging with mobile yarders from very low-grade roads to minimize sedimentation problems. Silen recalls Ash “was just, almost an enemy when I came here [laughing].” He claims that Ash, however, was a grudging convert to Silen’s road design. Some years after he was reassigned to Alaska, Ash returned to the experimental forest for a visit, and Silen recalls the former district ranger told him, “You know, before I left, I began to see some sense of what your program was going to be, but before that, ’he says, ‘I was just against it. The things you were doing, we were already doing, and you were trying to say you were doing them better, and we couldn’t see it.’” The problem, Silen explains, was more in the timing than in the personalities involved:

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60 December 1992 discussion with Roy Silen, 6-7.

“You can’t get something going in a year or so, it takes 3 or 4 [years], and by that time, … I think we had a superior road system in, and … we had as much planning going into the leave units as we had going into the cut units, and we could tell them, this was something that the National Forest didn’t do at all.”

Silen struggled to reconcile his research goals with the limited resources available for sale layouts on the experimental forest and with the federal guidelines governing road design on national forests. A professional relationship of grudging, mutual respect with the logging contractor on those sales (Savelich) helped his cause. Silen argues that existing standards for roads on Region 6 in the early 1950s lacked clear direction or coherence, and he concluded, “if I’m going to improve sale layout and do it with minimum impact, these standards are in the way.” As a research forester, Silen was able to reach beyond the limits of the usual standards, but only by shouldering responsibility for constant oversight and close interaction with Savelich, who was also initially resistant to the unusual design. Savelich, Silen recalls, often left notes scrawled in a blaze on the side of a tree, saying things like, “Roy, this is a fine place for a road, but I want no part of her.” After a few years of working on the experimental forest, however, he reportedly gained a grudging respect for the design. Silen recalls a roadside conversation with Savelich’s roadbuilder who reportedly confided, “You know, there was a guy that wanted to propose a change in this curve that you put through here and in the next site, … and [he said] ‘If we do it this way, we can save a lot of money,’ and Mike says, ‘Damn it. Everytime I change Roy’s plans it costs me money.’

Those few cases in which Silen successfully translated his research results at the experimental forest into management practice in the Willamette National Forest were direct products of his habit of working closely with forest managers and logging contractors onsite at the experimental forest. Silen, for example, recounts as a “success” one such encounter with Alan Winer, who did the timber cruising for the Willamette National Forest. Silen intentionally planned timber sales on the experimental forest so that the “most deteriorated stands” of old growth were in the first sales. He adopted this strategy after noting that some old-growth stands were virtually brush patches after many trees had fallen from butt rots, while other

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64 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 8-9.
stands of similar age were “better preserved.” As Silen recalls, Winer complained after one particularly stressful bout with Silen’s sale layout, “You know, that was the damndest country to cruise. It was … just so darn brushy. What’s going on?” As Silen explained his reasoning to Winer, he recalls thinking, “Well, I’ll hear from the higher-ups about this.” The standing rule at the time was to cut the concentrations of old growth to “pay for the roads.” Silen reasoned that 500-year-old stands typically had only a few Douglas-fir stems per acre, and only the best-preserved stands would still have enough standing fir to provide sustained yield late in the rotation. The result of this strategy from the perspective of Winer, however, was that it raised the cost of cruising the proposed sale areas. Silen expected a negative reaction from Winer’s superiors, but as he recalls, the next thing he heard on the issue from the Willamette National Forest supervisor’s office was a statement that said, “we’re changing our policy … henceforward, we will put the most deteriorated old growth into the cutting units.” Silen concludes, “I SOLD him on it!”

The key to this exchange was Silen’s ability to think on his feet under field conditions and effectively communicate to Winer onsite at the experimental forest.

The incompatibility of long-term research goals and short-term harvest targets left Silen and the experimental forest vulnerable to criticism. Silen, for example, tried to adjust the design standards for logging roads so that roads located farther from the main roads could be constructed at lower standards to better fit the topography. This meant more remote roads could be narrower, with sharper curves, and a shorter line-of-sight around corners. Silen made these changes on an ad-hoc basis with onsite revisions to the road standards that governed sales elsewhere in the district. District staff, however, were more concerned with “getting the cut out” than with testing Silen’s theories about the long-term benefits of a more flexible system of road standards. Silen observes, “the engineers didn’t like it. I was always complaining that … these road standards were forcing us to do dumb things, … and then they came back and said, ‘If you don’t lay them out to our standards then we won’t maintain them.’”

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65 Communication from Roy Silen, 9 November 1999.
66 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 18-19.
67 J. Herbert Stone succeeded H.J. Andrews as Regional Forester [R-6] in 1951 and served in that capacity through 1967. Rakestraw identifies John Ray Bruckart, who served through 1953 as forest supervisor for the Willamette National Forest, as “the last of the old time supervisors whose skills came from the ‘University of Hard Knocks’ rather than formal education in forestry …” Aufderheide replaced Bruckart in 1953, and was succeeded by David R. Gibney, a graduate of the University of Minnesota, who served as forest supervisor from 1959 through 1970. Rakestraw, 93-94. Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 20.
Silen’s effort to design roads that would minimize sedimentation in the Lookout Creek drainage was closely related to watershed studies at the Blue River Experimental Forest. By the time logging began on Sale #1, in 1950, the experimental forest was already dedicated to the study of watershed problems, with stream gauges established on both Blue River and Lookout Creek. The Army Corps of Engineers had also established Snow Laboratory facilities at various sites on and around the experimental forest. After his initial sale failed to draw a bid, Silen re-designed Sale #1 to accommodate paired watershed studies on three small drainages on the lower portion of the experimental forest. His sale layout located roads, landings, and cutting lines on those drainages to “demonstrate good practice from a water management standpoint.” He began with the hypothesis that the sale layout was the “greatest step in cutting down stream sedimentation. …” His design included detailed instructions on building methods to minimize cuts, disruption, and soil movement, notably including a requirement that culvert installation be at least partially completed before road building continued beyond any stream crossing. This requirement provided at least a temporary road surface to support traffic involved in logging the right-of-way, and it avoided the common alternative of driving construction equipment and trucks directly through the streambed. Silen’s reports also stressed the need to educate forest managers and loggers about culvert design, landing placement, and alternatives to yarding logs down creek banks with tractors.68

Silen’s efforts to minimize sedimentation in streams during logging operations at the experimental forest were more successful than his efforts to communicate those ideas to forest managers. He was proud of his strict guidelines for installing culverts, but federal guidelines governing agency contracts prevented Forest Service managers from adopting his standards. Sale-layout officers at Region 6 did support Silen in his efforts to draft sale contracts for the experimental forest specifying strict procedures for operating near streams. Silen also worked directly with District personnel and contractors to ensure strict enforcement of his require-ment that contractors build a “barely passable,” temporary road at the top of each cut, before clearing the right-of-way for each road. This temporary road allowed crews to work down from the top of the cut, clearing the road right-of-way while moving logs away from the stream to a cleared area higher on the slope. He recalls that getting contractors to build roads in that fashion was hard, but he wrote it into

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68 “Working plan for Blue River harvest outings (Sale #1) [1950],” 15; communication from Roy Silen 9 November 1999.
each timber-sale agreement, and he relied on support from Region 6 and district staff to ensure the legal framework was accurate and enforced. He was pleased with the results on the experimental forest, and he expected other forest managers in Region 6 would adopt his ideas, but he concedes that for the most part, they did not.69

Silen considered the road system an integral component of his research, but it was also an infrastructure development that supported subsequent logging. The result was a strikingly different landscape that broadened the range of potential research activities on the forest. Silen was among the first to take advantage of the emerging opportunities for research. He used wax pellets to measure temperatures lethal to seedlings, in an effort to show how shade and heat influenced seedling survival on staggered-setting clearcuts. He found that lethal temperatures were common on south slopes and the valley bottom throughout the growing season, but not on adjacent north slopes until early July. Silen experimented with timber-sale layouts in different sizes and shapes of cutting units designed to support studies of how shade and heat influenced seedling survival. He laid out a series of clearcuts aligned in north-south strips, ranging in width from 200 to 400 feet, to “see how they regenerated.” He recalls, “They ALL regenerated [new seedlings were established, survived, and thrived]. That was never a problem.” He experimented with other, larger clearcuts where he could leave lines of trees about 180 feet apart so that the tops of the trees would shade the ground that was cleared, limiting their exposure to about 4 hours of full sunlight. Those clearcuts also regenerated. Larger clearcuts, however, he found to be “much slower in regenerating.” In one study of a clearcut 3 years after logging, Silen observed seedlings were most numerous in the stand shadow along the south border of the units, and seedlings were more numerous on unburned than burned seedbeds.70

Landscape Legacies of Early Research and Perceptions of New Opportunities

Silen’s experimental clearcuts and road-building activities altered the landscape in ways that attracted more people to the experimental forest. The road system made the place more accessible than much of the surrounding national forest, and the clearcuts offered opportunities to study the effects of logging in old-growth

Douglas-fir. These changes made the place seem more relevant to human concerns beyond the Lookout Creek drainage. Silen observes, “… once we got into this large-scale cutting, we began to get cooperators and other guys coming in.” Two scientists from the Oregon Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit were among the first people to conduct fieldwork at the experimental forest on a regular basis. Don Wustenberg and Jay Gashweiler worked on plots at the experimental forest during summer and fall for most of the time Silen was in charge there. As a result of their work, Silen observes, “we had a good line on what was going on from the wildlife and fish standpoint.”

Wildlife studies and recreation activities on the experimental forest also led to innovative methods for describing the landscape at remote locations on the national forests. Silen recalls, for example, how a casual conversation with Dick Wilson (a planner with the Willamette National Forest) during “our barely successful deer hunt” prompted their efforts to draw topographic information (contours and section lines) on a mosaic of air photos depicting the experimental forest. Silen and Wilson hoped this method would reduce the cost of accurately and efficiently planning timber sales, believing it would support research needs. Silen argued in a subsequent memo to Victor Flach in the cartographic section of the Willamette National Forest that this use of remote sensing could be used for spotting clumps of old growth with airphotos, adding, “I am quite enthusiastic to try the idea. …”

Early efforts to gather baseline information from ground observations also refined the focus and mission of research at the Blue River Experimental Forest. Precipitation records for the Lookout Creek drainage began in 1951, after Silen installed three gauges, and he collected data and maintained the instruments until he left the forest. The Army Corps of Engineers also escalated its activity on neighboring drainages of the Blue River watershed during the early 1950s, building a snow cabin just off the experimental forest. The cabin was built of aluminum sheets packed in with mules and staffed during the winter with Army recruits from a base cabin 7 miles farther up Blue River. Just staying alive in that cabin was the primary challenge facing the Army recruits who staffed it during the 1950s. In the next decade, Station crews working under the direction of Al Levno refitted the cabin with bunks and a small wood stove that made it more habitable for crews.

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71 Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 5.
73 December 1992 discussion with Roy Silen, 14.
As data from Silen’s gauges and from the Snow Laboratory began to accumulate at PNW Station, the roaded and logged areas of the experimental forest attracted other scientists. The place gradually gained recognition as a leading site for watershed studies, and this emphasis displaced forest management as the primary focus of research.

The new facilities for watershed studies at the Blue River Experimental Forest fulfilled the requirements of the establishing agreement and interagency cooperation with the Army Corps of Engineers, just as Silen’s forest management studies fulfilled the intra-agency agreement with Region 6. As PNW Station geared up to address the watershed concerns that had contributed to establishing the experimental forest, E.G. [Jerry] Dunford returned to the Portland office in 1952 from the Rocky Mountain Station “to appraise critical watershed problems in Oregon and Washington.” He developed a problem analysis and implemented a program of research, beginning with field studies already underway at the experimental forest. The Station, which acquired responsibility for flood control research in Oregon during this period, also recruited Donald R. Gedney and his colleague, a Dr. Hale, both of whom transferred from the Northeastern Station to join Dunford in Portland in 1952. Gedney and Hale supervised installation of modified trapezoidal flume stream gauges in the three small watersheds at the experimental forest that year. Hale subsequently transferred to the Northeastern Station. Two years later, George Meagher, an assistant director at PNW Station, directed Roy Silen to leave the experimental forest in 1954 to join the forest genetics team in Corvallis, overruling Silen’s vehement objections. The PNW Station, in other words, simultaneously moved to reemphasize watershed studies and terminate Silen’s forest management studies at the experimental forest. Silen recalls, “Yeah, they wiped it out. The program stopped.” When Silen asked Meagher to explain the reasoning behind this administrative move, the assistant director informed him that, henceforth, the Blue River Ranger District would handle timber sales, and watershed management would continue as a separate program administered by PNW Station. The Station subsequently contracted with the United States Geological Survey to periodically service stream gauges at the experimental forest, with financial support from Region 6. The Station’s support for Silen’s legacy of forest management studies, however, was not completely terminated. Dunford hired Jack Rothacher, formerly a district ranger in the Pacific Northwest, to provide onsite support at the Andrews Forest.75

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75 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 16-17, 39; Cowlin, 314-315.
With Rothacher, the community of scientists connected with the experimental forest had a solid connection with timber management concerns, even as they branched out in new directions. That characteristic of adaptive innovation was a critical factor that attracted a small nucleus of young scientists to the Lookout Creek drainage, where they formed a close attachment to Rothacher in the late 1950s and formed the nucleus of an emergent group of cooperators and researchers centered on the experimental forest, whose association with each other and that place gradually evolved into a long-term and sustained engagement over the next few decades.

Community Legacies and Administrative Restructuring

The experimental forest attracted the attention of a more diverse group of scientists and administrators by the mid 1950s, when the Station redefined the purpose of the facility. That administrative move was both a product of evolving priorities at the Station and a catalyst for change at the experimental forest. The Station substituted a more remote, institutional framework for Silen’s personal connections with the Lookout Creek drainage and with local people in the McKenzie valley. The transition began with a formal dedication ceremony at the site on 26 July 1953, when PNW Station administrators renamed the experimental forest for H.J. Andrews, their former colleague who had died 2 years before the ceremony. His wife and daughter joined the 100 people attending the dedication. Before his assignment as Regional Forester, Andrews had alternately worked with the PNW Station and with Region 6. Among other accomplishments, he directed the early survey efforts that brought Briegleb to Carpenter Saddle in the 1930s, and he served in various administrative capacities with PNW Station and as a forest manager in the national forests of the Pacific Northwest. By the time of his death, Andrews personified an emerging tradition of close collaboration between scientists and managers in that region. When the agency renamed the Blue River Experimental Forest in his honor, the facility gained a name that linked the place with a dynamic personality well known to scientists at PNW Station and to forest managers who worked in the surrounding national forest. Before his death, Andrews had very little direct involvement with the facility at Lookout Creek, but after 1953, his name symbolized the intersection of people and ideas in that place. The previous name, Blue River Experimental Forest, had linked the place with a local geographic feature, and with the

76 “Blue River Experimental Forest: Representing the Old-Growth Douglas-Fir Type.”
nearby town named for that river. The new name linked the place with a person who, aside from putting his name to the interagency agreement establishing the experimental forest, was most remarkable for his role in a series of administrative decisions in a federal agency. The next step was to reassign away from the experimental forest the person who knew it best. Roy Silen reluctantly accepted reassignment in 1954, but he left behind a more humanized landscape than the one he first encountered 5 years earlier.

The Station decision to redefine the purpose of the experimental forest and reassign Silen to Corvallis had more to do with a remote bureaucracy than with the local place or person, but it did shift the focus of the scientific community closer to the Lookout Creek drainage. In the 1950s, people at the experimental forest did not yet have any real control over the place or its community. The people who defined priorities for the Andrews Forest had virtually no direct experience at the place itself.

The reorganization originated with an internal review at PNW Station that was prompted by a report from the Region 6 Investigative Committee. This committee, which convened in 1952 for the first time in 6 years, identified “shortcomings” in specific fields of work at the Station: forest influences, forest soils, forest genetics, and the slash-disposal phase of forest management and fire research. Resources were scarce for funding new research or hiring the additional scientists that would be needed to address those concerns, but the Director of PNW Station initiated an internal review of Station programs and work at field centers and noted a need for more technical aides “to relieve professionals of low-grade tasks.” The resulting report identified as a leading concern the inadequate physical facilities at research-center headquarters. The Station subsequently joined Region 6 in selecting and organizing a Regional Forest Service Advisory Council, composed of leaders from the Pacific Northwest who represented “major geographic, governmental, and economic segments of the region,” and charged the council with addressing broad policy issues.\footnote{Cowlin, 307-308.}

The Station reorganization was part of a broader restructuring in the Forest Service that elevated the status of research in the agency. The transition was at least partly due to a change of leadership at the top. Richard E. McArdle replaced Lyle F. Watts in June 1952 as Chief of the Forest Service. Until his appointment as Assistant Chief 8 years earlier, McArdle’s entire Forest Service career was in the
Research Branch. In his first year as Chief, McArdle directed a thorough revamping of the organizational and personnel structure at the major research Stations, including PNW. An internal review and reorientation of research programs at the Station, together with advisory group discussions, resulted in an administrative decision to focus investigative efforts on “urgent problems.” The renaming and dedication of the Andrews Forest was part of this broader reorganization.\(^78\)

The changes at the Lookout Creek facility were just one part of a general reassessment and restructuring of experimental forests and their function in the revised mission of PNW Station. The immediate effects differed considerably from site to site. The Station deactivated John Day Experimental Forest in 1954, for example, only 5 years after it was originally established, and moved its headquarters buildings to Unity, Oregon. Cascade Head Experimental Forest, by contrast, gained a boost from external funding in the same period. The Station negotiated a cooperative agreement with Publishers’ Paper Company that supported road building well in advance of actual logging at Cascade Head.\(^79\) In comparison with these examples, the changes at the Andrews Forest were relatively modest, although they were certainly wrenching from Silen’s personal perspective. A “follow-up memorandum of understanding” reduced the required annual cut at the Andrews Forest to its estimated “sustained-yield capacity,” or “roughly 7 MM bd ft” (an amount consistent with Forest Service regulations governing other national forest lands). Despite this change, timber production was still the top priority for the Lookout Creek drainage, and the language of the agreement stipulated that any reduction in the annual harvest must be “consistent with overall cutting plans for the McKenzie Working Circle.” The memo further recognized that “actual volume sold and cut may vary considerably from year to year.” Signatories to the agreement included, in chronological order, R.W. Cowlin, Director of PNW Station (5 May 1953); J. Herbert Stone, Regional Forester (7 May 1953); and J.R. Burchart, Willamette National Forest Supervisor (11 May 1953).\(^80\)

This “follow-up” memorandum of understanding clarified the transfer of authority for management activities at the experimental forest from PNW Station

\(^78\) Cowlin, 318-321.


to the Willamette National Forest. Even if the Station had not reassigned Silen, he would have lost the authority over sales that he previously wielded. The memo noted concerns about preparing and administering timber sales on the Andrews Forest, and it conceded that the original estimate of timber volume that could be removed from the experimental forest was “too high.” Silen’s planned Sale 5 was “fairly well along” at the time of this memo, which called for PNW Station to complete the layout of that sale, and then hand it over to the Willamette for cruising, appraisal, advertising, and “all further administration.” Sale 6 was the first one handled entirely by the Willamette National Forest. The 1953 memo emphasized that full responsibility for administration of all future sales on the Andrews Forest would rest with the Willamette. In a notable exception to this transfer of authority, the three small, gauged watersheds near the mouth of Lookout Creek were excluded from the cutting commitment, and the memo of understanding specified that...
they would be left undisturbed for 6 to 10 years to “complete their calibration period.” After that period, the memo explained, the timing and volume of timber harvests would be based “entirely on research needs.”

Conclusion: The Andrews Forest as a Humanized Landscape

The dedication ceremony of 26 July 1953, in the context of the revised memorandum, was more than a simple renaming. In the preceding 5 years of planning and management, Silen and his associates superimposed a management template of built and planned roads and logging units. Those plans effectively subdivided the forested slopes into discrete administrative parcels. The new agreement effectively divided the same drainage into two large units with different management goals: one 800-acre unit with three gauged watersheds would be managed for “research needs,” and one larger unit including everything else would be managed for “sustained yield.” This management overlay was virtually invisible to casual observers. The changes Silen had implemented were more obvious, including the system of central access roads extending halfway up the drainage along McRae Creek and Lookout Creek.

The Forest Service endowed the Andrews Forest, in 1953, with an official, but brief, history of human efforts to reconfigure that landscape since 1948. The Station printed that history on a dedication program and distributed it to a wider audience in the form of press releases. That narrative, as represented in promotional pamphlets and flyers, shaped the preconceptions people later brought to the place. The original purpose of the experimental forest, according to this official story, was “to serve as a pilot plant where the most promising timber growing and watershed management practices could be tested on a commercial scale.” The narrative described the place as “representative of the old-growth forests in the Oregon Cascades.” Since 1948, the Station had transformed the area from a “near wilderness reached by a single fire road, and a few ridgetop trails” to a managed site with a forestry-logging plan and a permanent road system. As of 1953, the narrative observed, “Sixteen miles of road have now been completed and the mature timber harvested on 18 clear-cuttings.”

81 “Follow-up Memorandum of Understanding [1953], 2.
83 “Dedication of H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest [1953].”
Silen consciously distanced himself from activities at the experimental forest after 1954, preferring to remember it the way it had been.\textsuperscript{84} Shortly before he moved to Corvallis, he married Ethel Arthur in a ceremony at First Presbyterian Church in Portland, and he left behind his bachelor days and the experimental forest in almost the same breath.\textsuperscript{85} He notes that his understanding of the place was “a very personal thing,” and he claims he knew “something on almost every acre out there.”\textsuperscript{86} The place he remembered, however, was rapidly changing, largely owing to his efforts. Others who later worked at the forest could talk to Silen about what he remembered, but the landscape they saw was more humanized than the one he recalled as a “forest primeval.” Fragments of Silen’s life and work at the experimental forest lingered on in the scientific papers and reports that he and his associates produced, and he left a legacy of physical changes to the landscape and a tradition of principled, applied research that later supported rediscovery and reacquaintance with the place. Silen continued his career with the Forest Service in Corvallis for nearly 50 years, sharing his memories of the forest that was with scientists exploring the potential of forests that would be.

\textsuperscript{84} Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 13.
\textsuperscript{85} McPhail, “The Supplements to the Station History, 1944 through 1953,” [1953].
\textsuperscript{86} Interview with Roy Silen 9 September 1996, 16.
Necessary Work: Discovering Old Forests, New Outlooks, and Community on the Andrews Forest

Chapter Two: Envisioning Long-Term Research and Innovative Science, 1955–1964

The institutional authority that ended Silen’s role at the H.J. Andrews Experiment Forest (Andrews Forest) in the mid 1950s also accelerated the pace of change on the Lookout Creek drainage through the next decade. By 1953, Silen and his assistant, Hank Gratkowski, located and marked more than 72 miles of road and about 580 log-gathering points (landings) on the landscape. Only a small fraction of the facilities Silen planned were built before he left the next year, but by 1956, more than 30 miles of all-weather, gravel-surfaced road were completed. In 1959, the Forest Service claimed, in a brochure designed to attract more scientists to the experimental forest, that the original road design was intended “to provide access to a generous variety of study areas,” even though Silen recalls that his primary design consideration was simply to “get the cut out” with “least damage to the resource.” In that brochure, Pacific Northwest Research Station (PNW Station) foresters Jack Rothacher and Carl Berntsen noted that development work at the Andrews Forest had produced a road density on the Lookout Creek drainage of 4.97 miles of road per square mile by 1959, or about 115 linear miles of roadway on those 23 square miles of the Willamette National Forest that were designated as the experimental forest. The density of roads for the entire 1.7 million acres of the Willamette National Forest, by contrast, increased from only 0.36 miles of road per square mile in 1954 to 1.42 miles of road per square mile by 1970. For most of the 20th century after 1950, this drainage was one of the most road-accessible on the Willamette National Forest. Designs for roads and timber sales initially followed Silen’s plan for the drainage, but he notes that the district ranger’s office made many changes after he left. Regardless of intent, the reality of roads and clearcuts began to attract more people to the place because they provided access and opportunity to those interested in studying the effects of clearcuts in an old-growth setting, as well as many other topics.1

The accelerated pace of road building and clearcutting on the Andrews Forest during the 1950s and 1960s highlighted the difference between management priorities and research goals for the drainage. As a result, conflicts often broke into the open, and the division of authority for reconciling those differences caused

conflict between district staff and Station scientists at the facility. The Station’s role at the Andrews Forest was sharply diminished after 1953 under the terms of the revised memorandum of understanding approved that year. The agreement assigned the district ranger clear authority and responsibility for administering Forest Service policy on the experimental forest. Station interests had no direct representative at Blue River for the first 3 years after 1954, when the district ranger directly managed the experimental forest as part of the McKenzie Bridge Ranger District. Beginning in 1956, the newly created Blue River Ranger District assumed direct responsibility for managing the Andrews Forest. Station authority over the place, thereafter, devolved upon a PNW scientist-administrator at the Corvallis center, and beginning in 1957, a research forester-in-residence at Blue River also monitored field projects at the experimental forest for the Station. The person who filled this latter position, initially Jack Rothacher, was also a local liaison linking research people with the district office in Blue River. Rothacher lived on the compound of the Blue River Ranger District and dealt directly with District Ranger Ed Anderson, who moved from his position as district ranger at McKenzie Bridge to become the first district ranger at Blue River. Rothacher could not represent research interest on equal terms with Anderson because he was only a site manager, not the responsible authority representing the PNW Station interest in the Andrews Forest.

Relations with Anderson were somewhat strained, but Rothacher and his wife, Jean, lived on the compound next door to Assistant District Ranger Mike Kerrick. Despite their different roles at the experimental forest, Kerrick, Rothacher, and their families became close friends, and that friendship helped Rothacher cope with an often disinterested or dismissive district ranger. By the end of the 1960s, Rothacher and Kerrick were part of an established Andrews group tradition of multiple leadership roles that built on informal paths of communication strengthened through face-to-face contact and daily life in the vicinity of the Andrews Forest. That tradition also involved formal structures of authority with distinct roles for Station and district staff. Those who built personal and professional networks around this place, were willing to work around unresolved tensions and irresolvable differences. In doing so, they constantly tried to balance conflicting ideals and multiple perceptions of opportunity on the Lookout Creek drainage.

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2 Interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick by Max Geier on 28 August 1996 at Anderson’s home in Springfield, OR, 1; interview with Jean Rothacher by Max G. Geier at her Corvallis, OR, residence on 29 August 1997, 1; interview with Mike Kerrick by Max Geier at Kerrick’s home near Springfield, OR, on 28 August 1996, 13-14.
Watersheds research was one of the more obvious opportunities that scientists perceived at the Andrews Forest in the 1950s and 1960s. Urban concerns about how best to manage the Bull Run watershed that supplied Portland’s water encouraged PNW Station leaders to make watersheds research the leading priority at the Andrews Forest. Scientists could readily study apparent linkages between old-growth conditions and watershed quality on this road-accessible drainage, and after the reorganization of 1953, the three lower watersheds draining into Lookout Creek were more fully under the control of PNW Station than the rest of the experimental forest. Station scientists who established study plots in this area could be relatively confident that management activities would not disrupt their plots. Installation of research flumes on the three small watersheds during this period further encouraged such studies. By the early 1960s, forest scientists, like the society in which they lived, relied on urban services and amenities. Urban outlooks also influenced Oregon State College and other research institutions that expanded funding and facilities for laboratory-based research. By comparison, relatively fewer funds and other resources were available to support facilities and programs for field research, including the experimental forests and natural areas.
As the cost of building and staffing laboratories escalated, some administrators at PNW Station proposed closing the Andrews Forest and other field facilities in the region. Two scientists already accustomed to working with Rothacher at Blue River, however, promoted the Andrews Forest to their colleagues as an “outdoor laboratory.” These scientists were Ted Dyrness and Jerry Franklin; together, they cultivated their professional and personal contacts to build the nucleus of an “Andrews group” at Oregon State University in Corvallis. As part of that effort, they portrayed the Andrews Forest as a valuable and scarce resource that should be used to support studies that would continue for a long time. The coincidental timing in 1964 of a major flood in the Willamette River basin and the global startup of the International Biological Programme (IBP) provided unexpected opportunities that Dyrness and Franklin quickly exploited in an effort to establish the Andrews Forest as a long-term resource.

Leadership Traditions of Vision and Detail

The joint efforts of Franklin and Dyrness followed a pattern established a decade earlier by Silen and Gratkowski. Gratkowski’s penchant for rigorously focused, detailed planning and by-the-book implementation balanced Silen’s tendency to adapt his plans to problems or concerns that arose along the way. Silen struggled to translate his broadly defined logging plan into daily assignments and goals for Gratkowski, who worked independently of Silen for prolonged periods in the field. Russ Mitchell, who worked one summer as a field assistant with both men, argues that they had different but complementary personalities. Both men were schooled in forestry at Yale University, but aside from that common link, they had little else in common. Silen, a bachelor, was born in Oregon and trained at Oregon State College before he went to New England as a graduate student, while Gratkowski was a newly relocated family man from Pennsylvania when he first began working at the Andrews Forest in 1951. Mitchell grew up near Pacific University in Forest Grove, Oregon, and later graduated from Syracuse University in New York. He argues that the academic culture of forestry schools in Oregon during the 1940s and 1950s was less interdisciplinary than comparable programs at eastern schools.

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3 Cowlin, 300-301; McPhail, “The Supplements to the Station History, 1944 through 1953.”

like Yale or Syracuse. Silen learned applied forestry at Oregon State College and combined it with his native understanding of timber communities in the same region. His native comfort with folks in McKenzie Bridge helped him work with local timber contractors and forest managers.

As a recent migrant to the Pacific Northwest, Gratkowski was less interested in going along with local wisdom in Blue River. According to Mitchell, he was also a “very organized” and “very intense guy” who had a reputation for getting “very upset” when things didn’t go the way he planned. By contrast, Mitchell observes, Silen tended to plan broadly and make up his mind about the details as he went along. That approach, Mitchell recalls, “just used to drive Hank [Gratkowski] crazy,” though it was a good fit with the shoestring budget the Station had allocated for large-scale work at the Andrews Forest. Silen’s folksy approach tempered Gratkowski’s “Old World style” and eased otherwise tense relations with district staff and loggers. Gratkowski’s perfectionism, meanwhile, was a systematic counterweight to Silen’s pragmatism. \(^5\) This balanced blend of broad planning, pragmatic adaptation, and rigorous attention to the details of good science is an early example of the Andrews group’s formula for successful and productive innovation.

An ability to balance reverence for the landscape with curiosity and good fun is an important, second component of the Andrews group’s formula for success. People differed in the way they balanced fun and reverence, however. In the early years at the experimental forest, for example, Silen demonstrated more emotional attachment to the Andrews Forest than did Gratkowski or Mitchell. Mitchell recalls how he and Gratkowski once amused themselves during a midday break by pushing boulders off a ridge and watching them roll downhill. At the bottom of the slope, the rocks crashed into a stand of Douglas-fir saplings, seriously damaging the young trees. When Silen chanced upon the scene a few weeks later, Mitchell recalls, “He was really mad that somebody would go scarring up those trees with these damn rocks.” In a second example, Mitchell and Gratkowski rolled cable spools from logging sites down one of Silen’s experimental clearcuts on a long, downhill slope. Mitchell recalls that the heavy, Volkswagen-size spools bounced as high as 100 feet in the air when they hit the trees at the bottom: “It just popped out of there, popped clear out of the damn trees!” Even though Mitchell claims it was “fun” to send those spools bouncing down the slope, he and Gratkowski were

\(^5\) Russ Mitchell, 4-5, 11-16
careful not to tell Silen about either incident. Mitchell observes, however, that they hadn’t given a second thought to the damage they were causing.\(^6\)

Silen and Gratkowski eventually went their separate ways at PNW Station in 1954,\(^7\) but the pattern of complementary pairs leading research, as well as the subordination of research to management goals, continued at the Andrews Forest. After 1954, Carl Berntsen and Bob Ruth assumed responsibility for managing the experimental forest. Berntsen previously was Gratkowski’s counterpart, and Bob Ruth was Silen’s counterpart at Cascade Head Experimental Forest. When Aufderheide moved on to become forest supervisor at the Willamette National Forest, Ruth replaced him as Silen’s superior at the Western Research Center.\(^8\)

Unlike Silen and Gratkowski, both Berntsen and Ruth worked in Corvallis and were only remotely involved with day-to-day events at the Andrews Forest. Under the terms of the revised agreement, moreover, their input was subordinate to the district ranger’s. Even without that constraint, Berntsen and Ruth did not demonstrate a high degree of personal attachment to the landscape or traditions of research before or after they assumed control over the Andrews Forest. Silen observes that Ruth implemented a system of roads and clearcuts at the Cascade Head facility that were “nothing like” the system he himself established at the Andrews. He further notes that Berntsen and Ruth mostly pulled the plug on the forest management research that he and Gratkowski initiated. Ruth and Berntsen, for example, recruited Boy Scout volunteers who replanted virtually all of the clearcuts Silen designed to study natural regeneration. Exceptions included some east-west strips where naturally regenerating seedlings were “so thick the scouts couldn’t fight their way through to plant new seedlings.” It was a period, Silen concludes, “… when the [Blue River Ranger] District took over the activity on the forest.”\(^9\)

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\(^6\) Interview with Russ Mitchell, 13-14.

\(^7\) Gratkowski, who initiated preliminary studies of brush control at the Andrews in the early 1950s, secured a reappointment to the PNW Station lab at Roseburg, where he continued his studies of brush control and herbicides on the South Umpqua Experimental Forest, established in 1951; interview with Russ Mitchell, 16; Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 16-17; Cowlin, 300-301.


\(^9\) Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 16-17.
Management Priorities and Distant Relations With Research

Forest managers with the Willamette National Forest operated under a different mandate than scientists with PNW Station. One important difference in the mid 1950s was the new Forest Supervisor, Robert Aufderheide, who made community outreach a leading priority on the Willamette. District Ranger Anderson recalls that Aufderheide initially told him his “primary job” at Blue River was to “restore confidence in the Forest Service by people in the McKenzie River area.” Local residents lacked confidence in the agency and accused district staff of favoritism in handling timber sales. Anderson responded with public-outreach programs that placed officers from the Blue River Ranger District in every class from elementary through secondary schools in the local school district. He hired high school students for weekend tree planting and adjusted work schedules on the district to accommodate local school schedules. Anderson considers the effort a success, observing that by the time he left the district, “We were pretty well known and liked.”

The Willamette National Forest public relations effort boosted local support for forest managers in Blue River, while scientists with PNW Station in Blue River focused more narrowly on their research with less concern for how it related to local concerns. As a result, local people were virtually unaware of the work at the experimental forest, and research began to focus on more basic questions. Research at the Andrews Forest had never been closely relevant to the immediate concerns of local people in the towns of Blue River and McKenzie Bridge, but community ties were an important part of Silen’s early success with applied studies. Silen did devote considerable personal time to cultivating social connections with local residents, but he and his research colleagues intended their work for other professionals and forest managers, not for local folks. He tried to answer two broad questions: “How does nature work? and “How can we use that information?” These two questions summarize the distinction between basic and applied research in the Andrews group. Scientists in this research community often argue that their work addresses both of these components, as compared with other research centers that often emphasize either basic or applied research at the expense of the other.

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10 As quoted in Rakestraw, 95.
11 Interview with Roy Silen, 31.
The distinction between basic and applied research, however, made little difference to forest managers like Anderson, who recalls that for him, the work at the Andrews Forest was a distraction, at best, from more pressing management concerns. He draws a much sharper line than scientists usually use to distinguish between research that produces findings managers can use, and research of merely academic interest. More often, Anderson argues, research created problems for himself and other forest managers. As an example, he recalls how University of Oregon Professor Carl Onthank publicly pressured him to leave all the snags in place on sites slated for clearcut logging during the 1950s. That public pressure, Anderson claims, interfered with his authority to manage the forest in a professional manner. In the end, Anderson had little use for research at the Andrews Forest, basic or otherwise. He claims he had virtually no direct contact with scientists working at the facility, observing, “I was only there once a year anyway.”

Anderson’s arms-length approach to activities on the experimental forest underscores the cultural distance between Research foresters and National Forest

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12 Interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick, 5-7.
Sidebar 2.1: Disturbance in Forest and Stream Ecosystems

The Issue: Many attributes of the Cascade Mountain environment set the stage for processes that can severely disturb forest and stream ecosystems. Steep slopes, heavy rainfall, and rapid snowmelt contribute to major floods. These factors combine with weak rocks and soils to make landslides common. Long, hot, dry summers gradually convert the huge quantities of forest biomass to tinder-dry fuel for wildfires. Hence, the forest and stream landscapes are complex and dynamic mosaics reflecting, in part, the history of disturbances. Understanding disturbance history is essential to interpreting many aspects of ecosystem structure, composition, and function. Land use can be interpreted as an alteration of the natural disturbance regime, increasing or decreasing the frequency and severity of different processes of disturbance.

The Roots: The significance of natural and land use disturbance regimes in the Andrews Forest landscape and the work there has emerged in a series of steps spanning the history of the forest. The earliest questions about disturbance in Andrews Forest ecosystems were about the effects of logging and forest roads. The importance of floods and associated landslides as disturbance agents became clear in the aftermath of major floods in December 1964 and January 1965 (Dyreness 1967). Other natural events strongly punctuated current thinking, most notably the 1980 eruptions of Mount St. Helens (Dale et al. 2005, Franklin et al. 1985) and the 1996 flood in the Oregon Cascade Range (Johnson et al. 2000, Nakamura et al. 2000, Swanson et al. 1998). Wildfire history came into focus first in the mid 1970s as a reference point for evaluating effects of land use disturbance, and then in the 1990s as a basis for developing landscape management plans (Cissel et al. 1999).

The Approach: Studies of disturbance take two paths: studying the disturbance processes themselves and studying the ecosystem response to disturbances. Floods, for example, have been examined in terms of the aftermath of major events in the Andrews Forest and neighboring areas, as well as retrospective analysis of streamflow records. Similarly, landslides have been inventoried immediately after clusters of events, supplemented by retrospective techniques to compile a record for the forest since its establishment. Revegetation of landslide scars was studied by sampling sites with a range of elapsed times since the landslides occurred. On the other hand, no significant forest fires have happened in the forest over the history of research there, so interpretation of fire history relies on reconstructing past events recorded in tree-rings and in lake sediment containing pollen and charcoal from the Andrews and neighboring areas.

Results: Study of disturbance history is revealing the integral roles of these processes in ecosystems and the extent to which land use can modify natural disturbance processes. This revelation has led the science effort to better understand disturbance processes, their histories, and ecological implications. Land management and policy have moved from a position of attempting to exclude natural processes, such as fire, to incorporating aspects of the historical disturbance regime in management plans (Cissel et al. 1999).
System managers during the 1950s. The Andrews Forest figured prominently in the newly created and relatively small Blue River Ranger District, recently carved out of the much larger Mackenzie District, and the establishing agreement called for a disproportionate amount of the district’s allowable cut from the Blue River drainage to be taken from the experimental forest, but Anderson was pointedly dismissive toward that administrative unit. Anderson claims that Station scientists at the Andrews Forest offered little of interest to forest managers concerned with meeting the administrative mandates of the 1950s. One reason for the lack of interest, he suggests, was the perception that Research was reinventing the wheel: “We [the NFS] used to do studies for 30 to 50 years. And we could go in there and tell you, if this was in a wild fire, it would burn up.” Kerrick, who became district ranger at Blue River in 1967, agrees with his predecessor on this issue. Noting that some scientists had proposed to study the effects of fire on succession, he observes, “ALL of this forest came in that way. I mean, yeah, it’s vast laboratories that already exist out there. That, in fact, HAS been studied.” Anderson concludes, moreover, that the necessary research was already done: “They’re in books, they could go to the library and find all the answers they want.”

Anderson’s tenure at the ranger district was about as long as Silen’s with the Blue River Experimental Forest, and his effects on community traditions and the physical landscape were arguably as important. By the time Anderson left the district in January 1960 to take a position on the Malheur National Forest, the scale and pace of cutting activities at the Andrews Forest had expanded dramatically over Silen’s last year in charge. Scientists from PNW Station and other agencies who established studies at the experimental forest had to adapt to the dismissive attitude of district staff and to the rapid pace of change at the research facility. Anderson, as the founding administrator of the Blue River Ranger District, set the tone for interactions between district staff and scientists working at the site. Anderson’s description of Jay Gashwiler epitomizes that attitude. He describes Gashwiler, who worked with Oregon Fish and Wildlife on pioneering studies at the Andrews Forest during the 1950s and 1960, as nothing more than a grown man who talked to mice: “He was a mice guy. I looked one day and … he’d been talking to the mice, and he was on a first-name basis with all the mice. I mean, he’d catch the same mouse 3 or 4 or 5 times, in the same traps. [chuckles] Then he traveled on.”

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13 Interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick, 9-10.
14 Interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick, 1.
Gashwiler’s work at the Andrews, it should be noted, resulted in some 15 publications between 1959 and 1977, including studies of small mammals, the harlequin duck (*Histrionicus histrionicus*), Cooper’s chipmunks (*Eutamias townsendi cooperi*), the Townsend chipmunk (*Eutamias townsendi*), the deer mouse (*Peromyscus maniculatus*), the California red-backed vole (*Clethrionomys occidentalis*), pine siskins, seed survival and abundance, plant and mammal changes on clearcuts, and seedling mortality. Dyrness notes that Gashwiler’s approach to studying natural regeneration in relation to small mammals and birds was to ask the question, “What are the most important factors of limiting sufficient seed for natural regeneration?” In an effort to answer that question, Gashwiler established plots with fenced-in areas designed to exclude small mammals, but not birds. In contrast to Anderson’s ridicule of Gashwiler and his work, Dyrness emphasizes Gashwiler’s attention to the standards of rigorous scientific methods and hypothesis testing.\(^{15}\)

Kerrick, Anderson’s assistant district ranger, gradually began to support closer involvement with research scientists at the Andrews Forest. He recalls, for example, that studies of erosion after logging on the Andrews Forest helped the Forest Service answer some of its critics during the French Pete controversy of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Mostly, he observes, the information from the Andrews Forest tended to support Forest Service practices and discredit the arguments protestors presented in that case. From his viewpoint, “They [the protestors] had this different view of how the national forest should be managed, and … they didn’t rely on good information in that regard. I mean, they were just very interested in not having any more harvest. Period.”\(^{16}\)

Kerrick’s gradual conversion was important because, over the course of a career with the Forest Service that stretched across five decades, he looped in and out of four different positions that linked him with the Andrews Forest. In his early days along the McKenzie in 1952, he assisted Silen as a seasonal student worker from the University of Minnesota. Two years after completing his forest management degree, he returned as the first assistant Anderson hired to help him set up the new ranger district, staying on until 1959. He returned in 1967 as the new


\(^{16}\) Interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick, 8-9.
district ranger at Blue River, and he became more broadly responsible for the Andrews Forest, among his many other responsibilities as forest supervisor for the Willamette National Forest from the early 1980s through the early 1990s. Kerrick’s personal and professional experience as Anderson’s protégé and as Rothacher’s personal friend and neighbor placed him squarely between two conflicting perspectives on the Andrews Forest. His personal ties with Rothacher and his love for the region helped Kerrick reconcile those perspectives. He notes, “I fell in love with Oregon when I first came out. I was blown over by the size of the trees and the opportunities to practice forestry here.” He also credits the professional ethics he learned in the forestry program at the University of Minnesota for his evolving appreciation for the value of research efforts at the Andrews Forest. The University of Minnesota program, he notes, was “… focused a lot on … preparing you for learning more. You know, the learning process didn’t stop the day you got your degree.”17

17 Interview with Mike Kerrick, 13-14, 21-22.
Kerrick is an example of a recurring pattern of people whose lives intersected at the Andrews Forest, then branched away only to circle back to the place later in their careers. In Kerrick’s case, he was drawn to the Willamette National Forest because of his interest in Oregon, not because of any interest in building bridges between research and management at the experimental forest: “… the Andrews didn’t have that reputation in those days.” If anything, he observes, the place was more known for the animosity between district staff and Station scientists. He argues, however, that animosity was not rooted in personal conflict between researchers and managers but simply resulted from larger, uncontrollable forces: “Hell, they weren’t stupid. … they [just] didn’t have all the information that they needed … and that’s the way the world is.”

Pacific Northwest Research Station and Management Priorities on the Andrews Forest

On the surface, the outlook for amicable cooperation between researchers and forest managers at Blue River seemed promising when Jack Rothacher started working at the Andrews in 1957. Rothacher moved from a promising career in forest management to accept the position with PNW Station in the Research Branch of the Forest Service. That move was not unlike H.J. Andrews’ similar move in earlier years. Unlike Andrews, however, he never returned to the National Forest System. His move was more of a conversion experience, and like many converts, he became fiercely loyal to his new faith. Rothacher came to the experimental forest directly from his previous position as district ranger at Steamboat, Oregon, on the North Umpqua. An avid outdoorsman, he was also a recent convert to married life. He met his wife, Jean, 2 years earlier during a hiking expedition in the mountains near Shelton, Washington. They lived in that town until Jack secured a Forest Service position as district ranger at Steamboat. Jean recalls, “I don’t think he liked being a ranger very much. He didn’t like … being responsible for people who were not responsible.” Rothacher’s friend, Jerry Dunford, who headed the watersheds program at PNW Station in Portland, convinced him to accept the position at the Andrews Forest, and Jean recalls Jack took it “because he liked the idea of … [research forestry] better than being in the regular Forest Service and being a ranger.” He and Jean moved to their residence on the district compound sight-unseen, largely on Dunford’s advice.

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18 Interview with Mike Kerrick, 25-26.
19 Interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick, 1; interview with Jean Rothacher, 1-2.
Rothacher arrived during the first full year of operations for the Blue River District and for the new District Ranger, and his prospects looked bright. He was relatively oblivious to the earlier tension between Silen and forest managers at the district, and the newness of the physical setting and administrative framework encouraged an optimistic outlook. These circumstances suggested strong potential for a fresh start for the experimental forest and for the Rothachers. Jean Rothacher recalls that the forest and general locale made a good first impression when she arrived in 1957: “I thought it was a lot neater than the North Umpqua road which went into Roseburg. A little farther away, a little less civilized. But … our main town for shopping was Eugene. The roads were better kept and … you were getting into the recreational areas. … The houses were brand new.”

The Rothachers were culturally distant from the local community, its traditions, and their predecessors at the Andrews Forest, and they arrived at a time when the Blue River District Ranger had gained new authority over the place. The PNW Station’s interests, priorities, and authority at the Andrews Forest were severely curtailed. In earlier years, programs of study at the experimental forest included a wildlife unit, forest management research, and the hydrology group. Of the three, the only one that survived after Silen’s departure was the hydrology group, and that was the focus of Rothacher’s assignment. The new administrative boundaries separating research personnel from day-to-day management decisions at the Andrews Forest were clearly evident. When Dick Koenig, of the Blue River District, asked Bob Ruth, of PNW Station, to obtain cruise data for the Andrews from Roy Silen, for example, Bob Ruth responded to that request with a curt note: “Roy does not have any cruise data for the Andrews. All data is in the ranger station files. …” Rothacher began his daily responsibilities in this climate of a present disengaged from the recent past, and his work centered on the watershed program that was unquestionably within the purview of his authority from PNW Station.

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20 Interview with Jean Rothacher and Ted Dyrness, 1-2; “Follow-up Memorandum of Understanding [1953],” 1-2.
Watersheds Research and Urban Priorities for the Andrews Forest

Watershed management research at PNW Station was elevated to full divisional status in 1955 amidst a flurry of public demands for greater attention to the role of forests in managing municipal watersheds. The first chief of the new division, Jerry Dunford, worked to coordinate the Station’s various watershed studies, and the Station supported those efforts with a small, but dedicated budget line, thus elevating the visibility of those studies within the agency and in the public eye. In November 1955, the Station entered into an agreement with the City of Portland Water Bureau to establish a jointly funded study on the Bull Run drainage of the municipal watershed. This agreement called for a 20-year study of watershed management conditions and problems “with the objective of determining an informed and sound basis for management of this 102-square-mile drainage.” Specific goals included a charge to explore the possibility of increasing water supply by cutting the old-growth stand, and to determine methods of maintaining water quality.23 City commissioners entered into the Bull Run watershed study at the urging of Marshall Dana, who was the former editor of the Oregon Journal and an official of U.S. National Bank. Dana, who visited the experimental forest with Regional Forester Herbert Stone in the 1950s, had long been a strong supporter of forest resource “conservation and utilization” efforts. By encouraging the 1955 agreement, Dana facilitated PNW Station’s efforts to enhance its visibility and reputation among conservationists in Portland and in Oregon, while also advancing the Station’s emphasis on applied research.24 Even before this agreement was approved, however, the Andrews Forest was well positioned as a site for exploring the relation between old-growth timber and watershed management.

Watershed management studies at the Andrews began with the original working plan, which focused on “three comparable side drainages on the south side of Lookout Creek … located between the experimental forest boundary and the end of the access road.” If Silen’s initial, failed sale had gone forward, the working plan observes, two of these watersheds “would have been spoiled for study purposes as they have to be calibrated for about seven years before cutting starts.” The original sales plan included a road into the first drainage “about where it started up steeply

23 The Bull Run reserve was established in 1892, excluding all human use, including livestock grazing from the watershed; Cowlin, 349-350.
24 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 42; Cowlin, 350-351.
and curved back.” From there, the road would have wound around the point into the second watershed and, finally, risen up to the landings on the third watershed. By the time Silen redesigned the logging plan for the area, the access road was completed farther into the drainage, and he designed a “very easy road” into the same area that came in at midlevel and eliminated most of the design problems in his original plan. In 1952, Dunford, who had recently returned to PNW Station from a 7-year stint directing watershed studies at the Southeastern Station, directed Hale and Gedney to supervise installation of modified trapezoidal flume stream gauges on the three small watersheds at Blue River Experimental Forest.

Dunford’s experience at the Southeastern Station linked the Andrews Forest into state-of-the-art watersheds research. Dunford worked with ecologists who pioneered watershed research at the Coweeta Hydrologic Laboratory, including Charles R. Hursh, who founded the Coweeta facility and still directed it during Dunford’s time there. Dunford’s move from Coweeta to direct watershed studies at the Andrews Forest in the early 1950s initiated a long chain of interaction among scientists at these two sites for forest hydrology research. By 1959, scientists and technicians working for Dunford at the Andrews Forest produced continuous records providing data about streamflow “under natural conditions.” Analysis of those data revealed peak flows of “as much as 140 cubic feet per second per square mile” in December and January. Streamflow data for September was dramatically less, approaching barely 0.1 cubic foot per second per square mile.

The study plan for the watersheds program that Hale and Gedney installed at the Andrews Forest called for calibrating and then clearcut-logging Watershed 1 with a skyline system that required no roads across the drainage; leaving Watershed 2 undisturbed for comparative, “control” purposes; and logging Watershed 3 “in the conventional manner [small clearcuts], with normal road construction.” They laid out small plots on each drainage to study key sources of erosion, with the goal of minimizing soil movement from those sources. Debris basins installed

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Debris accumulation in these basins, for the 3-year period of 1956-59, averaged 1.5 cubic feet of sediment per acre of drainage.\(^{28}\)

Preliminary results from early watersheds research at the Andrews Forest seemed to support the premise that logging old-growth timber on the Bull Run reserve would increase water production, but Station scientists also stressed the need to study the broader implications of this management activity. The Station’s 1959 brochure and bibliography also marketed the experimental forest as a site available for those kinds of studies. In this guide to the Andrews, Rothacher and Berntsen reported, “… old-growth Douglas-fir forests prevent a sizeable proportion of rainfall from reaching the ground. Apparently, the forest intercepts about a quarter of the gross rainfall during summer and early fall, and about 15 percent during the wetter part of the year.” The report noted that cooperative studies of the effects of timber harvesting on fish and wildlife were underway in 1959 by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Oregon Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit.

From Gashwiler’s studies of small-animal populations before, during, and after logging, and in relation to seed fall, this guide concluded, “… apparently, chipmunks and red-backed mice do not like logged or burned units, and quickly move into green timber. … deer mice continue to live in logged units and show signs of population increase.” Studies of fish and large game animals by the Oregon Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit showed “a noticeable increase in black-tailed deer populations since logging began.” Studies of native fish indicated limited home ranges for their life-cycles, and indicated sedimentation “temporarily reduced the trout population in small streams. …”

Urban Growth as a Stimulus for Research and Cooperative Effort at the Andrews Forest

The PNW Station secured increased funding in 1956 to study problems resulting from rapid urban growth and booming timber harvests in the Pacific Northwest. The Station fielded demands for information from an increasingly urban population seeking more access to forest resources, including water, timber, recreation, and aesthetic experiences. The new supply of funding and increased demands for research prompted a Station-wide review that revealed a serious shortage of trained professionals. State agencies and the timber industry, meanwhile, also initiated new programs of research and competed with PNW Station for qualified staff. Forestry schools in the region responded with programs that focused more on preparing their graduates for careers in research. The PNW Station responded by cooperating with universities to support more projects designed to gather “basic forest information,” and the Station began to support graduate training for research-oriented foresters. This trend toward highly trained specialists with more emphasis on “basic science” also answered public demand for multiple-use management of the national forests during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was an opportunity for innovative thinking in the area of forestry research, and two young scientists who met at the Andrews Forest during this period seized the moment, combining their resources to study forest ecology.

Rothacher’s family, home, and station as research forester-in-residence drew Ted Dyrness and Jerry Franklin together at the Andrews Forest at a critical juncture in the history of PNW Station. These two Station scientists brought very

30 Cowlin, 354-355.
different backgrounds and experiences to the experimental forest, but they were both graduates of Oregon State College who eventually pursued common interests in forest ecology. Dyrness, who first visited the Andrews in 1955 as a graduate student on a field trip with leading soil scientists, initially joined PNW Station in 1959 and worked on the Alsea River Basin soil vegetation survey for the next year and a half. He frequently visited the Rothachers for fishing expeditions on Lookout Creek in those years. He spent much of the summer of 1961 touring national forests in western Oregon and Washington with Rothacher, collecting information they needed to write a problem analysis of soil stability issues in that region. By the end of that summer, Dyrness notes, “I was thoroughly up on what was going on in the Andrews.” That same year, Rothacher moved to Corvallis, where he directed the watershed program from the Willamette Research Center.31 Through the Rothachers, Dyrness met Franklin, who was also a frequent guest at their house.

Franklin and Rothacher first met at the Andrews Forest several years before he teamed up with Dyrness. Jean Rothacher recalls that early in 1957, “the first summer we were there, [Jack] had a college assistant who lived in a trailer above our house. That was Jerry Franklin.” Franklin was the person Jack interacted with most frequently at the experimental forest.32 He began working there as an undergraduate and was employed by the Forest Service through the Oregon State College cooperative extension office in early 1957. Ruth, who headed the Research unit at Corvallis, hired Franklin shortly after Rothacher signed on, and Berntsen escorted Franklin to the Andrews, where he helped Rothacher monitor stream gauges. Dyrness recalls, “He [Franklin] had really good rapport with Jack and Jean Rothacher, and so it was natural that he would do his master’s [thesis] on his work on the Andrews.”33

Later in the 1960s, Dyrness and Franklin emerged as leaders of a science team at the Andrews Forest, although Dyrness notes that initially, “We definitely were not in leadership positions.” Their partnership, like the earlier pairing of Silen and Gratkowski, combined diverse backgrounds in the Eastern and Western United States, and they mixed their personal attachment to the region with visionary

31 Interview with Ted Dyrness by Max Geier on 11 September 1996 at Dryness’ office at the Corvallis FSL as transcribed by Jeff Fourier, 1-2.
32 Interview with Jean Rothacher, 2-3.
33 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 48; interview with Jerry Franklin by Max Geier on 13 September 1996 in a Forest Service cabin near the Wind River Canopy Crane facility as transcribed by Jeff Fourier, 2-3.
enthusiasm and cautious, pragmatic research. Dyrness, who was born and raised in Wheaton, Illinois, grew up amidst the academic trappings of Wheaton College, where his father was an administrator. He credits his mother with instilling an artistic ethic and for cultivating an early interest in plants and animals. He also traces his early interest in ecology to his experience as a high-school student building a family cabin in the Wisconsin woods with his father and grandfather, and to his father’s interest in outdoor activities, “… things like fishing and going out on the lake and sitting. Not any fancy fishing, … you know, a meat fisherman [laughs].” He headed West in 1951 as a young college student seeking summer employment and adventure in the forests of the “evergreen” Northwest. That experience inspired a life-long appreciation for the scenic wonders of the forested slopes of the Cascade Range. Dyrness notes, however, that he decided to pursue a career in ecology because of his college experience at Wheaton, where the liberal arts program required at least one laboratory course: “I sat down and said, “What’s the most Mickey-Mouse laboratory science that I can take, and get it out of the way as a freshman, you know, thinking very logically. [laughter] And I thought: ‘Ah, BOTANY!’”

34 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 7-8.
35 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 7-8.
That botany course set Dyrness on a career path that wound through the Pacific Northwest and eventually brought him to the Andrews Forest. Dyrness got more than he bargained for when his botany instructor taught the introductory course with an ecological emphasis. Dyrness was hooked, and he subsequently changed his major from ancient history to botany, setting him on the path to a future career in Forest Service Research. He worked as an itinerant employee in the timber industry of the forests of the Pacific Northwest during the summer after his freshman year of college, including a stint pulling the green chain and running the trim saw at a mill near Packwood, Washington. He also fought forest fires near Randall, Washington. Meanwhile, he lived in a makeshift home in a converted chicken coop and explored the countryside in his free time. He lived for the summer with the college buddy who lured him West with grand images of country life on a family ranch that didn’t quite live up to its billing. The surrounding countryside, however, was all that he expected, and more. During one overnight visit to a fire lookout near Goat Rock Wilderness in the western Cascades that summer, Dyrness decided to pursue a career in the Pacific Northwest.36

Gazing out from the fire lookout, Dyrness saw an inspiring wilderness landscape, and when he went back to Wheaton College, he told his academic advisor he wanted to go to graduate school in the Pacific Northwest. He was bored with the farm country of Illinois where he grew up, and he had always been fascinated with mountainous terrain, beginning with family excursions to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. His experience in the Cascade Range, however, eclipsed even his memories of the Smokies. His major advisor at Wheaton was close friends with Chet Youngberg, a graduate of Wheaton who secured an appointment at Oregon State College and was looking for promising new graduate students. Dyrness followed up on that contact and began graduate work in Corvallis in the late 1950s, about the time Jerry Franklin completed his undergraduate work at Oregon State College and began his graduate studies.37

Where Dyrness was a transplanted Midwesterner with academic roots, Franklin was a native Northwesterner with a working-class background. He grew up in Camas, Washington, where his father worked as a foreman at the local mill. Like Silen, Franklin’s appreciation for the local woods was based on regular, everyday experience from early childhood through his adult life. When he was a young

36 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 5-8.
37 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 6-9; communication from Ted Dyrness March 1998.
boy near the end of World War II, the Franklins purchased a car, and the family began taking frequent camping trips to the woods near Wind River, at Mineral Springs, Washington. Franklin cites those family outings as inspiration for his lifelong interest in trees and forests: “This is where it all began for me as far as an interest in trees and forests is concerned. …”

Franklin, like Silen, began his college career assuming he would eventually wind up in a job in the timber industry, and he spent most of his academic life bouncing back and forth between the state colleges of Oregon and Washington. He started out at Clark College as a freshman and then transferred to Washington State University in his sophomore year, planning to go into forestry. He notes, however, “I got distracted, as people often do. But then in my junior year, I went to Oregon State University and settled down.” He completed his B.S. (1959) and M.A. (1961) degrees in forest management at Oregon State College and eventually earned a Ph.D. (1966) in botany at Washington State University. Bill Ferrell, Franklin’s advisor at Oregon State College, “made the connection” between the Forest Service and Oregon State College Cooperative Extension (then called the Student Trainee program) in the 1956-57 academic year. Ferrell told Franklin, who was enrolled in his course that fall, that PNW Station was looking for a student “interested in a career in Research.” Franklin notes the shift from forest management to forest Research was a real “risk” because the government “didn’t pay very well” and he was “totally dependent” on his own resources at the time. He had been working at the Crown Zellerbach paper mill in Camas, where he made more than three times as much money as PNW Station offered in 1957, but he decided, “I’ll take the risk and hope I get a scholarship the next year. Which I did.”

Franklin initially planned to become a park or forest ranger, but once he began working with the research program at PNW Station, he discovered it was a “less-structured situation” than other jobs in the Forest Service. He found people there doing “exciting” and “interesting” work with minimal supervision, and by 1961, he followed their lead and shifted his goals to pursue a career in forest research. “I like freedom,” he observes, “I like options.” He mostly serviced and maintained gauging stations in his early days at the Andrews Forest, and he helped Rothacher install a forest regeneration study. He notes, however, his first big job of the summer” was to run boundary surveys on Watersheds 1, 2, and 3 with another

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38 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 1.
39 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 1-2.
technician who supervised his work. When Rothacher encouraged him to start his own research project, Franklin developed a guide for identifying tree seedlings.

Franklin, like Dyrness, was excited to be working in the old-growth timber of the Andrews Forest. He recalls it was a novel experience, despite his familiarity with the woods around Camas, Washington: “… wow it was neat! I hadn’t seen so much old growth in the Oregon Cascades up until then.” Franklin was interested in more than aesthetics, however. Working at the Andrews Forest was an adventure: “I think that’s the first time I’ve ever been … anywhere on snow shoes. So it was [an] exhilarating experience. … it was my first real experience working regularly in the big woods, a lot of time on my own, and I did a lot of backpacking on weekends.”

The “wow factor” that Franklin and others emphasize when describing their first encounter with the Andrews Forest also helped them recruit other scientists for research programs during the 1960s. It was, however, a constantly changing ally. Each generation of scientists encountered a forest transformed by their predecessors but impressive as an apparent example of relatively intact old growth.

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40 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 3-4.
41 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 3.
(for an experimental forest). Arriving on the scene 3 years after Silen left the Andrews Forest, Franklin was impressed with the place as a relatively untouched landscape: “the only clearcuts that were visible at that time, really, were at the head of Deer Creek. … there were none of the cuttings out in the High Cascades at all, there wasn’t anything out there, so it was an incredibly pristine landscape. … Blue River drainage was essentially pristine.”

The place Silen had worked so hard to make more accessible still seemed remote and untouched by comparison with the forests near Camas, Washington, and other places this native of the Pacific Northwest had seen.

People and research were relatively sparse at the Andrews Forest when Franklin and Dyrness first began working there together. Scientists walked a curious line between monitoring the effects of human activities on the watersheds and defining the degree to which the landscape remained “pristine” or apparently free of human disturbance. Anderson recalls that Franklin, whose career soon moved beyond the Andrews Forest, was initially somewhat impatient and detached from the legacy of previous work on the experimental forest: “Jerry didn’t know that we were there [laughter]. He was very ambitious, he was ready to learn.” Anderson recalls that from his perspective as district ranger, research at the Andrews all related to timber sales, and Anderson, Kerrick, and Franklin all recall working to lay out trails on the control watershed [Watershed 2]. The process, Kerrick observes, created “a lot of disturbance” despite the absence of roads. In an account reminiscent of Mitchell’s experience with Gratkowski, Franklin cites his work on the Watershed 2 trails as an example of Rothacher’s reputation for meticulous attention to detail. He notes that Rothacher made him lay out the trails three times before allowing he was satisfied with the results. Like Silen, Franklin also developed a sense of stewardship for the pristine character of the place, but with more of an emphasis on maintaining that character. He recalls coming down out of Watershed 2 at the end of the day and diving for cans at the bottom of Lookout Creek where it pooled near a gauging station: “People would leave cans in that pool, and so, I took ’em out, one at a time.”

Franklin was reassigned to Cascade Head Experimental Forest in the Coast Range of Oregon in the summer of 1958, and he was not happy about the transfer. Most of his work at the Andrews Forest had been in watershed research, but as he

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Interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick, 1-2.
recalls, “Cascade Head Experimental Forest was all timber management research. Cutting, ... regeneration, spruce hemlock type, a different forest type.” He didn’t mind working on timber management research, but he missed the Cascade Range and he missed working with Rothacher: “I’ve always liked the Cascades environment better than the coastal one. The guy I worked for at Cascade Head ... wasn’t near as much fun as working for Jack [Rothacher].”45 The year after his summer at Cascade Head, Franklin joined PNW Station as a permanent employee and took over Berntsen’s responsibilities at the Corvallis center, which included administrative authority over the Andrews Forest. Franklin recalls that from then through the mid 1960s, the object of management was to “road the Andrews. And we DID it.”46

45 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 4.
Franklin’s impression of district priorities mirrored Anderson’s view that Research had little relevance to forest managers, and research scientists who worked at the Andrews Forest after 1954 seldom interacted with district staff or other people in Blue River through the 1960s. When Franklin married in 1958, for example, he and his family lived in Corvallis and he visited the experimental forest for brief stays of only 2 to 3 days, living in a trailer camp near Blue River. “Once you got into the trailers,” he recalls, “unless your work brought you together, you didn’t [interact]. I didn’t drink, and so I didn’t go down to the bars, pool room, or anything like that, hang out.” Their priorities, he recalls were “pretty heavy duty … go-for-broke management. … they weren’t much interested in research.” District managers, Franklin notes, often acted on the Andrews Forest without consulting anyone at PNW Station: They would put up a timber sale and build a road [up] there … and drop it down on the Andrews side, … and we wouldn’t even know about it.

Scientists with PNW Station also worked on more compartmentalized and specialized projects during the late 1950s and early 1960s, and less commonly interacted with other scientists at the Andrews Forest than in previous years. In his first year at PNW Station, Dyrness discovered an institutional culture of strictly defined limits. He had studied soil-vegetation relations near Klamath Falls for his Ph.D. thesis, but his boss reprimanded him for presenting that work at a conference that focused on federal plans to terminate the Klamath Tribe and Reservation. Dyrness recalls, “I took the … Greyhound Bus to Klamath Falls, and stayed overnight and attended the meeting. And when I got back, I was in trouble [with PNW Station administrators]. You know: I was a west-sider. I shouldn’t have gone to that meeting, etc. … ” Station leadership expected Dyrness to work on the west side of the Cascade Range, meaning he should no longer engage in east-side studies. The Station subsequently assigned him to work with Rothacher at the Willamette Research Center in Corvallis.

The Transition From Research Centers to Research Laboratories

The PNW Station’s diminished role at Lookout Creek was painfully obvious by the time Dyrness began working there, and by mid decade, the facility teetered on the brink of formal termination. The few scientists who did any field work at the

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47 Interview with Jean Rothacher, 3-4; interview with Jerry Franklin, 6-7.
48 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 6.
49 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 9-10.
facility during the early 1960s did not seem to justify the costs of keeping it open, but Dyrness, Franklin, and Rothacher scrambled to preserve it as an irreplaceable resource. Congressional funding specifically earmarked to build new facilities for forest research in 1960 actually made their effort more difficult, because it shifted the agency’s focus from field studies to scientific laboratories. The allocation reversed a 15-year trend. After World War II, the Forest Service had reorganized research into “problem areas,” mostly emphasizing studies “in the woods” or “on the forest ranges.” Field studies in the agency were organized into 11 geographical forest regions, each with a forest and range experiment station supplemented by several experimental forests. This framework supported research in some 80 “problem areas” or “research provinces.” Each province had at least one research center, and each center had at least one experimental forest. At PNW Station, this structure produced the Willamette Research Center in Corvallis and other similar centers elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest. In 1960, however, PNW Station opened its first research laboratory in Olympia, Washington, and deemphasized experimental forests. Oregon State College also shook off Dean Peavy’s legacy of field-oriented training and planned a new laboratory for forestry research in the early 1960s. These parallel developments at PNW Station and at Oregon State College encouraged closer cooperation between scientists with PNW Station and faculty at the state college. The growing emphasis on laboratories at both Oregon State College and PNW Station came at the expense of institutional support for experimental forests, but the new climate of academic cooperation in Corvallis rescued the research facility from a proposal to terminate it.

Station scientists at the Willamette Research Center and faculty with the Oregon State College School of Forestry cooperated more closely after the state of Oregon concentrated its forestry research programs on the Corvallis campus during the 1950s. Walter F. McCulloch, who served as Dean of the School of Forestry at Oregon State College from 1952 to 1966, managed the transition from a program that emphasized field training and applied skills to one that emphasized more basic research, and he committed institutional support to laboratory-based research in Corvallis. Four years into McCulloch’s term as Dean, the state authorized funds for a Forest Research Laboratory (FRL) on the Corvallis campus and

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50 Cowlin, 406-407.
51 Arnst, A., ed. 1981. 75 years of continuing progress in forestry education. Corvallis, OR: School of Forestry, Oregon State University. 9.
placed it under the administration of a state committee that McCulloch headed, and it operated independently of the state college. The new FRL was completed in 1957, and the Forest Lands Research Division of the Oregon State Forestry Department moved from Salem into the new building. State silviculture and forest products researchers already in Corvallis also moved into the new building. This consolidation, together with the federal Research Center, made Corvallis a regional center of laboratory-based forest research.

Laboratory-oriented scientists who initially expressed little, if any, interest in field work at the Andrews Forest, converged on Corvallis during this period, and the number of scientists studying forest-related issues in Corvallis reached critical mass by the late 1950s. The transformation of Oregon State College into Oregon State University (OSU) in 1961 helped make the Corvallis campus seem more inviting to research scientists just beginning their professional careers. That same year, the Oregon State Legislature transferred authority over the Forest Lands Research Division from the State Forestry Department to OSU, merged it with the Experiment Station, and in 1965, redesignated the combined program the FRL (as distinguished from the building by the same name constructed 8 years earlier).

Robert Tarrant, whose career in the region’s forest research community included stints as PNW Station Director and as Forest Science Department Head at OSU, argues this concentration of forestry programs and scientists in Corvallis created an unsurpassed climate for forest-related research in the last third of the 20th century. Research at the university’s Forest Experiment Station included programs in forest management, forest products, soils, botany, plant pathology, and entomology. The School of Forestry was also well funded with sales of timber from state-owned forest lands. This convergence of people and programs created the potential, at least, for well-funded interdisciplinary research.

One young scientist who found the academic climate in Corvallis appealing in 1963 was Dick Waring, who completed his doctoral work at Berkeley and joined the OSU faculty that year. Waring saw OSU as an institution with enhanced national prestige and good opportunities for growth. He was initially attracted to the programs at Corvallis, but he soon emerged as a leader in the effort to develop field

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52 Arnst, 6, 12-13; George W. Bengston, “Forest Research Programs Stimulate Progress in Forestry.” In: Arnst, A., ed. 1981. 75 years of continuing progress in forestry education. Corvallis, OR: School of Forestry, Oregon State University. 47.
53 Bengston, 47.
54 Interview with Robert Tarrant by Max Geier on 24 July 1997 at Tarrant’s house in Corvallis, as transcribed by Keesje Hoekstra, 14-15; Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 23; Bengston, 46-47.
research programs at the Andrews Forest. He was a midwesterner, originally from Chicago, but with B.S. and M.S. degrees in forestry at the University of Minnesota and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, where his preparation included botany, physiology, and soils. Waring, like Dyrness and Franklin, cites an early involvement in the outdoors with his father as inspiration for pursuing a career in forestry, but his career path into research was less circuitous than theirs. One of his father’s business associates in Chicago was a lawyer who purchased land and then dedicated it to research. Waring, consequently, grew up surrounded by scientists practicing their craft, and he viewed that as a natural career path. As a high school student, they were his role models, and he began his own research projects even before he enrolled as a freshman in the forestry program at the University of Minnesota. His path through graduate programs at the University of Minnesota and the University of California was similarly direct. Even as an undergraduate, Waring secured summer assignments as a research assistant at the University of California, where he worked on the Redwood Ecology Project, and in Spokane, Washington, where he worked with the Inland Empire Research Station.
of the Forest Service on a pole blight project. As a freshly minted Ph.D. in high demand, he could choose among several job offers, and Waring notes the centralization of state forestry programs at Corvallis was a major factor in his decision to accept a position at OSU: “This was the one that was initially full-time research, but with a potential to fuse the … Forest Research Lab with the College of Forestry—at that time the School of Forestry, so that you could have some teaching, at least, at the graduate level.55

When Waring arrived, Franklin and Dyrness were already promoting the Andrews to Corvallis-area colleagues as a site for field research, hoping that if more scientists installed studies at the experimental forest, Station administrators would not close the facility. Shortly after Franklin and Dyrness began working there during the early 1960s, George Meagher had floated the idea that PNW Station should reduce its involvement with experimental forests. Meagher’s proposal called for returning the South Umpqua Experimental Forest and the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest to the National Forest System, except for existing experimental watersheds programs in those places. Although Meagher’s proposal simply recognized the Station’s already diminished role at the Andrews Forest, his suggested restructuring would have closed down one of the largest facilities available to support field research in old-growth stands of Douglas-fir. Given the political climate at the time, there was little doubt that the Station, once it surrendered formal control over a drainage with substantial quantities of marketable, old-growth timber, would never again control a similar parcel of federal land.56

If the proposal went through, scientists would have to adapt their studies to areas where market forces and other management concerns took priority over scientific plots without any requirement, whatsoever, for “consultation” with the scientists themselves, or even with PNW Station. Under such conditions, long-term studies would be vulnerable to the impact of unanticipated management actions, thus rendering field-tests of scientific hypotheses relatively useless. The governing memorandum of understanding for the Andrews Forest had mostly gutted the PNW Station Director’s authority over management activities on the Lookout Creek drainage, but

55 Interview with Dick Waring by Max G. Geier on 26 September 1997 at Waring’s office in Peavy Hall at Oregon State University, as transcribed by Linda Hahn and Keesje Hoekstra, 1-2.

56 Documentation for this proposal is elusive, but Tarrant, who later became PNW Station Director, recalls conversations between Meagher and Cowlin concerning this proposal during the early 1960s, and Franklin recalls Meagher circulated a letter confirming the proposal during that period. Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 20-21.
it still required “consultation,” even if it was perfunctory—or ignored. Termination of the designation as an experimental forest would have eliminated even that thin thread of security for the integrity of scientific research.37

Al Levno, who began working as PNW Station’s watersheds technician at the Andrews Forest in 1963, notes that Meagher’s proposal to close the facility just compounded existing problems with district staff who refused to support scientists on the Lookout Creek drainage. Levno recalls that Gashwiler, for example, “had a lot of trouble getting support from the district. And there was many a time he would come in and complain about not getting any support.”38 Levno lived in the house the Rothachers previously occupied at the Blue River compound and worked out of the district offices, monitoring rain and stream gauges and forest plots at the Andrews in his role as technician-in-residence. He recalls that, given the strained relations with district staff, research use of the experimental forest was very low: “The emphasis was that people needed to be here [Corvallis], that the center of interest was at OSU, so their people were leaving the woods and going to the big labs.”39

Opening the Floodgates and Facilitating Research at the Andrews Forest

Dyrness and Franklin bucked the trend toward laboratory research with a “bootlegged” vegetation classification study at the Andrews Forest. They also accomplished other, funded research more directly related to their assigned responsibilities while working on the unauthorized and unfunded vegetation classification project. Dyrness, for example, recalls he was studying effects of different logging methods on soil conditions: “I just investigated high-lead, tractor, sky-line, and balloon logging. So that salved my conscience a little. Then, I began to get interested in road-side soil stability and treatments to forestall erosion on newly constructed roadsides.”40 Informal collaboration with a soil survey crew working at the Andrews Forest in the summer of 1962 also boosted the vegetation classification effort. Dyrness and Franklin lived that summer next door to the trailer housing the survey crew. Dyrness talked to them each evening about their work as fellow soil

37 Interview with Dick Waring, 4.
38 Interview with Al Levno by Max G. Geier on 12 September 1996 at the Corvallis FSL as transcribed by Jeff Prater, 4-5.
39 Interview with Al Levno, 4-5.
40 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 12-13.
scientists, and by the end of the summer, he and Franklin had a broader understanding of soils on the Andrews Forest. It was a significant year in the development of the experimental forest for several reasons. Field work on the soil survey ended that year, and logging began that fall on Watersheds 1 and 3, shortly after Dyrness and a summer field assistant installed permanent vegetation plots on those drainages. Then, on October 12, a major windstorm swept through the valleys of western Oregon, including Lookout Creek, causing enough damage to be remembered thereafter as the Columbus Day Storm. Beginning in 1963, Dyrness and Franklin began to supplement the knowledge they had gleaned from the survey crews with their own reconnaissance studies of vegetation in association with those soils. Finally, in 1964, Rothacher insisted they draw up a formal plan for the vegetation study so that it would be officially listed at PNW Station and qualify for research funding and assistants.

Dyrness’ primary interest was always ecology, and he notes his specialization in forest soils was more a means than an end. Dyrness credits Rothacher for

62 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 11-12.
supporting his efforts at the Andrews Forest, despite resistance from both the district and the Station during the early 1960s. Rothacher, who directed their work from the Research Center in Corvallis, required they adhere to Station policy, but he also allowed them room to unleash their curiosity in the field, provided they kept things in perspective. Dyrness recalls, “I should have been working on soil erosion. And Jerry should have been working on just, … higher elevation, upper-slope silviculture.” Rothacher, however, allowed Dyrness to install permanent vegetation plots on Watershed 1 and Watershed 3, and he allowed Franklin and Dyrness to work on a plant community classification for the Andrews Forest for about 3 years, starting in 1963. Dyrness emphasizes that it was more an example of active encouragement than loose management: “It was a credit to Jack to recognize that what we were doing was worthwhile. … it was kind of a pioneer effort in vegetation classification. How to do it. What kind of units to come up with. … figuring out … successional relationships among the groupings.” Rothacher, in other words, encouraged scientists to look around when they were doing field work, observe what was happening, and then decide what they could do. Once they decided something didn’t fit into an existing study plan, Rothacher supported their efforts to draft a new plan. In short, Dyrness explains, Rothacher was “really grass-roots oriented.”

Franklin also credits Rothacher with encouraging his joint efforts with Dyrness, and he emphasizes that their “normal assignments” at PNW Station did not really permit collaborative work. The Station practice of assigning each scientist an approved area of work, he argues, limited opportunities for cooperative efforts, and scientists were seldom free to follow their independent interests. Franklin recalls, however, that the close quarters he shared with Dyrness at Blue River broke down some of those institutional barriers. Living in a trailer with Dyrness, he discovered they had “a lot of similar kinds of viewpoints and general inclinations,” and they began to look for “opportunities to do things together” at the Andrews Forest. The resulting vegetation classification study combined Dyrness’ expertise in soils with Franklin’s experience sampling vegetation.

Their joint effort was remarkably successful and illustrated the pragmatic value of collaborative effort for managers and scientists. They produced *Natural Vegetation of Oregon and Washington*, first printed in 1973 and later reprinted in the

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“*It was a credit to Jack to recognize that what we were doing was worthwhile. … it was a pioneer effort in vegetation classification.*”

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63 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 9-10.

64 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 20; interview with Jerry Franklin, 11.
1980s by Oregon State University Press, in response to strong and continuing demand for a reference work that had become an indispensable “bible” for field work in the area that it covered. This successful example of collaborative field work also enticed Dick Waring to join Dyrness and Franklin at the Andrews Forest. The young Berkeley graduate had prior experience in, and enthusiasm for collaborative research. While at Berkeley, he worked with three professors and three other graduate students on a joint project in the redwood region, and he was familiar with the benefits and some of the problems that arise in joint research. Waring became acquainted with Dyrness and Franklin through their interactions with the forest research community on the OSU campus in Corvallis. He was already working at a field site above Cougar Reservoir on the Augusta Creek drainage, a tributary to the McKenzie River. He was interested in the general area around the Andrews Forest, but he also wanted to place his own work in a broader context, and collaboration with Dyrness and Franklin was a relatively fast way to do it.65

65 Interview with Dick Waring, 4-6, 12-13; communication from Martha Brookes 28 August 2000; Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 20.
Collaboration at OSU did not automatically translate into cooperative efforts at the Andrews Forest, but the chance to work closely with other people did encourage laboratory-oriented scientists to do more field work. During the mid 1960s, the experimental forest began to attract scientists who wanted or needed to work with other people. As Dyrness observes of the Andrews, “… what we had was at least somebody that could help us down there. Because, starting with Jack [Rothacher], we always had somebody stationed down there. … after Jack it was Dick Fredriksen. After Dick Fredriksen, it was Al Levno. After Al Levno was Ross Mersereau. … you know, in these kinds of studies, you need somebody to help you.” Among their other responsibilities, Rothacher, Fredriksen, Levno, and Mersereau monitored and maintained equipment that measured streamflow, and they sampled storm flows. These people, who lived on site near the Andrews Forest, also gained an appreciation for the place, and they encouraged other people to consider doing field work there.

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Interview with Ted Dyrness, 12-13.
The human touch included a sense of respectful stewardship for the Andrews Forest as a research resource. Rothacher struggled to defend that outlook against forest managers at the district who were moving ahead with extensive logging activities on the experimental forest. He represented PNW Station in meetings to review logging plans and to secure basic resources, such as housing and laboratories, needed to support scientists working at the facility. Rothacher, Dyrness recalls, faced relentless pressure from forest managers, who claimed they needed to accelerate logging on the Andrews Forest to meet timber-production goals for the Willamette National Forest. Rothacher argued on behalf of Research scientists like Dyrness and Franklin that unless it supported a purely research purpose, no logging should be permitted on the Andrews Forest. Dyrness recalls the constant battles for research facilities at the district ranger station were a source of great stress for Rothacher, and by 1964, the outlook was bleak: “[Jack would] come back [from meetings with district and Region 6 managers], you know, just really worn out, saying: ‘Jimminy. I don’t know if we can hold ‘em off.’”  

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67 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 14-15.
Faced with a proposal from PNW Station to close the Andrews Forest, demands from the district for expanded logging there, and a general drift toward laboratory-based research at OSU and in the Forest Service, Dyrness and Franklin scrambled to identify a white knight. They found one in an international initiative that began in the mid 1960s and became operational in the United States by 1968. They found a second, unexpected ally in the flood of 1964, which left a legacy of changes on the landscape that revitalized enthusiasm for field research at the Andrews Forest. When Franklin learned about the International Biological Programme (IBP) through the National Science Foundation (NSF), he told Dyrness they needed to get involved, despite the fact neither one of them knew much about systems ecology. Dyrness recalls Franklin telling him, “We gotta get on-board! … sure, we don’t know much about this systems ecology stuff, but we can learn.”

Their biggest hurdle to attracting the IBP to the Andrews Forest was that very few people were working there at the time. It was a Catch-22 situation: involvement in the IBP would attract people to the Andrews Forest, but chances of including the place in the IBP network of sites were remote, unless they could recruit more people to work there. Dyrness observes, “… what really helped … was the ’64 flood.” He and Franklin advertised the place to their colleagues in Corvallis, urging them to “come down and see what happened on the Andrews in the ’64 flood.” They put people to work, documenting all the flood-related slides and measuring other effects on the landscape.

By mid decade, a small, but vital nucleus of scientists had identified the Andrews Forest as a valuable site for field studies, and they were experimenting with marketing strategies to “sell” the Andrews to their colleagues in the burgeoning community of forestry research in Corvallis. The flood of 1964 provided a hook for attracting more scientists to the Lookout Creek drainage, and by the late 1960s, the small, initial core of the Andrews group managed to put together a successful bid to designate the experimental forest as one of three research sites in the Coniferous Biome Project of the IBP. That accomplishment was due, in no small measure, to the emerging prominence of Corvallis as a world-class center for forest-related research, and it played into the political climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The rapid growth of research capabilities at the FRL on the OSU campus in that period coincided with increased recognition of tremendous problems with forest regeneration in Oregon and the need for fundamental knowledge

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68 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 11-12.
to address those problems. As a result of those concerns, OSU recruited more faculty with expertise in forest biology during the 1960s and early 1970s, and that expertise was a resource that helped the Andrews group secure their bid for designating the Lookout Creek drainage as an IBP site.  

After a decade of difficult relations with forest managers at Blue River, people like Franklin, Dyrness, and Rothacher responded by building a community of scientists interested in long-term research at the Andrews Forest. They saw the place as an irreplaceable, scarce, and threatened resource that should be protected and promoted to other scientists. They did basic survey work to document the soils and vegetation at the Andrews Forest, and they tried to shield the place, and the scientists who worked there, from distant and arbitrary management decisions. Their grass-roots effort laid the foundation for later collaborative research. Forest managers like Kerrick, meanwhile, began turning to researchers for answers to a broader range of management questions. Prospects improved for closer cooperation between scientists and managers at the experimental forest during the 1960s, even as the Andrews group scrambled to include Lookout Creek in the IBP and secure outside funding for research at the site. As of 1964, however, the IBP was a remote vision, and the few scientists working at the Andrews Forest had little influence, funding, or authority over the site.

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70 Bengston, 47.
Chapter Three: Basic Science Priorities and the International Biological Programme, 1964–1975

The Christmas flood of 1964 and full-scale logging on the surrounding Willamette National Forest changed the Lookout Creek drainage from a familiar to an exotic landscape. Curiosity about the flood and its effects brought more scientists to the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest) in the late 1960s than had visited the place during the previous decade. Those who arrived after 1964 worked at road-accessible sites on a logged drainage. The Lookout Creek drainage was heavily logged by 1964, especially by comparison with the rest of the Blue River Ranger District. By the time logging began in earnest on other drainages near the experimental forest later that decade, the oldest clearcuts on the Andrews Forest were already filling in with fast-growing, young trees. In those areas where later managers followed Silen’s original plan and road design, extensive stands of old-growth Douglas-fir \( (Pseudotsuga menziesii \text{(Mirb.) Franco}) \) surrounded relatively smaller clearcuts. Some people, consequently, described the Andrews Forest as a “pristine” landscape, despite the intensive management activities of the previous decade. Despite those perceptions, it was a place much more intensively managed and studied than the surrounding national forest precisely because it had been more accessible, for a longer time, than most other drainages in the district. This combination of a relatively pristine and unusually accessible drainage open to “experimental” activity attracted new scientists to the Andrews Forest in the 1960s. They saw it as an interesting and knowable place where scientific methods could extract detailed information more efficiently than from the surrounding national forest.

Roads and clearcuts attracted scientists who needed to work at accessible field sites, but the aesthetic appeal of the unlogged portions of the Andrews Forest made it a place where people wanted to work. Many people who saw the experimental forest for the first time during this period formed intense, personal connections with the place. The boundary between professional and personal concerns also began to blur during the 1960s. More people were increasingly aware of environmental problems and some of them campaigned to protect or preserve “pristine” sites. The resulting political pressure eventually led to more funding for the environmental sciences and some of that found its way to the Andrews Forest. When the Wilderness Act fueled public conflict over management decisions on the Willamette National Forest, for example, forest managers seeking to address criticism of their actions turned to the Pacific Northwest Research Station (PNW...
Station) for scientific information that addressed their concerns. Scientists at the Andrews Forest often had other priorities, but the Christmas flood of 1964 profoundly affected them. They saw powerful forces of nature reshaping landscape features that previously seemed immutable. As they gained a new appreciation for the changing character of the place, the group mobilized a landslide inventory to document the scope and characteristics of mass soil movements on the drainage.

The 1964 flood prompted a small surge of scientific activity at the experimental forest that helped the Andrews group gain credibility in advance of the International Biological Programme (IBP). The timing of the flood was fortuitous. The First General Assembly of the IBP convened in July, just 5 months before the flood, but another 4 years passed before the IBP was implemented in the United States. Those intervening years were a window of opportunity for marketing the Andrews Forest to the international community. In that period, the newly emergent Andrews group
Necessary Work: Discovering Old Forests, New Outlooks, and Community on the Andrews Forest

created a niche for itself. The IBP was an opportunity to build the group into a collaborative community of scientists that could transcend institutional barriers to interdisciplinary cooperation among American academics. E.B. Worthington, who chronicled the history of the IBP from the perspective of his personal experience as an administrative leader in that 10-year program, observes, “The toughest biological community into which to launch the scheme was that of the United States.” He cites, as major stumbling blocks, the ingrained hierarchies of academic life in America, particularly in the areas of field biology, microbiology, and molecular biology. Those hierarchies, he argues, interfered with the IBP ideal of integrated, international programs of scientific inquiry. An American culture of polarized extremes, he concludes, contributed to a political standoff between people who promoted a free-use ideology of unregulated access to public lands and people who advocated a preservationist approach to protecting public lands by creating national parks and wilderness areas. Conflict between those two groups, he suggests, poisoned the well for public support of ecological research and effectively delayed implementation of the IBP in the United States until the end of the 1960s.¹

The ultimate goal of the IBP was to overcome nationalistic boundaries while gathering comprehensive data to describe biomes—broad-scale ecosystem types, such as desert, tundra, and conifer forests, that would represent the global range of ecosystems. With this information, the project would build predictive models of natural ecosystems functioning in a global context. The IBP vision was that by studying particularly stable systems (including old-growth, coniferous forests), scientists could construct models to predict how a particular management action would affect an ecosystem. The ultimate goal was to help people understand how to avoid or otherwise manage problems resulting from human disruption of natural systems, in effect, promoting more efficient human control over nature.²

The Andrews Forest was an understaffed, dark horse candidate for the IBP, but in retrospect, it seems like an obvious place to include in an interdisciplinary and international effort to catalogue and model ecological communities. By 1964, it had been the focus of intensive monitoring and observation for more than 16 years, and scientists linked with the place were energized and enthusiastic about the IBP.

Dyrness describes the IBP years as an era of innocent optimism at the Andrews Forest: “We were naïve back then, I’ll tell you. … We were going to grow [computer models depicting] an entire ecosystem.” Once they got started, however, the group discovered they really didn’t know very much about the systems they were trying to model. They lacked answers to basic questions about internal processes, including “How limiting is soil moisture to our communities in the Andrews?” or “How are nutrients cycled through this system?” or “How long do [needles] … stay on the trees?” Looking back, Dyrness concludes, “that’s what modeling accomplishes. You don’t get all these sophisticated models up and running with a lot of predictive capacity. What you do, you find out your stupidity.” In the effort to develop predictive models, the group found they didn’t even know what they needed to learn in order to understand how the system operated. They did discover, however, the benefits of collaborative effort and interdisciplinary exchange.¹

Although the IBP effort didn’t reach the Pacific Northwest before the late 1960s, some scientists who later became associated with the IBP at the Andrews Forest sparked a spirit of community during that decade. They forged a group identity and an enduring legacy of enthusiasm for collaborative research at that site. The IBP also established the Andrews Forest as a globally prominent site for studying forest ecosystems. The Andrews group, and the enthusiasm for collaborative research at the Experimental Forest, survived the end of the IBP, as scientists adapted ongoing programs of research to meet the constraints of constantly shifting sources of funding.⁴

The Andrews group made an early decision to rely on postdoctoral assistants instead of graduate students and tenured professors, and that decision smoothed the transition from the IBP to alternative sources of funding in the early 1970s. Faculty cooperators from Oregon State University (OSU) initially played central roles in the effort. Leaders in the Andrews group, however, notably Dick Waring (OSU) and Jerry Franklin (Forest Service), soon shifted the focus toward more reliance on postdoctoral assistants. That decision diverged from customary practices elsewhere in the Coniferous Biome Project of the IBP, which included links with the University of Washington and study sites at Findlay Lake and the Cedar River Experimental Forest in Washington. Postdoctoral assistants on grant-funded

¹ Interview with Ted Dyrness by Max Geier on 11 September 1996 at 9:30 a.m. at Dryness’ office at the Corvallis FSL as transcribed by Jeff Fourier, 16-17; communication from Fred Swanson 27 April 1998.

⁴ Worthington, 164.
appointments could focus on their assignments, without the distraction of teaching, taking classes, or dealing with academic committees, and their future employment with the group depended on securing renewed funding from grants. Few of them could rely on a regular salary if the grants didn’t come through. With a large number of people working under similar pressures, the group developed a common culture of urgency to focus on the task at hand and produce results. This effort drew them together across disciplinary lines to secure ongoing support for the broader effort at the Andrews Forest. It was a formula for interdisciplinary collaboration, but it might just as easily have turned into a formula for disarray and rampant competitiveness.

A carefully structured core of salaried professionals held together the interdisciplinary group of scientists working on temporary appointments during the IBP. These salaried professionals designed an infrastructure that supported over 100 people who lived and worked at the Andrews Forest for prolonged periods during the field season. They built a tent city on a landscape they selected for its “pristine” and “natural” attributes representing the coniferous biome for the IBP. Others lived in rented trailers in nearby communities and commuted to work at the Andrews Forest. Researchers who lived in this scientific boomtown, paradoxically, constructed a community committed to the concept of long-term research and human occupation. In the mid 1970s, as that community weathered the transition from the IBP to other sources of funding, a few of the scientists working on “temporary” appointments at the experimental forest assumed more prominent leadership roles. In this period of transition from one generation of leadership to another, the group drew strength from those who were most vulnerable to the winds of change: scientists on temporary appointments. Together, they completed the transformation of the Andrews Forest from a Forest Service facility on the verge of elimination to a functional, outdoor laboratory where scientists enthusiastically congregated to support each other in their work.

National Policy and Growing Public Concern About Environmental Issues

The emergence of the Andrews Forest as a major site for interdisciplinary research was rooted in the contradictions of the political landscape and its influence on public lands policy in the early 1960s. Americans were increasingly ambivalent about science and technology in an era when the space race symbolized the hopes
of progress and the fear of nuclear destruction. Public concern about fallout from nuclear testing and dangerous chemicals polluting the natural environment challenged official optimism about scientific progress. By the 1960s, the United States was deeply mired in an international arms race and struggling with social unrest on the domestic front. In his 1960 election campaign, Kennedy claimed the Soviet Union had gained the advantage over the United States on several key fronts, but he argued that Americans could win the Cold War by unleashing untapped reservoirs of scientific talent and putting those skills to work on the “new frontiers” of science and industry.

Scientists who founded the IBP were deeply concerned about the ways in which science and technology accelerated ecological problems around the world, but rather than rejecting science, they optimistically hoped to harness its methods and technology in a global effort to catalogue and model “stable” natural systems (see footnotes 1 and 2). In the United States, scientists were caught up in a flurry of legislation, public debates, and administrative efforts to clarify how multiple-use mandates would translate into management policy for the national forests. The glaring lack of basic information about ecological processes and their effects on forest resources, however, undermined those efforts. Scientists needed more staff, resources, and funding to supply basic information to legislators and administrators, and the IBP was one way of structuring the flow of money to support that effort.

The Andrews group included scientists who relied on funding from federal agencies, from universities, and from outside grants. Each of these sources of funds included distinct benefits and drawbacks. Scientists with the Forest Service, for example, had permanent, civil service appointments with relatively secure prospects for long-term employment. That agency, however, disbursed funds only to support research projects that met specific information needs of land managers. This system required line-item approval for each proposed study. This meant that people like Rothacher could approve or disapprove funding for projects that people like Dyrness and Franklin required to support their field work. Their vegetation classification study at the Andrews Forest initially lacked such approval, although Rothacher unofficially allowed them to devote time and resources to that study. Eventually, however, even Rothacher required them to submit a formal research proposal for that work. Tenured university faculty also enjoyed relatively secure prospects for long-term employment, but much like their colleagues in federal
agencies, they also relied on a hierarchical funding structure. Campus administrators set budgeting priorities for staff and funded assistantships, and faculty had little influence over that process. Scientists with long-term appointments with the Forest Service or with a university also wrote grants to supplement agency funding. Scientists who secured grant funding gained more control over hiring and purchasing decisions, but they also assumed the administrative burden of managing those resources, and they could not guarantee long-term employment to the people they hired with such funding. Scientists who were secure in their own careers constantly struggled to procure the grants they needed to fund the people who staffed their research programs. The people recruited with this “soft-money” support from grants contributed skills otherwise not available, and they often supplied the innovative ideas and enthusiastic energy so necessary for securing additional grants. One key to the success of the Andrews group in this period was their ability to seamlessly integrate these different components (both “hard” and “soft” money) of the funding structure for work at the experimental forest.

The IBP dramatically expanded the funding available through grants, but the range of research that qualified for direct, budget-line funding from the Forest Service also broadened considerably in the 1960s. In the waning years of the Eisenhower administration, Congress responded to public enthusiasm for outdoor recreation and automobile camping by allocating $2.5 million to fund an Outdoor Recreation Resource Review Commission. The commission subsequently identified wilderness as a recreational resource. This definition strengthened the argument that wilderness was a legitimate management goal. The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 reinforced that argument, although it was the product of very different forces. Forest Service Chief McArdle and industry leaders involved in timber, mining, and grazing activities on national forests supported the act, and subsequently interpreted its multiple-use provisions primarily as a guarantee of future access. Nevertheless, the act directed the Forest Service to give equal consideration to outdoor recreation, range, timber, water, wildlife, and fish. In a compromise designed to thwart potential opposition from preservationists, the act also included the caveat that “establishment and maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent” with multiple use.

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5 Paul W. Hirt, *A Conspiracy of Optimism: Management of the National Forests Since World War Two* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 171-242, explores the evolution of this concept from the early 1950s through its application in the 1960s.
Sidebar 3.1: Vegetation Succession

The Issue: The sequential change in composition and structure of plant and animal communities through time in response to disturbance, establishment and growth, competition among plants, and mortality is called succession. Processes that alter the path of succession have long been of interest to scientists, forest managers, and other thoughtful observers, such as Henry David Thoreau, who first used the term "succession" in the mid 19th century.

The Roots: Succession in Douglas-fir forests of the Oregon Cascades proceeds over the protracted, even millennial, time scale of the presence of Douglas-fir in stands. Successional trajectories can be complicated by a great variety of disturbance processes, such as fire, wind, insect outbreaks, and disease. Practical issues also raise questions about processes of succession, such as defining old-growth forest for purposes of inventory and designing silvicultural approaches to enhance development of old-growth attributes in young, previously managed and natural stands.

The Approach: Studies of succession began with describing stands of various ages since the previous major disturbance. This "chronosequence" approach is supplemented by long-term, direct observation of stand development in vegetation plots, including some in postwildfire plots established as early as the 1910s and others in areas clearcut as early as the 1960s. Computer models have simulated successional sequences under different scenarios of natural disturbance and management influence. Silviculture experiments have been implemented in 20- to 50-year-old Douglas-fir plantations to explore effects on successional pathways, including the pace of development of old-growth conditions (Garman et al. 2003).

Results: The process of vegetation succession has taken on new importance as scientists, managers, and policymakers consider the consequences of climate change and issues of ecosystem restoration in areas affected by plantations, fire suppression, and other forms of management intervention. Some years ago, silvicultural practices were concerned with successional sequences extending only to 80 to 100 years, which was the rotation-length typical of federal forestry in the 1950s to the 1980s; however, the regional emphasis on old-growth forest conditions is extending that time horizon by additional centuries.
The wilderness provision expanded the range of disciplines and specialized studies that could be legitimately included in Forest Service Research budgets, just as the IBP expanded grant-funded ecological studies. Congress proposed wilderness legislation about the time debate began on the Multiple-Use Act and 4 years before it became law. When finally enacted in 1964, the Wilderness Act designated some 9 million acres as wilderness and required the Forest Service to recommend within 10 years whether an additional 5 million acres of national forest land should be added to that total. It also included a provision that the total acreage of national forest designated as wilderness under the terms of the act had to be substantially less acreage than the Forest Service previously managed as “wilderness, wild, and primitive.”6 In real terms, the Wilderness Act of 1964 actually required the Forest Service to reduce the amount of land designated and managed as wilderness on the national forests.

Growing support from the management side of the Forest Service further encouraged funding for ecological studies by Forest Service scientists. Forest managers with the Willamette National Forest, including Mike Kerrick at Blue River, faced immediate and vocal criticism when they initiated development in unroaded areas adjacent to wilderness areas defined in the 1964 act. Among other concerns, the Wilderness Act upped the ante in the long-simmering French Pete controversy on the Willamette National Forest. The French Pete issue originated well before the Wilderness Act of 1964. It began with public criticism of a Forest Service decision to reclassify the Three Sisters Primitive Area as the Three Sisters Wilderness Area and relocate the boundary of the unit. The boundary shift redefined a portion of the French Pete drainage as a designated primitive area adjacent to the wilderness area.

The controversy was an “educating moment” for Kerrick because, despite his argument that the decision to relocate the boundary was well founded, he agrees it was “never supported” by people he describes as “radical environmentalists.” Thereafter, he began to look for new ways to substantiate his decisions with concrete and “scientific” evidence that would convince even skeptics. In responding to subsequent preservationist challenges, Kerrick’s appreciation for scientific research transcended Ed Anderson’s attitude. Rather than deriding or dismissing scientific studies at the Andrews Forest, as Anderson was prone to do, Kerrick

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recalls he increasingly viewed those studies as useful tools. He argues that “good”
science was his best defense against those who questioned the policies he imple-
mented as district ranger at Blue River, beginning in January 1967. Under public
pressure, this manager of public lands discovered the value of data from studies
at the Andrews Forest, even though the scientists who generated that data did
d not necessarily agree how he used it or even his priorities of land management.7

Kerrick’s new appreciation for the Andrews Forest was a breakthrough in
thinking with the potential for opening a dialogue between scientists and forest
managers, but sudden managerial interest could not erase the effects of nearly a
decade of tense relations between forest managers and scientists. Given the empha-
sis on laboratory research at PNW Station, moreover, scientists in that unit had
little interest in closing the gap between researchers and managers at Blue River.
Scientists like Ted Dyrness, who began working at the Andrews Forest in the this
period, recall that in the early 1960s, interactions with forest managers at the Blue
River Ranger District were often less than cordial, and for that reason, he simply
tried to keep his distance while working there.

The Forest Service faced a rising tide of external criticism, close scrutiny,
and general mistrust from all quarters during the late 1960s. As part of the compro-
mise that facilitated passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964, Congress established
the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) and charged it with examining
policies pertaining to all public lands except Indian reservations.8 After a 5-year
investigation, the commission released a report that landed with a thud amidst Earth
Day preparations, passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
President Richard Nixon’s pronouncement in January 1970 that this would be the
“environmental decade.” It emphasized the need for Congress to reassert its con-
stitutional authority to manage public lands, and it accused federal agencies of
withdrawing and reserving public lands without adequate consultation with Con-
gress. The commission specifically argued that Congress should review all national
forest lands to determine which should be reserved to the federal government and
which should be transferred to state or private control. It proposed a “best-use”
policy that was heavily slanted in favor of timber production and favored an

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7 Interview with Mike Kerrick at his home near Springfield, OR, by Max Geier on 28
August 1996, 15-16; interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick by Max Geier on 28
August 1996 at Anderson’s home in Springfield, OR, 7-8; Rakestraw, History of the
Willamette National Forest, 111-115.

8 Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 231-233.
accelerated program for building access roads. The report concluded that “conser-
vative cutting practices” had resulted in “over-mature” forests, and it claimed
that the national forests were not particularly valuable for uses other than timber
production.\(^9\)

The commission’s recommendations ran counter to public enthusiasm for
environmental legislation and concern about past management practices by the late
1960s and early 1970s. Federal action included the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
(1968), the NEPA (1970), and the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency
(1970). Public protests against Forest Service strategies to promote reforestation
on the Bitterroot National Forest, including the practice of bulldozing terraces into
recently clearcut slopes, prompted a Congressional inquiry in 1969, with a particu-
lar focus on patterns of soil erosion and nutrient loss associated with clearcutting.
The Forest Service leadership, meanwhile, was preoccupied with PLLRC proposals
to move the agency into the U.S. Department of the Interior and create a new
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The Sierra Club capitalized
on the public mood with a counter-offensive against PLLRC proposals for “best-
use” management on national forest lands. Its legal challenges vigorously defended
a broad reading of multiple-use legislation in an effort to secure wilderness designa-
tions on the national forests and to place wilderness on a footing more equal to
other mandated forest uses, such as logging or game management. These chal-
 lenges further pressured the Forest Service to fund a broader range of ecological
studies. Dick Fredriksen’s earlier nutrient cycling and small watershed studies posi-
tioned the Andrews group to respond quickly to that challenge, building on those
earlier studies at the Andrews Forest and at Hubbard Brook.\(^10\)

The NEPA requirements that studies of potential environmental impacts must
precede any major action by federal agencies\(^11\) expanded the range of issues the
Forest Service, by statute, was required to investigate. The PNW Station responded

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\(^9\) Public Land Law Review Commission, *One Third of the Nation’s Land* (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1970); Roy M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-
1970* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), 466-469; Dana and Fairfax, *Forest
and Range Policy*, 232-234; Philip Berry and Michael McCloskey, “The Public Land
18-30.

Forest Service*, 328-329; Hirt, *Conspiracy of Optimism*, 245-247; communication from
Fred Swanson 15 September 2003.

\(^11\) Environmental Impact Statement requirements.
Sidebar 3.2: Small Watershed Hydrology

The Issue: Water enters a watershed by precipitation, may be temporarily stored in various sites in the watershed, is transferred through vegetation and soil back to the atmosphere, or may ultimately exit the watershed as streamflow or deep groundwater percolation. Change in vegetation conditions or waterflow paths, as may happen where roads are present, can alter this hydrologic system. Effects of vegetation and water routing can also vary in response to the climatic system affecting the watershed, such as the role of snow.

The Roots: The questions of how the hydrologic cycle operates in forest landscapes and how forest management affects water have roots that are centuries and even millennia deep. Use of small, experimental watersheds to address these questions began long before the Andrews Forest was established, though this approach was first used in the Pacific Northwest at the Andrews in the mid 1950s. Because of a succession of issues that can be addressed through analysis of long-term records from watershed studies, the experimental watersheds have been a critical meeting ground for scientists and managers in many disciplines (hydrology, biogeochemistry, plant succession), encouraging integrated work in that context. Both science and management questions concern effects of climate variability, vegetation, vegetation removal, and roads on total water yield, peak flows, and low flows. Despite decades of study, the issue of management effects on watersheds can still trigger heated debate (Beschta et al. 2000, Jones and Grant 1996, Thomas and Megahan 1998).

The Approach: Studies in small, experimental watersheds have long been used to elucidate the hydrologic cycle by examining water entering a watershed as precipitation, leaving as streamflow or evapotranspiration back to the atmosphere, and cycled and stored within the watershed. Effects of forest disturbance, forest regrowth, and roads on streamflow are measured with experimental treatments, such as removing vegetation and comparing streamflow from treated watersheds with untreated, control watersheds through time (Jones and Grant 1996). By studying sets of watersheds across ranges of elevation and latitude, effects of variation in snow hydrology and other factors that vary along these gradients can be assessed (Jones 2000).

Results: Although small watershed hydrology is a decades-old aspect of ecosystem science and management, watershed science is constantly finding new applications. New management issues emerge with changing forest practices, and new research opportunities arise as the length of hydrologic records increases, as vegetation succession proceeds into new states, as new analytical tools (like water aging and tracing techniques, and statistical methods for analyzing long-term records) become available, and as new science questions develop, such as how climate change is expected to affect hydrologic systems.
by increasing the level of support for ongoing studies and developing new programs. Station scientists scrambled to learn and use skills and methods from disciplines not previously considered relevant to the Forest Service mandate. The Station, for example, initiated a new, multiproject research program known as Forest Residues Reduction Systems, and it strengthened programs in recreation research and studies of biological methods for controlling forest insects. At the Andrews Forest, the trend toward interdisciplinary research was evident in the Forest Ecology project that Franklin headed, on the watersheds project that Rothacher headed with Logan Norris, and in the IBP. When they first started the drive to attract scientists to the Andrews Forest, however, Dyrness and Franklin had no way of knowing these forces would converge to support their efforts. In 1964, the landscape itself was their best ally.

The Flood of 1964 and Perceptions of Research Potential at the Andrews

Major flooding in the Willamette River basin in 1964, like the wilderness legislation of that year, made the Andrews Forest seem more relevant to the priorities of the Forest Service and of forest scientists. The flood was a force of nature that people could not ignore, and it was a reminder that people could not completely control nature, especially on an experimental forest. If the Andrews Forest was an outdoor laboratory, natural “disturbance” was an uncontrolled and unpredictable variable that could drastically affect the outcome of any experiment in that setting, no matter how carefully it was designed. Natural disturbances were many and varied. Two years before the 1964 flood, for example, the Columbus Day Storm downed an estimated 140 million board feet of timber on the Willamette National Forest, including the Andrews Forest. The downed timber caused logjams on rivers throughout the national forest, threatening property downstream, and causing localized flooding in riparian areas. Forest Service managers identified the downed timber as potential habitat for bark beetles, and they scheduled salvage sales in an effort to avert an expected beetle outbreak in commercial-grade timber nearby. Managers of the national forest were still struggling with the after-effects of the windstorm when the Christmas-week flood of 1964 began. That flood destroyed

12 Cowlin, 512-528; Dana and Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, 221-222, 241-242, 311-315; Steen, U.S. Forest Service, 328-329; communication from Fred Swanson 27April 1998.
The Christmas flood changed the physical appearance of the experimental forest.

The Christmas flood had personal as well as economic and ecological consequences. It changed the physical appearance of the experimental forest, it endangered field crews at the Andrews Forest, and it left physical evidence of its passage and indelible, personal recollections of its power. People familiar with the Andrews Forest suddenly found themselves on unfamiliar ground. Al Levno, then working for PNW Station as a technician assisting Dick Fredriksen at the Andrews Forest, had a view of the flood that was too close for comfort. He was working on a round-the-clock sampling routine on Watershed 3 when the storms hit in late December. The routine involved taking samples from streams at 3-hour intervals, 24 hours a day, using flashlights to climb down steep slopes after dark, crawling out onto narrow boards stretched over a stream, and then dipping a milk bottle into the water to get a fresh sample. Levno was driving out to the watershed with Fredriksen to begin that routine during a windy rainstorm at 1:00 a.m. on the

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Footnote:

13 Rakestraw, 101.
morning of December 21, 1964, when he noticed an enormous pile of debris and logs had piled up on the road where it crossed the stream, and he recalls, “we were really concerned and thought we ought to get the hell out of that place.”

Levno, who lived in Blue River and worked full-time at the Andrews Forest on a year-round basis, recalls the flood suddenly transformed the experimental forest from familiar woods to nightmarish chaos. He knew the logging roads and the landscape by heart, and together with Fredriksen, he plotted an escape route in the pitch-black darkness of the early morning storm. They drove back from Watershed 3 toward home, but halfway between Watershed 1 and Watershed 2, a debris slide blocked the road. It was 10 or 12 feet deep with mud and rocks, and it was too wet and slippery to cross, even on foot. Instead, they drove back to the first slide they had seen blocking the stream crossing on Watershed 3. They intended to climb across the logs tangled in that slide, and then walk up the road to an old log bridge that crossed Lookout Creek near that location. From there, they would be able to climb through logging unit B134, up a 1,000-foot ridge to the B130 logging road, and then walk to the main Forest Service Road 15. From there, it was a 4-mile walk to the McKenzie highway and a 3-mile walk to Blue River. This well-considered plan was based on their intimate knowledge of the Andrews Forest, but it didn’t work. Levno describes the trek as a “very noisy and confusing ordeal.” His eyeglasses were fogged up and covered with water as he walked in the dark through pouring rain in a driving windstorm. He heard big boulders “bouncing along the bedrock bottom” of Lookout Creek. The creek itself was “roaring,” old-growth trees crashed to the ground as they stumbled by, and Levno heard “the roar of several landslides … all around us.” Several landslides slumped away in the logging unit as they climbed through, creating enormous sinkholes of mud and debris. Levno stumbled upon one of these in the dark and would have fallen in if Fredriksen hadn’t grabbed him by the collar and pulled him back.

The nightmarish scramble through a shattered landscape continued after Levno and Fredriksen escaped the experimental forest. They finally reached the McKenzie Highway around 4:00 in the morning, 3 hours after they first realized their dangerous predicament, but floodwaters completely blocked their way. Fredriksen, Levno recalls, was a “big strapping guy—6-foot-6 or something like that,” and he tried to wade through the floodwaters. Levno, about half a foot shorter, followed behind.

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14 Interview with Al Levno by Max G. Geier on 12 September 1996 at 1:00 p.m., at the Corvallis FSL, as transcribed By Jeff Prater, 5-6.
15 Interview with Al Levno, 6-7; communication from Al Levno 3 November 1999.
with Fredriksen’s dog trailing him. As they waded in deeper, Levno suddenly noticed the dog floating by in the rushing current, headed for the open river. Fredriksen grabbed the dog by the tail, and they headed back to higher ground. They eventually reached a nearby farmhouse, where they waited for the floodwaters to subside.\textsuperscript{16}

The 1964 flood disrupted elegant theories about forest management as well as physical infrastructure and research facilities at the experimental forest. On the eve of the IBP, scientists discovered they didn’t know as much as they thought they knew about ecological processes in the Oregon Cascades. The big storm tested the group’s watershed management practices, and researchers and district staff at Blue River gained pragmatic insights about the experimental roads, clearcuts, and other projects previously installed at the Andrews. Anderson and Kerrick were surprised at the consequences of the flood in areas where roads, flumes, and sediment ponds were constructed on Watershed 3 during the early 1950s and then “calibrated” for nearly a decade until the watershed was roaded in 1959 and logged in 1962. About 25 percent of the watershed was hi-lead logged in three staggered clearcuts averaging about 20 acres each. The experimental logging plan included an upper and a middle logging road, along with the main road at the bottom. The 1964 flood, Kerrick observes, showed that midslope “wasn’t a very good place to put roads.” During the flood, the middle road failed, and Kerrick argues it “created more problems than Watershed 1.” In comparison with the partial cutting on Watershed 3, Watershed 1 had been completely clearcut with a skyline logging system designed to minimize the dragging that scarred landscapes logged with high-lead methods. Logging on Watershed 1 was recent and ongoing by the time the flood hit, but it was relatively unaffected by comparison with Watershed 3, where the stream flume installed in 1953 was buried beneath 14 feet of debris in the 1964 event. After the flood, technicians exhumed the flume, and it continued to generate streamflow data for the next 35 years.\textsuperscript{17}

Scientists at the Andrews generally agreed with the managerial lessons Kerrick drew from the 1964 slides on Watershed 3, but the flood also created new research opportunities. The fact that most of the erosion was connected with roads, rather than logging, Dyrness observes, “was a real eye-opener.” After the 1964 event, the

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\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Al Levno, 6-7; communication from Al Levno 3 November 1999.
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\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Ed Anderson and Mike Kerrick, 2-3. Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 39; communication from Ted Dyrness 15 April 1998; communication from Fred Swanson 27 April 1998.
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The Andrews group initiated a full-scale inventory of landslides on the experimental forest, and they concluded that mass soil movements of the type Levno encountered during the storm, rather than surface effects from rainfall, were the primary mechanisms of erosion in that drainage. Fredriksen had reached similar conclusions 5 years earlier, and his brief paper on a slide he studied was published shortly before the 1964 event. The postflood landslide inventory confirmed his findings, and in the aftermath of the landslide inventory, PNW Station adjusted its recommendations for road location and design to reduce the threat of mass movement associated with logging roads.  

The Andrews group reevaluated its data-gathering priorities after the 1964 flood and secured new funds to monitor stream levels, but technical problems forced them to decide between new technology or the long-term integrity of the data they were collecting. The PNW Station provided “flood money” that funded the purchase of automated, digital recorders that registered stream levels on a punch-tape. The group purchased scores of these recorders and connected them with stream gages, but they soon discovered the new technology generated data that was incompatible with research needs. Among other problems, field technicians could not read the punch tapes onsite, and the taped records were not directly comparable to hydrographic charts that earlier field workers had compiled with simpler mechanical devices. When they realized the problem, the watersheds team removed all of the new recorders and replaced them with the older, “A35” machines that had worked since the early 1950s. The group preferred to admit they had made a mistake in purchasing the new technology, rather than compromise the long-term integrity of the monitoring effort. Recognizing the need to maintain and protect their A35s while preparing them for long-term, continuous use, the group sent their technicians to train with the manufacturer of that device,
and they purchased and stockpiled a reserve of those older machines. Over the next 35 years, technicians salvaged parts from damaged A35s and used them to repair and replace other machines. The data stream, as a result, remained comparable across decades of record management.

Beyond generating new insights and enthusiasm for field research, the 1964 flood undermined management claims that Research was simply retilling old fields

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in search of answers to questions that had already been answered. It forced scientists to consider how the Lookout Creek watershed itself was changing and how apparent changes resulted from a chain of contingent events. That realization opened the door for a new range of science questions.\textsuperscript{21} Among its other effects, the flood prompted the group to shift the emphasis of research on the small watersheds from annual water production, streamflow, sediment, and nutrients, to an event-oriented model, in which the chronology of disruptions in the past could have an effect on the later characteristics of the ecosystem, and the sequence of events could dramatically affect the outcome. The new model took into account, for example, whether a big flood, or a heavy, wet snow occurred in the 1\textsuperscript{st}, 10\textsuperscript{th}, or 13\textsuperscript{th} year after the most recent logging activities on a watershed.\textsuperscript{22}

The PNW Station and Adjustments at the Andrews Forest After the Flood

Proposals to close the Andrews dissolved after the flood reenergized watershed management research on the experimental forest. The flood, ongoing efforts to include the site as a component of the IBP, and Meagher’s retirement in March 1968, virtually extinguished the argument at PNW Station that the Andrews had fulfilled its function and outlived its usefulness. Tarrant suggests that the initial proposal for shutting down the experimental forest originated with administrative concerns about staffing shortages, the pervasive “throw things out” mentality of postwar American culture, and Meagher’s personal bias that studies of old-growth were unnecessary because, in Tarrant’s words, “second growth is … all there’s gonna be left.”\textsuperscript{23} At one point, Franklin recalls, “Meagher told us to pull all the tags on the permanent plots. … He said, ‘… we don’t need those growth and yield plots anymore, and I want you to go pull the tags on them, so that no one can ever go back and remeasure them.’ [laughter] Of course, we didn’t do it.”\textsuperscript{24}

Efforts to block closure of the experimental forest dovetailed with an opportunity to tap into funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF) for the U.S. component of the IBP. The Andrews was “on the bubble” to be eliminated by PNW Station between 1964, when the IBP was formally launched, and 1967, when the

\textsuperscript{21} Small watersheds group interview, 8.
\textsuperscript{22} Small watersheds group interview, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{24} Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 22.
first round of requests for proposals for the IBP in the United States went out from
the NSF. Franklin and Dyrness both credit Rothacher with leading the ultimately
successful fight to “save the Andrews.” During the same period, PNW Station also
targeted the South Umpqua Experimental Forest for closure and eventually reduced
its size to four experimental watersheds, collectively known as the Coyote Creek
watersheds. The successful strategy for saving the Andrews Forest from a similar
fate revolved around a plan to attract other scientists to the place while securing
NSF funding to support an interdisciplinary program of research there under the
IBP umbrella.25

The tentative proposal to close the experimental forest was aborted without
any direct statement or decision from PNW Station, and it may have died simply
because no one stepped forward to push it through. Franklin considers the pro-
posal a trial balloon that would have gone through if no one had opposed it, but

25 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 21; communication from Fred Swanson
27 April 1998.
Silen argues that in the particular case of the Andrews, it failed largely because it lacked an advocate with decisionmaking authority: “I don’t think anybody was in a position to do anything who was close to it.” The apparent lack of administrative enthusiasm to return the Andrews to the national forest was far from a ringing cry of endorsement or funding to support more research at the experimental forest, but it was a significant improvement over previous attitudes of indifference, or efforts to discredit the need for further research. By the mid 1960s, managers clearly wanted Research on their side, if not in their corner, but mutual mistrust of motives and purpose barred any rapprochement with the new generation of Corvallis-based scientists whose interests centered on the Andrews Forest, through the 1970s. In the interim, the group secured a greater degree of self-confidence in their methods and abilities to secure funding independent of the Forest Service, and they subsequently avoided falling back into a management-support role.

Any rapprochement, such as it was, focused more on relations between individual scientists with PNW Station and OSU than between the Research Branch and the NFS. Dyrness, for example, argues that the IBP was the turning point for initiating constructive engagement with forest managers at the district and forest level, primarily because it increased the visibility of scientific research for students in forestry programs that trained future managers for the Forest Service. Tarrant also argues that, although events like the 1964 flood may have stimulated a change in thinking about the experimental forest as a Research resource, individuals and academic networks played a larger role.

One of the more obvious differences between scientists and forest managers at Blue River was simply a matter of corporate culture. Station scientists at the Andrews operated with fewer constraints on their day-to-day activities, whereas forest managers at the Blue River Ranger District had to follow rules and regulations that were more narrowly defined and more closely monitored. Dyrness, for example, recalls a feeling of relative freedom at the experimental forest, observing, “Sometimes, Jerry and I were surprised at what we could do with no repercussions.”29 As the number of scientists working on study sites at the Andrews Forest increased with the advent of the IBP in the late 1960s, however, Rothacher recognized the need to coordinate activities to avoid situations where one study might

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27 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 16-17.
29 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 43.
damage another. In an effort to maximize opportunities for complementary studies while minimizing the potential for studies that conflicted with other research efforts, he set up a map at the ranger station, with “verboten” areas marked on it in green pencil, delineating established study areas. With the advent of the IBP, the group planned to focus on Watershed 10, and they implemented a bewildering system of colored flags to delineate different study sites and avoid conflicts on that watershed. This concern, among others, eventually led to the decision to hire Art McKee as site coordinator, and McKee recalls he struggled to get a grip on the “chaotic” situation when he first arrived on the scene.30

The International Biological Programme and Interdisciplinary Initiatives

The eventual proposal to include the Andrews Forest in the Coniferous Biome of the IBP named Franklin and Waring as co-principle investigators for a major grant from the NSF. This pairing brought together OSU (Waring) and Forest Service (Franklin) interests for a cooperative effort at the Andrews Forest. Dyrness notes that Franklin led the charge in rounding up campus-wide support at OSU for the IBP initiative. Franklin arranged a meeting of all interested faculty on the Corvallis campus to explore the possibility of supporting the Andrews Forest as “the” intensive study site for the Coniferous Biome Project of the IBP. The most important obstacle to that plan was a similar proposal from the University of Washington that sought to pre-empt the leadership of the Coniferous Biome and exclude the site backed by OSU.31

Any initial hopes for establishing the Andrews Forest as the exclusive study site for the Coniferous Biome of the IBP dimmed in 1968 when Franklin, Waring, and others from OSU met at Pack Forest, near Seattle, with Dale Cole, Stan Gessel, and other scientists from the University of Washington. In that meeting, Waring recalls, he and everyone else who represented sites beyond the Seattle area began to realize that the University of Washington had the upper hand and “there wouldn’t be much off-site.” Waring concedes “there were some good people at the University of Washington,” but he didn’t think a proposal centered on University of Washington facilities was broad enough to develop the kinds of models needed for

30 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 21-22; small watersheds group interview, 17.
31 Small watersheds group interview, p. 17.
the IBP. He and other attendees, consequently, quickly organized a counter-proposal that would produce a more balanced model of the coniferous biome.32

The counter-proposal that Waring and Franklin engineered at the 1968 meeting included the Andrews Forest as one of three major sites for the Coniferous Biome. That outcome, however, required a risky move on the part of the Corvallis group. As Franklin explains, the Andrews group was “willing to hold it hostage if we didn’t get a significant piece of the action.” Relations between the University of Washington and OSU factions were so contentious, he recalls, that NSF administrators warned him, “either Seattle and Corvallis get it together or there will be no Coniferous Forest Biome.”33 Franklin’s group subsequently issued what amounted to an ultimatum, threatening to scuttle the entire biome proposal if the Andrews Forest was not included. Ultimately, it was included, along with Findlay Lake and Cedar River Watershed, which were located more conveniently for scientists based in Seattle.34

The human legacy of respectful stewardship, ongoing research, and scientific potential at the Andrews tipped the balance toward the Lookout Creek drainage during negotiations over the location of sites for the Coniferous Biome. Waring notes that Gashwiler’s wildlife studies, among others, gave the Andrews Forest an important edge over some other proposed sites. Norm Anderson, who represented the OSU Biology Department at the Pack Forest meeting, however, also argues that he and his OSU colleague, Jim Hall, together with Rothacher, “dreamed up” the aquatic component of the Coniferous Biome Project and proposed to locate it at Mack Creek on the Andrews Forest. These features strengthened Franklin’s efforts to slow down the “UW juggernaut” during the 1968 meeting.35 McDonald Forest, which was administered by the OSU College of Forestry and located nearby on the outskirts of Corvallis, was a possible alternative as an intensive study site for the Coniferous Biome Project. The Andrews Forest, however, had ongoing wildlife studies, including exclosures to keep out birds, deer, and rodents, and it also had gauged watersheds. Cost considerations, moreover, drove management decisions at the McDonald Forest, where the College of Forestry frequently scheduled timber

32 Interview with Dick Waring by Max G. Geier on 26 September 1997 at Waring’s office in Peavy Hall at Oregon State University, as transcribed by Linda Hahn, 3-4.
33 Small watersheds group interview, 16-17.
34 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 13.
35 Interview with Dick Waring, 7.
sales to generate revenue for the school. “It was much more difficult,” Waring concludes, “to control an experiment on McDonald Forest than on the Andrews, even though the Andrews was much farther away and on federal land.”36

The forced merger between the contending research groups at the University of Washington and OSU essentially divided the Coniferous Biome into two groups with separate administrative centers in Seattle and Corvallis governing three intensive research sites in Oregon and Washington. Fred Swanson, who joined the Andrews group in the early years of the IBP on a postdoctoral appointment at the University of Oregon and later rose to a leadership position at the Corvallis Forestry Sciences Laboratory, notes that despite the forced merger, the two groups took

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36 Communication from Fred Swanson 27 April 1998. Riparian group interview of Linda Ashkenas, Art McKee, Stan Gregory, Norm Anderson, George Lienkaemper with Max Geier on 21 November 1997 at the FSL, in Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Elizabeth Foster, 1; interview with Dick Waring, 2-3.
divergent paths. The Seattle group, he observes, “were hunkered on a lake [Findlay Lake], and hunkered on stands on glacial outwash [Cedar Creek] where there wasn’t an aquatic component.” Both of those locations, he argues, were “pretty limited” in their potential for ecosystems research as compared with the more diverse landscape of the Andrews Forest. That physical advantage, Swanson concludes, may help to explain why a more interdisciplinary ecosystem team developed at the Andrews Forest, although he suspects that the reason for that different outcome may be more sociological than geographical.37

The Coniferous Biome Project dramatically changed the sociological profile of the Andrews in ways that distinguished the Andrews group from other IBP sites, and those changes help explain the gradual emergence of an interdisciplinary, pragmatic emphasis at the Andrews Forest. Waring, Franklin, and Dyrness scrambled to recruit people who could fill the particular niches required for the Biome Project because, as Dyrness observes, “We needed people with new expertise and interests that we didn’t have in our little group.”38 They had few options, because Waring and other OSU faculty associated with the Coniferous Biome were mostly junior faculty. Graduate students tended to gravitate toward more senior faculty, but postdoctoral associates followed the grant money, not the personality. The University of Washington component of the Coniferous Biome relied more heavily on tenured faculty and their graduate students. Over the first 5 years of the Biome Project, Waring weeded out some full professors and graduate students from the OSU contingent and replaced them with an interdisciplinary group of postdoctoral recruits that included Chuck Grier, Kermit Cromack, Phil Sollins, Fred Swanson, Jim Sedell, and Frank Triska. Stan Gregory, who began working with the group as a student in this period, later continued on a postdoctoral appointment. These people, Waring suggests, were more willing and able to work across disciplinary boundaries than the people they replaced.39

Waring admits that interdisciplinary cooperation was an accidental consequence, not the driving motivation of this demographic restructuring—he was simply operating in a crisis mode: “You know, if we don’t do this, then we can’t go to the national meeting, we can’t renew the grant. … I mean, we had to show what … [we were] doing. … ‘cause these were BIG grants.” The first grants

37 Communication from Fred Swanson 27 April 1998; small watersheds group interview, 16-17.
38 Small watersheds group interview, 16.
39 Interview with Dick Waring, 3, 6.
totaled upwards of half a million dollars at a time when a full-time, tenure-track assistant professor at OSU was earning about $12,000 a year, and the NSF sent reviewers to Corvallis to talk to all the research assistants and verify how they fit into the larger project. It was a closely monitored process, and Waring considered postdoctoral associates a safer risk than graduate students, because they were more interchangeable and would begin with a stronger initial base of knowledge, with more self-confidence and experience in developing hypotheses and story lines, while enjoying more freedom and time to interact with other members of the project. Most importantly, they could be recruited for skills specific to the needs of the research project.⁴⁰ The down side, of course, was that overreliance on postdocs would limit opportunities for graduate students to participate in funded, professional-caliber research, and this tendency might gradually distance the project from the central mission and purpose of the university and thereby limit access to permanent, tenure-track appointments or state funding for its participants.

Budget-driven concerns and the need to show NSF reviewers concrete results also drove much of the early thinking about how to structure IBP research at the Andrews Forest. Lead scientists at the experimental forest had little experience administering budgets of that size and limited training or experience in conducting integrated ecosystems research. The early IBP work at the Andrews Forest, consequently, focused mostly on descriptive analysis. This orientation served the modeling emphasis of the program, but it also was a derivative of long-term field studies at Lookout Creek and of more established programs elsewhere in the United States. Small watershed studies already underway at the Hubbard Brook Experimental Forest (near Woodstock, New Hampshire), Coweeta Hydrologic Laboratory (near Otto, North Carolina), and the Andrews Forest, Swanson notes, were “somewhat parallel and continue that way today,” and they included “some inter-site comparative studies” during the IBP. Franklin particularly credits scientists at Hubbard Brook with showing the way, observing, “… a lot of it started there with a refinement and an expansion of the small watershed idea.” During the IBP, he notes, “everybody got into it, but they came at it, initially, through [hydrologic and nutrient] budgets. Because no one had any intelligent questions to ask about ecosystems, so, ‘Okay, let’s describe them.’” From that base, he concludes, “we very quickly found very interesting kinds of things about which we could make hypotheses and about which we could experiment.”⁴¹

⁴⁰ Interview with Dick Waring, 3, 6, 7; communication from Fred Swanson 27 April 1999.
⁴¹ Communication from Fred Swanson 27 April 1998; Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 33.
The concept of long-term research and its goals and methods evolved from these early interactions among the research group at the Andrews. Franklin notes that the climate for long-term research had improved by the late 1960s: “The only vision of long-term, ecological research [in 1962],” he observes, “was probably the vision of the small watershed studies and permanent plots.” Gordon Grant, a Forest Service hydrologist involved with the watersheds program at the Andrews in later decades, agrees with Franklin’s assessment, crediting Hubbard Brook scientists, notably Likens and Bormann, with “putting these forest issues out there, and having them blessed as major science issues in their own right.” Dyrness adds that Fredriksen’s interest in the chemical composition of streamwater originated when Likens visited the Andrews Forest in 1966: “I remember taking him [Likens] around out at the Andrews, and he was saying what they were doing, and of course, they were concentrating on nitrates … in the water.” He remembers Dick [Fredriksen] becoming interested, and saying, “Hey! We can do the same thing here. We should be doing it.” Fredriksen proceeded to set up a 4-year study on Watersheds 9 and 10 as part of his Ph.D. thesis.

After securing IBP support with a proposal modeled after other sites, the Andrews group moved in a more independent direction, challenging provocative theories with place-centered testing at Lookout Creek. Dyrness, who notes the community of watershed hydrologists in the United States was “fairly tight-knit,” recalls thinking the Hubbard Brook area was “very much different than the Andrews in terms of soil conditions and so on.” The work at Hubbard Brook was not just logging and then allowing natural revegetation, as Silen had done at the Andrews Forest. Scientists at the New Hampshire facility found vast amounts of nitrates in a logged watershed where researchers applied herbicides for several years to suppress vegetation in an effort to better understand its role in regulating nutrient release in that system. Their scientific findings seemed to support environmentalist arguments that clearcutting was an inappropriate and ecologically harmful management practice. Scientists at the Andrews Forest, however, argued that these findings from New England were not necessarily applicable to conditions in the Cascade Range. They did not defend clearcut logging, but they did argue that scientists had not studied the ecological effects of clearcut logging in the Oregon Cascades sufficiently to provide an informed and scientifically credible assessment.

\[^2\] Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 33.
\[^3\] Small watersheds group interview, 3-4, 18.
of its ecological effects in that region. The Andrews group stressed the need for studies designed specifically for the unique attributes of these Douglas-fir forests, noting that western conifer forests may respond differently than eastern deciduous forests. They were also concerned that several years of intensive herbicide treatment may not accurately mimic clearcutting. In part, theirs was a pragmatic move. As activist groups, including the Sierra Club, began to file lawsuits challenging Forest Service contracts for clearcut logging on national forest lands, both sides in the legal dispute demanded more detailed and more credible scientific studies of specific Western forests.

Scientific Community and Coordination of IBP Science

The people who converged on the Andrews Forest during the IBP had to reconcile the pragmatic, timber-management traditions of the forestry program at OSU with the emerging priorities of ecosystem research during the IBP. Scientists involved with the Coniferous Biome Project worked to develop the niche they had established for the Andrews in relation to other sites in the IBP, and in relation to OSU, the Forest Service, and their colleagues at the University of Washington. Applied science traditions in the OSU College of Forestry unavoidably shaped their sense of purpose, as the Andrews Forest gradually attracted a “critical mass” of personnel, recognition, and interest. The result was a science-oriented, research community where personal networks and loyalties were at least as important as institutional affiliations. The core of that community was a small group of scientists who recruited support through close colleagues and mentors. Those personalized patterns of recruitment tended to perpetuate and reinforce established traditions and priorities, rather than rootless experimentation. People whose graduate work included studies with leading scientists like Don Zobel and Chet Youngberg, Dyrness observes, tended to recruit others with similar experiences. The recruitment process, he notes, often originated with a scientist who had identified an interesting research question on the Andrews. That scientist, Dyrness recalls, would then telephone one or more contacts, asking, “Do you have graduate students who would be interested in working on it?” … That’s the way it went, but very, very personalized."

44 Insertions in Dyrness quotes from communication from Dyrness 15 April 1998; interview with Al Levno, 7-8; small watersheds group interview, 5-6.

The Andrews group used the big-budget funding of the IBP to support their strategy of recruiting new associates, and that strategy reinforced later perceptions that field research at the Andrews Forest was a relatively unstructured social experience. They recruited people with a common scientific bent and philosophical orientation of scholarly curiosity about scientific processes and informal, unstructured, and spontaneous, interdisciplinary exchange, but who specialized in rather different fields. Dyrness observes, “… that was the fun of it. You got to have people working on different things. Small mammal people talking to … the silviculturists and … measuring fire intervals and talking to the vegetation classifiers, and … all that kind of stuff.” Members of the Andrews group later drew on their positive experiences with the high-energy, interdisciplinary, group-oriented research of the IBP years as they tried to consciously replicate the IBP model of “unplanned” collaborative interaction. Franklin, for example, rallied a subset of the group to participate in a series of focused, professional field experiences that members of the group refer to as “pulses.” Dyrness explains the “pulse idea” originated in 1973 with the concept “that we could go other places [away from the Andrews] and have this same kind of interaction going on. … and we worked together all day, and then [sat] around the campfire at night, saying what you’d observed and what questions you had.”

Waring also emphasized the socializing benefits of the IBP in an internal paper he wrote at the time. Clarifying his perception of the primary benefits to be expected from participation in the Coniferous Biome, Waring predicted, “… the most valuable product of the International Biological Program in the United States will not be the systems models that will aid in making decisions concerning land and water management but the training of the people that will bridge the communication gap between disciplines and institutions.” Referring to that report two decades later, Waring cautions, “… it wasn’t necessarily a consensus from … [the] University of Washington. … [but],”that’s what we put out at that time so people could see how the thing was organized.” He notes that it was important to convey the structure of the group and its program to NSF reviewers in the political climate of the early 1970s, when “… most people didn’t think it [the IBP] was going to be a good investment.” Among other concerns, Waring concludes, critics argued the models were “too complex,” and he agrees, “all of that’s true, okay? [chuckle] It’s only when you look at the legacy of the next generation and how they were able to do

“The International Biological Program in the United States will not bridge the communication gap between disciplines and institutions.”

46 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 24-25.
better and integrate and ... begin to see applications where other people didn’t ... that you could really evaluate it.” The IBP, in his view, was “sort of like bringing up kids. ... you’re not sure when they’re in high school whether you want them to grow up [chuckles]. But you better wait a while because you have a big investment.”

Decisions about where and how to allocate funds were more restrained. The amount of money involved, and the professional interest that the IBP and Coniferous Biome Project attracted, forced project leaders to refine and focus their mission, and even to exclude funding for people considered outside the scope of the project’s purpose. After the Andrews group was successful in “elbowing their way in [to the IBP],” Franklin notes, “… We had to work through what we were going to do to allow for a piece of the action.” He asserts, “I had always been looking for ways to get money to study old growth,” and, he argues, “There wasn’t any question that a lot of the scientists that were involved in the initial workshop in 1968 were interested in old growth, were interested in natural forests. And clearly, ... that was what we were interested in by the time we got our first money in 1969.”

47 Interview with Dick Waring, 6-8.
48 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 13-14.
Other scientists with the Andrews group argue that Franklin tends to overemphasize the role of conscious planning in positioning the Andrews for the old-growth debates of later years. Art McKee, who was the first person Franklin and Waring hired with funding from the IBP grants, suggests for example, that accessibility and not foresight positioned the Andrews Forest as a place relevant to research questions dealing with the old-growth debate in later years. Fredriksen, he observes, “invested a lot of energy and time into describing watersheds, which were being set up for manipulation so we could do energy flow [and] nutrient [analysis] on those watersheds. The stage was set and he had chosen them because of their ease of access, not because of what kind of vegetation they have.” McKee further stresses that during the early IBP years of the 1970s the group committed much of its budgetary resources to studies in plantations or young stands, rather than in old growth, despite the fact that less than one-third of the Andrews was young stands. Neither the prominence of old growth on the Andrews, he contends, nor the predisposition of scientists necessarily led in the direction of old-growth studies. Rather, people like Fredriksen established study sites near well-traveled roads that provided wintertime access to gauging stations. Watersheds 9 and 10, he points out, had the advantage of being adjacent to a major logging road that was not even on the Andrews Forest: “Nothing is plowed in the wintertime and this usually had logging traffic and I suppose it [winter snow] was pounded flat or kept flat.”

Even if early scientists were mostly concerned with problems of access and convenience, when the group rapidly expanded the number and variety of research activities during the IBP, they had to think more systematically about where and how to structure study sites. Waring, who was the initial site director for the IBP, found his time commitments at OSU conflicted with the need for careful management at the Andrews Forest. Together with Franklin, Waring decided to hire a site-coordinator-in-residence at the Andrews. The person they selected to fill the position was Art McKee—a graduate student from Vermont and Maine, by way of Georgia. McKee worked with Yale ecologist George Woodwell on a nutrient cycling study at Brookhaven National Laboratory before he entered the graduate program at the University of Georgia, and he seemed a good fit with their evolving plans for implementing the IBP at the Andrews Forest. McKee recalls he was in a

49 Interview with Art McKee by Max Geier on 12 September 1996 in McKee’s office at the Corvallis FSL as transcribed by Jeff Fourier, 1-2.

50 Interview with Dick Waring, 9-10.
“pretty tight financial bind” at the time, and he accepted the position more for the paycheck and the promise that he would be free to pursue his own research interests than for any other reason.51

McKee is a good example of how the personal networks of recruitment operated in the early 1970s. Waring and Franklin wanted someone with an established

51 Interview with Art McKee, 4, 7, 12.
record in the IBP who could hit the ground running and help them get the Conifer-ous Biome operational at the Andrews. Although McKee had not completed his doctoral program at Georgia, leading scientists connected with eastern components of the IBP recommended him highly. His sponsors in the IBP establishment, in fact, contacted Waring and Franklin before they even began their search, asking, “We have a person … who’d like to come west and [he is] interested, are you?” Waring recalls, “I said, ‘well yeah!’” McKee’s introduction to the informality and spontaneity of the Andrews group occurred in a bar near the University of Georgia. Franklin and Waring had asked Fredriksen to “sound out” McKee during a visit to Georgia and the Coweeta laboratory. McKee, who was seated at a table in the bar, recalls that Fredriksen, whom he had never met, “… staggered up there to the table and bellowed, ‘Are you Art McKee?’” McKee recalls thinking, “Who is this guy?” He later discovered Fredriksen’s drunken act was a put-on, and that some mutual acquaintances associated with the group had put him up to it. It was his first indication that he was a candidate for the position.

From McKee’s perspective, he arrived at the Andrews Forest almost by accident, but personal networks tied him to the Andrews group even before he realized they were in operation. Once there, he served as a “scientist in the field” who was expected to coordinate and support research activities at the experimental forest. He describes his responsibilities as “… sort of a super-technician’s position, where people already had these ideas, and … I was … trying to organize myself and other technicians to collect the numbers.” At the time, he recalls, he had “no intellectual investment in the program.” He initially saw his job as a series of relatively “menial” tasks limited to building “support mechanisms,” although it “very quickly became more professional.”

The Andrews Forest gained a stable presence and long-term advocate over the next three decades with the appointment of McKee, who embodied a complex mix of continuing traditions dating back to Silen’s time there. McKee eventually gained faculty appointment at OSU, and after 1978 he moved into the Site Director’s role at the Andrews Forest. His deep, personal roots in New England and professional experience in the northeastern and southeastern centers of ecosystems research added depth to the growing assortment of scientific pedigrees in the Andrews group. His background at the University of Georgia included work in the Arctic

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52 Interview with Dick Waring, 10.
53 Interview with Art McKee, 3-5.
54 Interview with Art McKee, 8-9.
with plant physiologist Philip Johnson, who was his major professor, and he also
had worked with Dick Wiegert, studying thermal ecosystems at Yellowstone. His
pragmatic attention to detail and enthusiastic enchantment with the aesthetic appeal
of the forested public lands of the Pacific Northwest resonate with the best at-
tributes Silen and Gratkowski brought to the Andrews Forest. His emphasis on
applied research also dovetailed with ingrained traditions at OSU and at the exper-
imental forest. Like Franklin, his family tree included ties to the timber industry, and
he observes his mother’s family, “nearly lost a fortune in lumber.” He also brought
a Yankee commitment to craft and workmanship to the Andrews group.55

Over the next three decades, McKee emerged as one of several prominent
leaders who first joined the Andrews during the IBP. His personal characteristics
strongly influenced the way new recruits perceived the group and the experimental
forest. Several generations of scientists relied on his expertise as they acclimated
themselves to that community over the next 30 years. Another long-time associate
of the Andrews Forest, Andy Moldenke, who worked with McKee in the IBP at
other sites before they both wound up at Lookout Creek, argues that McKee is one
of the most critical factors behind the long-term success of the Andrews group. He
argues that scientific community tends to arrive at “fundamental realizations … a
lot easier than most other interdisciplinary groups,” and he attributes that character-
istic primarily to McKee’s role as a dominant personality: “He is the one element
who is really responsible for the way different people talk to one another in …
different disciplines. … he is the glue that holds it together.”56

The reputation of the Andrews Forest and the group associated with it were
scarcely sufficient to recruit and hold world-class scientists in the early 1970s.
The place was less than compelling for someone stepping onto the scene fresh
from the more plush appointments of established programs like Hubbard Brook,
Woods Hole, Coweeta, or Yale University. Idealized images of the pristine North-
west also conflicted with McKee’s initial impressions of what he describes as a
“Neanderthal environmental ethic” in the Pacific Northwest at that time. In the
context of the wave of environmentalism that was sweeping the country in the
early 1970s, McKee recalls thinking that Franklin and others in the Andrews

55 Interview with Art McKee, 7.
56 Interview with Andrew Moldenke by Max Geier on 14 Nov 1997 in Cordley Hall at
Oregon State University, as transcribed by Elizabeth Foster, 13.
group were “sympathetic, but not sensitive. They were listening to it and it resonated, but they weren’t actively engaged.” In comparison with other IBP sites where he worked before 1970, McKee suggests, the Andrews group tended to be reacting to environmental initiatives, not leading the way.\(^57\)

Scientists working at the Andrews Forest after McKee began working there in 1970 benefited from his efforts to improve its substandard support facilities. When McKee first arrived at the Blue River from the University of Georgia and saw the ill-equipped office assigned to him in the ranger station, he started brainstorming solutions to the problem of inadequate research facilities: “I was thinking mobile home, prefab homes.” It was, he recalls, an overwhelming problem: “Big program, big ideas, and zero facilities to work in.” McKee improvised an administrative center for the scientific boomtown near the confluence of Lookout Creek and Blue River: “We bought one trailer one year, one trailer the next. Put up the warehouse to house things at the site, got a couple of camper trailers on extended rental for people to work out of in the field.” McKee also purchased a variety of camping gear “… so that people could work out of tents and so on. [We] designated a campground area on the forest.”\(^58\)

The campground was a low-technology strategy for meeting human needs and building a sense of community at the forest during the field season. McKee built kitchens and outhouses in and around the many windthrows in the old-growth setting of a headquarters site located near the entrance to the Andrews. This improvised solution simply bypassed management guidelines and did nothing to soothe the already tense relations with the district: “… the Forest Service,” he notes, “… woke up one day and suddenly there was this defacto campground on the Experimental Forest.” The improvised facilities wedged between fallen old-growth trees successfully converted the mundane, daily routines of camp life into memorable experiences that helped forge a spirit of shared adventure at the Andrews Forest. The camp facilities, for example, included kitchens that used the root wads of windthrows as a framework for shelves, and McKee recalls that people even seemed to enjoy using the outhouses: We’d nailed a couple of planks between some windthrow trees and … put up a toilet seat. … It was very informal. People loved the open air, actually. Most of them loved it a lot.\(^59\)

\(^{57}\) Interview with Art McKee, 1.
\(^{58}\) Interview with Art McKee, 8-9.
\(^{59}\) Interview with Art McKee, 9.
A Crowded Landscape of Science and Community

The aura of adventure at the improvised camp on the Andrews Forest promoted a romantic, community ethic of “making do” and self-sacrifice in the name of science. The group’s struggle to fit their ambitious plans for research into the short field seasons, budgetary constraints, and temporary nature of the IBP heightened the atmosphere of frenzied enthusiasm. At the peak of the IBP, upwards of 100 people swarmed over the experimental forest during the summer months, living in a scientific boomtown that strained the capacity of the improvisational sewage disposal system, kitchen facilities, and transportation network. The Coniferous Biome was, by design, a project of finite duration that channeled funding from the NSF and other cooperating agencies and universities to scientists working in the field. The congregation of scientists at the Andrews Forest and the byproducts of their encampment, however, were also a concentrated human presence with environmental consequences on the landscape selected for the IBP as a “pristine” example of the Coniferous Biome. The contradiction of a “pristine” landscape attracting hordes of people echoed contemporary concerns about the environmental impact of the expansive urban culture of the United States. The group’s activities and priorities in this scientific boomtown, moreover, often deviated from local standards in the nearby community of Blue River, Oregon.

The immediate effects of this sudden influx of people were obvious to people with long-term, prior involvement at the Andrews Forest and in Blue River. Levno, who worked at the experimental forest for nearly a decade before the Coniferous Biome Project began, observes that it was a “real radical change.” He was accustomed to working in a landscape where there were seldom more than one or two people at any given time, but with the IBP, he recalls, “all of a sudden 50 to 100 people showed up and were living in trailers and camps. …” The sudden influx of people caused problems with the staff at the Blue River Ranger District, but Levno perceived it as a “good thing.” Among other concerns, he recalls a generational and cultural gap between district staff, who adhered to the paramilitary standards of the Forest Service, and the academic community of young college faculty, postdoctoral associates, and graduate students, who were steeped in the culture of antiwar protests and campus activism. As Levno observes, “This influx of kids, it was during the hippy days, I guess you could say, and if you went swimming anywhere in the Andrews you didn’t wear clothes. I remember at one of
our meetings Jerry said ‘well we need to clean up our act a bit, better not skinny dip right out in public places.’ It was a radical change.\textsuperscript{60}

The science community at the Andrews had few ties with local customs or culture in Blue River. Levno observes that little in the town catered to the interests of researchers, and scientists at the experimental forest mostly avoided Blue River, “almost to a point of avoiding the townspeople.” Other scientists tend to agree with Levno’s assessment. The one feature of the town that did attract scientists did little to dispel district concerns about relaxed standards at the scientific encampment. Dyrness observes that many researchers occasionally visited a local hangout in Blue River known as the Cougar Room—a tavern “with Go-Go Dancers and everything”—until it burned down in the early 1990s. Levno emphasizes, however, that for the most part, reciprocal disinterest prevailed: The townspeople were not very aware of activities on the forest, and researchers mostly avoided the town and paid little attention to affairs in that community.\textsuperscript{61} The camptown culture of the

\textsuperscript{60} Interview with Al Levno, 8-9.

\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Ted Dyrness, 25-26; interview with Al Levno, 9-10.
The Andrews group was centered on the landscape of the Lookout Creek drainage, but people in that community were more closely tied to the urban center and academic culture of Corvallis, than to nearby forest-oriented towns like Blue River or McKenzie Bridge. The encampment was not an isolated community, but it was also not integrated with nearby townfolk, and this was a distinct change from the era of Roy Silen’s leadership at the experimental forest.

Scientists, technicians, and other support staff at the Andrews Forest during the IBP era also differed from their predecessors in their scientific priorities. Their areas of specialization were more varied than those of earlier scientists at the Andrews, and they also included more people from different ethnic backgrounds and genders. Ross Mersereau, who replaced Levno as technician-in-residence at the Andrews Forest during the late 1960s, argues that in the scramble to provide sufficient staffing to support the proliferating number of field studies, hiring standards began to decline. Some technicians, he claims, were hired despite their weak understanding of scientific method: “Al [Levno] got permission to hire a couple of new technicians. And that was a real experience because … up until then, almost everybody that we had … was, uh, pretty well educated, you know. Yeah, I had a degree, Al, by this time had a degree. … Under different circumstances both of us would have been scientists rather than just technicians. … and then we get two guys that, I don’t even know that they finished high school.”

Mersereau continued the earlier tradition of close ties linking the Andrews group and community traditions in Oregon, despite the otherwise widening gap between the town of Blue River and the science group at the Andrews. At the time of his first assignment to the Andrews, he was a disabled military veteran who became involved with the group as a graduate student at OSU. He had served in the U.S. Marine Corps during World War II, serving in the South Pacific theater with the Marines from 1943 until the end of the war. He was released from service under the GI Bill in 1946 after suffering a gunshot wound on Iwo Jima. That injury forced him to quit his prewar career as a laborer and return to school under a vocational rehabilitation program at Oregon State College from 1946 to 1951. After a brief, unsatisfying stint as a general science teacher in Springfield during the 1950s, Mersereau returned to Oregon State College as a graduate student in the fisheries program. Gashwiler recruited him out of the fisheries program and recommended him to Fredriksen for the technician-in-residence position at the Andrews, where he began in 1966. By 1969, Mersereau observes, he and his family, including nine children, were well-integrated into the community of Blue River, and they secured most of their day-to-day needs from local establishments, except for occasional runs into Eugene to buy groceries in bulk. They moved to Corvallis in 1978, however, when his oldest son was still in high school. Interview with Ros Mersereau by Max G. Geier (with Ted Dyrness) on 3 September 1997 at Mersereau’s house in Corvallis, as transcribed by Brooke Warren, 2-5, 10-11.

Interview with Ros Mersereau, 19.
The number of scientists increased faster than the number of technicians at the Andrews Forest because postdoctoral associates did much of the technical work. Between 1968 and 1978, Waring and Franklin recall hiring some 16 postdoctoral associates, including Kermit Cromack, Bill Emmingham, Robert Fogel, Charles Grier, Joan Hett, Dick Holbo, Ron Nussbaum, Ken Reed, Jeff Richie, Jim Sedell, Phil Sollins, Mary Ann Strand, Fred Swanson, Gordon Swarzman, Frank Triska, and Bob Wissmar. The career path for postdocs recruited to the Andrews during this period, Waring recalls, typically involved prior experience as graduate students working with other IBP groups. The people in this cohort were typically hired on 3-year appointments.  

With IBP funding, the Andrews group built a nucleus of scientists and ongoing programs of research that snowballed into a self-activated recruitment mechanism. Dyrness explains that once people began to realize that there was at least a chance for funding at the Andrews Forest, people were “attracted in.” One of those people was a young geologist named Fred Swanson, then completing his graduate work at...
the University of Oregon. Dyrness recalls he and Franklin first met Swanson when they presented an evening seminar at the University of Oregon to an audience of “mostly geologists,” and he observes, “Fred, from the very start said, ‘Oh, gee, this is neat! You get to work with guys in biology and silviculture, geography, whatever!’”65

Interdisciplinary Traditions and New Generations of Leadership and Community

Three prominent leaders of the Andrews group who exemplify the trend toward a diversity of scientific specializations first became involved at the Andrews Forest during the early 1970s as graduate students or as postdoctoral assistants. These three scientists—Swanson, Sedell, and Gregory—all emerged as leaders before the end of the decade, and then guided the group through much of the remainder of the century. Sedell and Gregory both arrived in 1971, and Swanson began working for the Coniferous Biome in 1972. They added intergenerational depth to the demographic profile of the group’s leadership, and their combined efforts were largely responsible for transforming the temporary community of interdisciplinary cooperation into a long-term tradition for the Andrews group that survived the eventual departures of Franklin, Dyrness, and Waring. By the end of that decade, the leadership of the group was more diverse and less centralized in any one person, although Franklin remained the central figure holding the group together, and they were experimenting with various forms of consensus-oriented decisionmaking.

The unique combination of academic backgrounds and personal networks that Swanson, Sedell, and Gregory brought to the community help explain why those traits became prominent features of the Andrews group during their involvement and eventual leadership.

Swanson, like Gratkowski, came to Oregon by way of Pennsylvania, pursuing graduate studies at the University of Oregon after completing undergraduate work at Pennsylvania State University and two summers of field experience at the Bermuda Biological Station, where he reportedly hung out with “… a group of very interesting, top-notch grad students who were taking a course on organism-sediment relations in a modern environment of carbonate (limestone) depositions.” Swanson cites this interdisciplinary experience with “geochemists, sea-water

65 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 18-19.
chemists, biologists, and geologists” as a formative influence on his own priorities for scientific research. He recalls they all worked together with some “really impressive people,” including Stephen J. Gould. He went on to work with the U.S. Geological Survey on the Oregon coast, making professional contacts that eventually led him to pursue graduate studies at the University of Oregon. There, he “helped lead a project to the Galapagos that involved plant-geology interactions and geologic history. …” When he completed his graduate studies, in 1972, he began working on the IBP, studying the geology of the Andrews with Alan Kays, a University of Oregon geology professor who previously worked with Dyrness.  

Sedell, like Silen, was born and raised in Oregon. He attended Willamette University as an undergraduate philosophy major, but like Swanson, he also arrived at the Andrews by way of Pennsylvania, where he did his graduate work in Biology at the University of Pittsburgh while developing professional research networks with scientists at Hubbard Brook, at Michigan State University, and at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. His interest in fishing the lakes and streams of Oregon drew him into aquatic studies, and he attracted the attention of OSU fisheries professor Jim Hall and entomologist Norm Anderson through their mutual acquaintance with Ken Cummins, at Michigan State.  

Gregory came to the group with similarly strong links in his home state of Tennessee. He started his graduate career at OSU in 1971 after completing an undergraduate program in fisheries biology at the University of Tennessee, where he worked with Dave Etnier. He previously spent a summer in a multidisciplinary, NSF-sponsored program in geology, water chemistry, hydrology, and biology at the School for Marine Biology in Mississippi, before his senior year in high school. Etnier’s zoological interests and involvement in the IBP program at Oak Ridge and his contacts with the IBP program at Seattle drew Gregory into closer involvement with the Pacific Northwest. In 1971, he began working with his major professor, Jack Donaldson, at OSU, where he soon fell into close professional association with Sedell.  

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66 Interview with Fred Swanson by Max Geier on 6 September 1996 at his home in Corvallis, as transcribed by Sara Rogers, 2-3.  
67 Interview with Jim Sedell by Max Geier on 14 February 1998 in Sedell’s office in the FSL in Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Keesje Hoekstra, 1-3.  
68 Interview with Stan Gregory by Max Geier on 7 October 1997 at Nash Hall, Oregon State University, as transcribed by Keesje Hoekstra, 1-3.
The long-term involvement of Swanson, Sedell, and Gregory with the Andrews group, along with the ongoing roles of McKee, Levno, and Mersereau, laid the foundation for the first gradual transition of science leadership at the experimental forest since it was first established in 1948. Their mentoring into the group, their experience working under the leadership of Waring and Franklin, and their integration of graduate student, postdoc, faculty, and agency scientist roles, contrasted with the experiences of their predecessors. Previous science leadership was more centralized and administered far fewer researchers and programs. Silen and Rothacher, for example, both were assigned to the Andrews Forest without any prior involvement there, and Silen was summarily reassigned, with virtually no opportunity to transfer his knowledge to his successor. The PNW Station hierarchy, in fact, actively discouraged his continued involvement with decisions governing the Andrews. The new cohort of future science leaders arriving at the Andrews in the early 1970s, therefore, represents an unusual development. For the first time, the scientists most directly involved in managing and directing research at the Andrews were directly recruiting and mentoring their immediate and long-term successors.

During the early 1970s, Waring had emerged as the go-to leader of the Corvallis component of the Coniferous Biome. Franklin’s role at the Andrews was more sporadic because he took a 10-month sabbatical in Japan in 1970, just as the
Coniferous Biome was getting underway, and then accepted a 2-year appointment at NSF in Washington, DC, where he hoped to shore up support for long-term, continuous funding at established IBP sites, while also expanding the concept of ecosystem research into new venues. Franklin, who began his stint at NSF in summer 1973, emphasizes he was determined to “convert IBP funding to [budget] line funding, continuous funding to ecosystem research, so instead of disappearing into just regular ecology or biology funding, the line item that had been there for IBP was rolled over into the ecosystem science program.” He set, as one priority, the goal of continuing to fund “sites like the Andrews.” Franklin also worked to ensure “that some new, related kinds of activities that hadn’t been able to make it in under the IBP banner” would get funded. In that vein, he worked with Dyrness and Keith Van Cleve, of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, to establish the Taiga Research Project that later developed into the Bonanza Creek Long Term Ecological Research. Shortly after Franklin began working for NSF, PNW Station Director Bob Buckman tapped Dyrness to lead a multifunctional unit in Fairbanks, Alaska, and Dyrness carried the vision of interdisciplinary, collaborative research into his new, 16-year career in the far north, where he quickly linked up with Van Cleve.

Waring, while still a relatively junior faculty member at OSU, stepped into the local leadership breach and led the growing cohort of postdoctoral associates and cooperating scientists into one of the most prolific periods of scientific inquiry in the history of the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest. Franklin, meanwhile, broadened his personal and professional networks in Washington, D.C., eventually returning to the Andrews in the latter part of the decade to resume a somewhat diminished leadership role in a more diverse program already greatly transformed by the prospect of long-term, continuous funding for ecosystems research. He was still a prominent, even dominant leader in the group, but a broader system of decisionmaking and a more complex set of constraints and incentives guided the research effort through the end of the IBP. The number of people with professional connections and personal commitments to the Andrews Forest had greatly expanded, and the sheer numbers of people working at the place had left their imprint.

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69 Interview with Ted Dyrness by Max Geier at Dyrness home in Albany, OR, 17 July 1995; correspondence from Ted Dyrness to Ken Wright, 19 June 1995.

70 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 16.
The Reconstructed and Humanized Landscape of the Andrews Forest

By the mid 1970s, the Andrews Forest and programs of research linked with that place were already larger and more permanent than any one person could manage. To promote the place and protect it from closure, Franklin and Dyrness moved it from relative obscurity into national prominence. Their campaign to include the experimental forest as an intensive study site for the Coniferous Biome Project of the IBP humanized the landscape in ways that went beyond Silen’s system of roads and clearcuts: large numbers of people lived and worked at the Andrews Forest during the 1970s, and it became a place where scientists went to interact with other people. It went from being a place that Dyrness and Franklin had perceived as underpopulated, to a place that district staff at Blue River and others described as overrun with out-of-control people or even the wrong kind of people. It was a place that had become so popular with scientists that Waring finally had to admit he couldn’t manage the place without assistance. Finally, it was a place so crowded with people and their habits, that McKee began to perceive it as dismally lacking in human amenities. This humanized landscape, ironically, was the end-product of the decision to include the Andrews Forest as a “pristine” example of the Coniferous Forest Biome designated for “intensive study.” Much of the Andrews Forest remained relatively remote, and much of its potential as a research resource remained untapped. The most remarkable change resulting from the IBP at the Andrews Forest was the emerging spirit of collaborative effort and the tradition of pragmatic adaptation that became hallmarks of the Andrews group over the last quarter of the century.
The Andrews group capitalized on the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest’s) growing popularity as a site for field research throughout the 1970s. Scientists found inspiration and new respect for each other on a landscape they described as pristine, although it was more intensively developed than the surrounding national forest. The sudden popularity of the place forced leaders of the group to become managers of people and other resources, but it also killed the proposal to close the Andrews Forest. During this decade, the most immediate threat to its long-term viability was the possibility that different studies at the site might begin to interfere with one another. The group formalized an administrative structure for coordinating research efforts, but they also tried to preserve the informality and spirit of the group’s “make-do” tradition.

In the last half of the decade, the Andrews Forest and the group entered a new era of prominence as a pilot program in a permanent, global network of field sites dedicated to ecosystem research. It was a daunting experiment in collaborative management of people, place, and process in a decade of increased public concern about the environment. These people expanded their activities beyond the Lookout Creek drainage and began annual, community-building exercises modeled after their previous experiences at the Andrews. As they became more accustomed to their national prominence, they also gained self-confidence. They began to draw forest managers into the group’s inner circle, and they began to supplement the basic science orientation of the International Biological Programme (IBP) with more applied research, culminating in a pathbreaking collaboration with the Willamette National Forest to develop new guidelines for managing forests and streams.

New Priorities for the Andrews Research Community

The Andrews group forged a community ideal of interdisciplinary, cooperative, long-term research amidst swirling political debates and social tensions. In the decade that began with the first Earth Day celebration in April 1970, those who managed public resources had to pay more attention to the ecological context of their actions. At the Andrews Forest, more than two decades of continuous monitoring of streams and permanent plots supplied the data needed to support long-term studies of ecological processes. The self-defined limits of the Andrews group expanded during the 1970s to include more academic scientists not connected with
the Forest Service, more nonscientists, and more sites away from the experimental forest. Their focus, however, was closely centered on the Lookout Creek drainage. The rising public concern about environmental issues, and the political expression of that concern, also made the group’s research more relevant to the priorities of forest managers. As the IBP drew to a close, Forest Service scientists and Oregon State University (OSU) cooperators associated with the Andrews Forest pioneered a strategy of independent funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF). That strategy left them well positioned, by the mid 1980s, to explore with relative autonomy the long-term implications of policy alternatives to clearcut logging in the old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest.

The long-established ethic of stewardship-for-future-use continued as a core value of the Andrews group, but preservationist priorities for managing the forest also became more apparent during the “environmental decade.” The new generation of scientists who joined the group early in the 1970s gradually moved from assistant to leadership positions by the 1980s, while exploring hypotheses that challenged and advanced previous thinking about ecological processes. At the same time, a stricter test of scientific relevance virtually halted nonsalvage timber sales in theLookout Creek drainage, even as timber harvests and road building accelerated on neighboring drainages of the adjoining Willamette National Forest. By the early 1980s, roads and clearcuts were less common on the Andrews than on the surrounding landscape. Relative to nearby, logged drainages, the experimental forest had begun to live up to its previous image as a pristine place. In this comparative context, scientists reimagined potential uses for the Andrews. They perceived and managed the Andrews Forest as an accessible reserve of intensively studied, regenerating, older clearcuts and stands of old growth in a larger, patchwork landscape of more recent timber harvests, road projects, recreational developments, and other uses of the Willamette National Forest. They expanded their focus above and below the forest floor, and they explored ways to integrate ideas from their work at the Andrews with management practices on the adjacent national forest.

International Biological Programme Shortfalls and the Problem of Long-Term Ecosystem Studies

The sheer quantity of effort and funding focused on the Andrews Forest during the Coniferous Biome Project attracted national attention and skilled scientists to the site, but the IBP failed to fully meet its goals before the planned end of the program. By the time that international effort was scheduled to end, in 1974, the
U.S. component of the IBP had absorbed about $50 million, most of it channeled through grants from the NSF. These monies mostly funded studies of five biomes: grasslands, tundra, desert, western coniferous forest, and eastern deciduous forest. As the program neared its scheduled end, the National Academy of Sciences commissioned a report of the entire American component. That report, when finally released to the public in January 1975, drew harsh criticism. An unnamed reviewer in the 21 February 1975 edition of *Science* (Vol. 187), for example, observed that unspecified “critics” of the program questioned “whether IBP did anything that wouldn’t have been done anyway, and for less money.” The same critics suggested the program provided research funds to “second-rate researchers who wouldn’t have qualified for grants under the regular NSF grant programs.” The *Science* review also reported claims that “the biome studies have accumulated masses of data while failing to establish chains of cause and effect that could lead to deeper understanding of how ecosystems work.”¹

From the outset, Franklin, Waring, and others wanted predictive models that would structure the research effort and determine data needs. The group’s top priority for the first full year of the Coniferous Biome (1970-1971), was “to review available information for the development of preliminary models with an emphasis on the terrestrial-aquatic interface system.” Their second objective was “to initiate studies of poorly understood processes and elucidate functional relationships.” Second-year objectives (for 1972) reversed the order, with a stronger focus on (1) completing “selective ecosystem descriptions at the intensive sites,” (2) developing “additional information for modeling of transfer mechanisms and pathways of nutrients, particulate matter, energy, and water … ,” (3) modeling “assembled information … ,” and (4) developing “the coordination program.”²

Predictive models were elusive, and Waring admits much of the criticism of the IBP was well founded. Part of the problem was that the technology of computing could not handle the volume of data that the large assemblage of scientists had generated. The group struggled to pull together “just enough so we could see how

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the pieces fit together and get something out [published].” They rushed many reports into print as “gray literature” that didn’t measure up to the standards of peer-reviewed journals like *Science*. These caveats notwithstanding, the Coniferous Biome Project generated more than 45 contributions to the “open literature” by early 1975, including Waring’s own work with K.L. Reed and W.H. Emmingham to develop an environmental grid for classifying coniferous forest ecosystems.³

Unplanned spinoffs from IBP turned out to be more important than its shortcomings and arguably more significant than anything the group published as part of that effort at the time. Even its failures had long-term payoffs not fully recognized until much later. Work at the Andrews Forest, for example, provided initial data for characteristics not previously considered, including the amounts and functions of dead wood on land and in streams. These data were the foundation for later, experimental work in that area. The IBP work also linked the group with young scientists working at other sites, including Hubbard Brook and Coweeta. Reciprocal, intersite meetings with those scientists strengthened the group’s reputation for accomplishing significant results with minimal facilities.⁴

The Andrews group made a virtue of minimal physical improvements at the experimental forest in their dealings with NSF reviewers during the early 1970s. After visiting the Andrews, NSF officials could hardly accuse the group of wasteful spending. McKee and Waring, for example, blithely cited as a “major overhead” expense the cost of acquiring and installing a single mobile home unit that they acquired from Forest Service surplus stocks and designated as a combined meeting space, sleeping quarters, kitchen, and dining hall. This single unit supported more than 100 scientists who otherwise relied on the temporary camp facilities.⁵ McKee, Levno, Mersereau, and others supported a world-class science effort with a garage-sale mentality of making do.

The skeletal program at the Andrews Forest, relative to some other IBP sites, was obvious even to the most casual observer. Overnight guests crammed into a surplus trailer could not help but notice the enthusiastically efficient opportunism of the group. Scientists and staff volunteered their time, and cooperative arrangements with various OSU departments and the Forest Service covered the material


⁴ Communication from Fred Swanson 12 November 1998.

Necessary Work: Discovering Old Forests, New Outlooks, and Community on the Andrews Forest

cost of vehicles, equipment, and laboratory facilities. They hosted visitors from around the world, including representatives from Japan and Austria, U.S. delegates from the Grasslands and Deciduous Forest Biomes, and other visiting scientists who conducted seminars and workshops at the experimental forest. Together, they founded a community ethic of unpaid volunteering, and their human capital subsidized the group’s scientific programs.

Individual scientists and staff paid a high price for their volunteerism. They sacrificed personal time with their families to support programs at the Andrews Forest, and the time they donated seldom translated into lines on a résumé. It was time they might otherwise have invested in opportunities for professional involvement at more traditional venues in their own disciplines. The opportunity cost of their involvement at the Andrews Forest often exceeded their professional return, in terms of career advancement, but people found alternative outlets for their creative energies within the cooperative culture of the group.

The group promoted the failures of the early models as opportunities to rethink the goals, purpose, and approach of research at the Andrews Forest. They eventually rejected the idea that predictive models applicable elsewhere could be developed from the localized, intensive research sites of the IBP. The group’s initial models, Waring observes, “basically described what we measured.” They did not accurately predict how timber harvests or changes in climate would affect the ecosystem. That realization encouraged Waring to work with other scientists at the Andrews Forest and at other sites to devise broader, more generalized models built around physical processes, rather than site-specific observations. They began with models of hydrologic processes because, Waring observes, those are “the most physical-based and least biological-based of all the processes that go on in watersheds and in ecosystems.” The goal was to demonstrate generalities among the biomes of the IBP and build quantitative models based on the actual processes, rather than statistical correlations. Before that effort, Waring observes, most models of watersheds were tuned to data on how much water flowed in and how much flowed out, rather than on processes in the watersheds themselves. The Andrews group worked with Wayne Swank of Coweeta, who also had links with the University

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7 Interview with Andrews IBP group including Jerry Franklin, Dick Waring, Fred Swanson, Jim Hall, Martha Brookes, Don Henshaw, Art McKee, Al Levno, Bill Denison, and Ted Dyrness by Max G. Geier on 10 February 1998 at the Siuslaw National Forest Headquarters, as transcribed by Keesje Hockstra, 2.
of Washington, to develop a general model that could be tested in Arizona, Oregon, and North Carolina, and they worked with Dale Cole and others at the University of Washington to develop nutrient-cycling models.\(^8\)

The group’s shift from descriptive to process-oriented models is an example of their tendency to convert apparent setbacks into opportunities for innovation. People in the group used the failure of the initial models as a powerful rationale for aggressively expanding intersite networking. They pinned their hopes on a guiding principle of the IBP: to encourage greater integration across national, disciplinary, and institutional lines. They responded to local constraints by broadening the range of their interactions with people at other sites and expanding their field of inquiry. In that sense, Waring suggests, the IBP was phenomenally successful: “We did reach out … [to] other biomes, particularly the Tundra and Eastern Deciduous [biomes].” They worked with other people who were also studying decomposition, water, and carbon cycling, and they constantly sought opportunities to share and learn new methods.\(^9\)

A sense of desperate urgency drove the opportunism and adaptive style of research at the Andrews Forest during the 1970s. People who became involved with the Andrews Forest during the IBP knew that the Coniferous Biome, by design, was a finite project. That knowledge gave them a common purpose and unusual focus that encouraged effective teamwork, but it also set them up for a wrenching readjustment at the end of the project. Bill Denison, a cooperating scientist from OSU who worked on the Biological Processes team of the Coniferous Biome, notes that the IBP disrupted previous working relations and habits of thought among his colleagues on campus, and it left a legacy of heightened expectations that were difficult to meet. He describes the IBP as a lost opportunity to discard the traditional pattern of departmental rivalries and forge an interdisciplinary tradition at OSU: “People were reluctantly transformed. Once they were transformed [pause], we sort of [did not have] the resources … available to follow up on it.” He and his colleagues, Denison recalls, “got fired up and were excited about it.” They were excited partly because the money was available to support their research, but Denison remembers they were also attracted by the lure of “interaction across departmental lines and disciplinary lines.” He observes, however, that their initial excitement “proved to be very naïve” because the program ended, and

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\(^8\) Interview with Dick Waring, 2-3.

\(^9\) Interview with Dick Waring, 4.
“to have that evaporate, was [pause] a blow [long pause].” The dislocation and sense of abandonment that Denison recalls was real, but while some elements of the IBP abruptly ended, others continued and even expanded after that program formally ended at the Andrews Forest.

Modeling Research and Community During the IBP

Computer modeling was one area of remarkable success that helped reenergize the Andrews group. Dyrness, who observes that their early leaders were neophytes in the field of integrated ecosystem research, recalls that Joan Hett initially introduced him and Franklin to the concept of computer modeling at an orientation to ecosystems theory they all attended at the University of Wisconsin in the mid 1960s. Hett, who later joined the Modeling and Integration Team of the Coniferous Biome as a scientist at the University of Washington, demonstrated the potential of computer modeling at the Wisconsin session, which Dyrness recalls as a “gee-whiz thing.” That awakening to the potential of ecosystem science, Franklin adds, “led directly into our old-growth characterization and all our [subsequent] involvement with policy analysis.”

With the IBP field site at the Andrews Forest members of the group were full participants at the cutting edge of ecosystem research. They joined an interdisciplinary effort to model whole ecosystems, bringing in specialists from many different academic backgrounds. As a result, Waring explains, “We began to look at decomposition as a process.” They examined the details of how organic material actually decomposed, including the biological organisms and chemical exchanges involved in that process. In so doing, they furthered the goals of the IBP in which the Andrews Forest was just one site of many potential reference points for building a comprehensive model of how ecosystems function. That overarching model remained elusive, but the Andrews group benefited in other, unplanned ways.

The IBP initiative at the Andrews Forest was more successful as an exercise in human development than as a breakthrough in scientific thinking: it modeled new job possibilities for scientists interested in studying forest ecosystems in the post-IBP era. As new opportunities for interdisciplinary professionals in forest science became more apparent, Waring, at least, had a clear conscience when he recruited people from other disciplines to fill short-term niches in the Coniferous Biome: “At

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10 Interview with IBP group, 29.
11 Interview with IBP group, 2-3, 17.
12 Interview with Dick Waring, 3-4.
that time we could see jobs on the horizon either at the Forest Service or at the University, so we didn’t feel guilty about exploiting the talents of people from other fields when you could see that there was an opportunity to move them into classically forestry enterprises where you had to have a degree in forestry, otherwise you wouldn’t be accepted. … we broke that convention … big time. We did it!”

The postdoctoral and graduate student assistants that Franklin and Waring recruited to jump-start the computer-modeling program gained valuable experience and built networks with other scientists and funding agencies that helped them launch professional careers elsewhere.

Those who hoped to establish a long-term program of ecosystems research at the Andrews Forest needed to convince a substantial number of cooperating scientists not to leave at the end of the Biome Project. Those who stayed later argued that the transition toward a more sustainable, collaborative group at the Andrews Forest began with an informal process of “self-selection” during this phase of the project. That belief emerged as a core value among survivors of the Andrews group in the post-IBP era.

The recruitment and winnowing of participants was more self-conscious than the natural evolution that the group’s preferred term for the informal process seems to imply. Franklin observes that he and Waring “made decisions about people and activities which brought some in and pushed others out.” A prolonged disagreement between Franklin and statistician Scott Overton during the early days of the IBP, for example, led directly to Overton’s departure. Overton was an OSU scientist who cooperated with Hett and others on the Modeling and Integration team of the Coniferous Biome. His innovative work during that period didn’t mesh with Franklin’s vision, and McKee recalls Overton eventually left the group amidst evident displays of “bad blood” between the two men. The terms of Overton’s departure, he adds, had some long-term consequences for scientific exchange at the Andrews, including McKee’s sense that he “couldn’t use the term that Scott used” to describe the hierarchical statistical models on which Overton later worked.

Franklin describes his break with Overton as a struggle for control within the group and as an example of deep-rooted disagreements over the direction of

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13 Interview with Dick Waring, 2-3; interview with IBP group, 29.
14 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 19-20.
15 Communication from Jerry Franklin 6 December 1999; interview with Art McKee, 13-14; communication from Art McKee November 1998.
the modeling effort. He notes, “We gave him some major opportunities and responsibilities in IBP,” but relations between Franklin and Overton reached a “breaking point” over a dispute involving the sampling design for biomass on Watershed 10. Overton, Franklin observes, favored an innovative sampling model emphasizing statistical estimates, while Franklin himself preferred a “more traditional” sampling design emphasizing allometric relations. He admits Overton “really wanted to pioneer some new statistical ground” and that approach was “probably right” for a biomass estimate of Watershed 10, if that had been the sole purpose of the sampling design. Franklin argues, however, that he was concerned about the broader application of the sampling results while Overton was more concerned about the broader application of the sampling design. In Franklin’s view, “This biomass sampling was going to be very expensive, we weren’t going to do very much of it, and it had to be designed so as to be useful in many other places and in the future—even if it was less than perfect from a biometrician’s view!” Franklin wanted the work to generate results that accurately described the actual functioning of the ecosystem in ways that met the needs of forest managers. Presented with Franklin’s ultimatum, Overton subsequently left the group. The episode demonstrated a hard-earned lesson for the group that Swanson summarizes with the phrase, “personality matters.”

Dennis Harr, a hydrologist who worked closely with Overton, recalls the statistician was “a very sharp and brutally frank systems person,” and, he suggests, “Scott’s brutal frankness … put him at odds with those in control of IBP.” With Overton’s departure, McKee argues, the Andrews group lost an opportunity to lead the way in one important arena of ecosystems research. Overton’s later work in hierarchical modeling involved compartmentalized processes that operated at different timeframes, each providing input to the model at a higher level. At that higher level, the model could interrogate other models for input on specific conditions. In this way, models nested within other models could communicate with each other in an interactive system. That concept, McKee notes, was the basis for

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16 Communication from Jerry Franklin 6 December 1999.

a lot of high profile, hierarchical modeling work that came out in the mid eighties,” and 20 years later, he concludes, the group revisited the approach and found it “conceptually very useful.”

Overton’s role in the Andrews group, like his hierarchical models, illustrates how complex systems function at various levels simultaneously. Despite the rift, Overton nonetheless played a critical role in recruiting Don Henshaw into the group, and he guided Henshaw’s early involvement with modeling ecosystems and information management at the Andrews. Henshaw, who continued as a long-term associate of the group through the next three decades, recalls that when he first mentioned an interest in “doing something related to ecology” as a new student at OSU in 1974 he was “immediately” directed to Scott Overton, who became his major professor. He began working as a liaison between Overton and Boyd Wickman, Dick Mason, and other Forest Service people who were working on an insect population model, and he learned about the IBP through Overton’s cooperative effort to develop hydrology models with Harr.

Dennis Harr’s experience of recruitment, priorities, and interactions at the Andrews Forest during the IBP and through the 1980s demonstrates some of the more pragmatic reasons why people joined or left the group in these years. Harr, a native of northwestern Washington, studied forest management at Washington State University from 1959 to 1963. He recalls the curriculum proceeded from the assumption that, “The simple objective of forestry was to convert the decadent, overmature, rotten old-growth to vigorous, fast growing new growth for the benefit of all.” He secured a National Defense Fellowship to support his Ph.D. work in watershed management at Colorado State, and after serving a tour of duty in Vietnam with the Navy, he worked for 2 years at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation near Richland, Washington. Desperate to “escape the situation I was in at Hanford,” Harr recalls, he applied for a soft-money position funded with a grant that George Brown (then a forest engineering professor and later the Dean of the College of Forestry at OSU) wrote under the broader umbrella of IBP funding at OSU in 1971. Harr recalls of that appointment, “It didn’t fulfill some life-long dream.”

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18 Communication from Dennis Harr 27 August 1998, 1; interview with Art McKee, 13-14.
19 Interview with IBP group, 11.
20 Communication from Dennis Harr 27 August 1998, 1.
Harr’s work initially focused on subsurface hydrology of a forested slope on Watershed 10, but his recollections revolve around his experiences with people on that landscape. He worked most closely with Darrell Ranken, a graduate research assistant, and the time they spent together lugging equipment up and down the steep terrain on Watershed 10 left an indelible impression on Harr. He especially emphasizes the excitement of meeting people who later emerged as prominent scientists in a variety of different fields, all collaborating at the Andrews during the mid to late 1970s: he learned about spotted owls from Eric Forsman, old-growth forests from Jerry Franklin, canopy communities from Bill Denison, soil science from Ted Dyrness, nutrient cycling from Dick Fredriksen and Phil Sollins, and aquatic ecosystems from Jim Sedell. It was a veritable smorgasbord of ideas and approaches to ecological systems.

Mobility from soft-money, postdoctoral appointment to a permanent, funded position and a leadership role in the group was possible, if not common, during the IBP. Harr, for example, quickly secured a permanent position with the Forest Service in 1973, when Rothacher’s retirement left a vacancy at PNW Station. He “inherited all the watershed studies” from Rothacher about the time Swanson began his first geomorphologic study on soft-money funding at the Andrews Forest. Harr began to explore the relation between aquatic and terrestrial systems, and over the next 10 years, his studies focused on snowmelt in relation to watershed dynamics in western Oregon. In 1983, he became project leader of the Forest Service scientists assigned to the watershed group at the Pacific Northwest Research Station (PNW), which by that time included Swanson, Fredriksen, Doug Swanston, and Duane Moore. That year, the watershed group decided to abandon studies at Fox Creek (in the Bull Run watershed near Portland, Oregon) and Coyote Creek so they could concentrate their energies at the Andrews Forest.

Harr left the Andrews on good terms in 1988, when he transferred to a new position in PNW Station that required him to relocate to the University of Washington. There, he continued his snowmelt research through his retirement in 1994. He recalls with fondness his 15-year experience with the Andrews group: “I think a characteristic common to the Andrews Group is an outstanding, collective sense of humor. … Members of the Group have taken themselves very seriously

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21 Communication from Dennis Harr 27 August 1998, 3.


23 Communication from Dennis Harr 27 August 1998, 5-6.
over the years—and the success of the Andrews shows that—but they’ve also
done it with a great sense of humor.” He relates, for example, how Art McKee once
stopped a “runaway” snowmobile by “risking life and limb” to direct it harmlessly
into a clearcut area downslope from the road, observing, “This sounds more
responsible than what really happened.”

Excellence in science was an expected, but not sufficient qualification for long-
term involvement in that group. People had to be able to work together, and they
had to be able to produce. A community spirit of collegial good humor emerged
during the IBP and fostered a productive environment of collaborative exchange
and mutual goodwill. That characteristic was, potentially, a powerful force that
could support innovative science, and the Andrews group cultivated that commu-
nity ethic throughout the 1970s. The group recruited, in a spirit of consensus,
people to replace those who left, though McKee observes that, on occasion,
Franklin “cleverly gave people the feeling we were coming to a consensus and …
we would go to a decision that he had already made.” In the process, he notes,
“Sometimes a majority would be ignored, and, … that caused some heartburn and
there were several people who left the group for that reason over the years.” The
Andrews group of the 1970s and early 1980s was by no means utopian, but people
in the group had begun to value a shared spirit of community.

Reference Stands and the Community Ideal of Long-Term
Research

As people in the Andrews group developed close personal and professional ties with
others in that science community, they were more willing to get involved in long-
term research at the Andrews Forest, even without long-term funding. The group
developed a network of permanent study plots on and around the Andrews Forest
during the Coniferous Biome Project, when they designated specific “reference
stands” slated for long-term measurement and monitoring efforts. The vegetation
studies Franklin and Dyrness completed the previous decade provided the base-
line data needed to identify and lay out 19 reference stands by 1972 (12 on the
Andrews, 4 on adjacent drainages, 2 on Wildcat Mountain Research Natural Area,
and another reference stand located 1 mile west of Blue River). Each site repre-
sented a different ecological community, including the spectrum of stand produc-
tivity, moisture variability, and other attributes associated with that community.

\textsuperscript{24} Communication from Dennis Harr 27 August 1998, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{25} Interview with Art McKee, 14.
Sidebar 4.1: International Exchanges and Cooperative Research

The Issue: Ecosystem science is a global enterprise because science is addressing global questions, basic scientific knowledge is potentially relevant to all ecosystems, and individual sites are part of the global biosphere. Individual scientists and institutions such as the National Science Foundation are committed to sharing information on both the process and the products of science. Similarly, groups working in research-management partnerships share commitments to information sharing. Much can be learned from cooperative and comparative studies across borders.

The Roots: Formal international linkages of Andrews Forest people and programs stem from participation in the International Biological Programme in the 1970s and designation in 1976 as a biosphere reserve under the United Nations Man and the Biosphere Programme. Participation in LTER beginning in 1980 and in its expanding network in International LTER (ILTER) interactions presents new and growing opportunities for international scientific exchange. Many of the international collaborations with the Andrews Forest group arise from the initiative of individual scientists, but Andrews scientists also participate in country-to-country exchanges of delegations of scientists and administrators.

The Approach: International exchanges take place in diverse, commonly ad hoc forms, such as consultations, exchange of visiting scholars and graduate students, and program reviews. Specific science projects involving the Andrews group are conducted in an international context, such as comparative studies of litter decomposition with Costa Rica and Mexico, carbon sequestration in forests with Russia, soil processes with Hungary, and hyporheic zone processes with Japan.

Results: Ecosystem science and management of forest and watershed resources are enterprises shared around the globe; exchange of views within and across borders is always beneficial. International exchange facilitates comparisons and collaborations across starkly different ecosystems and social systems. International networks include study sites representing environmental conditions that do not exist in the United States. The global aspects of the work grow along with global concern for climate change and sustainable development.
Data collected from the reference stands, which initially measured 164 by 164 feet each [later expanded to 328 by 328 feet], included species composition, density, biomass, leaf-area index, structure, and, through time, forest succession. The intent, Dyrness notes, was to initiate long-term measurements on the reference stands.26

The reference stands were a tangible accomplishment, but the group still needed to secure institutional support for long-term research at the Andrews Forest. Abrupt changes in administrative authority and management priorities thwarted most previous efforts to promote long-term research in the Lookout Creek drainage.27 Those efforts were mostly obscure, internal battles waged by Forest Service employees directly involved with the Andrews Forest. Franklin’s 2-year appointment as program officer with the NSF in Washington, DC, (in 1973), however, moved the venue for that struggle outside the Forest Service and linked it with a broader, global effort. Franklin mostly wanted to find a way to fund long-term research at the Andrews Forest, but toward that end, he energetically supported broader efforts to establish the Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) program at NSF. Franklin stresses that his colleagues at NSF designed the program to support “everybody” interested in long-term ecosystems research, but his own efforts to initiate that program “came out of a desire to have it here in the Northwest.”28

Between 1973 and 1977, Franklin linked the Andrews Forest more closely with the long-term ecological research movement at the United Nations and at the NSF. He chaired the U.S. component of United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO’s) Man and the Biosphere Committee on Project 8 (Conservation of Natural Areas and of the genetic material they contain), and he led the effort to identify natural areas that would represent the major biomes or biotic divisions in the United States in 1973 and 1974. Over the next 3 years, the U.S. Project 8 committee identified 27 sites, including the Andrews Forest, as biosphere reserves in the United States.

Its designation as a biosphere reserve linked the Andrews Forest with regional as well as international interests. The UNESCO committee that Franklin chaired selected, for each biotic province, a site representing an outstanding natural or conservation-oriented reserve (or “control” site). The committee then paired each

26 Interview with Ted Dyrness, 16-17. Franklin recalls he was involved in establishing reference stand 2 in 1957, noting it was “a highly technical job;” Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 41; Rakestraw, 138-139.

27 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 32; interview with IBP group, 21.

28 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 15-16.
of these natural reserves with the leading center for field research (or “experimental” site) in that province. Their intent was to encourage collaborative programs. They paired the Andrews Forest (experimental) site with the Three Sisters Wilderness (control) site, together representing the Sierra-Cascade (north) Biotic Province. Franklin, in his summary description of the Andrews Forest as a field research site worthy of this status, highlighted the extensive, long-term, “Forest Service studies of management practices on water yield and quality and ecosystem analyses” at the Andrews. He also cited, as part of this rationale, the Andrews previous designation as an intensive study site in the IBP.29

The Biosphere Reserve network linked the Andrews Forest and group with the Global Environmental Monitoring System of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Earthwatch network and committed them to a long-term research emphasis. Franklin’s Project 8 committee, he later observed, considered “long-term baseline studies of environmental and biologic features” necessary for effectively managing the biosphere reserve. The committee wanted to encourage research that would “assist in determining management policies for the reserve,” and they also favored “experimental or manipulative studies” that explored the “ecological effects of human activities.” In an article published in 1977, Franklin stressed the need to locate a source of funding sufficient to support baseline surveys, studies, and monitoring efforts in the biosphere reserves, and he urged “ecologically oriented scientists” to design studies that would make “more effective” use of those sites. The key, he suggested, was interagency planning and cooperation to ensure that the system of linked sites would be “managed and used as unitary biosphere reserves and not as isolated tracts.”

The move toward long-term ecological research also took place in the context of a shifting political and social environment in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. The 1962 release of Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* in the *New Yorker* and the appearance of Paul Ehrlich’s *The Population Bomb* in 1968 helped mobilize public opinion to support ecological initiatives and legislation. The Santa Barbara oil spill of 28 January 1969 further demonstrated that the price of a technology-dependent world might exceed the supposed benefits of engineering “fixes” to human problems. The spill, and its aftermath, also exposed the relatively toothless federal Clean Waters Act, approved less than 3 years earlier. Also in 1969, reports that the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland had caught fire and burned added an air of ridiculous insult to dismaying injury. Heavy concentrations of flammable industrial chemicals in the river spontaneously combusted, and an astonished public demanded government action.

Congress responded with a flood of legislation that changed the legal footing for environmental regulation, beginning with the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969. President Richard Nixon established the Environmental Protection Agency the following year, announcing in his February 1970 State of the Union message

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30 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 15.
that the 1970s “absolutely must be the years when America pays its debt to the past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters and our living environment. It is literally now or never.”\textsuperscript{33} In the next 6 years Congress added The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1972), the Endangered Species Act (1973), the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), the Federal Land Management Act (1977), and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) (1978).\textsuperscript{34} These measures dramatically expanded the federal mandate to monitor and regulate the environmental impact of natural resource industries.

Ecological monitoring efforts also accelerated on a global scale from the late 1960s through the mid 1970s. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization sponsored the 1968 biosphere conference in Paris. Participants painted a grim picture of pollution, deforestation, and overgrazing, and they warned that natural resources would soon become critically scarce. They urged

Footnotes:

\textsuperscript{34} Some other major pieces of federal legislation enacted during this decade include Shabecoff, 131-132.
the United Nations to sponsor environmental inventories, monitoring, and training worldwide, but that agency initially did not immediately support such efforts. Other, ongoing programs such as the IBP, however, continued ecological monitoring efforts (independent of the United Nation) through the early 1970s. Among other accomplishments, those efforts documented DDT contamination in Arctic fish and Antarctic penguins, and they dramatized the global character of ecosystem issues.\footnote{Opie, \textit{Nature's Nation}, 468, 480; Shabecoff, \textit{A Fierce Green Fire}, 190-191, 198.}

Delegates at the 1972 United Nations conference on the human environment held in Stockholm formalized the global monitoring movement by authorizing the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). This new agency provided an institutional focus for the global ideal, if not reality, of integrated research. It rapidly gained influence after the IBP ended in 1974, despite an initially weak record of support in the United States. The UNEP, for example, established an Earthwatch network that included environmental data surveys and an international registration and referral system. One UNEP goal was to promote interdisciplinary and intersite cooperation through a global, information-sharing network. During the 2-year transitional period between the beginnings of the UNEP and the end of the IBP in 1974, Franklin joined other scientists at the National Science Foundation in building a U.S. component for that global effort. Their combined efforts built a network of LTER by the early 1980s.\footnote{Nature's Nation, 481; Shabecoff, \textit{A Fierce Green Fire}, 191.} Noel Brown, the North American director of UNEP, reflected in 1982 at the second United Nations conference on the environment in Nairobi, that, “In ten years, environmentalism has become a global value.”\footnote{Shabecoff, \textit{A Fierce Green Fire}, 190-191.}

Transitioning From IBP to the UNESCO Model of Collaborative, Intersite Monitoring

The Andrews group’s experience with intersite collaboration, interdisciplinary cooperation, and long-term monitoring during the IBP helped them understand what it would take to sustain a focused program of long-term, collaborative research. Among other things, Denison notes, they learned that it required personal sacrifice and collegial interaction: “You had to have colleagues willing to come to the table with something to really make a commitment.”\footnote{Interview with IBP group, 36.} Diane Tracy, for example, walked...
into Denison’s office one day during the early 1970s while she was still an undergraduate at OSU, and volunteered a way to help researchers study the question of whether lichens in the canopy were fixing significant amounts of nitrogen. Scientists were stymied by their need to obtain intact samples of lichens at that height. Tracy suggested that with modified rock-climbing techniques and equipment, she could ascend into the old-growth canopy and collect samples of lichens for researchers at the Andrews Forest. Denison agreed to try her suggestion, and Tracy followed through by assembling a volunteer crew of tree-climbers, mostly undergraduates. Their collaboration led to path-breaking research in the old-growth canopy at the Andrews Forest.39

The group’s informality and community spirit modeled on a small scale the ideas that Franklin proposed in his 1977 article. Sedell, for example, recalls how Denison and his OSU colleague, George Carroll held “brown bag seminars” that led to impromptu, interdisciplinary discussions where participants enjoyed taking “any wild, hairbrained idea and tossing it around.” One of the more remarkable seminars explored the relation between neurological networks, highway networks, tree-branch networks, and stream networks. Sedell, who notes, “I never did anything with that group other than [attending these informal seminars],” observes that he had had similar experiences at graduate seminars at the University of Pittsburgh, but his interactions with the Andrews group had an important difference: “This was the first time where you knew what you came up with, you could put down on paper and get funded to check [it] out or actually do something with what you had.”40

Although the UNESCO model, in theory, required more structured, collaborative strategies and more conscious linkage of theory with managerial methods, the Andrews group moved in that direction for reasons more personal and local. Kerrick, whose involvement with the group spanned more than three decades, first as district ranger at Blue River, and later as forest supervisor of the Willamette National Forest, nudged the group in the direction of stronger interaction with forest managers when he recruited Steve Eubanks as district ranger at Blue River.41

39 Interview with IBP group, 15, 36.
40 Interview with Jim Sedell by Max Geier on 14 February 1998 at Sedell’s office in the FSIL, Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Keesje Hoekstra, 7-8.
41 Interview with Al Levno, 8-9.
He also contributed a personal appreciation for the Andrews group from his wide-ranging experience as a forest manager in the far West. After his tenure as district ranger at Blue River ended in 1970, Kerrick had served as “the Timber staff” on the Six-Rivers National Forest in northern California and then as deputy forest supervisor for the Mount Hood National Forest. By the time he returned to the Willamette National Forest as forest supervisor in 1980, he recalls, the legacy of IBP and the heightened awareness of ecological issues during the previous decade had already improved the potential for closer relations between managers and scientists at Lookout Creek. He returned from the Southwestern United States with a new appreciation for those possibilities at the Andrews Forest.\textsuperscript{42}

Apart from the designation as a biosphere reserve, the research infrastructure at the experimental forest included other efforts to link the Andrews with a regional network of designated research natural areas on national forest lands. This network of satellite sites broadened the venues for scientists sampling vegetation types and environmental conditions in the Pacific Northwest. Early in the IBP, Dyrness and Franklin had jointly prepared a descriptive summary of the natural vegetation in Oregon and Washington,\textsuperscript{43} and they collaborated on the Research Natural Area Committee at PNW Station. That committee identified and designated potential research natural areas on Pacific Northwest Region forests and elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest, beginning in 1970. Research natural areas ranged from hundreds to thousands of acres of native ecosystems with minimal evidence of human manipulation since the time of recorded European contact with North America. These sites are restricted to nondestructive research. They were intended to provide future opportunities for research spanning the range of biological conditions in the United States.

Franklin and Dyrness, in collaboration with other scientists on that committee, produced a guide to research natural areas in the Pacific Northwest in 1972. Their intent was to inform scientists and educators about the sites and their potential for

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{42} Interview with Mike Kerrick, 22-23.

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Sidebar 4.2: Forest-Stream Interactions

The Issue: From a stream ecologist's perspective, the stream has a life of its own, but the towering stature of Pacific Northwest conifer forests and rapid downslope movement of water and other materials strongly link forests and streams. The Andrews Forest group has focused studies on how forests affect streams through mechanisms like shading, which regulates the light supplying energy to fuel growth of aquatic plants and to warm stream water; input of forest litter, which is consumed by stream organisms; and the supply of large wood, which shapes stream habitat. This perspective of forest-stream interactions (Gregory et al. 1991) led to the idea of delineating zones of influence of individual processes of interaction and to the question of how the degree to which forest influences decrease with increasing distance away from the stream edge.

The Roots: Individual forest-stream interactions have in the past been examined in response to scientific curiosity or specific information needs of policymakers and managers. Managing streamside vegetation was mainly motivated by controlling water temperature in the 1960s; gradually, more interactions were considered, especially viewing the riparian forest as the source of large wood for streams. For the Andrews group, the influence of forests on streams was starkly displayed in studies during the 1970s at Mack Creek, where an old-growth forest reach was compared with a recently clearcut section of stream. The stream ecologists, led by Jim Sedell, examined elements of the stream ecosystem that integrated multiple influences—light, temperature, litter availability, and habitat structure. This approach led to an ecosystem-scale perspective that has gradually expanded in the scope of interactions and the scale of stream network considered (e.g., Gregory et al. 1991, Swanson et al. 1982).

The Approach: The Andrews group has examined forest-stream interactions in both field (e.g., McDade et al. 1990) and modeling (such as Van Sickle and Gregory 1990) studies to determine the zone of forest influence on stream ecosystems. Studies of more complex interactions, such as water and nitrogen exchange between surface and ground waters, involved combining simulation modeling with field studies that use observational and chemical tracer techniques (Wondzell and Swanson 1996a,b). Collective influences were examined by comparing ecosystem properties in adjacent open- and closed-canopy stream reaches (Murphy and Hall 1981). A novel study using time-lapse photography along streams showed unexpected dynamics of the system, such as massive logs within a logjam bobbing up and down during a flood.

Results: Knowledge about the lateral extent and ecological significance of forest-stream interactions have had both practical and scientific importance for decades. Widths of riparian reserves in the Northwest Forest Plan are based in part on interpretations of the extent of forest-stream interactions of various types (USDA and USDI 1994). Ecosystem science continues to refine understanding of these interactions and efforts to scale up interpretations to full stream networks.
supporting research, partly in an effort to counter critics who claimed that no one ever used the sites for research. As Dyrness recalls, “What we were facing, you see, was land managers [who] would say, ‘gosh, you guys run around, set up these things, withdraw them from mineral entry and logging, and nobody ever goes to [use] them, that we can see.”

The Research Natural Area (RNA) committee, Franklin notes, faced difficult obstacles and intense criticism from all sides at the time: “They [were] asking us again and again, ‘… How many of these damn things do you need?!’ And so, it became obvious, we needed to develop a comprehensive list.” The PNW Station eventually published Research Natural Area Needs in the Pacific Northwest, by Dyrness and Franklin, et al. in 1975. That publication went far beyond a simple catalogue of existing sites. It built a template of “cells,” each representing a specific ecosystem type in Washington and Oregon, and it stressed the need to expand the existing network to fill in the “gaps” where a given cell lacked a corresponding RNA. The report suggested guidelines for selecting future RNA sites and noted the need to address concerns relating to rare and endangered organisms and aquatic areas.

Tarrant suggests the success of the RNA effort surprised Station administrators like himself. Speaking to a group of scientists involved in that effort who assembled one summer at Carpenter Lookout, Tarrant observed, “It’s amazing how successful you were. You know there’s not another network like it anywhere else in the nation that holds a candle. Other regions are beginning to come on-line, but what you accomplished over that short period is just astonishing.” Franklin explains they moved with such urgency because “we realized, this landscape’s being cut over real fast, and we’d better get with the program.” Others in the agency, he observes, “were willing to encourage young folks like us to, ‘Well, get out there. Run into brick walls.’ [laughter].”

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Administrative changes at PNW Station also encouraged scientists to rethink their priorities for the Andrews Forest. A new Station Director, Robert Buckman, reorganized PNW Station during a general restructuring of the Forest Service in 1974. Buckman placed the Station’s 24 projects under the control of two assistant directors (including Robert Tarrant) and three program managers. Franklin credits Buckman with sparking his early concern about clearcut logging during a field excursion to a proposed RNA at Wildcat Mountain in the early 1970s. “That trip with Buckman,” he notes, “first got me thinking about the negatives. People had started these clearcuts, and it took about a decade for the whole thing to bloom in my mind, but … I’m sure, today, he’d disown any responsibility for anything I’ve been involved in, subsequently.”

Buckman’s indirect influence on research priorities at the Andrews Forest far exceeded his direct influence on Franklin. He was a strong supporter of research in the Forest Service hierarchy, and he was particularly influential in supporting Tarrant and PNW Station at the national level during a period when Tarrant directed researchers like Franklin at the Andrews. Before taking over from Briegleb as Station Director, Buckman served 10 years at the Forest Service research lab in Grand Rapids, Minnesota, and another 5 years in the Washington Office. He held graduate and undergraduate degrees in forestry, silviculture, and public administration from the University of Minnesota, University of Michigan, and Harvard. His tenure at PNW Station was brief, but significant. One year after the 1974 reorganization, he transferred back to Washington, DC, where he served as Deputy Chief for Research over the next 11 years. Tarrant, who followed Buckman as Station Director, was a graduate of OSU and a soil scientist with 29 years of experience in the Research Branch of the Forest Service at the time he was appointed to head PNW Station. Tarrant previously worked at the Andrews Forest, where he pioneered research in the nitrogen-fixing characteristics of alder. His experience working there with other scientists, and his ties with Buckman, enhanced the group’s standing with the Washington Office. Together with their stronger interagency and international networks, this indirect network of support within the

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48 Interview with Robert Buckman by Max Geier, 13 July 1995, at Peavy Hall, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR.
Forest Service bolstered the group’s confidence in their interactions with national forest managers and their science peers at a crucial point in the global development of long-term research networks.

The Stream Team and the Transition to Long-Term and Applied Research

The Andrews group easily adapted to the UNESCO model of research linked with management applications. One manifestation was the relevance of their studies of woody debris in streams as a pragmatic solution to an expensive problem on the Willamette National Forest. Prior to these studies, forest management guidelines...
required loggers to remove woody debris from streams on sale units, and that requirement increased the cost of cutting on those units. Research at the Andrews Forest, however, demonstrated that riparian ecosystems needed woody debris. Kerrick, as forest supervisor, quickly grasped the implications: “It was costing money to take all this stuff off the slopes. And the process of doing it wasn’t making any money at all. And … we were spending big bucks. … [laughing] I mean, you could save a bundle, and make [ecologically] good decisions as a result of it. I mean, my God, what could be better?”

The woody debris issue was the first time the Andrews group successfully translated a research finding into a major policy shift on the Willamette National Forest. Woody debris studies originated with the Andrews-centered stream group that worked with the lakes group at the University of Washington in the aquatic project of the Coniferous Biome. Oregon State University cooperators Norm Anderson and Jim Hall, along with Stan Gregory and Jim Sedell, formed the core of that group in the early 1970s. Anderson, a professor in the Entomology Department at OSU, together with Hall, of the Fisheries Department, and Rothacher, jointly convinced Franklin to include an aquatic project in the Coniferous Biome at the Andrews Forest, and they hired Sedell as a postdoc to help them get the project underway. Sedell was one of the new leaders who emerged when Franklin left the group in 1973, and his “stream team” gradually shifted the focus of water-related research from continuous hydrologic monitoring efforts to more broad-based, aquatic ecosystem and thematically broader research funded with grants from the NSF.

The aquatics group developed a spirit of close-knit teamwork, personal commitment, and intersite cooperation to compensate for their initially marginal role and isolation from other groups of the Coniferous Biome. They ignored the institutional rivalries that sometimes divided the IBP leadership at OSU from their counterparts at the University of Washington. They rejected the notion that the aquatics program was peripheral to the central concerns of the Coniferous Biome, and their energetic efforts to prove that point made their unit a uniquely cohesive “collective” (in Sedell’s words). That characteristic, and their breakthrough success with the woody debris studies, established the stream team as an effective model for the larger Andrews Group.

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51 Riparian group interview, 1, 6; interview with Jim Sedell, 3-4.
52 Interview with Jim Sedell, 4; interview with IBP group, 3; communication from Fred Swanson 16 December 1998.
The interdisciplinary nature of the stream team and earlier studies of landslides and debris flows at the Andrews Forest led to their breakthrough insight on the woody debris issue. As the stream team struggled to understand how stream ecosystems worked, they focused on the storage and flux of carbon as a common denominator of ecosystems. Their studies of standing-crop carbon and the transport of carbon in stream ecosystems primarily focused on leaves and other organic debris, but Hank Froehlich, a professor of forest engineering at OSU, alerted them to an alternative. Froehlich was particularly interested in whether logging slash precipitated debris flows and landslides in small drainages, and he developed a method to measure the amount and siting of wood and slash in a stream after logging operations. Froehlich’s forest management study coincided with the IBP aquatics effort at the Andrews Forest and inspired an innovative method for studying stream ecology.53

In an effort to determine what precipitated debris flows after logging, Froehlich theorized that in cases where logging operations left slash piled up in small streams, the water collected in ponds until, eventually, the stream broke out, producing a large debris flow. Realizing that he needed to distinguish between the slash left behind by loggers and the woody debris that was already in the stream prior to logging, Froehlich then applied the problem-solving methods of forest engineering to the question of woody debris in streams: he broke the question down into discrete components and then tackled each element as an independent problem.54

To determine how much logging slash from harvest activities in a particular drainage was deposited in the stream, Froehlich needed a method to determine the baseline amount of woody debris in the stream before logging. He independently devised a census technique to establish that baseline, but, Gregory observes, Froehlich was “still looking at it totally from a logging operation point of view.” Froehlich’s attempt to document the amount of wood already in streams alerted stream ecologists to the prevalence of woody debris and the need to study it. He also alerted scientists to the relation between the width of buffer-strips and their effectiveness in keeping logging slash out of streams. When Sedell learned of Froehlich’s method, he invited the engineer out to the Andrews Forest to teach members of the stream team how to use the census method in areas that had not been logged. Froehlich demonstrated the technique in Mack Creek; shortly

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53 Interview with riparian group, 14.
54 Riparian group interview, 14; communication from Fred Swanson 16 December 1998.
thereafter, the group started applying the technique in other streams. They sampled streams beyond the Andrews Forest in places as farflung as Washington, California, New Hampshire, Alaska, and Tennessee. Gregory recalls they discovered “a huge amount of wood in the streams. … any place there was an old forest we found a lot of wood.” With their newfound ability to measure the amount of wood in streams, the stream team also began measuring the biological activity in that debris. The resulting research notably included OSU entomologist Norm Anderson’s studies of insects associated with large wood.55

Scientists in the group found Froehlich’s method useful for studying stream ecology in old-growth drainages, even though he intended it to solve a forest engineering problem on logged sites. That pattern of management concerns influencing research at the Andrews Forest was nothing new. During the IBP, however, it inspired a conceptual breakthrough that helped the group understand the ecology of old-growth forests. That research insight, Gregory observes, established the Andrews Forest as one of the first places where ecologists “recognized the importance of large wood.” The group’s conceptual breakthrough also inspired new policies for managing large woody debris in forest ecosystems.56

The stream team first adapted Froehlich’s management-oriented techniques to their research needs at the Andrews, and then they tested their findings at other sites around the country. Sedell invited Froehlich to demonstrate his method of surveying the amount of wood in streams to members of the stream team at the Andrews, and then they applied his methods to their studies of carbon transport and storage in streams. In Gregory’s words, they “found that there was a huge amount of wood in the streams.” When they presented their findings at conferences and meetings, he notes, “people started saying ‘Oh that’s just an anomaly, that’s just the Andrews, or that’s just the Northwest. So we started going around to streams around the country.’ Wherever they went, the stream team found the same results: “Anyplace there was an old forest we found a lot of wood, and any place that there was not an old forest the wood amounts to about 10 percent of what’s … in forested areas.” As people in the Andrews group became more aware of

56 Interview with Stan Gregory, 5-6.
wood in streams, they also became more aware of woody debris on the forest floor, and their studies of woody debris linked terrestrial and aquatic research at the Andrews Forest.\textsuperscript{57}

The woody debris studies led the group from studies of stream ecosystems into involvement with land management planning. Gregory observes that it “suddenly became an issue in how you manage the stream-side zone, not just [for] shade.” Previous management concerns primarily emphasized the need to anchor the banks and provide shade for fish. As Gregory explains, “If you could provide bank stability and shade, [management activity] … wasn’t an issue. But, suddenly this [concern for supply of woody debris] … pushed back riparian management quite a ways up the slope.”\textsuperscript{58} Franklin also argues that the woody debris finding was a turning point in establishing the reputation of the Andrews as a site for productive, applied science, and he suggests it gave scientists associated with the Andrews some leverage with the Forest Supervisor’s office at the Willamette National Forest: “In a matter of two or three years … there were some [major] turnarounds.”\textsuperscript{59}

The woody debris studies stimulated long-term thinking that branched into other arenas of research, notably including the role of logs in forest ecosystems. Sedell recalls, “We used to not think about logs as anything [significant] until we did a carbon budget and found out that all this wood … was the total dominant.” In the short term, he argues, leaves were the “energetic driver” in a forest ecosystem, but compared with logs, leaves were “a minor league part of the [total] organic story.” The overall volume of wood was so dominant that even if the ecosystem processed only a very small fraction of that wood, it would still be a “huge contribution” to the overall energy budget for the system. Large woody debris, Sedell observes, went from being “something that we cursed when we tripped over it as we went to gather our leaf packs or do our sampling” to an asset that the Group recognized as “something really unique and … worthy of study in itself.”\textsuperscript{60}

District Ranger Steve Eubanks worked closely with the Andrews group on the woody debris issue, testing their ideas on the Blue River Ranger District, and that relationship spilled over into other projects. Franklin, who was rethinking the concept of forest fragmentation at the time, theorized that dispersed-patch clearcutting

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Stan Gregory, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{58} Riparian group interview, 15-16.

\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Jerry Franklin, 23.

\textsuperscript{60} Interview with Jim Sedell, 13.
would minimize problems associated with forest fragmentation. When Franklin explained his ideas, Eubanks quickly implemented them on the district, and the scientist was able to see the management implications of his ideas in practice. The enthusiasm with which Eubanks responded to research ideas helped scientists in the Andrews group realize the potential benefits of working with people who could translate theory into policy on a large scale. That feedback, Franklin notes, was “very useful,” but sometimes their ideas moved from conceptual theory to practical application before they fully analyzed the full implications of what they were doing.  

Social Cohesion and Awareness of Community

The stream team’s studies of forest-stream interactions provided a focal point for community involvement that went beyond mere working relations. People in the group remember, for example, how Dennis Harr kept them entertained with his 12-string guitar after long, weary days in the field on Watershed 10. Sedell notes there was a lot of “informal sharing” among group members, and he credits Stan Gregory’s sense of humor, his “mouthiness,” and his “real sense of corporate responsibility” for nurturing the “real openness” that keyed the stream team’s success.

The team also capitalized on the camp-town mentality of making do with minimal facilities at the Andrews. In keeping with that “roughing-it” mentality, team members, their families, and other volunteers staffed a storm watch that far exceeded the normal call of duty for scientific field work and tested the commitment of the participants. To measure organic debris movement during the fall storm season, the group ran Watershed 10 through a net to capture all of the particles that flowed out the watershed. During storms, the net filled rapidly with debris and had to be cleared or it would be swept away. Gregory recalls, “everyone on the stream project—and daughters—were assigned weekends that they were responsible.” In one case, a storm came through shortly after Thanksgiving. Sedell spent almost the entire month of December on the storm watch, even though he and his wife had just had a new baby. Gregory recalls telling him, ‘Jim, you got to at least go buy some Christmas presents for your family.” When Sedell refused to leave,

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62 Interview with Jim Sedell, 5.

63 Riparian group interview, 2.
Gregory recalls, “Vicki and I went up, we decided to spend Christmas up there tending the net and to be with Jim and help him out, and … on the night before Christmas Eve, suddenly it opened up and we saw the stars for the first time in weeks, and he was able to get down to Christmas Eve with his family.”

The storm watch had a short lifespan compared with many other activities at the Andrews, but it had long-term implications for those involved. Many who shared that experience were still close associates more than 20 years later. The sheer physical and mental strain of the storm watch, however, eventually eroded support for the duty, especially after logging began on Watershed 10 in 1975. The group ended the practice that year, but the storm watch survived as a shared memory of people who demonstrated personal commitment to their colleagues and their work at the Andrews Forest. The cooperative effort served its immediate purpose, and it yielded unanticipated benefits.

The Andrews group experimented with other, planned events intended to simulate the bonding experience of the storm watch. When Franklin returned to the Andrews from NSF, he realized that “… the group was becoming bigger—35, 40, 45 people involved—a lot of them didn’t know each other.” He organized a field excursion that the Andrews group later identified as a “pulse.” The idea was to take the group away from their ordinary surroundings and get them out in a setting where they had to live with each other for a couple of weeks of intensive fieldwork. Dyrness recalls he accompanied Franklin, McKee, and Bob Woodmansee, of Colorado State University, on a minipulse to Steamboat Mountain Research Natural Area, where Franklin wanted to establish permanent plots in 1973. All four of them packed into one carryall, lived in tents in a campground, and ate meals in the mess hall at Trout Lake Ranger Station. McKee recalls a similar event in 1976 near Waldo Lake. The first event that Franklin describes as a pulse, however, was a 2-week-long excursion he organized in 1978 to the South Fork of the Hoh River in Olympic National Park. The primary purpose of this team-building exercise, he notes, was to “go out and suffer together” (it rained most of the 2 weeks and the camp, located on a Hoh River gravel bar, partially flooded).

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64 Riparian group interview, 3.
65 Riparian group interview, 3.
66 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 25; interview with Ted Dyrness, 24-25; communication from Art McKee November 1998; communication from Ted Dyrness December 1998; communication from Fred Swanson September 2003.
Community Ideals and Forest Policy in the Late 1970s

The successful transfer of theory into practice in getting woody debris in streams included as a management goal helped overcome any misgivings that scientists may have carried over from previous, more antagonistic interactions with Forest Service managers. By the late 1970s, despite the spartan research facilities supporting their work, scientists associated with the Andrews had assumed a more independent, consulting role in their relations with district rangers and forest supervisors. Forest managers themselves confronted increasingly complex expectations and congressional mandates. The coincident involvement of the group with local, regional, national, and international networks of ecosystems research created a more authoritative, autonomous, and cooperative context for interactions between managers and researchers at Blue River. The emerging self-confidence and self-awareness of this scientific community paralleled changes in public-policy and management priorities for the experimental forest and for the surrounding districts of the Willamette National Forest. Intellectual curiosity, an eagerness to test elegant theory against the harsh reality of field conditions, and an interest in finding ways to mitigate ecological problems encouraged these scientists to work more closely with forest managers. Those managers, meanwhile, sought practical solutions to the disputes that resulted when public values changed more rapidly than forest
policy. The NFMA of 1976 reinforced these general tendencies with a Congressional mandate that pushed scientists and forest managers into more cooperation.

President Gerald Ford signed the NFMA into law in October 1976 as a measure intended to resolve a long struggle in the courts and in Congress against an accelerated pattern of timber sales on national forest lands. A ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the 1975 Monongahela case established a precedent that temporarily halted clearcutting in the national forests. Senator Hubert Humphrey’s subsequent bill, the NFMA, specifically authorized clearcutting, but it directed the Forest Service to develop detailed land and resource management plans in consultation with a committee of scientists, to be appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Committee of Scientists met 18 times between 1976 and 1979, culminating in revised NFMA regulations by 1982. The law imposed a ceiling on timber sales allowed each year, it required the Forest Service to initiate regional and local planning programs, and it required the Forest Service to complete new management plans by 1985. The agency subsequently established interdisciplinary teams to prepare management plans for each national forest.67

The NFMA mandate for long-term, science-based, region-wide, forest planning resulted in a flurry of activity among the various national forest staffs to comply with the new law. The NFMA’s more restrictive definition of sustained yield (“nondeclining even-flow,” meaning timber output and other forest values must be sustainable in perpetuity, without decline) effectively broadened the range of considerations included in planning.68 The NFMA was implemented between 1976 and 1983, just as the Andrews group transitioned from the end of the IBP to the beginning of the LTER. By the mid 1980s, the group was more secure, with independent funding from NSF to supplement their ongoing support from the Forest Service. The process of securing that status, however, was anything but linear or final. It was the result of continuing and convoluted efforts to hold together a nucleus of scientists jointly engaged in cooperative, interdisciplinary, long-term research through a period of uncertain experimental grants of limited duration and dubious precedent. By the early 1980s, group leaders had managed to turn an impending crisis in funding into an opportunistic experiment in long-term research, and the Andrews emerged as a flagship program of a fledgling network of research sites supported with NSF funds as a LTER.


68 Critics of the act observe, however, that the NFMA contained “…loopholes large enough to drive logging trucks through…” Hirt, Conspiracy of optimism, 262-264.
Building an Autonomous Subculture With Interagency Support

The Andrews group broadened its base of support during the 1970s to include three major legs of support: the Forest Service, OSU, and the NSF. As late as 1972, the Forest Service annually funded 14 of 19 major research projects at the Andrews for a total of $100,000. Those funds supported six agency scientists, their research assistants, and their staff. Aside from this direct funding for specific research projects both the PNW Station and the university provided basic infrastructure and support for the Andrews group in the form of permanent staff (including scientists, technicians, and faculty), office and lab facilities in Corvallis, and other tangible and intangible support, not least of which was the way in which the university provided an administrative structure for processing the grant and routing it through the budgeting system to cover expenses and salaries. The Andrews group also drew support from the broader research community that the university and the Forest Service lab attracted to that city, including formal and informal consultations, meeting venues and other networking opportunities. The concentration in Corvallis of those university and agency resources was a tangible asset that scientists could cite in their efforts to secure NSF funds through the competitive grants process. The 1974 proposal to NSF for funding in 1975-76, for example, included 69 “subproject” proposals with 139 cooperating scientists at the various sites of the Biome. Local scientists clearly benefited from working in the surroundings of an NSF oriented culture that encouraged and mentored broader participation and involvement in these funding opportunities. 69

By the late 1970s, this third leg of funding (NSF programs) was at once the most important and the most tenuous. Through the competitive grants process, the NSF funded programs at the Andrews Forest at an annual amount of $569,000 by 1975. As principal investigator of record, Waring channeled these funds through OSU, but the program under which the NSF offered these funding opportunities was scheduled to end in 1977. Additional NSF grants in the annual amount of approximately $247,400 supported studies (variously scheduled to end in 1977 or 1978) of canopy subsystems, the incidence and significance of coniferous needle and twig endophytes, and the structure and function of aquatic ecosystems (the River Continuum project) at the Andrews Forest. During the same period, Forest Service funding included $10,000 from the Pacific Northwest Region for a study

of northern spotted owl ecology, and $115,000 from PNW Station to fund studies of forest watershed management, the ecology and successional patterns in natural stands and disturbed habitats of mixed-conifer forests, community-environment relations in mixed-conifer forests, intensive culture of Douglas-fir, and genetic variation in Northwest trees.\footnote{“Current research [1975-6]” (unpublished typescript, NSF Proposal for Support File, 4060 Research Facilities Folder, Publications Room, FSL, Corvallis, OR).}

Before 1975, the NSF funded research proposals only up to 3 years, but Franklin and other national science leaders wanted to extend that funding over a longer period. He and several associates at NSF cultivated support for the idea in that agency by promoting the concept of “centers of excellence” as a mechanism for funding place-specific programs to benefit sites that had flourished during the IBP. Scientists at the Andrews Forest had compiled continuous records of monitoring efforts spanning more than two decades before 1975, and those baseline data, along with other ongoing research at the Andrews Forest, Franklin argued, were compelling reasons for converting NSF funding for the IBP into an ongoing program of support for long-term research.\footnote{Interview with Jerry Franklin, 16-17; interview with IBP group, 31.}

McKee worked closely with Franklin to draft a proposal they both hoped would be the prototype for a broader network of National Field Research Facilities independently funded with long-term grants from the NSF.\footnote{Interview with Art McKee, 15.} McKee’s effort produced an initial, 16-page, draft proposal for an NSF grant to support the Andrews Forest as a National Experimental Ecological Reserve. Franklin circulated the proposal to six of his colleagues at PNW Station, OSU, and at the Blue River Ranger District in December 1975. Franklin’s cover letter solicited their input on the draft, inviting a three-way dialogue among scientists and managers directly involved with the Andrews Forest. He addressed carbon copies of the memo and the attached proposal to an additional 24 colleagues from all three groups, and he invited “other interested parties” to attend a meeting in the conference room of PNW Station’s forestry sciences laboratory in Corvallis on December 22. As a leading agenda item for that meeting, he stressed the need to carefully define the administrative responsibilities and limits of authority implied in channeling the money through OSU.\footnote{Memo (8 December 1975) from Jerry F. Franklin to William Ferrell, James Sedell, Thomas Moore, George Carroll, Robert Burns, Dick Fredriksen (4060 Research Facilities Folder, Publications Room, FSL, Corvallis, OR).}
McKee structured the proposal in response to the formal request for proposals from the NSF (NSF 75-32) conforming to the National Science Foundation Biological Research Resources Program: Support of Field Research Facilities. The Andrews group formally designated this effort as the Field Research Facilities program in correspondence with the NSF, but commonly referred to it as “the experimental ecological reserve program” in internal documents, and they commonly refer to this 1975-76 proposal as “the facilities grant” or the “bridge grant.” The proposal identified as outstanding attributes of the site its long-term control by a research organization, its representation of important and widespread forest ecosystems of the Pacific Northwest, its “pristine” and “virgin state,” its extensive stands of mature and old-growth forests, its large size and suitability for large-scale experimenting and control, its diversity of represented ecosystems, its legacy data from past research and inventories of physical and biological features, and its physical improvements and field sampling installations.

The facilities grant outlined a 3-year budget totaling $443,000, with a starting date of 1 June 1976, and it listed Waring (OSU) and Logan Norris (PNW Station) as co-principal investigators responsible for administering funds channeled from NSF through OSU. Forest Service “ownership” of the site was one complicating factor for a proposal that implied OSU ownership of facilities improvements funded with a federal grant channeled through that institution. The preliminary budget targeted improving the database and services for scientists at the Andrews, including additional trailers for working and living space. Franklin’s cover letter also highlighted the need to fund at least two full-time positions: a site manager and a technician.

The NSF guidelines for the facilities grant forced leaders of the Andrews group to develop a new agreement clarifying administrative responsibilities at the experimental forest. Previous memorandums of understanding had clarified the boundaries of responsibility for PNW Station and the Willamette National Forest. The Facilities Grant, however, complicated matters. It included soliciting funds from a third party (NSF), then channeling those resources through a fourth party (OSU), which would formally authorize distribution of those monies for expenditures to


update the physical infrastructure of federal property under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service and jointly administered by the Research Branch (PNW Station) and the National Forest System (Willamette National Forest). This convoluted structure hinged on a self-appointed, interagency, advisory group of scientists and forest managers directly involved with the Andrews Forest, and it erected a tangle of potentially overlapping zones of legal responsibility. This arrangement with the NSF implied the two branches of the Forest Service and the university had made a long-term commitment to support the programs linked with the facilities funded under this grant. The group, however, never fully defined the boundaries of legal responsibility for all of the parties, thus avoiding the risk that turf wars among agencies and among scientists might block the proposal.

The site-centered Facilities Grant stretched the precedent of program-centered cooperative agreements between OSU and PNW Station during the Coniferous Biome. Those earlier arrangements covered specific research efforts with no guarantee of continued support after the program ended. The NSF funded the Facilities Grant, however, as an effort to support an open-ended commitment to long-term research. To protect the autonomy of the Andrews group, Franklin and Waring negotiated a series of limited agreements between OSU and the Forest Service that clarified some limits of bureaucratic authority. Station Director Tarrant facilitated their efforts. Together, they negotiated a three-cornered set of agreements including OSU and regional representatives for both branches of the Forest Service (PNW Station and the Willamette National Forest). Those agreements, which spanned 1976 through 1980, reaffirmed previous agreements that withdrew the Andrews from allowable-cut calculations on the Willamette National Forest. In the process, the group secured university funding for McKee’s position as site manager.

The group negotiated separately with NSF to meet program requirements for specific agreements defining the responsibilities of all parties at the Andrews Forest. Scientists participating in that effort struggled to define the limits of bureaucratic authority and responsibility without surrendering control or forfeiting the opportunity to secure NSF funding. Two participating scientists (Kermit Cromack and Waring) met in March 1976 with William Sievers, who represented the NSF

76 Communication from Art McKee December 1998. Interview with IBP group, 10.
77 Interview with Dick Waring, 6-7.
Biology Research Resources Program, to discuss the Facilities Grant and the respective commitments of OSU and the Forest Service. Waring referred Sievers to the PNW Station Director (Tarrant) or the Deputy Chief for Research (Buckman) for confirmation of Forest Service intentions to continue the scientific dedication of the site. He also stressed the size of that agency’s annual investment at the Andrews Forest, citing the “draft supplement to the Master Memorandum of Understanding between OSU and the FS [PNW] Station” as evidence of their intentions. At the time, that draft supplement was completely devoid of signatures, but Waring confidently conveyed to Sievers his expectation that small detail would be resolved “by the time you arrive in July.”

The three-page draft document to which Waring referred was circulated barely 2 weeks earlier to Dick Fredriksen, Logan Norris, Art McKee, Bob Romancier, and Dick Waring with a marginal notation by “Lucy F.” indicating it was merely “an idea draft” seeking input and suggestions on a draft document of ideas that Lucy F. considered “vague enuf to fly in both institutions [PNW Station and OSU].” Even this document did not formally coordinate the three-way division of authority among OSU, PNW Station, and Willamette National Forest. Instead, separate agreements (memorandums of understanding) were approved between PNW Station and Willamette National Forest on 21 December 1976, and between PNW Station and OSU on 7 June 1977. Despite Waring’s assurances that any loose ends would be tied up by July 1976, and despite repeated pleadings from Franklin to the Station and the university, moreover, loose threads pertaining to this agreement hung in the air until 22 February 1980. On that date, the OSU Business Affairs Office forwarded a finalized memorandum of understanding to Franklin.


81 “Letter 7 June 1977 from R.M. Kallender, Assistant Director, Forest Research Laboratory, to Charles J. Petersen, Assistant Director, Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Experiment Station,” Master Memorandum of Understanding Folder, H.J. Andrews Files, File Box D, Storage Vault, FSL, Corvallis, OR.
detailing the interagency agreement to jointly administer the Andrews.\textsuperscript{82} Until that 1980 memo, however, the Andrews group autonomously coordinated NSF funding, site administration, and research from 1976 through 1980 on little more than a handshake agreement not to inquire too closely into the matter.

The structure of support linking the NSF, PNW Station, OSU, and the Willamette National Forest with a scientist-administered program was difficult to explain to people outside the group. Franklin recalls that visitors to the Andrews Forest often asked, “How the hell does this work? You got all these university people down here on the Andrews and they’re calling a lot of the shots. And, you know, you’re a Forest Service employee and you’re spending National Science Foundation [funds]? And how the hell does this stuff work?” His common response was, “You know, we just do it.” Franklin theorizes the structure mostly worked because, initially, OSU, PNW Station, and the Willamette National Forest “probably didn’t have us far enough up on their radar screen to cause them to really think that much about it.” That began to change during the 1980s, as the capital invested in programs at the Andrews Forest began to attract more attention, but Franklin notes, “some stuff never has gotten down on paper.” Unusual features of the agreement, he observes, include a university employee (McKee) who wields authority over a university facility on Forest Service property with no clear agreement on “who cleans up the mess when the party’s over.” Since that time, the NSF has tightened its funding guidelines, with the result, as Franklin concedes, that many of the proposals for which the Andrews group secured funding in previous years, likely would not have been funded if current rules had been in force at that time.\textsuperscript{83}

The facilities grant funded the group’s plans to designate an experimental ecological reserve (EER) on the Andrews Forest. The new EER included 23,588 acres of lands in and around the experimental forest and linked them with the

\textsuperscript{82} “Memorandum of understanding 22 Feb 1980 to J.F. from OSU Business Affairs Office,” H.J. Andrews Files, File Box D, Storage Vault, FSL, Corvallis, OR.

\textsuperscript{83} Interview with Jerry Franklin, 19; interview with IBP group, 30-31.
97,600 acres of the Three Sisters Wilderness. This structure of an experimental area paired with a wilderness control area resembled the biosphere reserve concept Franklin helped develop earlier in that same decade. McKee and Franklin expected the NSF would adopt the EER as a prototype for a more permanent and far-flung program funding long-term ecological reserves across the country within the next 5 or 6 years. They envisioned a structure of interagency funding tied to place-centered monitoring, and site-specific research, all geared toward long-term studies with short-term productivity. The NSF, however, actively discouraged the Andrews group from referring to their site as an EER, preferring instead the formal designation of the place as a National Field Research Facility.

The Andrews group worked to coordinate their work at the experimental forest with other sites, in an effort to convert the facilities grant into a more secure, long-term structure of support from the NSF. Between 1977 and 1980, the group’s small-but-expanding circle of alumni and associates sent delegates to a series of conferences and workshops. These conferences were precursors to the NSF’s request for proposals for a LTER program. Ken Cummins (OSU Department of Fisheries and Wildlife) and Franklin, for example, attended the Long-Term Ecological Measurements Conference at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, in March 1977. Conference participants generated an NSF report that addressed the feasibility of long-term ecological measurements and recommended measurement priorities for terrestrial, freshwater, and marine ecosystems. The next year, Waring, McKee, and Carl Berntsen (then with the Washington Office of the Forest Service) joined Cummins (who subsequently moved from the W.K. Kellogg Biological Station at Michigan State University to OSU) as participant and observers at a second conference at Woods Hole. Conferees at that February 1978 meeting considered what

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84 In addition to the 14,943 acres in the Andrews itself, this total includes the Wildcat Mountain Research Natural Area, Olallie Ridge Research Natural Area, Gold Lake Bog Research Natural Area, Middle Santiam Research Natural Area, and two areas described in the proposal as the “Mountain Hemlock Research Natural Area,” and the “Second-Growth-Douglas-Fir Research Natural Area,” as well as the “Chesheds” (watersheds 9 and 10) near the experimental forest. “Land Allocation for H.J. Andrews Experimental Ecological Reserve Proposal [1975/6],” 4060 Research Facilities Folder, Publications Room, FSL, Corvallis, OR.


86 Interview with Art McKee, 15.
would be needed to operate a program of long-term measurements in ecology. The next year, at a June workshop at the Institute of Ecology in Indianapolis, Indiana, Waring and 39 other participants exchanged insights from previous long-term studies in different agencies. That workshop developed the structure for a new, continuing LTER program. As a culmination to this series of meetings, the Institute of Ecology issued a final report to the NSF in November 1979, and circulated it to all participants.

The LTER program went from initial conceptualization to operative reality in a remarkably short time. The NSF issued the request for proposals for the first LTER in late 1979, and applications for the first round of LTER funding were due back at the agency by March 1980. The Andrews group responded by proposing, among other ideas, a study of log decomposition slated to continue for 200 years. Ongoing EER funding at the Andrews Forest from 1977 through 1983 overlapped with the LTER, beginning in 1980, and that overlap complicated the group’s initial proposal. The NSF renewed the initial, 3-year facilities grant for another 36 months, beginning in March 1980, for a 3-year total of $683,798, ending in 1983. These funds, averaging a little over $200,000 per year, included support for significant expansion of facilities at the headquarters site, including the purchase and conversion of additional trailers that housed a laboratory, cafeteria, and sleeping quarters.

By comparison with the funds that NSF provided for the facilities grant, the agency provided about $500,000 per year for LTER sites. The NSF, therefore, approved the first LTER grant to the Andrews group with lower funding so that the combined funds from the LTER and the facilities grant totaled about $500,000. After 1983, when the facilities grant ended, the NSF boosted annual LTER funding to the

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88 Interview with IBP group, 40.
Andrews group to $500,000.\textsuperscript{89} Technically, the group received no more than other sites under the LTER, but they had a running start on the LTER concept in the 3 years before other sites had access to that NSF program.

**Conclusion**

The Andrews group, by the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century, was a self-conscious community that supported interdisciplinary cooperation and mutual support for long-term programs, and people in that community cooperated in joint efforts to secure funding and other support from two different federal agencies and a state university. The resulting community was a refuge for scientists struggling to reach long-term goals in a period of sustained instability. The group patterned its vision for the future on a collective legacy from the IBP years: a composite portrait of remembered experiences conveyed through oral traditions and science data, including the landscape

and publications rooted in research at the Andrews Forest. The community of the LTER era, however, was not the same as the community of the IBP era. Those who survived the transition from IBP to LTER funding, and those who joined the group during those years, passed through a cultural filter that winnowed out a significant number of their colleagues. Many people who worked on the Coniferous Biome at the Andrews were disillusioned with the unfulfilled promise of the IBP. They had rational concerns about whether alternative funding would materialize after the IBP ended, and they were frustrated by the constant strain of trying to make a living or raise a family while working in a professional environment of ongoing uncertainty about future sources of funding and support. The temptations of other opportunities for career advancement, consequently, seriously depleted the core group of cooperating scientists. During this transitional period, the NSF trimmed the proposed network of field sites from nearly 200 to fewer than 10 LTER sites—a 95-percent reduction of the sites in the original proposal—and there were no guarantees the Andrews Forest would make the final cut.

People who stayed with the Andrews group had to be willing to work under uncertain conditions at a facility with a long record of abrupt changes in staffing and funding. Programs and facilities at the Andrews Forest survived in a never-never land of overlapping, interagency responsibilities. The group’s leaders wielded authority that rested on little more than bureaucratic indecision and vague assurances not to look too closely at what was going on. Under these conditions, passion for the place and the endeavor was a more important variable attracting people to the Andrews group than was common sense. These characteristics of the Andrews Forest and group did, however, virtually ensure that the people who remained in this community in the last two decades of the 20th century included many scientists who were light on their feet, intellectually and academically nimble, adaptive, and willing to take on daunting new challenges. People who remained with the group through this period were whistling through a scientific graveyard strewn with half-finished projects and ongoing responsibilities. They were ideally suited for negotiating the opportunities and minefields of natural resource policy and ecosystems research in the last two decades of the 20th century.
Chapter Five: Integrated Science and Long-Term Programs of Research

The success of the Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) Program at the National Science Foundation (NSF) depended on the credibility, innovation, and intellectual rigor of the science it funded after 1980, and the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest) supplied that need. Long Term Ecological Research funding helped people with career appointments at Oregon State University (OSU) and at the Pacific Northwest (PNW) Research Station make long-term commitments to support, develop, and staff studies at the Andrews Forest with less concern for how much support the university or the Forest Service might be able to provide. This structure of funding, however, meant that most of the people hired to support the Andrews group’s research programs after 1980 depended on fixed-term appointments. The group, as a whole, had more autonomy to design and staff programs of research, but many people had to live with constant uncertainty about their futures in that group. Those who succeeded in that environment quickly learned the importance of nurturing good professional and personal relations with other people while pursuing their own research goals.

At the Andrews Forest, the group struggled to dispel the common notion that “very little research … lasts past the lifetime or career of the investigator.” During the first LTER grant, they experimented with ways to encourage researchers to cooperate with each other, to look for ways that their projects tied in with earlier studies, and to consider how their studies might help others who might develop studies at that site in the future. They needed to communicate across disciplinary boundaries and from one project to another. At the Andrews Forest, people structured their science to meet goals that the group defined in a collaborative process. The group considered new proposals in the context of previous efforts and plans for future studies at that site. Links among various studies, however, often were apparent only in retrospect. The advent of LTER, and the group exercise of developing proposals for renewal under that NSF program, formalized efforts to identify long-term “threads” of research themes. After two decades of working under this system, the group presented those threads in its fourth LTER proposal (LTER4). It identified each thread of research as a “component” in a broader “synthesis area” that linked scientists and ideas from various studies at the Andrews Forest.

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1 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 37; communication from Fred Swanson 2 January 1999.
By the end of the 1990s, scientists at the Andrews Forest had identified nine major threads of long-term continuity linking research efforts applied across the 50-year history of scientific inquiry in this place: (1) vegetation succession; (2) hydrology, small watersheds; (3) soils; (4) disturbance, landscape; (5) wildlife; (6) biodiversity, arthropods; (7) decomposition, carbon dynamics; (8) forest-stream interactions; and (9) information management. These nine threads of research share an emphasis on the characteristics of old-growth stands, but the group’s continuing attentiveness to conditions in young, managed stands, also pushed them more in the direction of research at the landscape scale to include much that is not directly related to old growth.

The Andrews Forest of the late 20th century was a landscape dramatically transformed from the “forest primeval” Silen remembered from his work there decades earlier. Experimental clearcuts and other manipulations from the preceding half-century left about a quarter of the Andrews in various stages of regeneration. Young and maturing stands on this landscape offered many different opportunities for research in related components of the ecosystem. The nine threads of research identified in LTER4, however, illustrate the snowballing accumulation of research and specialized skills relevant to old-growth and other issues that this group brought to bear on the Andrews Forest. The self-conscious, group effort to retrospectively trace threads of continuity belies the organic process by which individuals became involved in specific studies and shaped their outcome. Their published work details numerous individual studies, but it seldom conveys the personal initiative and interpersonal skills that linked those projects into this web of interconnected, long-term science. Those human patterns are apparent in various programs initiated since 1969 that collectively illustrate how scientists grounded their studies in the intellectual and physical legacy of the Andrews and contributed to the emerging pattern of those nine threads.

Linkages that were invisible or only vaguely apparent to people at the time, later became more obvious and eventually influenced the direction of long-term research in this group. The nine threads identified for the 50th anniversary of the Andrews Forest illustrate the thinking of the group at the end of the century. This study, consequently, does not attempt to trace any one of those threads from start to

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2 Conversations with Fred Swanson September 1998.
The group first developed the concept of long-term research at the Andrews Forest and then applied the lessons they learned in that landscape to studies at other scales and in other locations. Studies of stream ecology near logged drainages on the Andrews Forest, for example, contributed to a breakaway proposal for a “river continuum” study with regional and national components that built on an idea originating with Robin Vannote, of the Stroud Water Research Laboratory in Pennsylvania. Scientists who had explored theories of vegetative succession, stream ecology, and geomorphology at the Andrews Forest during the 1970s, as another example, led an interagency study of the effects of the Mount St. Helens eruption in 1980 and returned to the Lookout Creek drainage with new ideas about disturbance and biological legacies. That experience renewed their enthusiasm for “questioning the obvious.” In a dramatic example of “questioning the obvious,” the group proposed a 200-year log-decomposition study on and near the Andrews Forest. That “long-term” proposal for the first LTER grant also forced the group to grapple with strategies to transfer leadership from one generation of scientists to the next. That long-term commitment also attracted attention to the incongruity of permanent science and temporary facilities, and the group parlayed that paradox into a major grant to support infrastructure improvements at the headquarters site. In the process of improving the site, the group transformed the Andrews Forest into a place for spiritual renewal and professional networking. In this way, long-term research secured a future for the group and the experimental forest itself.

Long-Term Research and Clearcut Legacies

Scientists planning research at the Andrews Forest after 1969 had to fit their studies to the clearcuts, roads, and other consequences of previous management efforts on that landscape. The initial memorandum of understanding establishing the experimental forest had specified that the new facility would supply the entire quota of timber slated for harvest from the Blue River watershed of the Willamette National Forest through the first 15 years of the agreement. That consideration overwhelmed science goals during the initial phase of planning roads and laying out timber sales. The understanding stipulated that sales would “fulfill obligations incurred in accepting access road money for opening up the Blue River watershed.” The implications of the agreement were clear: the PNW Station Director
agreed to develop cutting plans for the experimental forest “so that this planned rate of cutting can be maintained in an orderly fashion.” The Willamette National Forest planned to harvest 20 million board feet of logs per year from the Blue River drainage from 1949 to 1964, with the explicit proviso that this entire amount would come from the experimental forest.

The character of the place relative to the surrounding landscape changed dramatically during the last half of the century. By the late 1960s, the initial agreement had favored management practices that produced a patchwork landscape of clearcuts linked with a network of roads traversing the Lookout Creek drainage. The Andrews Forest was a “gap” surrounded by a relatively intact forest of old-growth timber on nearby drainages. In the last three decades of the century, however, the group curtailed timber harvests on the Andrews Forest while the rate of cutting escalated in nearby drainages, inverting the relation between the experimental forest and the surrounding national forest. The group gradually redefined the Andrews Forest as a science-oriented reserve of regenerating second-growth stands interspersed with relatively extensive stands of old-growth and younger, native forest. The Lookout Creek drainage, by the end of the century, was in a situation inversely similar to conditions at mid century. In the 1950s, the pace of logging on the Andrews Forest had exceeded the pace of logging on nearby drainages, but by the end of the century, proportionally more unlogged, old-growth stands survived on the Andrews Forest than on nearby drainages of the national forest. Scientists who worked at the Andrews Forest during that later period encountered a hybrid landscape in apparent transition, and their perceptions of that place shaped their priorities for future research.

The early process of “roading the Andrews” and “converting” its old-growth stands into young-forest conditions left an enormous amount of woody debris.

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4 “Agreement [4 June 1948] between the Regional Forester, Forest Supervisor, and Experiment Station Director ...in the administration of the Blue River Experimental Forest,” H.J. Andrews Memorandum of Understanding Folder, H.J. Andrews Files, File Box F, Storage Vault, FSL, Corvallis, OR.

5 December 1992 discussion with Roy Silen, 11-12; communication from Fred Swanson 2 January 1999.
his extensive field work. As logging created new openings in the old-growth stands, however, Silen observed “heavy” increases in “all the game populations.”

This perception of a forest in transition shaped management priorities on the Andrews Forest and subsequent research priorities. The evident effects of logging and road-building activities during the 1950s attracted wildlife specialist Jay Gashwiler, who studied small-animal populations before, during, and after logging, and in relation to seed fall. He observed that chipmunks and red-backed mice quickly moved from recently logged or burned stands into adjacent green timber, but deer mice populations in the logged units increased. The research emphasis on logged and roaded areas and effects of logging continued through the mid 1960s. Rothacher’s concern about “debris down the drainage” and Fredriksen’s analyses of erosion and sedimentation problems associated with building logging roads, exemplified the focus of research in the era of intensive logging on the experimental forest. Franklin and Dyrness began to branch out into regional vegetation classification studies by mid decade, but through the beginning of the International Biological Programme (IBP) at the close of the 1960s, logging activities and their aftermath were dominant factors guiding individual research efforts on the Lookout Creek drainage.

The emphasis of research at the Andrews Forest shifted in the 1970s, during the IBP, from studies of logging effects to studies of the attributes of old-growth stands and associated streams. As logging activities geared up on adjacent drainages after the 1960s, the experimental forest became an apparent refuge from the

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industrial transformation of the Willamette National Forest. Its patchwork landscape of regenerating stands intermixed with old growth attracted scientists who hoped to include the place as one in a network of sites in the IBP. One important constraint was the group’s perception that any proposal for long-term research had to be “sexy enough to be salable to the National Science Foundation.” In an effort to define a unique niche for the Andrews Forest in the IBP, they downplayed the managed characteristics of the place and emphasized its more “pristine” features. The group’s focus, thereafter, shifted to studies of the remaining stands of old growth on the drainage. The effort to fit research at the Andrews into the constraints of the IBP, 11 inverted previous perceptions of the place as a site managed for intensive logging. That process of adapting to the priorities of an external program of research, however, also limited opportunities to secure funding for some projects more closely linked with the earlier emphasis on the regenerating patches. Scientists in the group struggled to reconcile wildlife studies, for example, with the broader effort at the Andrews Forest during the Coniferous Biome project. Waring later confessed that despite ongoing wildlife studies at the site since the 1950s, he “couldn’t really see the role” of those efforts in the IBP, which emphasized studies of “undisturbed” forests. 12

The Coniferous Biome’s emphasis on undisturbed forests was an easier fit with the group’s earlier research and data on woody debris and logging effects on the Lookout Creek watershed. The physical characteristics of woody debris help explain why the Coniferous Biome strengthened this arena of research while wildlife studies languished. Studies of woody debris detailed “interface issues” that involved interactions between organic and inorganic components plus forest and stream components of the ecosystem. The IBP provided scientists in the group with unaccustomed resources and encouraged them to apply their understanding of woody debris in the unfamiliar terrain of “undisturbed” stands of old growth at the Andrews Forest. Among the new resources that the IBP provided, Waring lists as most valuable the ability to link up with people who were studying similar processes and issues in other biomes. The IBP created interdisciplinary networks stretching across many different sites: people at the Eastern and Tundra Biomes contributed ideas that the Andrews group applied to their own studies of decomposition and carbon cycling in old-growth, coniferous forests. 13

12 Interview with Dick Waring, 7.
13 Interview with IBP group, 20; interview with Dick Waring, 4.
Sidebar 5.1: Woody Debris in Streams

The Issue: Wood in streams is a particularly significant component of forest-stream interaction studies at the Andrews Forest. Big, slowly decomposing, dead wood is conspicuous in streams flowing through forests of large, long-lived trees as well as in younger forests. When static, wood strongly influences the ecological, hydrological, and geomorphic structure and function of stream systems (Triska and Cromack 1980), and while moving in floods, wood pieces can increase ecosystem disturbance (Johnson et al. 2000). Management activities can alter stream systems by changing the condition of wood in streams and by modifying the riparian zones that are sources of wood for streams.

The Roots: The issue of wood in streams developed in parallel on both science and management fronts. Scientists sought to bring the woody debris component into stream ecosystem budgets of nutrients and carbon during the International Biological Programme study period and to quantify effects of wood on channel form, aquatic habitat, and sediment movement. Both ecologists and geomorphologists had ignored wood in streams because it was inconvenient to study with standard methods, which were designed to measure the rapid accumulation and breakdown of fine litter. Woody debris in streams became a major management issue in Oregon in the mid 1970s, when new requirements for removing logging debris from streams raised the specter of high logging costs and unnatural, wood-free streams. This issue was highlighted by standing-room-only crowds at 2-day symposiums on logging debris in streams in 1975 and 1977 at Oregon State University, which brought together scientists and loggers with shared interests.

The Approach: The earliest studies of wood in streams in the Andrews Forest were simple inventories and maps (Froehlich 1973, Swanson et al. 1976). Wood moving during a flood in 1977 showed the value of repeated mapping to document change (Lienkaemper and Swanson 1987). Measurement of wood conditions, dynamics, and consequences was enhanced by establishing forest reference stands straddling streams and networks of surveyed channel cross sections to track channel change, repeated mapping, and annual surveys of more than 1,700 numbered pieces of wood in study reaches. These observations were supplemented by computer simulation modeling of wood dynamics; studies of wood movement in small, experimental streams; and replicated field experiments manipulating wood abundance and configuration to test their effects on fish populations and other ecosystem components.

Results: River ecology research in North America, Europe, and Japan has embraced the study of wood in rivers as an important theme (Gregory et al. 2003). Studying wood in streams was a major departure for stream geomorphologists. It led to new methods for characterizing wood transport, budgets, and the structure and function of wood accumulations in ways that parallel more traditional studies of inorganic (sand and gravel) sediment in rivers. Forest ecology studies of riparian zones often feature concerns about wood recruitment to streams, including the rate of wood decomposition and its residence time. Sustaining the supply and function of wood in streams has become a pivotal issue for improving stream habitat and managing riparian vegetation.
Woody Debris in Streams and the River Continuum

The IBP encouraged scientists at the Andrews Forest to look at an old forest in a new context. Earlier studies on the Lookout Creek drainage had emphasized the effects of logging, but the IBP shifted the emphasis to consider conditions before logging. The IBP was a community of people and ideas that inspired researchers at the Andrews Forest. As people in the group tried to figure out how stream ecosystems worked, their involvement with people from other IBP sites encouraged them to study the storage and flux of carbon as a common denominator of ecosystems. Jim Sedell and Frank Triska (another OSU postdoc) were particularly receptive to this external pressure to explore issues relating to carbon storage and nutrient cycling. They were also influenced by studies closer to home, including Froehlich’s method for measuring woody debris in streams.14

The stream team was well positioned to adopt Froehlich’s methods in their research, and to expand on those ideas to explore forest-stream interactions, because of their earlier efforts to build interdisciplinary, collaborative links beyond their own group. Entomologist Norm Anderson’s faculty standing and his collaboration with Jim Hall, a colleague in fisheries and wildlife at OSU, helped him build a nucleus of people with scientific credibility in the academic community. These well-established scientists supported and inspired their more junior colleagues, like Frank Triska, Sedell, and Gregory, who began working with the group as graduate-student and postdoctoral associates during the Coniferous Biome. Among their other cooperative efforts, for example, Sedell, Hall, and Triska collaborated on a 1973 publication, *Stream Ecology in Relation to Land Use*.15

The riparian group became more than the sum of its individual members in 1973, when it joined a multisite initiative to secure major funding from the NSF, independent of the IBP. This “river continuum” grant, which the NSF approved 2 years later, enabled the riparian group to operate with relative autonomy while still participating in the Coniferous Biome.16 The river-continuum concept is a hypothesis that a river network is a linked system in which ecosystem-scale processes downstream are linked with upstream components. The concept posits an orderly system of biotic assemblages and processes operating along a continuous and

14 Interview with riparian group, 14.
16 Interview with Jim Sedell, 6-7.
Sidebar 5.2: River Continuum Concept

The Issue: Aquatic ecologists long struggled for a conceptual framework for interpreting results of studies conducted at localized sites along rivers. The river continuum concept provides a broad geographic perspective on the variety of river ecosystem conditions and processes from small, forest-dominated, headwater streams to large rivers (Vannote et al. 1980). This concept describes rivers systems as longitudinally linked, with orderly biotic assemblages that link ecosystem-scale processes in upstream and downstream parts of a river network (Sedell et al. 1989). The influence of adjacent forests on food resources and habitat structure in river ecosystems is thought to decrease from small streams to large rivers. For example, small, heavily-shaded streams have communities of invertebrates dominated by consumers of forest litter, but more open, downstream areas have major communities of invertebrates that consume light-loving algae.

The Roots: The river continuum concept was developed by Robin Vannote and colleagues, including Jim Sedell of the Andrews Forest group, in an effort to bring theories about energy expenditure in river systems from the field of geomorphology into stream ecology. The river continuum concept has become a central theory in stream ecology and the subject of constructive debate.

The Approach: The river continuum concept was originally explored by sampling streams in four large basins in the United States, including the upper McKenzie River streams of the Andrews Forest. In each of these basins, a sequence of four study sites arrayed down the river was sampled and the longitudinal variation in stream properties was compared to the river continuum concept predictions.

The River Continuum Concept of variation in ecological characteristics from headwater streams to large rivers (modified from Vannote et al. 1980). FPOM is fine particulate organic matter; CPOM is coarse particulate organic matter; P/R is the production/respiration ratio.

The Approach: The river continuum concept was originally explored by sampling streams in four large basins in the United States, including the upper McKenzie River streams of the Andrews Forest. In each of these basins, a sequence of four study sites arrayed down the river was sampled and the longitudinal variation in stream properties was compared to the river continuum concept predictions.

Results: The river continuum concept has been an exceptionally fruitful idea in stream ecology, as much for the discussion it has precipitated as for the strength of the original idea. Vigorous, collegial debate has led to proposed modifications that accommodate conditions not considered in the original construct, such as the flood pulse concept. A next important scientific step is to move from the strictly longitudinal view of the river continuum concept to address the effects the network structure of river systems. The implication of the concept for managers is that the properties of a stream reach depend strongly on the context of that stream's position in the river network. That context reflects both location along the stream system and the types and strength of local forest influences. Thus, management objectives can best be met by considering both conditions at the project site and its broader context.
integrated series of resource gradients and physical adjustments downstream from headwaters to the larger river. Sixteen years after the group’s initial river-continuum proposal to NSF, Sedell and Swanson, in an article they coauthored with Jeffrey E. Richey of the University of Washington School of Oceanography, described the river continuum as “One of the most provocative concepts of longitudinal variation in riverine ecosystem characteristics.” They observed, however, that the concept had some important limitations for understanding both large and small basins; notably, dams and other disruptions may fragment the river system into discontinuous “patches.” Nonetheless, they concluded, the river-continuum approach had important advantages over more traditional studies of drainage-basin ecosystems or studies that proceed from a fisheries perspective with an emphasis on species distributions and productivity in different habitats.17

The river-continuum initiative helped a subset of the Andrews group coalesce into an integrated work-unit that gained a new public identity as the stream team. Gregory recalls that near the beginning of the events leading up to the river-continuum proposal, he attended a workshop on how to measure primary production in streams. That workshop inspired him to incorporate the concept into a graphic design he created for T-shirts intended for distribution to riparian crews working at Mack Creek. The design had a western theme, with a picture of a bunch of cowboys above the words “stream team.” That T-shirt, Gregory observes, “solidified what had been bubbling for the last couple of years. We just started calling it the Stream Team.” The T-shirt maneuver encouraged individuals to identify with the group, and the tongue-in-cheek moniker (stream team) subsequently found its way into the OSU staff directory and the community traditions of the Andrews group.18

The river-continuum grant lent fiscal and programmatic weight to the public image of the stream team. The informal campus group grew rapidly from its start as informal gatherings of five or six people crammed into one small office early in the 1970s. Less than two decades later, more than 50 people from 15 different departments and 5 different colleges attended regular, Monday-morning meetings


18 Interview with riparian group, 6.
of the stream team. The meetings provided a forum where graduate students could present their research plans and seek informal critiques and suggestions. Sedell argues the concept was “pretty novel.” They encouraged people to talk about what they thought, “take risks,” and inspire others in the group to do likewise. He concedes that informal presentations were not necessarily the ideal format for communicating concrete research proposals, but he concludes that they “really defined what we were about, … it was much more inclusive and interdisciplinary than what, certainly, this university had seen.” Stream team meetings also frequently featured visiting senior scientists, and Swanson observes that, although the ideas they presented were not yet set in concrete as “dogma,” they were nonetheless “real.” People were freely sharing their ideas and intellectual property while it was still in germinative form.\textsuperscript{19}

The stream team was rooted in substantive science, but its community links beyond the Andrews Forest were a significant source of inspiration and intellectual credibility. The conceptual basis for the river continuum grant originated in 1972, shortly after Sedell arrived in Corvallis as a postdoctoral associate fresh from his graduate work at the University of Pittsburgh. When the aquatic group began to discuss their lack of a defining concept for streams in the Coniferous Biome, Sedell drew on his connections at Oak Ridge, Pittsburgh, and Michigan State University to bring in leading aquatics experts. He organized a workshop in 1972 that brought together people like Charles Warren, who presented his ideas on systems analysis, and Ken Mann, known for his work on energetics in England. Other participants included Ken Cummins, then with Michigan State University, Wayne Minshall, then with Idaho State University, Robin Vannote, with the Stroud Laboratory in Pennsylvania, and their graduate students. That workshop culminated in a decision not to follow the philosophy-rooted, systems analysis path Warren had laid out; instead, the stream team decided to focus more on nutrient balances. Sedell argues, however, that the workshop started a dialogue with Minshall, Cummins, and Vannote that continued at subsequent meetings of the Ecological Society of America. Those meetings led to a small grant proposal that was funded in 1975, and those funds supported a meeting at the Hickory Corners field station at Michigan State University, where participants drafted the NSF proposal that was eventually funded while Franklin was still a program manager at that agency.\textsuperscript{20} All of these factors eventually led to the River Continuum Project.

\textsuperscript{19} Communication from Fred Swanson 2 January 1999; interview with Jim Sedell, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Jim Sedell, 6-7.
At the time the river-continuum proposal went forward to NSF for review, Sedell observes, “classic ecologists” tended to rate “ecosystem” proposals low because those proposals tended to be “big and messy,” not to mention expensive. Despite initial encouragement and support from leading scientists in aquatics research at other institutions, the stream team initially floundered in search of a “story line” that would lend structure and focus to their efforts. Vannote’s suggestion that they build the grant around the concept of a “river continuum” broke the logjam. He hypothesized that rivers were a continuum with major gradients of change in energy expenditure from their headwaters to large rivers. From that point on, Sedell argues, “It was a matter of structuring how we were going to test or describe this concept empirically, at four different sites and in a common place.” The proposal listed Jim Sedell as the principal investigator coordinating the effort at the Andrews Forest through OSU, with Wayne Minshall at Idaho State coordinating work on the Salmon River, Ken Cummins at Kellogg Biological Station coordinating in the Kalamazoo River Basin, and Robin Vannote coordinating work on the Brandywine River system in Pennsylvania. The proposal received mixed reviews, but at Franklin’s urging, NSF approved the grant.21

Waring and Franklin were both strongly supportive of the river-continuum grant as a partial solution to the impending budget crunch for studies at the Andrews at the end of the IBP. The grant provided support for a core group of scientists from the coniferous biome to continue building on an existing body of work. It also led the group in new directions and offered opportunities for another generation of leaders to emerge at the Andrews Forest. That, according to Sedell, was “the whole point … you define a core, and then your grants that you get are just spokes off of that core. … for the most part, we tried to build on what we’d already done [at the Andrews Forest].” Gregory was just finishing his doctoral research when the river-continuum grant came through, and his work helped the initial effort to get the project up and running.22

The stream team inspired a wide array of research at the Andrews Forest that followed the strategy of defining a core concept and then branching out into related studies funded with individual grants. Scientists who coalesced around the stream team weathered the transition from IBP to EER and then LTER funding with


22 Interview with Stan Gregory, 6; interview with Jim Sedell, 6-7.
minimal disruption. Sedell and Gregory tried to direct funds budgeted for “over-head” in the river-continuum grant at the Andrews Forest into either new equipment or new pilot studies. In that way, they funded Alsie Campbell’s studies of riparian vegetation that initiated a whole new thread of research. The river continuum also eased the transition from IBP to EER funding in the form of a grant supporting Chuck Hawkins, Gregory, and Triska in their studies of intake, succession, and decomposition. Those studies were later funded as components of the EER proposal.  

The success of the river-continuum proposal had ripple effects that spread well beyond the Andrews Forest or even the Willamette basin. The ripples included both people and ideas in a self-reinforcing cycle of collaborative research. The concept of a continuum began with the group’s and Vannotes’ studies of small streams, and then people applied it to studies of carbon flow and standing crops of carbon in other aquatic systems. “Suddenly,” Sedell observes, oceanographers like Cliff Dahm began to look at dissolved organic carbon in small woodland streams, as well as in the larger Columbia River basin. Involvement with the river continuum effort linked Gregory and other new members of the Andrews group with an array of well-connected people at an early point in their careers. The grant brought in Bob Naiman as a postdoctoral associate and Dale McCullough and Chuck Hawkins as graduate student research assistants. Naiman worked at the Andrews Forest for several years before transferring to Woods Hole, and he eventually secured an appointment at the University of Washington. Hawkins and McCullough both finished their degrees at OSU before moving on to career positions at Utah State (Hawkins), and at the Columbia River Intertribal Council (McCullough). The four of them, Gregory observes, “grew up [professionally] together.” Gregory, himself, took a job with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 1977 for nearly 4 years, before rejoining the group as a postdoctoral associate working for Cummins, who replaced Sedell at OSU. Sedell, himself, accepted an appointment with Weyerhaeuser. Cummins brought his colleagues, Milt and Amelia Ward, into the Andrews group, and they subsequently worked with Nick Auman, who was finishing his Ph.D. in

23 Interview with Jim Sedell, 6-7.
microbiology at OSU. Then, when Mount St. Helens blew, Sedell rejoined the group, and the stream team began to get more involved with the land-water and forest-stream interactions in a riparian setting.24

Legacies of the Andrews Forest and the Mount St. Helens Catharsis

The stream team’s image and accomplishments buttressed the tradition of long-term continuity at the Andrews Forest and linked it with people committed to riparian issues.25 They blurred the boundaries between basic science, applied research, and forest management, notably in the case of woody debris in streams. Their success with riparian issues also carried over into studies with a more terrestrial focus. The 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens reinforced the Andrews group’s focus on interdisciplinary work when they responded to that event with an intense, interdisciplinary field project. That effort was a high-profile variation on the “pulses” that Franklin staged as team-building exercises in other venues, including expeditions as early as 1973 at the Steamboat Mountain Research Natural Area and the group’s work on the Hoh River of the Olympic Peninsula in 1978. The group, he observes, began to “take ourselves out of an Andrews context and put ourselves in little mini-crucibles, both for team building and for science, and when [Mount] St. Helens came along, you know, it was an extraordinary opportunity.” At Mount St. Helens, he notes, the group staged “two immense pulses,” each for 2-week periods. One of the pulses involved 150 people. Franklin admits to not knowing “where this was going to go,” but he emphasizes that it was useful to be up there in an “interdisciplinary context.” Most of what they learned, he concludes, “had to do with disturbances and how disturbances work.”26

Three veterans of the Andrews group—Jerry Franklin, Jim Sedell, and Fred Swanson—effectively became research coordinators for an ad-hoc, interagency research effort at Mount St. Helens soon after the eruption. They secured about $50,000 from NSF plus additional Forest Service funds for each of 2 years to cover expenses for pulses on the mountain, including everything from food and lodging to helicopters. “Mostly,” Swanson observes, “we facilitated interactions

24 Interview with Stan Gregory, 6; interview with Jim Sedell, 7.
25 Interview with riparian group, 11.
26 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 25-26.
and communication so the science, overall, could be better.” Swanson and Franklin recruited Sedell into the collaborative effort at Mount St. Helens, and he emphasizes that the personal connection he had forged with Swanson over the previous decade was the central reason for his decision to work with the group.27

The Mount St. Helens event was an opportunity to extrapolate themes originating with the Coniferous Biome and test them against field conditions in the broader landscape of the Pacific Northwest. Among other benefits of their experience at Mount St. Helens, people in the group gained an appreciation for the power of conceptual modeling, as opposed to the advantages of models on a strictly mathematical basis. McKee explains they learned to appreciate the eventual interaction of terrestrial and aquatic systems and the potential for incorporating feedback loops into that conceptual model. He also suggests that the group’s response to the eruption was an important test of their leadership and organizational structure. The stream team, McKee argues, “stayed together so much because of the Mount St. Helens [eruption]. …” That group was able to get together the money needed to

27 Communication from Fred Swanson 2 January 1999; interview with Jim Sedell, 11-12. Interview with Robert Tarrant by Max Geier on 24 July 1997 at 1:00 pm in his Corvallis home as transcribed by Keesje Hoekstra, 13.
The Mount St. Helens effort was the first time Swanson really emerged as a major leader of the Andrews group. He worked closely with Franklin to orchestrate the focus of the program, and Franklin concedes Swanson may have had a clearer grasp of where that work was headed.28

Swanson suggests that the work at Mount St. Helens “drove itself in terms of issues to study” but he notes that it also addressed questions that concerned land managers, including the effects of salvage logging and agency efforts to develop interpretive programs at the volcanic site. Franklin recalls that he, Swanson, and Sedell were well-positioned to lead the Mount St. Helens effort because by the early 1980s, land managers who previously focused on salvage operations designed to remove decayed timber began to pay more attention to ecological issues. He notes there were “extraordinary opportunities” to position themselves in an institution [meaning the National Forest System] that would have “a lot of control over the situation, and at the same time, also remain connected to the National Science Foundation.” The three of them, Franklin concludes, essentially became coordinators, or “gatekeepers in the field for, in my case, terrestrial ecology, [in] Fred’s case, geomorph[ology], [in] Jim’s case, aquatic research.”29 Swanson found the connections he had developed while working for the U.S. Geological Survey very useful as he worked with Franklin and Sedell to coordinate the Mount St. Helens effort. One of those contacts was Dick Janda, of the U.S. Geological Survey, who previously served on the Andrews Forest advisory committee and had led a forest geomorphology project at Redwood Creek and Redwood National Park. Janda, who was used to working in high-profile arenas, worked in the spotlight of the national news media at Mount St. Helens, where he led a component of the Geological Survey work.30

Many of the research issues unearthed in the Mount St. Helens eruption were obvious extensions of concerns that the stream team had addressed earlier at the Andrews Forest. Sedell recalls thinking at the time that it was “the chance of a lifetime” to take what they had learned on the Andrews Forest and say “Well here’s the most colossal event we’ve seen in our careers. What’s the recovery, what are

28 Interview with riparian group, 9.
29 Interview with Jerry Franklin, 25-26.
30 Communication from Fred Swanson 2 January 1999.
some of the processes we’d look for?” It was also an opportunity to strengthen the interdisciplinary team of cooperating scientists and demonstrate their flexibility as a science group capable of doing significant research under public scrutiny and time constraints at field locations beyond the Andrews. Sedell recruited Cliff Dahm, who brought along other oceanographers, along with Milt and Amy Ward, Gary Lamberti, and Al Steinman. Eventually, he observes, “a whole bunch of the Andrews group also did work up … on the mountain.”

The Andrews group gained insight into issues of disturbances and biological legacies from their work at Mount St. Helens, and they learned about many different types and combinations of disturbances. That work, Franklin observes, led initially to the group’s concept of ecological “survivors,” and eventually to the concept that he termed “biological legacies.” Their joint experience at Mount St. Helens, he notes, “illuminated the whole issue of disturbances and biological legacies and how nature stores systems [through] a disturbance.” One advantage of the research at Mount St. Helens, Franklin concludes, was that the group was able to simultaneously examine “a dozen different natural kinds of disturbances or combinations of disturbances that turned up there.” Swanson also recalls, “At first glance, the place looked devastated—it looked like everything had been killed. This heightened the surprise at finding so many survivors of such varied types.” It was a place that piqued their curiosity and that, more than anything, drove them to work there.

Long-Term Modeling Concerns and Terrestrial and Aquatic Legacies of Mount St. Helens

Mount St. Helens drew members of the Andrews group away from the experimental forest and into a venue that placed them in the limelight of national attention. Their willingness to test ideas originating at the Andrews Forest in that venue was a high-stakes gamble. Much of what they learned demonstrated that previous models of ecosystems did not explain the complex patterns of recovery apparent in

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31 Interview with Jim Sedell, 11.
the blast zone. Scientists involved in research at Mount St. Helens later observed, “Essentially no post-eruption environment outside the crater was completely free of pre-eruption biological influences, although there were substantial differences in the amounts of living and dead organic material that persisted.” These legacy elements, they argued, were critical determinants of post-eruption successional patterns. The landscape at Mount St. Helens may have appeared simple, but “complex interactions developed immediately,” thus demonstrating the maxim that “ecosystems are characterized by numerous and elaborate linkages among plants, animals, and physical processes.” The very diversity of recovery patterns at Mount St. Helens, they concluded, “makes apparent the inadequacies of simple models in characterizing or explaining successional patterns.” That insight, in itself, challenged many assumptions guiding previous efforts to design long-term studies at the Andrews Forest.

The results of the Mount St. Helens effort forced a reassessment of long-term thinking at the Andrews Forest, but scientists like Swanson characterize the consequent need to readjust the group’s theories and models as “fun and compelling.” Much early work at the Andrews Forest had focused on recovery and regeneration issues related to disturbance from fires, floods, timber harvests, and landslides. Many of the people who led that earlier work were also directly involved as leaders in the effort at Mount St. Helens. They tested hard-won lessons from the Andrews Forest, added new insights from the blast zone, and brought them home to the Lookout Creek drainage. In this way, the group used challenging new insights to improve their initial theories, rather than viewing such challenges as threats to their initial theories. The concept that many particulars of research at the experimental forest were specific to that site, or at least not directly transferable to Mount St. Helens, actually raised exciting possibilities for scientists steeped in the adaptive culture of the Andrews group. They were eager to test those new ideas against ongoing programs of research at the Andrews. This dynamic generated a sense of method prevailing over theory, or as Swanson explains, a sense of “natural history in real time.” The group began to design studies that actually accommodated and encouraged cooperative, collaborative, and adaptive effort, and they placed less emphasis on building detailed, theoretical models or computer simulations. Gregory clarifies, “The stream team hasn’t been anti-modeling. We just use it where it

works and don’t feel the need to model everything that we do. … we have had small bits and pieces of other models … it’s adapting the research to the situation as opposed to having one trick that we try to apply to in all situations.”34

Their experience at Mount St. Helens and with the river continuum helped the group realize they could link terrestrial and aquatic research with conceptual, rather than quantitative models. They perceived a “strong influence” of aquatic interactions with the terrestrial landscape, and, as a result, they expected that terrestrial ecosystems would change along with the continuum from smaller to larger streams. That concept, Gregory concedes, “would get so complex if you tried to quantify it, it would crash.” The key, he argues, is flexibility. Overreliance or adherence to a particular conceptual model, in other words, could become such a drag on creativity that it might lead scientists into a political conundrum: “If you produce either a controversial concept or model, then you are at the stage that it will be attacked and criticized and then, even if you don’t want to defend it, you usually get dragged into defending it and large portions of your time are spent defending something that was in the past.”35

One strategy for avoiding the paralyzing distraction that Gregory associates with defending outdated conceptual models was to initiate studies on a larger scale that continued over a longer span of time. The river-continuum initiative was a compelling example of the potential benefits of moving in that direction. It tested the contribution of forests to small streams and explored whether a succession exists from leaf-dominated organisms and processing in small, forest-dominated streams to more algae-dominated organisms in large rivers. That concept, Gregory argues, was “amazingly successful.” “As long as water is going to run downhill,” he argues, “you’re going to come back to some sort of continuum and succession or gradation of different energy processing.” Once the group linked gradations of scale in streams with the degree to which forest-stream interactions affected the terrestrial and aquatic components of that system, they also began to look more closely at different scales of woody debris and its respective role. The group tended to discount the importance of logs until they worked out a carbon budget and discovered large wood was “dominant” in that budget. The energetic driver, as Sedell observed, was the leaves, but they were a “minor” part of the total “organic

34 Communication from Swanson 2 January 1999; interview with riparian group, 10.
35 Interview with riparian group, 10.
Sidebar 5.3: Log Decomposition, Dead Wood, and Carbon Dynamics

The Issue: Conifer forests of the Pacific Northwest store massive quantities of carbon in the living and dead components of the forest and in soil. The roles of forests as sinks for carbon by uptake of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and of forestry practices as possible sources of carbon dioxide have become important issues in the science and politics of global climate change. Dead wood is an important, but often neglected, component of the carbon budget and an integral part of forest ecosystems.

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<tr>
<td>Cross-section shape and invading roots</td>
<td>Original color</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Original color</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color of wood</td>
<td>Original color to faded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red brown to dark brown</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Roots: Dead wood is a conspicuous component of Douglas-fir forests, and it posed an ecological as well as navigational challenge to scientists. During the 1970s, dead wood was considered in studies of nutrient and carbon budgets of forest stands, soils, decomposition, and wildlife habitat. Not until the late 1980s did issues surrounding carbon sequestration and the global carbon budget bring studies of dead wood into focus for ecologists as a component of global climate change.

The Approach: Initial studies of dead wood and carbon stores simply described stages of log decay and amounts of wood in stands of different composition and history. Detailed field studies of processes and functions associated with dead wood followed, including Mark Harmon’s 200-year log decomposition experiment (Harmon 1991). This field experiment was preceded by a compilation of world literature on the ecology of coarse woody debris in temperate ecosystems by Harmon and a team of other Andrews scientists (Harmon et al. 1986). These studies and a host of others, including remote sensing and archival research, are incorporated into a modeling system used to assess how forest growth, decomposition, forestry practices, and use of wood products affect change in carbon storage in a 2.5-million-acre area centered on Andrews Forest (Cohen et al. 1996).

Results: Managing forests was once the exclusive domain of silviculturists focused on the live trees; however, with recognition of the many important functions of dead wood in ecosystems, "morticulurists," in Harmon’s term (Harmon 2001), are now providing creative schemes for managing the dead wood component of stands. Dead wood has become an integral part of the land managers’ responsibilities for both ecological and carbon-sequestration objectives. The science of carbon dynamics has gained definition and even prominence as a field in only the past decade or two.
story.” Even a very small fraction of wood processing, they concluded, was a “huge contribution” to an energy budget on a stream, and that insight led to the group’s ongoing studies of the structural roles of wood in streams.\(^\text{36}\)

Long-term studies of log decomposition simply extended the earlier effort to study woody debris in streams onto the forest floor. Legacies from past studies and insights from contemporary research converged at the Andrews Forest during the mid 1980s in ways that made that conceptual leap seem obvious. As the Mount St. Helens effort wound down at mid decade, scientists who participated in that program returned to the Andrews with renewed enthusiasm for questioning the obvious. The group embraced the concept of flexible, conceptual models, while continuing their commitment to uphold the legacy of long-term monitoring on the Andrews Forest. These scientific insights from the river-continuum effort and Mount St. Helens coincided with programmatic shifts at NSF and policy adjustments in the National Forest System. The log decomposition study they initiated in 1985 merged elements from all of these factors into a key proposal for the newly established LTER program at NSF. That LTER proposal exemplified McKee’s view that long-term research, as with any study proposal, should be fundamentally rooted in “coming up with the story line that will be funded.” The proposal explained the group’s ideas as a framework that could not only tie the various components of the group together, but could also be tested with scientific rigor.\(^\text{37}\)

The group’s concept of long-term research grew out of the Forest Service tradition of managing water and tree resources for long-term use, but the ecosystem perspective of the IBP transformed the concept. The group looked for ways to include components that would excite the group and NSF reviewers, and the concept of a 200-year study of log decomposition seemed to fit the bill. As Franklin observes, it was long term, experimental, and “real.” The long-term approach also had the added benefit of encouraging land managers to pay closer attention to their scientist counterparts when drafting policies governing forest management practices. Managers who participated in “show-me” tours of the log-decomposition study were impressed with the commitment and rigor of the scientists who designed the experiment, and, Swanson argues, that further encouraged them to integrate research ideas into their management plans.\(^\text{38}\)

\(^{36}\) Interview with Jim Sedell, 12-13.

\(^{37}\) Interview with riparian group, 13-14.

\(^{38}\) Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 22.
The log-decomposition study extended the concept of long-term research across a chronological scale of unprecedented proportions, and the ability to secure funding and initiate the project was as much an institutional breakthrough as it was a conceptual innovation. Dyrness notes of the 200-year duration of the study, beginning in 1985, “This is a real departure. We were always schooled, … when I started out in research for the PNW Station, that our studies should be short in duration. That you should be able to finish it up in a year and have a publication and then go on to bigger and better things.” Dyrness himself had challenged those expectations with his early work laying out long-term study plots on vegetation succession in the Andrews, where he had established permanent plots before logging and then continuously monitored those plots after logging. In his experience, he observes, Forest Service administrators at the time usually “didn’t believe in long-term studies.”

Log Decomposition and the Convergence of Individual and Community Experience

The task of first designing the log-decomposition study as an archetype for long-term research, and then implementing it, fell to a person whose involvement with the group was recent and tenuous. Mark Harmon’s involvement at the Andrews Forest paralleled the Mount St. Helens eruption and subsequent research. After beginning with the group as a graduate student in 1980, he took the lead for the log-decomposition work in 1984 and vaulted from a relatively inconspicuous role to the forefront of a controversial, yet defining study. He first compiled a “story line” for the initial grant proposal, beginning with extensive review of pertinent literature. This demanding effort required an intensive investment of time and energy. At the time he began the work, Harmon was still working on his doctoral research at OSU under the direction of Jerry Franklin. His first involvement with the Andrews group followed the Hoh River Pulse, which focused on the “nurse-log” concept. Participants in that pulse explored the notion that old-growth logs provided nutrients and other benefits to the ecosystem as they decomposed on the forest floor. Harmon’s fieldwork mostly focused on the Hoh River drainage, and he had very little experience with the Andrews Forest before December 1980.

Short-term, soft-money appointments, first as a graduate assistant, and continuing as a postdoctoral associate, funded Harmon’s work on the log-decomposition study. He initially placed his graduate studies on hold to design and implement the project for the group, but he eventually completed his Ph.D. in 1985. In many ways, Harmon’s work set the tone for subsequent research at the Andrews Forest through the late 1990s. It was long term in nature, collaborative in style, and responsive to management concerns of the National Forest System. It was driven by the intense personal effort and scientific commitment of a unique personality, as reflected in his teenage years when he competed in high school athletics as an accomplished wrestler. It was also a flashy way to highlight basic science and other research at the Andrews Forest while still addressing the pragmatic concerns of forest managers. Harmon engaged about a dozen people to work with him on the literature review, and he produced a 170-page monograph detailing that review. Even before it was in print, he distributed early drafts to land managers at the Willamette National Forest. The concept moved from initial theory to management concerns.

Harmon’s work was long term in nature, collaborative in style, and responsive to management concerns.

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40 Interview with Mark Harmon by Max Geier on 1 October 1997 in his office at Oregon State University, as transcribed by Linda Hahn, 6, 9, and 13.
practice even before Harmon implemented the field study. His initial literature review synthesized previous, relevant research and convinced both District Ranger Steve Eubanks and Forest Supervisor Mike Kerrick that management policy on the Willamette National Forest was flawed. In response, they ordered an immediate halt to the “piling of unmerchantable material” (PUMing) on the Willamette National Forest, resulting in an estimated savings of $18 million a year. The other national forests on the west side of the Cascades soon followed suit.41

The process of compiling the literature review and initiating the decomposition study began a generational transition of leadership that was apparent to the young graduate student assigned to the task. Harmon perceived that those who worked at the Andrews Forest in earlier years, notably including Franklin, Cromack, and Phil Sollins, considered the literature review a culmination of their efforts on that particular study. From Harmon’s perspective, however, it was “the beginning.” In that sense, the previous generation of scientists passed “the baton” of leadership to Harmon, who viewed the assignment as a personal and professional opportunity.

41 Andrews History Project Workshop of 7 August 1996, 16; interview with Mike Kerrick, 25.
with few parallels. He considered the general theme of log decomposition such a “basic question” that it was open to almost limitless possibilities. Where others emphasized the expansive, temporal scale of the study, Harmon perceived an opportunity to miniaturize the scale of ecosystem studies. Referring to the log study, he observes, “It’s like a mini-ecosystem. Lots of times … [we] have a hard time measuring what’s going on in a big ecosystem. But this was like a little, mini-ecosystem.” The study was Harmon’s answer to critics who claimed that ecosystem research lacked scientific rigor. In that miniaturized system, he argued, scientists could measure “all the things you could measure in an ecosystem,” and they could design experiments that tested ecosystem processes with measurable results that could be replicated or tested with other experiments.42

The log-decomposition study continued the IBP’s emphasis on studies of old-growth ecosystems, but it also built on earlier, management-oriented studies of regeneration, growth, and yield. In Harmon’s efforts to formulate a study design that would eventually span 200 years, moreover, growth-and-yield studies were among the few prototypes available for genuinely long-term research. Even those long-term studies, however, were poor models because the log-decomposition project was not primarily intended as a management-oriented study. Referring to his search for precursors or potential models for the log study, Harmon observes that even with studies of litter decay, including leaves and other small debris, “a long study was a year. People hadn’t even acknowledged that even [litter decay] took decades. So, there weren’t many decomposition experiments that went beyond a year or two.”43

The group’s willingness to trust Harmon with a study so symbolic of their long-term commitment to the Andrews Forest was ironic, given his almost complete lack of prior involvement and tenuous status. The paradox of a tightly knit community handing over their legacy to a raw recruit, however, is more apparent than real. Harmon’s background reads like a roadmap to previous traditions of recruitment into the group, and many of those with more established records at the Andrews Forest could easily recognize pieces of themselves embedded in Harmon’s past. He was new blood from an old vein. Like McKee, Harmon hailed from New England, and although he attended Amherst for his undergraduate degree, he also headed south for his graduate work. Like Dyrness, he was an undergraduate convert to ecology, and after a brief, postgraduate stint at Glacier

42 Interview with Mark Harmon, 14.
43 Interview with Mark Harmon, 13.
National Park, Harmon took the advice of a fellow Amherst graduate at Glacier and headed to the University of Tennessee. At Tennessee, Harmon, like Gregory, was drawn into closer involvement with the Park Service, working at Great Smokies National Park and with scientists involved with research programs at Oak Ridge National Laboratories. Like Dyrness, Harmon’s prior experience in Oregon was limited to a jaunt through the Pacific Northwest as an undergraduate. He hitchhiked down the Oregon coast from Seattle in the early 1970s as part of a break from a summer excursion to Nevada, where he helped his brother build a house. Like Swanson and Gregory, Harmon traces his evolving scientific interests through a series of summer research camps and field experiences at sites remote from his original home and from his eventual involvement at the Andrews. He recounts, for example, a conversion of sorts that he experienced while attending a geology summer camp in Montana: “I found out I was not going to be a geologist because I, I just absolutely [had no talent] as a geologist.”

Harmon’s brief experience hitchhiking through the Pacific Northwest stimulated his abiding interest in big trees. His research interests subsequently moved in the direction of vegetation studies, eventually leading to his involvement with the Andrews group. Harmon’s interests met his future in the mid 1970s at a conference in Athens, Georgia, where he happened to encounter Kermit Cromack and Jim Sedell. Over the next 4 years, he more frequently encountered members of the group at other conferences. He particularly recalls McKee, Sedell, and Franklin presenting their research from the Hoh River Pulse, shortly before Harmon considered transferring to OSU to begin his doctoral work. Of the Andrews group, he observes, “even then [late 1970s], they were known for real integrated studies. We would hear crazy things … about people climbing trees with ropes, and all kinds of strange things.” The key to his involvement, however, was an incidental contact with Franklin when Harmon was working as a guide in the Great Smokies: “I guided him; he came right at the height of fall color season, and [it was] a perfect time for Jerry.” In the course of their encounter in the woods, Harmon discussed graduate school with Franklin, who suggested there might be some opportunities for funding at OSU. Harmon was also attracted by the “whole idea of integrated work and also working in a team.”

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44 Interview with Mark Harmon, 1-5.
45 Interview with Mark Harmon, 4.
46 Interview with Mark Harmon, 1, 4.
Harmon began his postdoctoral appointment about the time his mentor began to distance himself from OSU. By the time Franklin left to take a sabbatical at Harvard Forest early in 1985, Harmon had developed a personal, long-term interest in collaborative research at the Andrews. After setting up the log study, he was determined to stay with it, and he was sold on the opportunities for research he had identified while compiling the literature review. He enthusiastically embraced the group’s ideal of integrated work and team research, and he found it “exciting” to work in a place where people were actually putting those principles into practice.\(^7\)

**Watching Puddles Dry Up and Logs Fall Apart**

In designing a study intended to last 200 years, Harmon saw the opportunity to link many previous, briefer studies at the Andrews Forest. He envisioned a program of research that would be a central reference point for everyone connected with the group. Harmon, therefore, designed the log study as a “temporal backbone” for a whole series of experiments, observations, and measurements. He and other scientists in the group could design and implement a wide range of research in a fashion that would link them all together, through time. In that sense, Harmon conceived of the log study as “just a series of linked short-term studies.” Those shorter, linked studies would generate interim results with immediate utility, while the long-term study proceeded through the next two centuries. “You would have to be an idiot, to wait two hundred years,” Harmon explains, “and we were not idiots. We were going to keep working on this.”\(^8\)

The log study epitomized the group’s goal of promoting collaborative, long-term research that would also be useful to forest managers. That strategy, however, involved some risks. If they focused exclusively on research with practical applications, the group might encourage the idea that basic science was, by comparison, irrelevant, or trivial. Instead, they emphasized basic science as a foundation for applied research, and they stressed the value of field-testing scientific theories. In that sense, the log-decomposition study resembled the stream team’s

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\(^7\) Interview with Jerry Franklin, 25-26; interview with Mark Harmon, 18.

\(^8\) Interview with Mark Harmon, 12.
contributions to the riparian management plan for the Willamette National Forest. Both efforts encouraged collaboration and synthesis. The riparian management plan, conceptually, applied insights from the river-continuum effort and, more broadly, from the whole set of forest-stream interactions work at the Andrews Forest. It was also collaborative in the sense that it was the product of the Willamette National Forest Riparian Task Force. That body included managers, planners, and district staff associated with the national forest, as well as scientists involved with the Andrews group. The task force laid out guidelines for establishing riparian resource values, landscape management, basin management, harvest

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unit management, riparian rehabilitation, and monitoring responsibilities on the
Willamette National Forest. The log study, similarly, was a group effort to organize
and synthesize information in topical areas.

The riparian plan and the log study both dealt with “basic science issues,”
although the science attracted less publicity than the planned duration of the re-
search or its management implications. In the public eye, McKee observes, the
log study was “like watching mud puddles dry up.” To the participating scientists,
however, it involved experimental designs that tested fundamental concepts in
exciting new ways not previously possible. In each case, the social interaction of
the group encouraged individual scientists to question the obvious, adding insight,
depth, and immediacy to the concept of long-term research. Their close association
with other scientists and land managers while attending monthly meetings, riding in
vans to field sites, standing on landings, or pointing down a stream, helped them
work and laugh together, without rancor, even when they disagreed on particulars.
That characteristic helped the group bridge the apparent gap between basic re-
search and applied studies.50

Explicit links between the log study and other prominent research previously
accomplished at the Andrews shielded Harmon’s work from potential ridicule for
its impossibly ambitious timeframe. Harmon emphasized the study’s similarities
with previous work at the Andrews. He had previously worked with permanent
plots for measuring forest growth—many were tagged and measured at regular
intervals across more than 70 years. Those studies began with people who placed
the original tags, even though they knew that someone else would have to follow
up on their work. Without that initial effort, Harmon noted, “We wouldn’t be doing
what we’re doing now. We wouldn’t have all that information. To me it wasn’t that
different.” The most obvious difference was Harmon’s effort to improve on the
experimental design: “… instead of the trees just growing on their own, we actually
had to put these things [logs] out … we couldn’t just go with what was there, and
… have a good experiment.” The integrity of the experimental design was, in fact,
Harmon’s central concern: “It wasn’t enough to put out a bunch of logs and say,
‘Gee whiz.’ You had to have some pretty tight hypotheses. So, actually, before I
ever went down to the Andrews, I spent a lot of time just thinking what those
would be, and how they would … lead to a [general] model of decay.”51

50 Interview with Mark Harmon, 11-12; Andrews History Project Workshop of 7 August
1996, 18.
51 Interview with Mark Harmon, 11-12.
Harmon anticipated criticism of the log study, and he launched a pre-emptive effort to define the ground on which critics would have to stand or fall by their arguments. In July 1985, he sent copies of the initial study plan to Louise Mastrantonio, Research Information Services at PNW Station in Portland, requesting help in filming and otherwise recording efforts to install the experiment. The study plan, he observed, was designed to test the effect on decay of log species and logs of different sizes, as well as the relation of invertebrates to rates of decay. In his letter to Mastrantonio, he also stressed plans to initiate “a series of detailed process-oriented studies on the interactions between microbes and invertebrates.”

The Station publication PNW News reported the beginning of the study that month, outlining plans to place “logs of specified ages, sizes, and species at six locations on the Experimental Forest, in an attempt to standardize initial log conditions and natural processes.” Aside from the long-term, 200-year goals of the study, the report stressed the initial objective for the first 5 years of the study to “characterize and quantify the roles of insects in the colonization of logs by decay organisms, such as fungi and bacteria. This will be accomplished by screening a selected set of logs to keep insects out.” The study involved replication at six sites on the Andrews Forest, for a total of 500 logs, in an effort to ensure the long-term project would survive unplanned disturbances and to sample some of the climate variability of the forest landscape. The effort was funded with a timber sale on the Andrews Forest, with grants from the NSF through the LTER program, and with funds from PNW Station. Other grants also funded subsequent phases of the study.

The experimental design required field placement of logs under controlled and replicable conditions. The scale of the logs and the planned duration of the study required close coordination with district managers and contractors. Steve Eubanks, District Ranger at Blue River, developed a critical-path diagram for the project because, as Harmon recalls, “The fear was that [the project] ... was just too ... complicated and complex, and ... we just had to make sure that this wasn’t an embarrassment and a boondoggle.” Harmon and Eubanks “spent a lot of time” discussing possible, worst-case scenarios: “‘What if it snows in September?’ Or, ... ‘What if something breaks down?’ And, ‘How late can we go, how will we address this problem?’” From the start, the scientists and managers involved in

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the effort recognized the potential for a public relations nightmare. Harmon worked with district personnel to address strategic and tactical concerns. In some ways, he admits, the plan was “literally a crazy idea. To take sound trees, cut them down, drag them out into the woods and stick them out to rot was, you know, ‘Oh my God.’” Among others who Harmon worked with at the Blue River Ranger District, Vince Pulao helped him decide from which sites to take trees, based on the feasibility of getting them out. Once the overall strategy was determined, Harmon and Pulao spent “a lot of time” working out the details of how they would “actually get access” to the sites, using old roads or other strategies.  

Harmon notes that Forest Service managers were “not too involved” in planning the basic experiment, but they became “more and more involved” during implementation. They adopted the acronym “D-Day” (for “duck day”) in planning field operations, anticipating a negative public reaction as details of the effort became more apparent to outside observers. Mostly, however, they were concerned about pragmatic engineering concerns. Once the logs were acquired from

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54 Interview with Mark Harmon, 9-10.
the donor sites, they had to be placed into the host sites. That second phase was the reverse of a normal logging operation, and the group considered the feasibility of moving the logs into intact stands with cable systems. The district staff, however, convinced McKee and Harmon that if they installed a small, temporary road to provide access for “regular logging machinery,” then loaders could place the logs with more accuracy and care. In the end, Harmon concludes, “They were right, actually.” Out of 500 logs placed for the study, only 1 small tree on a single site had to be removed to make room for the equipment used to place the log.

The entire operation of putting 500 logs of various species and sizes at 6 places on the Andrews Forest was completed in the month of September 1985, from felling the first tree to placing the last log. After the initial installation effort, much of it with volunteer labor supplied by cooperators in the Andrews group, Harmon continued the study with little direct assistance. Once the logs were at the appropriate sites, he required an additional 5 months to install the remainder of the study. This included, in Harmon’s words, “an awful lot of work to describe what they looked like at first.” He then proceeded with the planned, experimental manipulations, cutting sections off each log at both ends, mapping them, and building insect exclosures. Harmon began his analysis even before completing the installation. He stored cross sections of logs measuring about 19.7 inches in diameter and 3.94 inches thick in a cooler at the Blue River Ranger District office. The “cookies” he cut from the ends of the logs completely filled a 2,400-cubic-foot cooler originally designed for storing seedlings. An interim progress report in *Forestry Research News* (28 January 1986) detailed some of the procedures, including hand-trimming, drying, measuring, and recording data on size, weight, and condition of more than 20,000 wood samples of Douglas-fir, western redcedar, western hemlock, and Pacific silver fir. Each sample was bar-coded to facilitate tracking and future analysis, and the inner and outer bark on the various wood samples was stripped apart with wood chisels. Harmon’s study design also specified the same process for each new sample from each of the 500 logs, scheduled at intervals of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 16, 24, 32, 60, 90, 120, 150 180, and 220 years.

The concept of cutting down mature trees, sectioning them into logs, and then spending money and resources to place that sound timber in the forest just to watch them rot, was a public relations powderkeg. The study site was close

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55 Interview with Mark Harmon, 10.
56 Interview with Mark Harmon, 10-11.
to Blue River, a timber-dependent community suffering through economic decline throughout the 1980s. Harmon recalls few expressions of concern from local community leaders at the time, but the attitude of some of the people who actually placed the logs was more of a problem. On the first day, Harmon recalls, “I went up to check on the work, and the guy who was in the loader... he got out of there and he just cursed a blue streak. He thought that this was just the stupidest, damned idea he ever heard of. ‘What idiot came up with this?’ He went on and on.” By the end of the month, however, Harmon observes, the equipment operators were “quite proud of the work they did and they understood why they did it.” The key was communication with people on the work sites. Harmon and others in the group explained the theory and urging the operators to “Think about it this way,” and he concludes, “they got convinced.” The atmosphere in timber towns in the mid 1980s was arguably not as tense as it later became, during the crises of the 1990s, when Harmon argues the group would “get fried” if they tried the same thing. Even in that more contentious decade, however, the log-decomposition sites were a handy starting point for many field tours at the Andrews Forest. They served as a dramatic example of basic science examining ecological processes like decomposition and forest-stand composition and structure. Tours of the Andrews Forest typically began with this study in the morning and then moved on to other sites to show applications and demonstrate findings from the log-decomposition study in actual land use practices.\footnote{Interview with Mark Harmon, 11; communication from Fred Swanson 2 January 1999.}

The ability to work closely with contracting loggers was a critical element of a study that relied on funds from a timber sale on the Andrews Forest to finance the implementation of the log “treatments.” The process resembled Silen’s earlier efforts to devise an experimental road system funded with timber sales that included detailed specifications written into the contract. Silen had enforced those provisions by cultivating a personal understanding with the contractor, Mike Savelich. In the 1980s, however, the Blue River Ranger District assumed more of the burden of planning and administering the sales. Harmon and Pulao worked with Eubanks to devise contracts that specified placing logs at the various sites. Eubanks then assumed responsibility for making the process as seamless as possible. He worked to “implement a fair amount of the installation of that research” as part of the timber sale. Each contract required the logger to build the
roads, take the logs from the harvest area, put them on a truck with a self-loader, take them to the installation site, and set them in place. Eubanks worked to ensure that the contractors and the researchers communicated at each step in that process. In his own estimation, it was a “very nontraditional approach” that “saved a lot of research money for other things.”

Harmon’s effort to explain the scientific basis for the detailed specifications in the timber-sale contracts effectively prevented a rift with the local, timber-dependent community. Beyond the immediate vicinity of Blue River and the other timber towns where those loggers lived, however, critics of the study were more numerous and potentially threatening. As with other new projects, the log study was incorporated into “show-me” tours of the Andrews, and although it was not the only study with controversial implications, he notes it was “probably one of the highlights.” It was popular, he suspects, because, “at least in a bizarro sense … you could say you went and you saw where the insane people were.” One of the most blunt and intimidating challenges he encountered came from the dean of the college where Harmon was still a graduate student, and where he was angling for an eventual postdoctoral appointment. Harmon recalls that Dean Carl Stoltenberg, College of Forestry at OSU, sat down across from him at a dinner after one such tour and, as Harmon recalls, said, “This is the most stupid … thing I’ve ever heard of in my life.”

Stoltenberg’s response was just one example of a general skepticism that Harmon attributes to the relative novelty of doing long-term, ecological research. “At that time,” Harmon notes, “… the value of long-term studies in ecological work was still up in the air. In subsequent years, however, the results of the study began to validate the premise that initially inspired the log-decomposition proposal in the first place: “People realize that a lot of short-term results are often just misleading. That you have to actually look at it in a longer framework, … or you don’t know what the results mean.” In the late 1980s, however, that premise “wasn’t necessarily clear. And we got lots of comments like, ‘200-year study, that’s a long time to wait for results’… you’ll be dead.’ Nice things like that.”

“At that time,” Harmon notes, “… the value of long-term studies in ecological work was still up in the air.”

58 Interview by Max Geier with Steve Eubanks on 9 January 1998 in Eubanks’ Office at the Chippewa National Forest, Minnesota, as transcribed by Elizabeth Foster, 16.
59 Interview with Mark Harmon, 33.
60 Interview with Mark Harmon, 12.
Wildlife Studies and the Reconstructed Landscape

The group’s LTER funding and the relatively secure, supportive involvement of the Willamette National Forest rendered Stoltenberg’s criticism essentially toothless. Over the next decade, however, the log study raised the stakes for other initiatives on the Andrews Forest. As an emblem of long-term research, collaborative relations with forest managers, and conceptual innovation, the 200-year study was a hard act to follow. It was a dramatic hook for reporters seeking an unusual story line, and numerous news reports and magazine articles popularized Harmon’s work by the end of the first 5-year interval.\footnote{Harmon compiled a hefty file of newsclippings covering the study beginning, for example with a report of the initial installation, which was covered in the \textit{Eugene Register Guard} (3 March 1986), and continuing into the 1990s, including a front-page article in the Sunday edition of the [Salem] \textit{Statesman Journal} (17 June 1990). See also, Robert Heilman, “Coarse Woody Debris: the Underside of Forestry” \textit{Forest World} (Fall 1988): 36-40.} The study elevated terrestrial programs of research into the spotlight previously dominated by old-growth forest and riparian studies at the Andrews Forest, but it also raised expectations for future proposals. The detailed process of designing the log-decomposition study also uncovered gaps in the fields of research represented among cooperators in the group. Those gaps of expertise attracted more attention in the group through the latter half of the 1980s and into the next decade. As Harmon explains, much of his prior work with Franklin focused on how things changed or evolved in an old-growth forest. The log study simply inverted the logic to explore how things fell apart. That study’s emphasis on decomposers, however, highlighted questions about animal activity in old-growth stands. Previous wildlife studies on the experimental forest focused largely on regenerating stands. The log study, however, raised issues that demonstrated the relevance of early research by people relatively peripheral to the group but critical to that community’s collective grasp of old-growth issues.

Wildlife biologist Chris Maser and mycologist James Trappe, for example, ranged broadly through forests of the Pacific Northwest, including the Andrews Forest, to study the relation between small mammals and fungi found in association with decaying timber. Maser, who worked with the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and Trappe, who worked with PNW Station and then (after retirement from the Forest Service) with OSU at the Corvallis Forestry Sciences Laboratory, began their collaboration during the 1970s, exploring the relation between decaying logs,
fungi, small mammals (including the northern flying squirrel and the California red-backed vole), and the nutrient-cycling processes that sustain living trees in old-growth forests. Much of their work during the 1970s and early 1980s included collaboration with members of the Andrews group. Trappe maintains, however, that his own work was mostly peripheral to the experimental forest, aside from occasional trips there for gathering fungi. One of his graduate students, Makoto Ogawa, also worked at the Andrews Forest with IBP funding while devising the five-class decay classification scheme for coarse woody debris that subsequently became the standard for work in west-side forests of the Cascade Range. Their combined efforts demonstrated the importance of more systematic studies to understand the ecological role of wildlife in old-growth forests. Despite the work of people like Maser and Trappe, however, wildlife studies were a weak link in the legacy of interdisciplinary cooperation at the Andrews.62

The comparatively light emphasis on wildlife studies was a product of the perceptions of scientists involved with the Coniferous Biome. Their activities, interests, and concerns had redefined priorities at the Andrews Forest during the 1970s. The relative dearth of wildlife studies in that era was a shortcoming that often went unnoticed amid the many accomplishments of the group, although Swanson notes they “often get ‘dinged’ [by outside reviewers] for not having more wildlife work and having it integrated.”63 Within the group, this lapse also attracted the attention of Phil Sollins, a soil scientist who contributed a somewhat unusual perspective to the group in the course of his nearly three decades of involvement with that community.

Unlike many others in the group, Sollins was unimpressed with the “big trees” at the Andrews Forest, and he preferred to study the more-hidden parts of that ecosystem. One of his many studies suggested the need for more wildlife research at that facility. His unique perspective is, at least in part, rooted in his west-coast upbringing, which is unusual in the group. Sollins, a Los Angeles native, frequented redwood forests on family camping trips in the 1940s and 1950s. That experience influenced his later perceptions of the Andrews Forest. “I certainly had seen big trees and seen bigger trees,” he observes, “so this [old-growth Douglas-fir] ... was

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63 Interview with Mark Harmon, 5; communication from Fred Swanson, 1998.
That was an uncommon view in the group, except for Waring, who also came to the Andrews Forest after extensive experience in California. Little about the place struck Sollins as remarkable. Even the amount of precipitation failed to impress him because he was accustomed to the tropical forests of Puerto Rico, where he once lived as a youth. People and science, not the characteristics of the local or regional landscape, attracted Sollins to the Andrews. Sollins had worked with the renowned scientist, Tom Odum, while finishing his graduate studies at the University of North Carolina and the University of Tennessee. He also worked on the Eastern Deciduous Biome of the IBP at Oak Ridge National Laboratories. That work plugged him into other sites in the IBP network, and he joined the Coniferous Biome in the early 1970s. By that time, he already had considerable expertise and experience in the areas of nutrient cycling, biomass estimation, stem flow, water chemistry, and computer programming. He initially split his time between Andrews-affiliated modeling efforts and the Coniferous Biome components centered on the University of Washington until 1975, when he moved to Corvallis. Thereafter, he worked on soft-money appointments at OSU and focused more exclusively on the Andrews component of the Biome.
until 1991, when he secured a tenure-track appointment in the Forest Science Department at OSU.\(^{64}\)

The group’s relative inability to expand on earlier wildlife studies at the Andrews Forest during the biome became a concern for Sollins when he encountered difficulty with a study of snowbrush that did not develop as expected.\(^{65}\) One ongoing thread of research at the Andrews Forest involved studies of nutrient cycling and the role of species associated with nitrogen-fixing bacteria, such as red alder along streams or snowbrush in the uplands. Continuing that thread of inquiry into the 1980s, Sollins set up a study on the Andrews that was designed to evaluate soil nutrients in relation to the amount of snowbrush on a particular site. The study called for a clearcut followed by a hot, prescribed burn. Sollins worked closely with the Blue River Ranger District to coordinate that treatment. “We were trying to kill everything,” he observes, “… [and] when we’d plant Doug-fir, *Ceanothus* [snowbrush] would out-compete the Douglas-fir and we’d be able to study the competition.” The plan didn’t work: “We did everything we could to encourage the

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\(^{64}\) Interview with Phil Sollins by Max Geier on 24 September 1997 at Sollins’ office, FSL, Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Jeff Prater and Elisabeth Foster, 1-2, 5.

\(^{65}\) Interview with Phil Sollins, 10.
Ceanothus. We got 20, 30, 40 thousand [snowbrush seedlings] per hectare germinating and they never grew. The Doug-fir just took off, totally.” Contrary to Sollins’ expectations, virtually all of the snowbrush on the treated study area died or languished.

Sollins and his cooperator at OSU, forest ecologist Dave Perry, scrambled to rescue the study by isolating the factors limiting snowbrush growth. Despite concerted efforts, they never identified a clear solution to the puzzle, but they had many theories about what “went wrong.” Sollins suspects that the study failed for reasons related to changes in hunting regulations that promoted wildlife recovery in the vicinity, but he had little to go on. The group had not established a base of wildlife research sufficient to support a rigorous postmortem on the snowbrush study. As the population of elk and bear increased at the Andrews Forest, the problem of inadequate wildlife studies became more acute. Observing that the group has done “excellent work” on studies of streams, insects, birds, and bats, Sollins suggests, “It would be nice if we could get some more work than we have on this [large wildlife species].” About the time the snowbrush study mysteriously derailed, he observes, “the elk herds took off [rapidly increased in number].” He postulates that “over-hunting had just finally been stopped and the elk herds were finally widely established and this was the first year which they [elk] really started coming around the Andrews again.” Given the opportunity to browse on snowbrush, he concludes, “Elk prefer it to Doug-fir.” Lacking any structured wildlife studies examining elk behavior on the Andrews Forest in that period, however, Sollins was at a loss to prove his theory, which might have had far-reaching implications. Efforts to manage snowbrush with herbicides during the 1970s triggered controversy about the environmental implications of aerial spraying. When elk populations recovered, Sollins observes, that controversy “sort of dropped out of the picture.”

Conclusion

The efforts of people like Maser, Trappe, Harmon, and Sollins clearly demonstrated by the late 1980s the importance of wildlife issues to collaborative studies of forest ecology. Wildlife could not be ignored if scientists and land managers hoped to
develop a clear, practical understanding of ecosystem processes in Pacific Northwest forests. Wildlife issues, indeed, loomed large in the future for managers of public lands in the United States, where popular interest in ecological issues had escalated rapidly in the previous two decades. The group was better positioned for responsive engagement with new issues than for any particular concern in the late 1980s, and the key to their preparedness was the Andrews Forest itself.

People in the group were stewards of a relatively intact expanse of native forest in a setting that permitted manipulation of that resource for research purposes. The group had imposed a stricter test of scientific relevance on management activities at the Andrews Forest during the 1970s, which amounted to a virtual moratorium on nonsalvage timber sales in the Lookout Creek. Timber harvests and road building on neighboring drainages of the Willamette National Forest, meanwhile, rapidly escalated through the 1980s. As a result, people who joined the group during that decade saw the Andrews Forest in a new light. It was an accessible reserve of intensively studied, regenerating, older clearcuts and stands of old growth within a larger, patchwork landscape of more recent timber harvests, road projects, recreational developments, and other activities on the Willamette National Forest. The place, however, was relatively underdeveloped, by comparison with other research facilities funded with LTER grants, and the group played up that fact in their search for additional support. The NSF reviewers who cycled through the Andrews Forest on “show-me” tours through the late 1980s could hardly accuse the group of profligate spending. It was a skeletal, shoe-string operation with a make-do ethic that was patently obvious to even the most casual observer. The group promoted the Andrews Forest as a place of mystical attraction where people subsidized scientific programs with voluntary effort. People came to the place for emotional, as well as pragmatic reasons. They found the place inspiring, and they forged new ties with other people in that setting. The result was a community that supported scientific research in both a spiritual and a practical sense.

That context of over 40 years of continuous monitoring and data management at the Andrews Forest helped the group adapt quickly to new demands for research on old-growth and other issues. They could speak with authority, if not definitiveness, on native forest ecosystems. Their successful efforts to collaborate across disciplines and in cooperation with forest managers earlier in the decade also helped them cope with the intense pressure of a changing political environment. Finally, their ability to mobilize intellectual and community resources beyond the Andrews Forest in response to the Mount St. Helens event demonstrated a potential for responsive engagement with real-world concerns. The group was poised to dramatically expand its public role and consciously exploit its professional influence.
Chapter Six: The Old-Growth Debate and the Andrews

Wildlife studies, for the most part, lagged well behind other areas of research at the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest) through the end of the century, but one such project transformed the group’s public role. Eric Forsman’s behavioral study of the northern spotted owl focused public attention on old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest. That development provided a dramatic new focal point for the Andrews group. Forsman’s owl study had more impact on people in that collaborative community than his involvement with them, although he earned all three of his undergraduate and graduate degrees in wildlife management at Oregon State University (OSU). Forsman, a native of Eugene, worked with OSU fisheries and wildlife professor Charles E. Meslow during the early 1970s and finished his Master’s thesis in 1976. That work focused on the Andrews Forest, but it also included field work elsewhere, notably on the nearby O&C Forest [lands previously included in a since-terminated land-grant to a 19th century railroad, the Oregon and California, now administered by the Bureau of Land Management]. His subsequent Ph.D. dissertation project ranged more broadly. It was a detailed, yet far-ranging assessment of the owl’s habitat needs and distribution. At the height of the International Biological Programme (IBP) era, the Andrews Forest was an obvious locale for an OSU graduate student seeking field sites among extensive stands of old-growth Douglas-fir readily accessible by road. Many of his peers and professors already worked at other sites on that drainage. He and Meslow collaborated with seven other scientists in a report on spotted owls on the Willamette National Forest, and the group included that report in its compilation of Andrews-related research. Forsman’s primary significance to the group, however, was indirect. His linkage of the spotted owl with old-growth habitat prompted two decades of intense scientific scrutiny of this bird and its habitat needs in

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relation to federal and state standards of forest management in the Pacific Northwest. The group had little direct involvement in that effort, but the owl inquiry raised the stakes for ecosystems research at the Andrews Forest.

The prolonged inquiry into the biology and habitat needs of the northern spotted owl forced state and federal agencies to revise guidelines for forest management to reduce adverse effects on this species. Managers tried to determine the optimal size and arrangement for habitat conservation areas in old-growth forest. By the mid 1980s, that effort was deeply entangled with the science issues of the owl’s habitat needs and with public policies mandating multiple uses for national forest lands. After a convoluted and contentious process, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service proposed in 1989 that the northern spotted owl warranted protection as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Two federal agencies responsible for managing public lands in the owl’s range subsequently assembled an interagency task force charged with developing a “scientifically credible” conservation strategy for the northern spotted owl. The Forest Service collaborated in the effort with three agencies in the Department of the Interior: the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service. That group submitted its report in early 1990.

The owl report weighed heavily on timber-dependent communities already suffering from a depressed regional economy hard hit by a slump in the construction industry, declining competitiveness in global markets, and corporate restructuring. Reactions in those communities lurched from anger and resentment toward resigned despair as residents who already faced a bleak outlook for future employment anticipated the fallout. The report noted the owl’s dependence on old-growth conditions and proposed a drastic expansion of habitat-conservation areas to include large tracts of old-growth and other forest types. It also proposed opening to

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Sidebar 6.1: Northern Spotted Owl

The Issue: Of the numerous species believed to be highly associated with old-growth forest habitat, the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) is best known and the focal point for forest and species conservation measures in the Pacific Northwest. The viability of spotted owl populations has been considered an indicator of the viability of old-growth forest communities as a whole.

The Roots: Basic understanding of the biology of northern spotted owls began in the 1970s with the personal curiosity of Eric Forsman, a graduate student at Oregon State University working in the Andrews Forest and neighboring lands on and near the Willamette National Forest. Drawing on these and other studies, efforts by federal agencies to protect these owls and other old-growth-associated species culminated in the Northwest Forest Plan (USDA and USDH 1994), which prescribed forest management for 24 million acres of the range of northern spotted owl from northern California to Canada. Studies and monitoring activities continue to track owl populations and their responses to management actions and other ecological and environmental factors. Thus, work that began in the basic science arena was enveloped in heated, high-level, policy and management debates.

The Approach: As with most ecological studies, Forsman’s original study began in the field as descriptive work, making repeated observations of locations of banded owls to determine their home ranges, uses of habitat, interactions with predators and prey, and other aspects of their life histories (Forsman et al. 1984). Since the 1980s, populations of owls have been monitored and modeled to assess change in response to habitat loss, forest regrowth, predation, and other factors in a large (>370,000 acre) area centered on the Andrews Forest (Ackers 2004), and in similar large areas elsewhere in the region.

Results: The northern spotted owl represents a key lesson in the history of the Andrews Forest—some simple, basic studies can be central to major policy and management issues many years later. Work on the spotted owl, old-growth forests, and forest-stream interactions followed this course. Long-term monitoring and other science and management efforts offer a more refined understanding of how this species is related to forest structure and composition, which could affect future approaches to understanding and managing species-habitat relations in general.

Right: The 1990 Interagency Report (Interagency Scientific Committee on the Northern Spotted Owl), recommended an adaptive management plan that included long-term monitoring of how spotted owls responded to the strategy, including sampling units that extended across a matrix of several different Habitat Conservation Areas and connecting corridors. From Thomas et al. 1990.

Above: Northern spotted owl adult perched on a snag in the Andrews Forest. Photo: Al Levno, USDA Forest Service.
logging and other uses some areas previously off limits, and it proposed managing selected stands of second growth to hasten the development of old-growth conditions. That strategy, of course, required answers to two questions: “What are old-growth conditions, and how does one manage for those conditions?” The Andrews group in 1990 was remarkably well positioned to address these questions.

Much was at stake beyond the owl’s immediate survival. Public debate over the future of forest management on public lands was heated in the late 20th century. A political backlash against the environmental initiatives of the early 1970s took root near the end of that decade and flourished during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, from 1981 through 1992. The debate about federal and state priorities for managing public lands included a conservative reconstruction of Congressional mandates after the 1994 federal elections. Members of Congress intensively scrutinized management practices on national forests, particularly in the Pacific Northwest. Timber production in the region was a central feature of the postwar economy. Forest policy issues reverberated through local and state politics and preoccupied congressional delegates from the Pacific Northwest. The human demographics of the issue, however, changed during the mid 1980s. People who depended on timber jobs found themselves increasingly outnumbered by people in other sectors of the economy, especially urban dwellers, for whom timber was not necessarily a leading priority.

Acceptable standards of stewardship over forest resources on the national forests in the Pacific Northwest, consequently, were a dynamic management concern in the 1980s and 1990s. The scientists and managers responsible for the Andrews Forest during those years were no more capable of controlling these forces than their predecessors had been in the first decades after World War II. For the most part, the old-growth debate of the late 20th century took the group by surprise.

Their applied-science focus, their maniacal persistence in long-term studies, and their collaborative effort, however, positioned people in the group as acknowledged authorities on this and related issues. They were able to tap into networks of support nurtured and cultivated over previous decades of research at the Andrews Forest. Most important, their ability to adapt, respond, and act brought them national prominence as consulting professionals who helped shape a strategy for the next century. By the last decade of the 20th century, they were in the unaccustomed position of working as first-source consultants, managing facilities and programs that inspired envy, awe, and even resentment from their peers. The story of the Andrews group during these years is the story of a community discovering
itself and then learning how to act with self-conscious authority when confronted with crises beyond their control.

Modeling Sustainable Networks of Science and Community on a Managed Landscape

Forest Service and OSU scientists at Corvallis had previously launched joint efforts to understand ecological composition and function in old-growth stands and watersheds at the Andrews Forest during and after the Coniferous Biome. In the intervening years, Franklin tried to impart a sense of urgency and mission to his colleagues, encouraging them to focus on the science mission and to avoid petty distinctions between agency and university scientists. Younger scientists picked up on the theme, partially sacrificing their initial science interests in service to the collaborative ideal. Gregory, for example, would have preferred to focus on fish, and he had considerable latitude in the type of research project he could pursue for his graduate work. His colleagues in the IBP, however, encouraged him to focus his

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6 Interview with small-watersheds group, 19-20.
dissertation work within certain broad parameters: “It needed to be something in
the Andrews, and something that helped understand stream ecosystems, something
that wasn’t already being done.” Those parameters led Gregory to study primary
production in streams. His thesis focused on a clearcut section and an old-growth
section of Mack Creek on the Andrews Forest, where he studied rates of primary
production, and the nutrient dynamics associated with those rates. That focus
involved Gregory in what he describes as “one of the first truly multidisciplinary
ecosystem programs.” As a young graduate student, he was involved with Jim
Sedell, Jim Hall, Jerry Franklin, Dick Waring, and Kermit Cromack, and “lots of
other people” in an atmosphere where everyone in the program was “constantly
getting together and exchanging ideas and concepts about how ecosystems func-
tion.” It was an unparalleled learning experience and professional opportunity.7

By the time the Andrews group assembled for a working retreat at the Wind
River Experimental Forest in Washington in 1978, its members generally espoused
the collaborative ethic of the IBP as an ingrained tradition and shared value. They
were unconcerned with artificial distinctions between Forest Service or university
employees, or relative rank within those institutions, and unaffiliated, visiting
scientists swelled the ranks of those officially connected with either OSU or the
Pacific Northwest (PNW) Research Station. Their Wind River gathering was
intended as an opportunity to synthesize insights from a variety of divergent, yet
interrelated studies of old-growth forests and streams, and the group expected the
meeting would eventually lead to a publication reflecting that synthesis. Sedell and
his fellow conferees at that meeting were motivated by a collective sense that the
funding mechanisms on which they all relied would inexorably drive research
deeper into a tinkering mindset of small studies nibbling around the edges of larger
issues. As a remedy, they proposed to jointly articulate a new paradigm for re-
search designed to address, more directly, public concerns about urgent ecological
problems. Whereas standard industry sources tended to fund questions like, “How
can we ‘up’ production and cut costs?” or “What’s the minimum [environmental
protection] we need?” Sedell and his colleagues at the Wind River meeting argued
they could tap into an emerging willingness, particularly in the National Science
Foundation (NSF), to fund basic studies that addressed more fundamental ques-
tions: “How does the system work and are we doing the things that keep the sys-
tem working that way?” By the time of that 1978 meeting, those who attended the

7 Interview with Stan Gregory, 1.
conference had worked together for nearly a decade. The pressures of securing grants, tenure, positions, and promotion in federal agencies, academia, and private industry, however, had discouraged formal integration of their work. The meeting produced a publication that Sedell describes as a collaborative effort: “… there were about six or eight of us authors that put together this book on the characteristics and function of old-growth forests, and that was just synthesizing bits and pieces that we’d all done, to put it into a coherent story, and that was the first look at those forests that way.” That government technical report,\(^8\) he concludes, “had more to do with focusing [research] on old-growth forests than anything.”

The report, publicly released in 1981, provided the group with a central theme around which they could weave a coherent program from the multiple strands of research at the Andrews Forest. It included two major components: “Characteristics of old-growth forests” and “Managing for old-growth forests and attributes.” Descriptive sections of the report explored the composition and function of forests and streams, and the structure of old-growth trees, snags, and logs on land and in streams. Programmatic sections suggested strategies for “perpetuating or re-creating old-growth forests,” including the distribution of old-growth management areas, and appropriate structural attributes to guide management planning toward accomplishing these goals. The programmatic sections went well beyond characterizing or describing old growth: they were a call for action. This report confronted the group with the question of what management methods might be needed to maintain ecological processes and structural features of old-growth forests.\(^9\) In response to that question, people in the group acted. They shared their collective insights on the processes and structure of the old-growth Douglas-fir forest at Lookout Creek in a 2-week program offered in July 1981 as part of the Continuing Education division of the College of Forestry at OSU.

The 2-week program drew on a wide range of Andrews collaborators and resources, pairing a 5-day short course involving fieldwork at the Andrews Forest with a 5-day workshop in Corvallis that focused on habitat types. This intensive, two-stage program communicated scientific ideas and then illustrated their application in a real-world setting. Topics for the short course were a virtual catalogue of

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\(^9\) Interview with Jim Sedell, 18.

\(^10\) Interview with Jim Sedell, 18.
research relevant to the questions swirling around the 1981 report. They included methods for assessing biomass, leaf area, net production, stand vigor, and growth efficiency; environmental controls on forest composition and function; techniques for measuring environmental conditions; structural features, including old-growth stands; tree canopies as complex ecosystems; nutrient cycling and nitrogen; coarse woody debris in forests and streams; chronic erosion processes (creep) and catastrophic erosion processes (landslides); vegetation and geomorphic interactions; riparian zones (structure and importance); stream channel stability; stream ecosystem structure and function (energy sources, invertebrates, fish, other vertebrates); and contrasts between natural and managed ecosystems.\textsuperscript{11}

The report and related events amounted to a coming-out party for many of the scientists affiliated with the Andrews group, and not everyone hailed their arrival. Public land policy in the Pacific Northwest during the early 1980s was a political minefield. With few exceptions, these scientists had relatively little experience negotiating that political terrain. The economy of the Pacific Northwest was mired in a timber recession linked with double-digit inflation and a stagnant construction industry. People who depended on the timber industry for their livelihood demanded attention to their concerns. In that context, a misconception about the group gained credence in the popular culture: State-funded scientists who studied old growth at the Andrews Forest were supplying information that aided environmentalist efforts to halt logging in old-growth forests. That perception led to an inquiry by the Oregon State Legislature, which summoned McKee to explain why the state was supporting research at the Andrews Forest that might buttress environmental initiatives to protect old growth. McKee responded, “We don’t study just old growth.”\textsuperscript{11}

The group’s political support was unpredictable and tenuous by comparison with its critics. Oregon Congressman Peter DeFazio (Democrat) and Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield (Republican) provided a strong, bipartisan, national base of support for the Andrews Forest and related programs. Closer to home, however, representatives in the Oregon State Legislature were often less open in their support, if not directly hostile, from the perspective of the group’s leadership. McKee assigns much of the credit for defusing the legislative inquiry of the early 1980s


\textsuperscript{12} Andrews History Project Workshop of 7 August 1996, 34.
to the legislative representatives for the district that included the Andrews Forest. From his own perspective, however, he concludes that political and physical geography sometimes eroded their standing with political supporters in state and local government: “We’ve had a diversity of support from some people at the state level and county level … [because] that state district keeps changing its boundaries. They call it the helicopter district, because it’s a bunch of west-slope valleys running north and south.” These westward-draining river valleys, separated by high ridges, made it difficult to move around or campaign in the district except by air and tended to separate people and interests in that district into separate enclaves that lacked a cohesive central focus or direction.13

Management Transitions and Implications for Studies of Forest Ecosystems

Faced with uncertain support from the state of Oregon, the group leaned more heavily on its federal base and strengthened its ties with the management branch of the Forest Service. They found a strong ally in Mike Kerrick, who took the helm as forest supervisor for the Willamette National Forest shortly before the controversy over old growth heated up in the Pacific Northwest. Kerrick’s previous career wove in and out of the Andrews community five different times between 1952 and 1980, when he returned to the Willamette as forest supervisor.14 Even he, however, was surprised to find that relations between managers at Blue River and researchers at the Andrews Forest had taken a cooperative turn by 1980. Jim Caswell, for example, had replaced Robert Burns as District Ranger at Blue River a few years before Kerrick’s return as forest supervisor. McKee credits Caswell with strengthening the “partnership” between district personnel and scientists with the group and concluded he “really wanted to build that partnership into a stronger partnership.”15

Kerrick had gained an appreciation of the need for stronger links between managers and researchers during his previous stint as deputy forest supervisor with the Coconino National Forest. His efforts to encourage better interaction between forest managers at Coconino and scientists engaged in research relevant to grazing and water issues on that national forest never fully paid off because, he recalls, “it was still a we-they kind of thing from the district standpoint.” By comparison with

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14 Interview with Mike Kerrick, 14, 17-18.
15 Rakestraw, 133; interview with Mike Kerrick, 14, 17-18.
the more-established, long-running conflict over grazing rights and water claims in the American Southwest, the full implications of the emerging old-growth debate in the Pacific Northwest were less obvious to Kerrick when he returned to the Willamette National Forest. He did, however, quickly grasp the need to ensure that management practices would keep pace with science relevant to issues on that national forest over the next decade. The potential for closer cooperation with scientists at the Andrews, consequently, was a valued attribute of his new appointment. Kerrick, in short, had undergone something of a conversion since his earlier years as Anderson’s protégé at the Blue River Ranger District. After 1980, he supported forest managers and staff at Blue River who showed an emerging interest in research findings. The timing of this rapprochement was critical for the success of the group, as the debate over old-growth forests brought research programs at the Andrews Forest under increased scrutiny. The group’s proposal to establish the Andrews as a National Field Research Facility coincided with Kerrick’s arrival, and together, those two circumstances helped forge a stronger bond with managers at the Blue River Ranger District. The NSF proposal called for a local advisory committee to include the district ranger at Blue River and representatives from the Willamette National Forest and from the Pacific Northwest Regional Office.

Kerrick’s goal of promoting stronger relations between managers and scientists at the Andrews Forest came at an opportune moment in the history of that facility. The group’s ability to secure renewable funding from the NSF in addition to ongoing support from the Forest Service and Oregon State built a more autonomous base than would have been possible without that third leg of support. Scientists in the group were also becoming more assertive in promoting management applications for their research, thanks in part to the more accommodating style of District Ranger Caswell. When Caswell accepted a promotion to deputy forest supervisor in Boise, Idaho, in 1983, scientists at the Andrews viewed his departure as an opportunity to play a more direct role in selecting his successor at Blue River. They wanted to recruit a district ranger who would work more actively with the group and break down some of the barriers separating research ideas at the Andrews from management applications on the Blue River Ranger District. That goal was consistent with the 1981 report on strategies of “managing for old-growth forests

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16 Interview with Mike Kerrick, 17-18.
17 Interview with IBP group, 23.
18 Interview with Franklin, 22-23; interview with IBP group, 24.
and attributes.” The group embraced its responsibility to directly address management issues, and the science leadership presented the Andrews Forest as a venue for communicating that mission to a wider audience.

The group’s perception of Caswell’s departure as an opportunity, rather than a crisis, illustrates the emerging self-confidence of the science leadership at the Andrews in the early 1980s. Rather than responding to management inquiries or seeking ways to interest forest managers in their work, science leaders asserted their relevance to an internal personnel decision of the Willamette National Forest. In doing so, they stepped beyond the sketchy boundaries laid down in previous memorandums of understanding between PNW Station, OSU, and the Willamette National Forest. The fact that they perceived their efforts to influence Kerrick’s decision on this hire as successful, however, was as much a measure of Kerrick’s evolving management style as it was a testimony to the brash self-confidence of
the Andrews group. During his interview with Steve Eubanks, who eventually won the job, Kerrick never specifically indicated that good relations with research was a management goal for the district ranger at Blue River. Instead, he asked Eubanks, “How do you feel about working with research folk?” Eubanks, who had been working with research in his previous assignments, responded that he considered it “a real unique opportunity.” From Kerrick’s perspective, the budding partnership with the group at the Andrews Forest was an “incredible resource” and his priority was to avoid doing anything that would “negatively affect it.” Instead, he wanted to “nurture it and see it grow.” In the end, Kerrick concluded, Eubanks “probably spent more energy and effort on the Andrews than … I wanted,” but he could see “great things happening” as the partnership with research “really flowered under his administration.”

Kerrick assigned the new district ranger responsibility for nurturing the liaison with research, and he included that responsibility as a management goal for that person. For Kerrick, that directive was a simple extension of the traditional priorities of the Forest Service. Forest managers, he explained, constantly look for “useful stuff” that will “help manage the forest better.” In his view, people, rather than ideas, most commonly interfered with that goal, and he favored a strategy of selecting people who could “hang out and work … with the research community” while also fulfilling their responsibilities as a district ranger. The person he selected to fill that niche at Blue River brought a level of management energy and enthusiasm that few scientists at the Andrews Forest had noted in his predecessors. They nicknamed Eubanks “The Research Ranger on the Research Ranger District” because he demonstrated a real enthusiasm for research by applying it in his district. People in the group considered Eubanks a “major participant in the research program” who did more than just support their efforts: he actually made proposals and suggestions, sometimes disconcerting scientists who casually tossed around ideas without concern for their practical implications. Eubanks, however, took each suggestion seriously, and in Sedell’s words, “ran it back at us” with a critique of its feasibility. He was also aggressive in implementing new practices on the ground to demonstrate the management implications of ecosystem research, particularly in relation to alternative silvicultural practices.

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21 Interview with Steve Eubanks, 10; interview with Mike Kerrick, 17-18; interview with Jerry Franklin, 23; interview with IBP group.
20 Andrews group interview 22 September 1997, 35.
21 Interview with Mike Kerrick, 17-18; interview with Jerry Franklin, 23; interview with Jim Sedell, 8; communication from Fred Swanson 3 January 1999.
Linking Personal and Professional Priorities With Experimental Forestry on the Andrews

The person Kerrick selected to replace Caswell as district ranger at Blue River had professional and personal roots deeply embedded in the old-growth forests of Oregon. Like Silen and Franklin, Eubanks was a native of the Pacific Northwest. He was born and raised near Salem, Oregon, where he grew up hunting and fishing in nearby Douglas-fir forests. His career path to forestry was less a conscious decision than a predictable outcome, given his childhood experiences, peer group, and proximity to OSU. He grew up in the latter years of the postwar timber boom in western Oregon, when many Willamette Valley high schools still offered programs designed to prepare graduates for entry-level jobs in the timber industry. Eubanks recalls of his own career plans during that period, “I didn’t really have a vision of what I wanted to do, but I ended up in forestry.” When an OSU recruiter visited Eubanks’ high school to talk about careers in forest engineering, Eubanks thought it sounded like “a pretty neat deal” although he “didn’t know diddly-squat about forestry at that point.” With a similar degree of introspection, he stumbled into the forestry program and eventually graduated from OSU in 1970 with a degree in forest engineering.  

When Eubanks decided to seek a career in the Forest Service, his fellow graduates questioned the move. By the time he completed his degree, the forestry community was more polarized than in Silen’s era, and many of his classmates urged him to pursue a career in private industry. As a recent product of the state’s leading forestry education program, he was thoroughly steeped in that school’s traditional emphasis on applied research. Eubanks, however, worked for the Forest Service each summer of his college career, and he considered the agency a possible career path. His Forest Service co-workers impressed him with their commitment to principled forestry. Upon graduation in 1970, Eubanks landed a permanent position in the forest supervisor’s office of the Mount Hood National Forest, headquartered in Portland, Oregon. It was an auspicious year that included the first Earth Day celebration and related initiatives that expanded the mission and focus of the modern Forest Service well beyond production forestry. In Portland, he rubbed shoulders with a new cadre of scientists who, like Eubanks, found a home in the Forest Service of that era, and he learned to appreciate “the nonforestry specialists

22 Interview with Steve Eubanks, 1.
as well as the forestry—such as the hydrologist, the fish biologist, the wildlife biologist, and … the landscape architects.” From them, he learned “how to do things” in an environmentally sensitive way.\textsuperscript{23} In that decade, from Eubanks’ perspective, he and other forest professionals in the management branch of the Forest Service sought appropriate responses to an increasingly complex array of issues: “That sort of stuff [ecosystem thinking] just made sense. … we weren’t butting heads with anybody. I mean, we were bringing folks along with us as we went … it just sort of made sense.”\textsuperscript{24}

Eubanks indirectly linked up with the Andrews community after he transferred from the Mount Hood to the Wenatchee National Forest in east-central Washington. Two years after that transfer, in 1977, some technicians who worked with Eubanks in his new position attended a workshop in Wenatchee, where they encountered Chris Maser, an invited speaker and ecologist. Maser was then working for the Bureau of Land Management in eastern Oregon and he participated in the Wind River meeting on old growth the next year. In 1977, the Wenatchee office was struggling with a management plan for a small drainage on the Wenatchee National Forest. Eubanks learned about Maser from the technicians who were “very impressed with Chris [Maser] and what he had to say as sort of nontraditional viewpoints of managing the forest ecosystem.” When the supervisor’s office later assembled a team to plan precommercial thinning and harvesting in that basin, they included Maser as an outside consultant. Maser spent a week on the district with the forest silviculturist, the district silviculturist, and the forest soil scientists. “Really, at that point,” Eubanks notes, “things just clicked … we were just sort of on the same wave length. That was the beginning of a long-term friendship with Chris that … influenced a lot of my thinking. We came up with some very nontraditional approaches on how to handle everything from coarse woody debris to … what kind of harvests that we were gonna do.”\textsuperscript{25}

By the time Maser brought his interagency vision of management alternatives to the attention of people in the Wenatchee National Forest supervisor’s office in 1977, he was already serving with Sedell and eight other scientists on the H.J.

\textsuperscript{23} Interview with Steve Eubanks, 1.
\textsuperscript{24} Interview with Steve Eubanks, 2.
\textsuperscript{25} Interview with Steve Eubanks, 2.
Andrews National Advisory Committee. That committee helped the group plan its campaign to secure additional NSF funding, beginning with the initial facilities grant (or Experimental Ecological Research [EER]) and eventually resulting in the first Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) grant. Among other responsibilities, the advisory committee suggested strategies for attracting scientists from outside the region and for evaluating whether the permanent facilities for research at the Andrews Forest met the group’s needs. They also considered how to increase funding from the NSF, manage data, and devise a management plan with zoning restrictions to protect the research resource. Committee members, who met at the Log Cabin Inn at McKenzie Bridge that year, toured, among other sites, the large-stream monitoring and stream research programs on Mack Creek, the tree canopy research program, and the erosion and geomorphology studies on Lookout Creek.

The linkage of Eubanks, Maser, and the advisory committee in 1977 is just one example of how events beyond the Andrews Forest linked the group with its past and future priorities. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, that experimental forest emerged as a center for studying old-growth forests and planning management strategies that integrated scientific research with public mandates. In that period, the group transcended the Andrews Forest by linking experimental theory with management needs on the Blue River District of the Willamette National Forest, and that link between science and practice enhanced their national reputation. As a result, the group was well positioned to respond when the old-growth debate exploded into the open. Eubanks was a primary, but not unique agent of the pairing of management and research interests at the Andrews Forest. His case illustrates how the group informally recruited and cooperatively engaged other scientists and managers involved with similar issues in the Pacific Northwest in that period.

When Eubanks returned to Oregon from Wenatchee to become district ranger for the Bear Springs District of the Mount Hood National Forest in the late 1970s, he reinforced his previously indirect links with the Andrews group. He arrived to

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26 Committee members included: Daniel Botkin (Marine Biology Laboratory, Woods Hole, MA), Dale Cole (UW College of Forest Resources), Stanley Cook (UO Biology), Dak Crossley (U Georgia Entomology), Richard Janda (USGS, Menlo Park, Geomorphology and Hydrology), George Lauff (W.K. Kellogg Biology Station, Hickory Corners, MI), Jack Major (UC Davis Botany), Chris Maser (BLM Range and Wildlife Habitat Laboratory, La Grande), Robert Pierce (USFS Durham, NH, FSL), James Sedell (OSU Fisheries and Wildlife). Memo (31 August 1977) from Jerry F. Franklin, Chief Plant Ecologist to H.J. Andrews National Advisory Committee re: arrangements for September meeting. Research Office Records (RG 170) Accession 91:1, reel 1, folders 29-30, Oregon State University Archives; interview with IBP group, 27.

find his new district still relying on traditional methods, including “a lot of clean up of slash.” Eubanks arranged a meeting of his Bear Springs staff with Maser and some of his close associates, including Jim Trappe, the mycologist with PNW Station whose work included some collaboration with the Andrews group at the Corvallis Laboratory. Trappe and Maser also collaborated on several studies in the Andrews Forest during this period, culminating in a jointly edited compilation entitled, *The Seen and Unseen World of the Fallen Tree.*

Maser and Trappe worked with Eubanks and his staff at Bear Springs into the early 1980s as they devised guidelines for slash treatment on the district. As a result of those efforts, the Bear Springs District implemented some of Eubanks’ “nontraditional” approaches, leaving more coarse woody debris and more reserve trees.

By the early 1980s, public support for innovative strategies of forest management was directly evident. Eubanks is just one example of how even traditional graduates of production-oriented programs of forest engineering were receptive to relatively new ideas, including those linked with the Andrews. Eubanks and his colleagues at the Bear Springs District “took a certain amount of heat” from other staff officers on the Mount Hood National Forest, but they also earned “kudos for the things we were doing in nontraditional ways.” Despite criticism from some quarters, in fact, these efforts to implement innovative ideas of ecosystem management earned the Bear Springs District an award from the Pacific Northwest Region as “District of the Year” for several years running. In recruiting Eubanks for a transfer from his GS-12 position as district ranger at Bear Springs to his GS-13 appointment as district ranger at Blue River, Kerrick hired an experienced administrator with proven success in implementing new ideas in ways appropriate to the specific concerns of his district. Eubanks was also, however, a forest manager firmly rooted in the standards of forestry as traditionally practiced in western Oregon. His success at the Bear Springs District demonstrated that “nontraditional” ideas appealed to people whose personal origins and professional roles were rooted in the mainstream of traditional, production-oriented forestry. In 1984, he brought that ingredient of common appeal home to the Andrews Forest.

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29 Interview with Steve Eubanks, 2.

30 Interview with Steve Eubanks, 2, 4.
Implementing Old-Growth Theory on the Blue River District, 1983–1989

Scientists with the Andrews group gained an enlarged arena for experimental forestry with the arrival of Eubanks at Blue River in 1984. He joined the core community after a 5-year period of progressive involvement with people more peripheral to the group’s efforts at the Andrews Forest. He arrived in an era when the core leadership of the group was becoming more assertive about the management implications of their research. The surrounding district, however, remained largely unaffected by their efforts before Eubanks took over as district ranger. With some exceptions, he was surprised to discover that cooperation between district staff and researchers was mostly limited to the Andrews Forest itself. The Blue River District had implemented relatively few nontraditional strategies beyond the Lookout Creek drainage. On his first tour of the Blue River District, Eubanks drove around with some of his staff to survey harvesting yields and management strategies on the district. He observed “basically traditional” clearcuts, with “no wildlife trees,” and he mentioned to one of his companions, “You know, I’m not used to that.” Management strategies that Eubanks had implemented at Bear Springs called for leaving a substantial number of green, tall trees, and standing dead trees on logged units. In response to that observation, Eubanks recalls, one of the assistant district rangers at Blue River responded, “Well, geez, the Forest Supervisor [Kerrick] was out one time, and we were looking at the unit where we had a couple of wildlife trees left and he made the comment that the only good wildlife tree is one that is going down the road on a truck.” Eubanks concludes, “I sort of filed that one away.”

Whether his new subordinates were attempting to avoid a confrontation with their new boss by shifting upstairs the responsibility for a perceived failing, or whether Kerrick really had made that comment, it was a rude awakening to the realities of forest management on the Blue River District. Eubanks professes he “had a lot of respect for Mike [Kerrick] as Forest Supervisor,” and he concedes Kerrick “gave us lots and lots of freedom,” but he also understands that Kerrick “had a certain amount of discomfort” with the ideas and innovations Eubanks brought to his work on the Blue River District. The important point, however, was that Eubanks found Kerrick willing to consider new ideas and to change his mind and introduce new policies in cases where there was “better information.”

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31 Interview with Steve Eubanks, 11.
32 Interview with Steve Eubanks, 11.
As management plans for the Blue River Ranger District began to include ideas that originated with studies at the Andrews Forest, the group’s ideas about old growth and ecosystem productivity began to change. The starting point for the group’s evolving ideas about old-growth forests and ecological interactions during the 1980s was the 1981 publication, *Ecological Characteristics of Old-Growth Douglas-Fir Forests*. That report identified old-growth Douglas-fir—western hemlock forests, ranging from 350 to 750 years old, as the primary example of old-growth ecosystems in western Oregon and Washington. It stressed, however, that in the strict sense, they are “generally not climax forests” because on most sites, Douglas-fir is “subject to replacement by western hemlock and other more [shade] tolerant associates.” The concept of an apparently ancient forest in a sustained stage of dynamic transition was central to the initial synthesis of ideas.

about old growth in the early 1980s. The report framed specific attributes of old growth as a comparison between “natural” and “managed” stands, and as a contrast between “old growth” and “second growth.” A cautionary note explained that managed stands of second growth differed, qualitatively, from natural stands of second growth, notably in terms of the continuity, or legacy, of woody debris through severe disturbance. Young, natural stands tended to have significant amounts of woody debris, but intensively managed stands of any age did not.

Variation, according to the report, was the most important constant in old-growth forests. The publication cited variation—in size, spatial distribution, species, color, texture, lighting, and undergrowth—as a central feature of old-growth forests, with numerous logs of various sizes and stages of decay littering the forest floor, and with relatively few evident signs of wildlife present. These attributes of old growth, the authors noted, were clearly evident in small- to moderate-size streams flowing through old growth, where organic debris (ranging in scale from logs to leaves, needles, twigs, and bud scales) was a primary component of variation. Large-scale elements were also central features of old growth: live old-growth trees, standing dead trees, logs on land, and logs in streams. These prominent elements were also functional components of the forest, with distinct roles as habitat and in terms of nutrient cycling. The report inverted contemporary logging literature by asserting, “The most sterile successional stage, in diversity of both plant and animal species, is a dense, rapidly growing young conifer forest.”

The group’s 1981 publication emphasized areas of uncertainty and the need for further studies, but it also noted, “many species find optimum habitat in old-growth forests and some probably require old-growth habitat for survival.” The report linked these concepts to mechanisms of primary production, energy flow, conservation and cycling of nutrients, and regulation of waterflow in old-growth forests. The authors also countered arguments that primary production necessarily

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declined in old-growth stands, emphasizing that the multilayered canopy of an old-growth forest was well suited to “efficient capture of energy” and that photosynthetic production “is generally large and intact in an old-growth forest.”

The early emphasis on watershed studies at the Andrews Forest and the more recently developed concepts of a river continuum and forest-stream interactions were particularly evident in the group’s 1981 report. It identified streams as integral components of old-growth conditions and suggested they were a reservoir of organic matter and a locale for processes in old-growth forests, rather than simple conduits for exporting debris from the ecosystem. Bacteria, fungi, insects, and other organisms processed organic matter in forest streams, and a large proportion of the basic food resource derived from wood in small streams under old-growth trees. Coarse, woody debris in smaller streams was a major source of nitrogen fixed in those systems. The influence of the forest, however, diminished with the increasing scale of the stream, according to this synthesis of previous research, while the kinds, numbers, and biomass of organisms increased with the scale of the stream.

The ideas expressed in the group’s 1981 synthesis are a freeze-frame view of the thinking of the Andrews group on the subject of old growth and forest-stream interactions at the end of the 1970s. Like the dynamic forests they describe, however, those ideas were in a state of sustained transition when PNW Station published that synthesis as a General Technical Report. The synthesis was based on monitoring and research activities spanning more than three decades, and those efforts continued through the next two decades, with different people, insights, and methods added into the mix. The who participated in that process at the Andrews Forest seldom can point to any specific “eureka” experience that revolutionized their thinking, just as Eubanks has a hard time identifying any specific event that revolutionized his thinking about acceptable forest management practices. Scientists with the Andrews group, moreover, seldom considered their research a viable model for revolutionizing management practices. Instead, they tended to answer questions with more questions, and they sought venues for exploring issues as they arose and evolved through time. Opportunities for such explorations dramatically expanded when Eubanks joined the group. His willingness

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35 Franklin, Cromack, Denison, [and others], *Ecological Characteristics of Old-Growth*, 5.

to reconsider what made sense in the manager’s world of applied forestry pushed the group to reconsider what made sense in the realm of ideas about forest ecosystems. He was, however, a contributing factor, not a determining factor in the evolution of the group.37

Minutes taken at the monthly meetings of the Andrews group collectively provide a record of a scientific community in transition during the 1980s. Individually, the minutes from any particular meeting outline the central concerns of that community at a given moment, much as the 1981 synthesis provides a rough outline of the group’s thinking on the issue of old growth at that historic moment. It was a group held together by dynamic engagement with ideas and people, and they were consistently pulled in many different directions at any given time. The LTER meeting of 12 October 1984, for example, introduced new District Ranger Steve Eubanks to the 23 other people in attendance that day and to many others who later read the meeting notes. Other items on the agenda included a discussion of the Renewal Proposal (requesting $233,981), strategic planning for LTER II, and the results of a visit to the Andrews Forest by Deputy Regional Forester John Butruille and Johns Hopkins University Professor Gordon “Reds” Wolman in their new roles as members of the LTER National Committee. In the area of data management, the group was informed of efforts to improve the performance of the biomass [software] package to make it more user-friendly, they were warned of the need to develop a 5-year strategy for meeting data management needs, and they learned that students were doing data entry in an effort to cut costs. The H.J. Andrews Data Management Group was also planning to attend a symposium at the University of South Carolina that would include representatives from all 11 LTER sites. Along similar lines of intersite coordination, Andrews’ site director Art McKee was planning to exchange places with his counterpart from Hubbard Brook for winter 1986. The Andrews group was also informed that funding for building improvements at the headquarters site was running out, even as interest in the site for summer short courses was exceeding capacity. Four people were employed by the “Central Lab” with LTER funds at an annual cost of $40,000, but people from seven different agencies were listed as the “main users” of that facility. Efforts to communicate the group’s ideas in separate syntheses of work on woody debris, on ecosystem volume, and on ecosystem response and recovery at Mount St. Helens were proceeding “painfully,” or were awaiting sabbatical opportunities so

37 Interview with Al Levno, 8-9.
that someone could devote more time to those tasks. One timber sale (the “Vanilla Leaf sale”) was underway, and two others were delayed for a year. Additional concerns at that meeting included an insect proposal to examine the effects of log structure on heterotrophic activity and the effects of invertebrate populations on decomposition processes. The group was introduced to Shigeo Kobayashi, a visiting scientist from the Forestry and Forest Products Research Institute in Tsukuba, Japan, who worked at Mount St. Helens and the Andrews Forest, and they learned of problems with protecting research sites at Mount St. Helens.38

The above listing of abbreviated discussion points from a typical meeting in 1984 imperfectly illustrates the mushrooming concerns of the Andrews group during the mid 1980s. The 23 people who attended and discussed these issues contributed hours of their time and energy to the meeting. The printed record, however, summarizes what actually ensued in less than three pages. Attendance itself is also an imperfect indicator of participation in the group. A memo dated 17 November 1983, from Franklin to the “H.J. Andrews Local Site Committee and Associated Interested Parties,” for example, was addressed to the attention of 36 different people. Minutes from the 28 October 1983 meeting were attached to the memo. Subsequent minutes indicated only about 16 people actually attended the meeting that memo was intended to announce.39 Those who attended meetings of the group, moreover, often did so on a casual basis, leaving and sometimes returning to rejoin the gathering or arriving late from other engagements, while business continued in their absence. The meetings operated on a consensus model, usually with a senior collaborator setting the agenda and facilitating the discussion, but often deferring to scientists who were directly engaged in a particular project when the meeting reached that point in the agenda. It was a fluid, free-flowing format that operated within a minimalist executive framework while encouraging group


39 Those included on this list of “Associated Interested Parties” included Jim Sedell, Paul Alaback, Art McKee, Dave Perry, Greg Koerper, Fred Swanson, George Bengston, Kermit Cromack, Bill Emmingham, Susan Stafford, Jack Lattin, George Keller, Dennis Harr, Tom Spies, Tom Callahan, Don Boelter, Jim Caswell, Phil Sollins, Mark Klopsch, Mike Gallegly, Jim Hall, Al Levno, Kenneth Cummins, Dick Waring, Bob Tarrant, Stan Gregory, Rolfe Anderson, George Carroll, Tim Schowalter, Peggy Reilly, Karen Luchessa, Mark Harmon, Vince Puleo, Debra Coffey-Flexner, Adelaida Chaverri, and Karen Waddell. LTER meeting minutes (2 December 1983)
discussion, debate, and consensus-based problem-solving that drew on all the expertise and human resources in the room at that particular time. The monthly meeting was a touchstone event reflecting, but not embodying, personal sacrifice and commitment to the group. It was also a structured, but flexible opportunity for communication and coordination, but it was not the defining event of the Andrews community. Working relations were initiated and developed beyond the meeting room, and they required active engagement in the issues, events, and people working with specific programs of research at the Andrews Forest or other, relevant sites.

By summer 1986, the group was grappling with problems of overcrowding resulting from the proliferation of research projects at the Andrews Forest. Concerned that new projects might compromise the integrity of ongoing field studies, some members of the group drafted a protocol for securing approval of research in the experimental forest. They then circulated that protocol to the rest of the group at the meeting of 21 February 1986. The protocol charged the site director with maintaining a registry of projects, and it required scientists to provide the site director with brief preproposals or research descriptions in advance of actual work. The site director would then present these preproposals at the monthly meeting and notify researchers whose studies might be affected by the proposed work. All studies requiring manipulations exceeding 12.5 acres would also be submitted to the National Advisory Committee for review and approval. All projects approved by the Local Site Committee would be signed, dated, and filed at the Andrews Forest, the Blue River District, and the Corvallis Forestry Sciences Laboratory. At that point, the research project and location would be entered into the Land Base Inventory for the Andrews Forest.\footnote{LTER meeting minutes (21 February 1986).}

One obvious solution to the problem of competing pressures on the experimental forest itself was to move beyond the limits of that piece of real estate. The nearby districts of the Willamette National Forest, particularly Blue River, were obvious candidates for such an expansion. Eubanks was a regular participant in the monthly meetings of the group, beginning in 1984, and that venue became a setting for exploring possible links between scientific theory and forest policy. By mid decade, Eubanks began to take the ideas presented at the monthly meetings and develop strategies for implementing them on the Blue River Ranger District. He also returned to those meetings with feedback and concerns that challenged previous thinking in the group. In managing for old-growth characteristics, for example, he
provided the research community with newly drafted guidelines the district had adopted for managing large woody material on intensively managed sites. As background, he cited a 2-year-old report by Maser and Trappe. Those guidelines noted concerns about long-term site productivity and recent evidence suggesting that productivity may decrease over time at high rates of use. He also announced that the district had convened an “interdisciplinary team” to develop a strategy applying “recent research findings” to ensure the long-term productivity of timber in managed stands.

Long-Term Site Productivity, Problems of Scale, and Coordination of Effort

The decision to incorporate research ideas about long-term productivity into guidelines for managing woody debris at the Blue River District had broad implications for the group. Dave Perry and Phil Sollins led an effort to develop a long-term site productivity project at the Andrews Forest as part of the LTER. Minutes of the group’s monthly meetings from the mid to late 1980s, however, suggest that those efforts stalled and sputtered amid a flurry of personnel changes in that period. In addition to Franklin’s sabbatical and eventual move to the University of Washington, Art McKee left on an exchange to Hubbard Brook during the latter half of the decade. Then, amidst planning efforts on the long-term site productivity project, Sollins accepted a 2-year appointment at Yale in June 1987. His responsibilities for the project shifted to Perry and Mary Leuking, a recent postdoc from the University of California Riverside hired to run Sollins’ lab in his absence. Before the end of 1988, Steve Eubanks announced he had accepted a position in Washington, DC, and would leave the Andrews group by the end of January 1989. The next month, Bernard Bormann, who previously had little involvement with the Andrews Forest or group, moved to Corvallis to lead Forest Service research on long-term site productivity. His arrival rejuvenated enthusiasm for the concept in subsequent

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41 Chris Maser and James M. Trappe, The Seen and Unseen World of the Fallen Tree.

meetings, and the group learned that his research unit planned to locate two study sites on and adjacent to one of the reference stands that year. By December of the next year, Mike Kerrick had also announced his retirement.\textsuperscript{23}

The high degree of turnover forced the group into a leadership transition related to its search for a defining research focus. Among other concerns, the group needed to strengthen its proposal for continuing LTER funding. Harmon, whose log-decomposition study was a frequent topic of discussion at the monthly meetings, emerged as a leading figure in that effort. He and others in the group struggled with the idea of adding more projects to the LTER proposal. Harmon’s log study remained a centerpiece of the proposal, but they wanted to avoid tying their fate to any particular project, however long term. That concern led them to the decision to look at long-term site productivity as a possible addition that would begin late in LTER 2. The group was less clear on who should lead the project because it included many different disciplines. Harmon notes the confusion over leadership was compounded by a sense of overload on major projects. As one example, the group had an “endless debate” about a proposal Franklin termed “the Phoenix Project.” Franklin’s concept was to do something “big and bold and exciting,” and he came up with the idea of setting the torch to a patch of forest (about 100 acres) so the group could study the effects of a catastrophic fire in old growth. Despite some initial “prework” and lengthy discussions, Harmon observes, that “neat idea” never crystallized into a viable proposal because it was “a bit more complex than anybody could quite take on” and the group “could never get consensus on a central idea, theme, or anything.”\textsuperscript{44}

Eubanks added a jolt of managerial reality to the theoretical focus of the group as they pondered the idea of torching off a large area of old growth in the tense political atmosphere of the late 1980s. That proposal was one of the more dramatic examples of Eubanks’ dual role as enthusiastic participant in the group and as a seasoned Forest Service administrator. From his perspective, the idea was to simulate a natural disturbance regime. They would select a large patch of old growth, intensively monitor and document the site, and then deliberately set it on fire during the summer to simulate the same conditions that would lead to a natural fire.


\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Mark Harmon, 18.
Eubanks’ recollection of the proposal conveys a mixture of professional curiosity and pragmatic disbelief: “Now that was an interesting discussion because what we were talking about was going to be very complicated and very expensive. I mean, you don’t torch off a 70- or 80-acre … stand of old growth in the summer time without a lot of implications. You know, that is right during [the period of high] fire danger.” From a research perspective, however, a burn scheduled during the winter would not duplicate natural conditions, and it would not burn as hot as a summer fire with dry fuel. The study needed a high-intensity fire that would “crown out,” and that was simply not acceptable, from a management standpoint, during the summer period of high risk for fires elsewhere in the national forest. Despite the technical hurdles and potential for disastrous public relations, however, Eubanks seriously considered the proposal. District staff drew up a burn plan for a candidate area, and studied the implications relevant to that particular site, mapping out the potential for spot fires up to 2 miles away, among other concerns. The proposal ultimately died in the planning stages, but Eubanks considered the study meritorious from a management standpoint because “premonitoring” the site would have provided “more qualitative information” than relying only on postmonitoring an area burned in a wildfire. The proposal, however, simply failed the acid test of enthusiasm in the group: it lacked sustained sponsorship or sufficient interest in that community. When Franklin left for the University of Washington, the proposal lost its strongest proponent.45

The Phoenix proposal raised important leadership issues that demonstrated an emerging complexity and diffusion of authority within the Andrews group. Monumental projects took place in a political context that had to be factored into the decision process: Did the risks outweigh the potential science and management benefits? The Phoenix proposal was not without parallel. Scientists and forest managers at other sites had plans to initiate catastrophic fires to study the effects in various ecosystems, including the LTER research area near Fairbanks, Alaska. Swanson observes that the group also proposed broader science questions relevant to the proposed burn at the time they were considering the Phoenix idea: “Part of the context was [the] nuclear winter debate and what gases and particulates are emitted in a big fire and what are effects [in the] atmosphere.” Despite the scientific potential, however, Swanson questioned the wisdom of proceeding: “I felt it would put too many eggs in a risky basket, and it would be a stand-scale study (or

small watershed), and we needed to move on to a big landscape scale.” The issue opened an internal debate within the group over the need to initiate a landscape experiment. The group had planned such a study for the upper Blue River drainage in 1988, but sidelined that project when the study area was designated as a habitat conservation area for the northern spotted owl and, therefore, off-limits to manipulative experiments of this nature. The group nonetheless moved in the direction of a landscape study at a different site that eventually became the Augusta Landscape Plan. More than a decade later (January 1999), the group revisited the concept of a landscape experiment in an expanded version, including the same area planned for the 1988 study, that eventually became the Blue River Landscape Plan and Study.\textsuperscript{46}

The apparent lack of support for the Phoenix Project in the group seems paradoxical, given Franklin’s role in the conceptual development of the idea. The group, however, had already moved toward a more diffuse process of decision-making, and Franklin was no longer a dominant leader. That transition was partly a function of new personalities blending into the group, but it also demonstrated the evolving community culture at the Andrews in the era of the LTER. The Forest Service component of funding and other support remained critical to the survival and identity of the group, but LTER funding introduced an element of flexibility that subtly eroded previous lines of authority. People adapted, but they did so in ways that were often indirect or submerged beneath a frenzy of distracting detail and mushrooming responsibilities. The result was a vague, unarticulated sense that things were slightly off-balance. Fred Swanson officially took over from Franklin in 1986 as the PNW Station scientist in Corvallis responsible for leading Forest Service Research at the Andrews Forest, but the more informal lines of authority in the group could not be so summarily transferred. In addition to leadership concerns, an overload of responsibilities and a multitude of possibilities confronted the group. The leadership of grant-funded scientists like Harmon and Warren Cohen, for example, encouraged more carbon studies and landscape work, as opposed to the more “monumental experiments” Franklin tended to favor. As the group moved in other directions, Franklin concluded it was a good time for him to move on to other things, trusting Swanson to continue his legacy of Forest Service leadership at the Andrews.\textsuperscript{47}


\textsuperscript{47} Communication from Fred Swanson 2 January 1999; interview with Jerry Franklin, 21.
Amid the distractions of this transition in community culture, the failed Phoenix initiative simply dramatized chronic issues that also plagued the long-term site-productivity project. Rather than the lack of interest and excessive risk that ultimately scotched the Phoenix initiative, the long-term site productivity project suffered from too much input. It simply lacked focus. It was a “mish-mash” of so many good ideas that, Harmon concluded, “just was not coalescing.” The effort to secure NSF funding for the second round of the LTER, however, sharpened the group’s focus, and in the process of working through their difficulties, the new cohort of leaders clarified their thinking. It was really clear, they concluded, that they could not keep adding on new “mega-projects” when they were having “real problems” keeping their earlier blockbuster studies on track. Despite the crumbling vision of long-term productivity as a centerpiece project for the group, that initiative did yield a compendium volume in 1989 addressing long-term productivity issues relating to forest ecosystems in the Pacific Northwest. This publication solidified the group’s status as an obvious source for information about how to sustain forest production while protecting old-growth habitat. It was particularly important in the next decade, when the spotted owl issue placed a premium on ideas about how to reconcile these issues. The project, however, was a disappointment when compared to its potential to provide a central focus for the group’s divergent research. It came to an abrupt end when Perry suddenly declared the project over, after an expenditure of about $350,000. The Forest Service subsequently revived the project and relocated it to the Isolation Block on the Willamette National Forest south of the McKenzie River. Harmon, who cites Perry’s decision as personally disappointing, concludes, “They frankly did a much better job with it than we did. But it was a shame because when it started, it was a hot topic.”

The group learned an important lesson from its inability to continue the long-term site productivity initiative. The pressure to secure large blocks of funding spawned a tendency to think in blockbuster terms, but expanding the scale without refining the focus imperiled the viability of the project and risked other damage to the group. Human and financial resources were limited, and both were contingent on demonstrable successes. Young scientists could not be expected to sacrifice their careers on projects with no definable near-term output, and funding agencies could not be expected to keep the money flowing to programs from which results were not forthcoming. The site productivity study consumed many resources but

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68 D.A Perry, R. Meurisse, B. Thomas, [and others], eds., “Maintaining the Long-Term Productivity of Pacific Northwest Forest Ecosystems” (Portland, OR: Timber Press, 1989); interview with Mark Harmon, 18, 22.
the group had very little to show for the money they had invested. They spent about $30,000 a year to set up the tightly structured and narrowly focused log-decomposition study, but the long-term site productivity initiative consumed $70,000 per year for upwards of 5 years without clarifying its direction or even installing the study. The contrast was glaring, and Harmon concluded it was not only “risky,” but “we can’t afford it.”

External and internal pressures forced the group to invent new strategies during the 1980s, but they inherited a powerful legacy of research that blended detailed focus and creative flexibility. Their collaborative efforts contributed to an evolving set of ideas and strategies for understanding and managing forests and watersheds that began to bear fruit during that decade. Studies involving the group and the Andrews Forest, for example, were the basis for a 1988 publication that focused on coarse woody debris in the old-growth forests, streams, rivers, estuaries, and beaches of western Oregon. That publication included Franklin and Maser’s ruminations on future options for public lands in the region. They emphasized the need for a management philosophy built around the premise that biological diversity must be maintained if forest management is to attain multiple-use objectives. They also acknowledged that intensive forest management was intended to produce large quantities of wood fiber in the shortest time possible. They warned, however, that methods that reduced the complexity of biological systems might sacrifice the potential for long-term productivity in those systems. They noted that management strategies for such biological simplification could be “economically disadvantageous,” and they proposed an alternative forest management strategy to maintain long-term site productivity by promoting ecological diversity in the forest portion of the ecosystem.

The “diversified management” option that Franklin and Maser proposed reformulated the group’s 1981 concept of a forest in sustained transition, but their 1988 publication placed more emphasis on management options. They called for a strategy of temporal diversity, noting that intensive timber management typically aims to eliminate three successional stages: grass-forb, mature, and old-growth. They defined the mature stage as beginning at 80 to 100 years of age and persisting for about 100 years, and they argued old-growth conditions began emerging

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49 Interview with Mark Harmon, 18, 21.

between 175 to 200 years of age. The management strategy they proposed emphasized the contribution of a diversified forest to the “stability, diversity, and productivity of the tributary aquatic portion of the ecosystem.” The young, closed-canopy forest (less than 80 years) that intensive management strategies were designed to promote, they argued, is the “least diverse stage of succession” and, in that stage, the trees “mobilize all resources of the site.” They proposed mechanisms for delaying, or otherwise manipulating the timing of canopy closure to mimic patch conditions in other, “natural” successional stages. Perhaps most significantly, in the context of the recommendations of the Thomas proposal on spotted owls that followed 2 years after this publication, Franklin and Maser argued, in 1988, that mature and old-growth stands could be maintained by “reserving existing stands and creating new stands with long rotations.” It was both a call for action and a formula requiring ongoing studies: “Diversified management accommodates change and recognizes our limited knowledge of how forests function.” They emphasized the need for “maintaining options” with an eye toward ensuring long-term productivity.  

Franklin and Maser’s recommendations stood on the foundation of previous decades of work focusing on old growth and broader forest and watershed issues at the Andrews Forest. Their recommendations also set the tone for implementing old-growth and landscape studies and management priorities over the next decade. Other sections of From the Forest to the Sea emphasized particular mechanisms creating diversity in old-growth forests, including the importance of disturbance from falling trees. These events, they observed, create openings in the canopy and opportunities for new plants to become established; contribute organic matter and habitat for microorganisms, plants, fungi, and animals; release nutrients to forest soils; reduce erosion by forming barriers to downhill soil movement; and promote nitrogen fixation by bacteria living in the wood, in addition to nitrogen from other litter components such as leaves. Complex arrangement of fallen trees across the forest floor, some on the ground and others suspended at various heights, creates a complex matrix of shade, habitat, and cover, further promoting a diversity of microhabitats and associated species. Progressive decomposition of logs adds internal as well as external surface area, further enhancing the diversity and number

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“Diversified management accommodates change and recognizes our limited knowledge of how forests function.”

of microclimates. Old-growth trees in riparian zones provide dense vegetative canopies, contribute litter that delivers nutrients to the stream portion of the ecosystem, and eventually fall into streams and rivers, becoming large organic debris that supports productive habitats for salmonid and other fish by stabilizing other debris, anchoring pools, providing cover, and storing and releasing nutrients. Large, stabilized logs also protect riparian sites where alder and other species can become established. They promote vegetative growth that eventually stabilizes stream channels or restabilizes stream channels after floods. Woody debris in streams also provides habitat for algae and microbes consumed by insects, and it provides substrate for aquatic invertebrates. Gradual decomposition of logs in streams releases nutrients while providing habitat for nitrogen-fixing microorganisms. From the perspective of the Andrews group, this publication helped clarify where they had been, but they were less certain, heading into the 1990s, of exactly where they were going.

Stepping out of the Fire and Into the Frying Pan of the 1990s

Just as the Andrews group struggled to find a focus and to adapt to a significant transition of leadership and talent, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service clarified matters in the broader arena of forestry conflicts with its April 1989 proposal to list the northern spotted owl as a threatened species. Four federal agencies responsible for managing public lands in the owl’s range subsequently assembled an interagency task force to develop a “scientifically credible” conservation strategy for the northern spotted owl, and that group submitted its report in early 1990. That strategy defined a two-stage approach to the problem: first, protect existing old-growth habitat in amounts and distribution that would “adequately ensure the owl’s long-term survival” and second, seek ways to “produce and sustain suitable

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54 Thomas, Forsman, Lint, and others, A Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl, (the Interagency Scientific Committee, or ISC report), 51-57; Dietrich, The Final Forest, 72-85.
The scope of the plan extended from northern California to the Canadian border. It was a magnet for criticism. On the one hand, timber interests complained it was an unfair expansion of regulatory control beyond existing habitat conservation areas. Environmental groups, however, criticized the proposal as a sellout that would open previously protected old-growth habitat for future logging on the unproved premise that second-growth could be managed to mimic old-growth characteristics and thus provide suitable habitat for the owl. Both sides in the controversy questioned the proposal as a technocratic compromise that undervalued other concerns. Neither side, however, was willing to surrender the hallowed ground of scientific principle. Instead, the argument turned on whether science could be, or already had been sufficiently integrated into management strategies.

Implementing the interagency strategy would have required close coordination of management goals with state-of-the-art research relevant to old-growth forests. By 1990, when the Thomas report appeared, the Andrews group was not only modeling the concept of applied research on the Blue River District, they were working on a book-length synthesis of their efforts. The synthesis volume idea originated in the mid 1980s, and it continued through the end of the century. It had reached the stage of chapter assignments and an outline by the time Franklin began to prepare the group for a pulse planned for 8-16 June 1987 at Fraser Experimental Forest in Colorado. The book effort sputtered, however, and the group managed only a few, partial efforts before the end of the century. Eubanks wrote a publication describing the process of technology transfer at Blue River before he left in 1989, and Franklin issued his manifesto on New Forestry in a brief article that appeared that same year. Swanson and Franklin also teamed up on a 1992 article for *Ecological Applications* entitled “New forestry principles from ecosystem analysis of Pacific Northwest forests.”

The group directly addressed the conservation strategy for the spotted owl in an extended discussion at their April 1990 meeting. That discussion centered on

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the issue of “placing large tracts of partially clearcut land on a recovery path.” Only 15 people attended the meeting: Lynn Burditt, who had just replaced Steve Eubanks as district ranger at Blue River; Cynthia Orlando; Tom Spies; Bill McComb; Art McKee; Mark Harmon; Julia Jones; Jack Lattin; Dave Perry; Cindy McCain; Joe Beatty; George Lienkaemper; Bob Griffiths; Linda Ashkenas; and Fred Swanson. By comparison with the list of 36 prominent scientists Franklin had invited to a similar meeting 7 years earlier, this session attracted a relatively small number of long-term veterans mixed with more recent additions to the group. Together, they concluded the owl recovery plan was a “natural extension of landscape studies we are planning.” Provisions of the interagency proposal that attracted particular attention at the 1990 meeting included the strategy’s call for “testing of alternative silvicultural practices that may provide some owl habitat and some cutting for timber,” as well as other provisions for “creating more compositionally and structurally diverse stands in plantations previously destined for max[imum] Douglas-fir wood fiber production.” With those goals in mind, the Andrews group planned their strategy for the upcoming months: “We will be defining the landscape- and stand-level studies that arise from the owl report, keeping our eye on the ecosystem ball and not being distracted by the present owl-emphasis.”

The newly reconstituted Andrews group clearly perceived the owl crisis as an opportunity to refocus public attention on underlying ecosystem processes in old-growth forests. Working from Franklin’s dictum to “look for something big to do, and just do it,” the group also committed itself to ensuring that people did not abandon the forest for the big trees. The rising tide of public sentiment surrounding the owl issue was an opportunity for recommitment to community principles and action. It opened a window for promoting the Andrews vision in more public venues. The broader context of the old-growth dispute also led to overblown political rhetoric that seemed to invite a more public response from the scientific community. In response to rising concerns about the buildup of greenhouse gases and global warming, for example, Alaska Senator Frank Murkowski and others urged the Forest Service to press forward with a program of intensive clearcutting as a way to promote young forests that would allegedly store more carbon than old-growth forests. Ongoing research at the Andrews Forest, however, suggested that cutting old forests to make way for young stands would actually release more

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37 LTER/HJA Local Site Committee meeting minutes (6 April 1990).
carbon into the atmosphere. Harmon, Franklin, and Ferrell responded to the political opening with a February 1990 article in *Science*, directly challenging, with science, the argument that conversion of old-growth forests to young, fast-growing stands would decrease atmospheric carbon dioxide. On the contrary, they argued, it would take 200 years before regenerating stands would begin to approach the carbon-storage capacity of the previous old-growth stand. They also issued a press release summarizing the arguments presented in that paper. Harmon recalls, “Within days two things happened: The Forest Service disavowed any knowledge of this proposed [accelerated logging] program, and they were searching on a way to get me fired. But I didn’t work for them.” Secondly, he notes, Murkowski denied having made the claim. The *Science* article made the proposal a political orphan. The group had previously advised Congress through agency channels that the concept was mistaken, but in Harmon’s words, “they were not listening.” The *Science* article, however, attracted newspaper coverage, and helped avert the changes to Forest Service policy that Murkowski reportedly had wanted.

The carbon-storage example illustrates the group’s higher public profile in the 1990s. During that decade, people in the group learned the political value of their multiple lines of support. They could address complex and controversial issues in public forums with less concern for political backlash, provided they could back it up with good science. The group’s past success and increasingly public profile also attracted more favorable Congressional attention. Lawmakers from the Pacific Northwest scrambled to demonstrate their responsiveness to the concerns of constituents caught in the wrangle over old-growth forests in the region. The Andrews Forest happened to be located in the heart of the old-growth controversy in the western Oregon Cascades. More important, the group was already working with forest managers on the Blue River Ranger District to implement ecosystem management and riparian guidelines for maintaining stream ecosystems as a management strategy. These circumstances made the Andrews Forest a logical field venue for politicians seeking to learn about forest ecosystems and related concerns and to demonstrate their relevance and engagement with the old-growth issue.

The group enjoyed strong support from the Oregon delegation to Congress, particularly from Congressmen Les AuCoin and Peter DeFazio, as well as Senator Mark Hatfield. That support yielded tangible benefits in the early 1990s. AuCoin accompanied Congressman Chet Atkins, who chaired a House subcommittee overseeing the Forest Service budget, along with other committee members and staff, on a tour of the Andrews Forest in August 1989. During that visit, the group spotlighted its ongoing research at the Andrews Forest in areas relating to New Forestry, the spotted owl, landscape studies, and other issues. AuCoin returned for a second visit in April 1990. During that visit, he expressed shock at the living conditions scientists endured at the Andrews while pursuing world-class programs of research. AuCoin converted the affectionate nickname “Ghetto in the Meadow,” by which scientists referred to the headquarters site, into a powerful political metaphor that helped him win a major Congressional allocation to improve those facilities. The following June, the group learned he was preparing a $1,000,000 request to fund facilities improvements at the Andrews Forest headquarters site, including several bunkhouses, office and laboratory facilities, and a meeting room. On 30 June 1990, DeFazio accompanied Congressman Bruce Vento (D-Minn.) and five staffers to view research and forestry practices at the Andrews Forest and on the Blue River Ranger District. That tour emphasized demonstrations of the research-management partnership modeled there. In November 1990, people in the group learned from AuCoin’s office that the $1,000,000 for facilities improvement at the Andrews was appropriated in the FY1991 Forest Service budget. They proceeded
to organize a site development committee consisting of Art McKee, Jack Lattin, John Cissel, Stan Gregory, Dick Suwaya, and Fred Swanson. In addition to the new funds from the Congressional allocation, the Forest Service and the NSF provided ongoing support, notably including the NSF approval in 1990 for continuing the Andrews LTER from 1991 through 1996. The LTER renewal began at $500,000 for the first year, and scaled up to $600,000 by the last year of that period. Within a month after learning from AuCoin’s office that the $1 million allocation had been appropriated for FY1991, the Dean of the College of Forestry at Oregon State University also awarded the Andrews Ecosystem group the College of Forestry Dean’s Superior Achievement Award for 1990. The Congressional allocation provided a major boost for capital improvements at the Andrews Forest, but it also solidified the group’s standing with the three primary legs of its funding triad. Everyone loved a success story.

Conclusion

By the early 1990s, the Andrews group had clearly moved into a new era, with a refined mission and a reconstituted community that combined new faces and initiatives with continuing ideas and associates. The emphasis on characterizing old growth during the previous decade gave way to a more concerted effort to coordinate research and management in an adaptive strategy for promoting long-term productivity in old-growth forests. More broadly, the group emerged as a leading venue for developing ecosystem management guidelines for national forest lands. With this emerging prominence, they suddenly confronted the reality of unprecedented amounts of funding. That funding, however, came with higher expectations. Events largely beyond their control and away from the Andrews Forest buffeted the group, but they kept their focus on fundamental issues rooted in previous decades of research there. Old-growth forests continued as one central theme among many other continuing threads of collaborative research, and people in the group engaged new issues with more self-confidence. They adapted the principle of sustained transition that Maser and Franklin outlined in From the Forest to the Sea, and they applied it to their group, developing internal networks of informal authority and communicating their ideas to a broader, public audience.

Chapter Seven: Mainstreaming the Andrews and Transforming the Mainstream

The Andrews group focused on fundamental, underlying ecosystem processes during the old-growth debates of the 1990s and promoted that outlook in public forums. People in the group tried, however, to make their studies more directly relevant to the public debate over management priorities. By the late 1990s, that outlook helped make the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest), and the group associated with it, a model for how the Forest Service and other agencies might better integrate management and research activities on public lands. The group constantly reinvented itself throughout the decade, and people in that community considered that pattern of sustained innovation one reason for their continued success. Unconsciously mimicking the dynamic nature of the ecosystems in which they worked, these people struggled to reconcile the dynamic structure and ideas of the Andrews Forest and group with the constantly evolving priorities of public agencies and their policy mandates.

Major personnel changes forced the Andrews group to adapt and examine more closely the ways in which scientists and managers collaborated on the Blue River Ranger District during the 1990s. In many cases, the people who filled in for departing veterans had less personal experience at the Andrews Forest. The sudden infusion of funds for new buildings and other infrastructure improvements at the Andrews transformed the place into a more permanent, more urbanized setting that helped recruit cooperators but also altered their initial perceptions of the experimental forest. Even Dyrness, who returned to the Andrews group early in the 1990s after nearly two decades in Alaska, was surprised to discover that modern facilities at the headquarters site had transformed it into a prominent center for community interaction, including volleyball games and other recreational activities.¹

The new cohort of researchers who joined the group on soft-money appointments during the 1990s supported a smaller core of people who continued in leadership roles with more secure funding. By comparison with previous decades, more people in the group were younger, with less secure tenure. The new buildings, infrastructure, and community activities at the headquarters site provided a sense of permanence for this increasingly impermanent community. The group still emphasized continuity with earlier efforts, but fewer people in the group had

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firsthand experience in that previous work. At the same time, the group attracted people from a broader array of backgrounds. More scientists joined the group while working as employees of other, cooperating agencies, although the more senior members of the group were more often Forest Service employees who tended to stay with that agency for most of their careers. Those who came to the group from the university community at Corvallis, by contrast, more commonly were undergraduate or graduate students, or people just beginning their postgraduate careers. These more recently trained recruits contributed newly honed skills in specialized fields to a group led by seasoned professionals. In the late 1990s, Swanson characterized the resulting makeup of the group as “bi-modal, with a few senior people, and a lot of really young [folks].”

The Andrews group styled itself as a self-selecting community with a cooperative ethic, but it struggled to articulate a consistent vision for the 1990s. The group’s self-image contrasted sharply with the more hierarchical structures and bureaucratic traditions of the various state and federal agencies that supported its work. Before the Andrews model of adaptive management could be implemented in even one of those agencies, either the agency—or the model—had to change. The group’s cooperative ethic originated with a set of virtually unexamined, shared assumptions about historical origins of the Andrews community, and its successful engagement with the Willamette National Forest rested on a similarly unexamined foundation. People in the group spent much of the 1990s trying to explain the Andrews model to people unfamiliar with the history of how that collaborative community came to be. In the process, they began to examine more closely and critically the way they functioned as a group.

One of the more important ways in which the Andrews model changed during the 1990s involved members of the group who gravitated toward regional issues that absorbed energy and diverted them from day-to-day activities at the experimental forest. Leaders of the group participated in efforts to integrate landscape and regional perspectives into management plans and policies at regional, national, and international scales, notably including the Northwest Forest Plan of 1996. Swanson, for example, identified the watershed analysis component of the Northwest Forest Plan as “a medium for carrying some of that landscape thinking to the land manager.” The concept, he noted, “came out of academic circles, merged with Forest Service experience, and … then moved on into policy, and [then it] comes ripping back out to management.” Scientists affiliated with the group were

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2 Interview with small watersheds group, 21-22.
also featured contributors to a major 1997 synthesis of the scientific principles underpinning ecosystem management. As a group, they tried to encourage a cooperative linkage of ecosystems research with forest management policy.

Personal and Community Pathways to the Cooperative Ethic of Adaptive Management

Scientists affiliated with the Andrews group during the 1990s looked beyond old-growth forests to promote habitat restoration across a broad mosaic of ecosystems in the Pacific Northwest. The stream team, for example, continued studies rooted in their previous efforts at the Andrews Forest, but their research also focused on densely populated and intensively managed areas adjoining other major streams and rivers. They grappled with research questions that included social and

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economic components as well as ecological concepts. As urban growth led to increased demands on natural resources and added pressure for updated land use guidelines, the group explored whether ideas developed on the Andrews Forest could be applied on agricultural, urban, or other landscapes altered by human use. The question included both science and policy issues. At one level, scientists explored how to “restore” riparian areas where urban growth impinged on those ecosystems. At another, the growing number of people changed the political context in which management decisions were made. Policymakers balanced scientific concepts of land use planning against the competing priorities of a growing population, and people in the group were uncertain what roles they could play in that process.

The Andrews Forest is remote from regional centers of urban growth, but people joined the group during the 1990s for reasons similar to those attracting other immigrants to the Pacific Northwest. The place had a reputation, deserved or not, of providing opportunities for individual success. Scientific productivity was one measure of success, but prominent, continuing access to funding was a measure of opportunity. Both scientific productivity and access to funding were obvious attributes of the Andrews group by the early 1990s. Julia Jones, who joined the Andrews group in 1991 after extensive work in north and east Africa and after leaving an appointment on the faculty of the University of California at Santa Barbara, was particularly struck by the availability of funding through the Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) program that dwarfed programs with which she was previously associated. While working in Africa, she learned of the group’s involvement with the LTER program, and considered them “rich researchers.” As a result, she had “ambivalent feelings about LTERs.” They were “so much better off” in terms of funding and staffing that she didn’t see what she could offer by way of making a “contribution,” nor did she ever see it as something that she “would have wanted to do.” When she relocated to the Pacific Northwest for family reasons, however, she was naturally drawn to the group, the body of work they had accumulated, and the opportunity for funded research that she discovered in that community. She perceived and exploited the long-term streamflow records from monitoring efforts at the Andrews Forest as an underdeveloped resource, and she earned a niche in the group by applying her skills to those data.

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4 Interview with riparian group, 28.
5 Interview with Julia Jones, 27 October 1997, by Max Geier at Jones’ home in Corvallis, as transcribed by Keesje Hoekstra, 6.
The reputation of the place attracted more people who arrived with only vague notions of what the Andrews Forest had to offer or whether the site was even relevant to their research interests. Preconceptions shaded initial perceptions of the place, and the process of selecting a site for scientific research was personal and social, as well as professional and scientific. Long-term associates of the group were somewhat bemused when people came to the Andrews Forest with a set of expectations for what they needed to do their research, but with little knowledge of whether the place suited those needs. They were drawn to the group for reasons less related to site characteristics on the Andrews Forest than with their own preconceptions about the place. The group then helped them adapt their ideas to the real conditions they encountered in the Pacific Northwest, on and beyond the Andrews Forest.

The social process of selecting a site for scientific research brought people together in ways that forged personal bonds and contributed to the potential success of a project. Stream team collaborators Norm Anderson, Stan Gregory, and Linda Ashkenas, for example, had a memorable time simply picking out a site for studying old-growth, clearcuts, and regrowth in relation to riparian concerns on Grasshopper Creek. That and similar social experiences with other people on field projects, Gregory remembers, “make it enjoyable and worthwhile.” People in the group sustained their community with shared, social experiences at field sites that they recalled as adventurous outings. In one case, Gregory and Chuck Hawkins rode into the Grasshopper Creek drainage on a snowmobile to check potential study sites during the winter. The snowmobile wasn’t big enough to carry both of them and their gear, so Gregory and Hawkins took turns towing each other on skis behind the machine. As they roared across the flats, Gregory bounced through a big hole with the snowmachine. When Hawkins hit the same hole on his skies, he “springboarded up about 15 feet in the air straight over a hill and crashed.” Linda Ashkenas recalls that Gregory and Hawkins later “replicated” that experience while driving in a car with her during field work on Mount St. Helens. She remembers Gregory had his mouth full of mandarin orange slices as Hawkins drove “much too fast down a road.” Gregory saw a hole coming up, but his mouth was full of mandarin oranges, “so he just went, whoo, whoo, whoo.” [laughter] Chuck and I looked at him like ‘What is going on?’ and then we hit the hole.” Gregory later

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6 Interview with riparian group, 1-2, 20.
explained, "‘whoo, whoo, whoo,’ ... means to stand on the top [in] Oregon. [laughter] It is those experiences that actually keep us all in it. That is what makes it enjoyable."\(^7\)

Social interaction—and the ability to laugh about it later—was also a critical element of the adaptive management philosophy on the Blue River Ranger District by the 1990s. Eubanks tried to keep people “actively involved” and communicating with each other about their activities on the Andrews Forest. He worked to facilitate and mediate human interaction by identifying people with negative attitudes and encouraging them to talk about it. He also tried to keep as many people on the district involved with as many of the scientists at the Andrews Forest as possible.\(^8\)

\(^7\) Interview with riparian group, 21.
\(^8\) Interview with Steve Eubanks, 19.
A new cohort of scientists and managers during the early 1990s tested the group’s ability to sustain a community built on shared experience and informal opportunities for social bonding. The proliferation of programs with links to the Andrews Forest during this period forced the group to devise a more systematic strategy for maintaining a sociable spirit of community. In this era of transition, a few long-term associates, including Swanson, Gregory, Lattin, Levno, and McKee, assumed more prominent roles, but more recent recruits also shouldered much of the burden. Biometrician Susan Stafford, ecologists Linda Ashkenas and Mark Harmon, entomologists Andy Moldenke and Tim Schowalter, and hydrologist Gordon Grant all joined the group and assumed more prominent roles. These names are just a few examples that illustrate this generational transition in leadership and involvement. They identify the people most commonly mentioned by those interviewed for this study. Many other people, however, also attended the monthly meetings of the LTER/HJA Local Site Committee or participated in research that resulted in publications linked with the group.9

The core group of people who had already embraced the collaborative spirit of the group helped a new cohort of scientists, managers, and administrators adapt to the reality of the Andrews Forest. Within 3 years, beginning in 1989, John Cissel, Lynn Burditt, Julia Jones, Gabriel Tucker, and Bob Griffiths all became closely affiliated with the core group as research scientists or forest managers, and George Brown succeeded Carl Stoltenberg as Dean of the College of Forestry at Oregon State University (OSU) in 1990. These six people followed career paths that converged at the Andrews Forest in the last decade of the 20th century. Brown, who had worked at the Andrews early in his career, digging soil pits during the International Biological Programme (IBP) era, brought a personal affinity for the place to his role as an administrator at the university most closely associated with that place. All six people followed career paths to the Andrews common to many of their predecessors in the group. All of them made apparently serendipitous decisions that eventually led them to the Andrews Forest, and several of them returned there in the 1990s to renew an involvement begun earlier in their academic careers. Taken in context, however, something more than chance guided them in this direction. One characteristic all of these people share is a place of origin not in

the Pacific Northwest. They were recent migrants in a region of immigrants. This contrasts with many people prominent in earlier cohorts of leadership at the Andrews Forest, including Silen, Franklin, Levno, Sedell, and Eubanks, whose experience in the Pacific Northwest began when they were children. This 1990s cohort, however, consists of people who grew up in the northeastern and south-central regions of the United States. Their most obvious, shared characteristic is frequent geographic mobility in a closely interwoven network of research institutions and professional associations that converge in the Pacific Northwest at the Andrews Forest. They are not a scientific sample, but they are examples of people closely associated with the Andrews Forest, in terms of their personal identification with that group, regular participation in group meetings during 1996-98, or frequent referral by other members of the group interviewed for this study. In a period when regular attendance at monthly LTER/HJA Local Site Committee
meetings averaged barely 20 people, these six researchers and forest managers figured prominently in that forum.

**Management Transitions and Institutionalized Innovations at Blue River Ranger District**

The district ranger in Blue River was a crucial link in the administrative framework linking research at the Andrews Forest to policy on the Willamette National Forest. Lynn Burditt, who took over that assignment in 1989, worked with the group to structure an institutional foundation for their collaborative efforts that would go beyond the personal rapport and enthusiasm that Eubanks had offered. Burditt also brought a stronger, national perspective to the position. As district ranger, she argued that management initiatives at the Blue River District and the Andrews Forest should be relevant to and compliant with institutional goals in ways that could be clearly articulated. Unlike Eubanks, her prior involvement with the group was negligible. Her pathway into the group, however, was a composite of institutional affiliations, academic preparation, and field experience common to other people at the forefront of applied research at the Andrews Forest.

Burditt was born in Kentucky but grew up in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and lived in 17 different states as a young woman. Life in Oak Ridge is an experience many of her associates at the Andrews Forest also shared. Sollins, Gregory, and Harmon, for example, all had professional and academic connections with scientists at Oak Ridge that influenced their career decisions. Burditt, however, was the only person in the group who actually grew up there. From that experience, she gained an appreciation, later in life, for the way in which a bureaucratic agency could influence what people considered “normal.” At Oak Ridge, she lived with the inescapable presence of Oak Ridge National Laboratories and she saw how that nuclear research and production facility influenced the local community. In one respect,

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1 Interview with John Cissel by Max Geier on 7 November 1997 in Logan Norris’ office at the FSL, in Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Jeff Prater and Keesje Hoekstra, 1; interview with Lynn Burditt by Max Geier on 3 October 1997 in Geier’s office at the FSL, in Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Brooke Warren, 9; interview with Julia Jones, 1-2; interview with Gabe Tucker by Max Geier on 19 August 1997 in Geier’s office at the FSL, in Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Elizabeth Foster and Keesje Hoekstra, 1; interview with Bob Griffiths by Max Geier on 6 November 1997 in Griffiths’ office at the FSL, in Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Andy Coleman and Keesje Hoekstra, 1-2; interview with Sherri Johnson by Max Geier on 24 November 1997 in Johnson’s office at the FSL, in Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Lisa Fleming and Keesje Hoekstra, 1-3; interview with George Brown by Max Geier on 19 September 1997 at Brown’s office in Peavy Hall, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Brooke Warren and Nicole Duncum, 1-2, 12.
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, resembled Blue River, Oregon: it was a place where relatively poor people with rural outlooks went about their lives while scientists with doctoral degrees lived in a separate world in the same place. Her father worked for the Navy in a high-security area at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Burditt had no idea what her father did in that facility. At the time, she thought it was normal to work in a place where workers could not talk to their own families about their jobs.\footnote{Interview with Lynn Burditt, 3-4.} A strict hierarchy separated insiders from everyone else, and Burditt learned how those barriers interfered with human interaction. Later, she discovered other models for communicating in federal agencies

Oak Ridge schools pressured students to consider careers in science and engineering, and Burditt followed that advice. She studied at the Syracuse College of Environmental Sciences and Forestry before transferring to Iowa State University, where she graduated in the mid 1970s with a degree in Forest Management, Outdoor Recreation, and Resource Management. One of her professors at Iowa State was John Gordon, who later chaired the Forest Science department at OSU and mentored many of his colleagues into work on the Andrews Forest before moving on to become Dean of Forestry at Yale.\footnote{Interview with Lynn Burditt, 4.} Growing up, like Gregory, in the vicinity of the Great Smokey Mountains, Burditt’s initial goal was a career with the National Park Service. Federal jobs were scarce in the mid 1970s, however, and Burditt did geomagnetic surveys for an aerial survey company in Houston, Texas, until she finally secured a position with the Clearwater National Forest in Moscow, Idaho, in 1977. Two years later, the Clearwater National Forest sent her to OSU for a technical training program in forest engineering.\footnote{Interview with Lynn Burditt, 1.}

Burditt gained national exposure and career mobility during and after that Corvallis-based technical training program, which included field trips to the Andrews Forest for a course in stream ecology. At the time, the group was absorbed in the effort to secure its first LTER grant with an emphasis on research with an applied purpose. Ecological research was gaining national support, and the technical training program introduced Burditt to a broad range of management practices in different sectors of the Forest Service. Participants in the program worked on projects for several different national forests during the summer. Burditt drew assignments in North Carolina and Virginia, as well as more local stints with the Mount Hood National Forest, where Eubanks was also employed, and at the

\footnote{Interview with Lynn Burditt, 3-4.} \footnote{Interview with Lynn Burditt, 4.} \footnote{Interview with Lynn Burditt, 1.}
Shasta/Trinity National Forest in California. Her involvement in the training program also helped Burditt secure a place on a Forest Service detail to Mount St. Helens to work on the volcano recovery project in May 1981. From there, she moved on to an assignment with the Flathead National Forest in Montana, where she served a couple of years as the Forest Logging Engineer. For much of the 1980s, she served as a management assistant responsible for planning, presale and layout, timber sale administration, and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act. She discovered that the Flathead National Forest was a “pretty controversial place,” with hot-button management issues involving grizzly bear, bull trout, and scenic
resources. With that experience, she earned promotion to district ranger in Whitefish, Montana, in 1987, serving in that capacity until 1989, when Kerrick hired her to replace Steve Eubanks as District Ranger at Blue River.\textsuperscript{14}

Kerrick hired Burditt just a year before he retired from the Forest Service, and he expected her to build on the cooperative relations Eubanks had established with researchers at the Andrews Forest. He also expected her to change the tone of that program. Burditt had more extensive, wide-ranging experience in national forests in the Western United States than Eubanks. She was also well seasoned in public relations, having survived close, critical scrutiny as one of a handful of women who worked their way into the mostly male profession of district rangers during the 1980s. She had a solid reputation as a careful, fair-minded, and seasoned administrator. Kerrick didn’t think she would be as “gung-ho” as Eubanks, but he expected her to be “more effective” in adapting to the changing political climate while implementing adaptive management areas and managing the “flow of information between researchers and management.” He found her to be “more cautious” than Eubanks, who took actions about which, Kerrick “felt a little nervous,” even though he didn’t want to discourage similar efforts. For her part, Burditt accepted the position primarily because she was impressed with Kerrick and his support for building on the partnership between the Blue River Ranger District and the Andrews group.\textsuperscript{15}

Burditt made an immediate contribution, working with Swanson, McKee, and Kerrick, to define and implement a research liaison position at Blue River, transforming a position that previously emphasized silviculture to one that addressed broader issues of landscape planning and management. Kerrick argued the Willamette National Forest could be a leader in ecosystem management, and toward that end, he agreed to fund the newly defined research liaison position from his national forest budget. The person who filled the position would work as a “transfer agent,” to help “move information” from managers to researchers and from researchers to managers.\textsuperscript{16} The immediacy of the owl issue and the public scrutiny that accompanied the injunction that halted logging in old growth in those years made the idea of a research liaison particularly inviting to forest managers on the Willamette National Forest. At the Blue River Ranger District, in particular, the staff faced a steady flow of visitors interested in old growth and related issues. In

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Lynn Burditt, 3.

\textsuperscript{15} Interview with Lynn Burditt, 4-5, 7-8; interview with Mike Kerrick, 18-19.

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Mike Kerrick, 18-19.
Burditt’s first year at Blue River, visitors from various political groups, international organizations, and media outlets swarmed over the Andrews Forest and the surrounding district in search of information and ideas. Among other innovations, Burditt developed a tracking system to keep tabs on everyone who visited the Andrews and the surrounding district. The system, she argued, was an effort to exploit an opportunity, not a reaction to concerns about security at the site. The Andrews Forest attracted people who took ideas from that place to apply elsewhere. Those people, therefore, were a potential network for disseminating ideas and information from the Andrews group to others who might put those ideas into practice. Burditt’s tracking system simply documented and systematized the informal networks that already linked the Andrews group with scientists and forest managers at other sites.

Burditt favored the proposal to shift the emphasis to a landscape planning and management research liaison at the Blue River Ranger District as a strategy for managing the challenge of public scrutiny and media attention at the Andrews Forest. As a native of Oak Ridge, Burditt was no stranger to living and working with leading scientists and intellectuals, but she later recalled a sense of being at the center of something momentous in her role at Blue River. She described the setting in almost mystical terms: One day, as she walked through Reference Stand 2 with some visiting VIPs accompanying a work party on their way to open a trail through that site, they encountered Jerry Franklin walking up the hill, and “… the sun shone through just at the right moment [and shone on him], you know, it was like … the mountain had come to talk.” The ranger district was on a fast track to national prominence, and a series of reporters visited and featured the place in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Seattle Times, Discovery Magazine, and on public television. Burditt neither expected nor wanted a high-profile position, but it was an unavoidable part of her job at Blue River. She took over from Eubanks just as concerns about old growth and the northern spotted owl peaked, and by that time, he had already established the district’s reputation as a place for people who wanted to learn how to apply scientific theories about riparian reserves, riparian management areas, green tree retention, and woody debris.

The concept of a research liaison working with national forest staff and Andrews Forest scientists evolved from an earlier initiative to establish a silviculturist assigned to the Andrews Forest and funded through the national forest. That

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17 Interview with Lynn Burditt, 9.
18 Interview with Lynn Burditt, 10.
initiative built from the premise that, given the previous rate of harvest activity at the Andrews Forest, the district needed to develop a long-term plan for managing silviculture of the Douglas-fir plantations that early cutting created on that drainage. Vince Pulao, who worked as the silviculturist at Blue River several years before Burditt became district ranger, resigned just a few weeks after she arrived and took a new assignment in the Eugene office of the Willamette National Forest. As they planned the search for Pulao’s replacement, Burditt and other leaders in the group were also beginning to explore the concept of a Blue River landscape study. The study called for an aggregate of clustered cutting units, rather than the more usual practice of dispersing them across the landscape. They wanted to implement that concept on the Blue River Ranger District so they could study the consequences of the aggregated (as opposed to dispersed) cutting plan at a landscape scale. They realized the research questions the group was exploring could not be adequately addressed without moving outside the Andrews Forest to areas where substantial logging was anticipated and on a scale larger than the experimental forest could accommodate. As Burditt considered how to implement the idea, she realized the position description for the Andrews silviculturist did not adequately describe the skills needed to manage the proposed landscape study.19

Once they realized the demands of the job had outgrown the standards expected of a silviculture specialist, District Ranger Burditt worked with Andrews site director McKee (an employee of OSU) and Pacific Northwest (PNW) Research Station scientist Swanson to draft a new position description for a “research liaison.” The person in that position would primarily be responsible for installing the Blue River landscape study. The new position description defined a wide range of roles in broad terms, and it included an upgrade from GS-11 to a GS-12 on the federal scale of job classifications. McKee, Swanson, Burditt, and Rolf Anderson, the lead planning officer with the Willamette National Forest supervisor’s office, then sat down to select a candidate for the job. The person they chose was John Cissel, who stood out from other applicants for his experience in forest planning and modeling and for his demonstrated interest in ecological research.20

19 Interview with Lynn Burditt, 10-11.
20 Interview with Lynn Burditt, 10-11.
Facilitating Collaboration With a Foot in Both Worlds and a Home in Neither

Cissel stands out from his colleagues in the Andrews group as someone who was recruited specifically because of the existing collaboration between researchers and managers. Others were recruited or drawn to the group because of their clear interest in collaborative research or because of their demonstrated ability to cooperate effectively with researchers and managers. Cissel, however, was hired to fill a position designed to institutionalize that collaborative spirit and to serve as a catalyst for moving beyond that initial beachhead. In that role, he had few benchmarks or guides, and no real peers in the Willamette National Forest or even in the Pacific Northwest Region (Region 6). He didn’t know anyone in the agency with a similar position.21

Cissel had only a vague understanding of his responsibilities as the Willamette National Forest’s research liaison with the Andrews Forest. He had an even vaguer sense of his subsequent career path or the standards by which he would be evaluated. The job appealed to him because it offered the otherwise unlikely opportunity to develop his own research interests in the management branch of the Forest.

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21 Interview with John Cissel, 3.
Sidebar 7.1: Managing Forest Landscapes

The Issue: Early approaches to managing forests focused on managing individual forest stands, and landscape considerations were rudimentary and secondary, at best. As issues of protecting biological diversity and watershed values have increased in stature and complexity, greater emphasis has been placed on design of landscape patterns. This emphasis has led to exploring alternative landscape management systems, including systems based in part on the historical disturbance regime. The premise of this approach is that native species were sustained, historically, under a range of ecosystem conditions and disturbance events, so maintaining the ecosystem within that range of conditions may be a useful first step in planning future management to sustain those species.

The Roots: In the period 1950 to 1990, federal forest land managers in the Pacific Northwest used a harvest system of clearcut patches dispersed across the landscape. By the 1980s, questions were raised about the fragmented landscape pattern created by this approach and its ability to sustain species that favored interior forest habitat. Alternative forest landscape management systems were put forth—aggregated cutting patches to reduce the fragmentation effects, a system emphasizing reserves to protect species, and the use of historical disturbance patterns as a general template for setting cutting frequency and extent. In sum, management and policy issues have raised questions about how landscapes function; however, the science of landscape ecology has had difficulty providing answers.

Alternative forest landscape management plans for the Blue River watershed outside the Andrews Forest (labeled HJA above). The Landscape Plan (left) is based in part on the historical wildfire regime, with cutting frequency ranging from 100 years (Landscape Area 1) to 260 years (area 3). The Interim Plan (right) is based on the Northwest Forest Plan (USDA and USDI 1994) and has extensive riparian reserves and an 80-year cutting rotation in matrix areas. Adapted from Cissel et al. (1999).

The Approach: In the 1980s, issues concerning management of forest landscapes were addressed with simple observation, modeling of pattern development, and interpretation of possible ecological consequences (Franklin and Forman 1987, Harris 1984, Spies et al. 1994). More sophisticated simulation modeling addressed pattern development and effects on habitat and the resistance of landscape pattern to change (Li et al. 1993; Wallin et al. 1994, 1996). A subsequent generation of simulation models was used to examine a broader range of landscape management approaches and their consequences in terms of hydrologic features, biodiversity, and carbon dynamics (Swanson et al. 2003). A critical step in learning about landscape management has been to develop and implement a plan to manage a real landscape—the Blue River Landscape Management Plan and administrative study carried out with an adaptive management approach (Cissel et al. 1999). This effort links the concept of managing landscapes in the context of historical disturbance regimes with actual on-the-ground management.

Results: The issue of how to manage forest landscape patterns created by cutting has had profound and still-emerging effects on science and management. Land management policy is struggling to find approaches that meet the very diverse management objectives for public forest lands—to protect biodiversity, yield wood products, sustain water quality and flows, manage fire risk, sequester carbon, and accomplish other objectives. The approach embodied in the Blue River Landscape Management Plan may be a harbinger of future approaches.
Service. The Blue River position was unique because it assigned someone stationed on a ranger district responsibility for coordinating, implementing, and monitoring research, and for educating other people about those efforts. Burditt also encouraged Cissel to develop his own research agenda. That was an unusual opportunity for a position in a district, and Cissel’s rank (GS-12) was also unusually high for a district, where people more typically were responsible for laying out trails, preparing timber sales, or managing wildlife. Since the people who hired him seemed uncertain about how to define his job, Cissel could shape it to suit his interests. Even his title was uncertain. Swanson tended to call him a research liaison, but Cissel called himself a research coordinator. His job classification listed him as an ecologist. He had never worked in that field, but he did hold graduate degrees in forestry and operations research, and he included ecology and ecosystem modeling among his fields of academic preparation.\textsuperscript{22}

The man hired as research liaison personified both the institutional structure that linked science with management at the Andrews Forest and the group’s hopes for ecosystem management. The position, like the Andrews itself, was subject to the joint oversight of the Willamette National Forest, PNW Station, and OSU. The group, paradoxically, attempted to institutionalize its interagency framework with a position that largely depended on the personality and abilities of the person they hired. It was an uneasy pairing of personal and political responsibility with limited authority. That combination was not necessarily an attractive opportunity for someone schooled in the hierarchical traditions of the Forest Service. At the time the position at Blue River opened, however, Cissel was at a point in his career where the administrative distinction between the research and management branches of the Forest Service threatened to divorce his personal and professional goals. The research liaison position allowed him to forestall that split while advancing his career. It made him an employee of the Willamette National Forest, but he reported to a board of directors: one from PNW, one from OSU, and one from the Willamette National Forest. Swanson, Burditt, and McKee gave him broad direction at quarterly meetings of the board. The national forest issued his paycheck, but he considered himself an employee of the group that directed his work, and together, they tried to determine “collective priorities.”\textsuperscript{23}

The career path that brought Cissel to this new position was unique but not remote from others in the group. He grew up on a dairy farm in Montgomery

\textsuperscript{22} Interview with John Cissel, 3.

\textsuperscript{23} Interview with John Cissel, 1, 5.
County, Maryland, until it was swallowed up by the urban growth of metropolitan Washington, DC. His academic career touched down at several universities where Sedell and Swanson had contacts. He attended the State University of New York and Michigan State University, where he completed a BS degree in forestry. Like Eubanks, his choice of major was driven by a vague interest in forestry and hopes for employment in that field. He followed up the undergraduate degree with graduate studies at Pennsylvania State University, where he specialized in forest planning and operations research, with an emphasis on systems modeling and research forests. During his graduate years, Cissel also worked for a few summers in northern Idaho. That experience revived images of the old-growth forests in the Cascade Mountains and Olympic Peninsula that he gleaned from *National Geographic* in earlier years—pictures of “hugely productive and lush forests and snow-covered mountains.” Thereafter, he began exploring opportunities for employment in the Pacific Northwest. After graduate school, however, he worked for the Allegheny National Forest, working with other staff to develop a prototype forest plan. He hoped to translate that experience into a position in the Pacific Northwest because he simply realized that “this was the region where I wanted to come.”

The personal and the political converged for Cissel during his early career in the Forest Service, and that convergence eventually led him to the Andrews group. He worked during the early 1980s as an operations research analyst working on the forest plan for the Richmond National Forest until 1985, when he took a summer position with the Willamette National Forest. In that period of transition for forestry practices in the Pacific Northwest, Cissel found “a lot of opportunity” and “lots of things happening” in his new position. He led a team of people assigned to explore possibilities for a research plan for the Willamette National Forest. His team classified—from a landscape point of view—ecological functions of old-growth forests and translated that information into landscape-level priorities to help managers decide whether, when, and where to cut. Cissel first encountered the Andrews group at a meeting where he presented his work with the Willamette National Forest. As he presented his team’s ideas, Cissel ran into Swanson and McKee, who suggested some additional scenarios Cissel’s group might try. When his team followed up on that suggestion, Cissel “felt it was cool and we enjoyed working with it.” It was the beginning of his collaborative work with the group.

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24 Interview with John Cissel, 1.
25 Interview with John Cissel, 2.
Cissel staked an early claim to the vaguely defined middle ground between the research and management wings of the Andrews group. That professional stance, he argues, left him somewhat apart from both wings: “I have to operate in both cultures and make the connections. … lots of folks up here [at the Corvallis FSL] tend to see me as a down-to-earth, pragmatic, get-it-done kind of person because that’s the role I have to play a lot of times. But, … the [Blue River Ranger] District, lots of times, sees me as this airy research person coming in [with] ideas and concepts and not real connected with how you get stuff done. That’s the role I play—to try to bring both sides a little closer together with what’s reality here.”

Adaptive Planning and Collaborative Initiatives on the Willamette National Forest

The group’s efforts to bridge the gap between research and policy strained the limits of the Andrews Forest as an institutional base for their work, especially as they moved from relative obscurity into the public eye. During the early 1990s, the group established the Cascade Center for Ecosystem Management to more clearly define their research-management partnership, which conducted applied studies, and to communicate their findings to a broader, public audience. One important venue for communicating the group’s ideas involved taking visitors on tours of the Andrews Forest and neighboring national forest land. These tours typically began early in the morning at a field site where members of the group presented findings from basic research on streams and long-term studies, such as the 200-year log decomposition study site. After a midday break, the discussion continued at sites on the Blue River Ranger District where the staff showed visitors how they implemented concepts from research presented earlier in the day. These tours, however, sometimes generated questions that could not be answered with field demonstrations on the small piece of real estate that included the Blue River Ranger District and the Andrews Forest. The group wanted to explore landscape management approaches at a larger scale and on other forests.

The group’s strategy for testing their model beyond the Andrews largely depended on the Research Liaison at Blue River. Swanson, McKee, and Burditt all worked on landscape projects at the Andrews Forest, and the group was looking for a new, integrative focus for research there. These concerns influenced the group’s plans for the Cascade Center for Ecosystems Management in 1991. Cissel,

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26 Interview with John Cissel, 10.
27 Interview with Lynn Burditt, 14.
meanwhile, needed to secure his status with the Willamette National Forest in a position that was only vaguely defined and therefore potentially vulnerable in times of budgetary reductions. The group’s initial plans called for the Research Liaison to install a forest fragmentation study in Blue River, but that idea ran afoul of the recovery plan for the spotted owl. The supercharged politics of the spotted owl issue directly blocked efforts to implement the landscape project when interim directives put the Blue River watershed within a habitat conservation area (HCA), where the recovery plan prohibited manipulative activities. The landscape project that Cissel was supposed to install would have called for timber harvests in aggregated and dispersed clearcuts, but the HCA designation prohibited that activity.

The HCA also threatened the group’s other programs because a cartographic error mistakenly included half of the Andrews Forest in its boundaries. McKee immediately filed a protest, and with Kerrick’s support, appealed to the Regional Forester to change the boundary of the HCA to exclude the Andrews Forest. Pending that appeal, the western half of the Andrews Forest was off limits to any manipulations whatsoever for about 2 years. The area intended for the forest fragmentation study in Blue River, however, appeared to be permanently off limits.28

Habitat conservation areas were intended to protect the old-growth habitat and migration corridors necessary to sustain a viable, breeding population of northern spotted owls, but this particular HCA blocked a landscape study that the group hoped, among other things, would help federal agencies manage more effectively for old-growth conditions. The Interagency Scientific Committee followed a detailed process governing the selection of HCA areas that provided venues for public hearings,29 but its designation of an HCA that excluded much of the Blue River watershed from manipulative management knocked the group off its stride. It also eroded the premise for funding Cissel’s position through the Willamette National Forest. Cissel had to “start from scratch” to build a program that supplied a purpose for his position. Kerrick asked him, “Now what you going to do? Is there gonna be any workload for you?” In retrospect, Cissel views that as “a laughable kind of question.” At the time, however, he felt the pressure to “create a program,”

29 Jack Ward Thomas, Eric D. Forsman, Joseph B. Lint, [and others], “A Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl” (Portland, OR: Interagency Scientific Committee to Address the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl, Report, May 1990), 283-297.
and he worked with the group to establish the Cascade Center that first year. Rolf Anderson helped the group identify and define functional areas with specific funding codes in the line item budget for Region 6 and then linked those different line items together to create a budget for the Cascade Center.\textsuperscript{30}

The Cascade Center needed a clear, functional purpose to qualify for line-item funds from the Forest Service, and Cissel assumed much of the burden for defining one. He focused his efforts away from the Andrews, looking for a site elsewhere on the district that could be integrated into an existing, regional network of Long Term Ecosystem Productivity (LTER) sites. He quickly identified a site close to the Andrews, and his LTER proposal leaned heavily on that facility’s reputation as a center for long-term studies. Cissel hoped the LTER would provide some stability and funding for the research program at the Blue River District. With the LTER site installed, he also helped initiate a young-stand thinning and diversity project, and he organized a landscape project on the district at Augusta Creek, outside the area governed by the HCA.\textsuperscript{31}

The Cascade Center was not entirely Cissel’s idea. Burditt, Swanson, McKee, and others tried to restructure the group’s efforts to reach an audience beyond the Andrews well before Cissel joined them. Amidst recurring visits by Congressional delegations and many others, the group discussed the “tremendous level of media attention to Andrews research and spinoff forestry practices” at their monthly meeting in July 1990. The reputation of the place was attracting resources and attention from other federal agencies. The U.S. Geological Survey, for example, initiated plans in that month to build a debris-flow flume at the headquarters site, within easy walking distance of a newly built, 16-bedroom dormitory funded by the Forest Service. At their July 1990 meeting, the Andrews group discussed these developments and noted an “increasing need for more organized interface with the public.”\textsuperscript{32}

The group brainstormed ways to create a formal public entity that conveyed their concept of collaborative research and management in ways that an “experimental forest” could not. Institutes and centers were popular organizational concepts in the Forest Service and universities in the early 1990s, and PNW Station had recently established two of them: the Copper River Delta Institute in Alaska and the Blue Mountains Institute in eastern Oregon. The group decided they needed

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\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Lynn Burditt, 14; interview with John Cissel, 7.
\textsuperscript{31} Interview with John Cissel, 8.
\textsuperscript{32} Minutes of LTER/HJA Local Site Committee meeting (7 July 1990).
a similar structure to pull together the various fragments and threads of research programs, grants, initiatives, and science-management teams in which they participated. While the LTER provided a central organizing theme for basic science, the group lacked a central identity of the strong research-management partnership that had evolved at the Andrews. A center could provide the formal, organizational structure they needed to reach across multiple agency and geographic boundaries and establish an institutional identity that the informal Andrews group otherwise lacked. With the Cascade Center for Ecosystem Management, people in the group hoped to reconcile their group’s informal identity with the bureaucratic structures on which they relied. The center they proposed was a concept or a program of work, not a place or a building, but it was a real, sponsoring agency that they directly controlled. It would coordinate the group’s wide array of activities and public service interests involving adaptive management and related research and management questions. It would support the group’s efforts to implement projects designed to answer those questions and then coordinate efforts to integrate the results from such projects with other, related work. The center would also facilitate the group’s efforts to communicate an integrated view of its programs with practical demonstrations and education forums.  

The group’s effort to establish the Cascade Center for Ecosystem Management in the early 1990s was collaborative, informal, and more circuitous than linear. Cissel, for example, explains how he ran across a chance reference describing how the Chief of the Forest Service had designated a “demonstration forest” on the Ouachita National Forest. “I started thinking,” he recalls, “Well you know, we’ve got the Andrews, all this stuff going on here, then we’ve got these other research projects kind of scattered all over the place, then we got the LTEP, the Young Stand Diversity [Silviculture Study], we got Augusta Creek [Landscape Study], the whole district that’s involved in significant ways in terms of developing and applying ecosystems information, maybe we are a demonstration district: Blue River Demonstration District.” When he floated that idea during a conversation with Swanson, McKee, Gregory, and Grant on their way back from a field trip at the Augusta Creek site, Cissel recalls, “People said, ‘Well, that sounds kind of cool.’” With that understated vote of confidence, he took the matter up with Burditt, who cautiously encouraged Cissel with the comment, “You know, that’s kind of interesting, lots of implications there.” Cissel next floated his idea past Rolf

Anderson, in the Forest supervisor’s office, just as Kerrick happened by: “So I got up and got to the map and I pitched it to Mike, and … he felt that was really cool too, so I started writing it up.” In working with Swanson to refine the proposal, however, Cissel notes, “I hit a snag. Somebody said ‘Demonstration District? That sounds like, you know, you’re gonna, maybe not cut as much timber or something. … it doesn’t seem like a good idea,’ or something like that. The connotation of a Demonstration District was too much for somebody along the way.” The reputation of the Andrews group, however, rescued the idea from oblivion. Portland-office coordinators for an internal, Forest Service reform initiative known as “New Perspectives” visited the Andrews because, as Cissel recalls, “They recognized our history … as a place that was innovating and developing new practices. And so we laid out this same kind of thing for them and what we were thinking about for a Demonstration District.” Cissel argues the experience had a formative influence on the New Perspectives program: “At that stage, they were trying to figure out what structure … this New Perspective program should have. And we said, ‘This is kind of what we were thinking, but maybe … a different title than Demonstration District.’” After some effort, Cissel concludes, “We hit upon Cascade Center. And that Center label, Steve McDonald was the PNW New Perspectives manager there, … he said, ‘I think that’s got potential.’”

The Cascade Center was up and running by 20 September 1991, when it shared top billing with the LTER as the heading for the minutes of the monthly meeting of the Andrews group. Those in attendance at that meeting participated in an extended briefing and discussion on the Cascade Center. Briefing documents observed, “Communications are a major emphasis of the Center.” They included a six-point statement of objectives: producing information about ecosystems; developing management systems that incorporate new information about ecosystems; correlating management practices with social values; developing more effective processes of public participation; sharing new information about ecosystems, management practices, and social connections to ecosystem management; and adapting management practices in conjunction with the Willamette National Forest plan mechanisms to keep them current with new knowledge. The briefing emphasized local, regional, national, and international links with the Cascade Center, notably including landscape ecology workshops for four national forests, New Perspectives demonstration areas and sites for the Young Stand Study on three districts of the Willamette National Forest, long-term field studies, studies of biodiversity

34 Interview with John Cissel, 8-9.
and long-term site productivity, and analysis of cumulative effects of management on hydrology and fish habitat on “a variety of watersheds across the Willamette National Forest.” According to those briefing documents, “The guiding concept giving coherence to the whole collection of projects underway is called Adaptive Management.” That concept was based on the fundamental premise that “We do not now know, and may never know, all that we would like to know about how resource and social systems operate, and that we must proceed with management actions despite incomplete knowledge. Adaptive Management is an active information-seeking strategy guiding design of management, research, and monitoring projects.”

Once established, the Cascade Center was a convenient handle for the fluid network of personal contacts that supported programs at the Andrews Forest and elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest. It was intended to break down the distinction between “applied” and “basic” research to promote further cooperation among forest managers and researchers. The development team for the Center modeled that process. In addition to Burditt, Cissel, McKee, and Swanson, that team included Anderson, a planner with the Willamette National Forest, and Darryl Kenops, Mike Kerrick’s successor as forest supervisor. Kenops continued where Kerrick left off, supporting the science-management partnership centered on the Andrews. That support was critical when the agency was down-sized in the early 1990s. Kenops, along with his deputy supervisor, John Nelson, helped the group counter suggestions from other sectors of the agency that the Cascade Center was a “discretionary item” and therefore subject to budget cuts in lean years. Other Forest Service administrators particularly questioned whether funding for Cissel’s position helped the district meet its targets to produce fish structures, timber volume, or recreation visitor days. With support from Nelson and Kenops, however, Burditt countered those concerns by arguing, along with Cissel, that “Part of our responsibility, because of this setting that we have, is generating new knowledge.” The center and Cissel, she argued, helped the district meet those goals and objectives. Burditt’s arguments eventually carried the day, but not without some controversy over the human costs of funding the center over other positions in the agency. The Willamette National Forest dropped from 770 permanent employees to barely 400 during the 1990s, and for managers like Burditt, that reduction in force was “very painful” and “controversial.” Ultimately, they had to decide “What is ‘necessary work’?”

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35 “Minutes of LTER/Cascade Center meeting,” 20 September 1991.

36 Interview with Lynn Burditt, 14.
The Andrews Group, “Necessary Work,” and the Northwest Forest Plan

Amid the social and cultural dislocation of communities in the Pacific Northwest during the 1990s, the Andrews group joined a regional effort that effectively redefined the nature of “necessary work” in forest management and forest research. The Cascade Center for Ecosystem Management and the Research Liaison position were self-conscious efforts to institutionalize the community ethic of collaborative research and management at the Andrews Forest. That effort evolved in the context of productive and ongoing interactions among scientists and local forest managers on the Blue River Ranger District. The experience of collaborative involvement in the effort to develop the riparian management guide for the Willamette National Forest between 1988 and 1990 gave some members of the group a taste of success in moving from a theory to implementing that theory (technology transfer) on a broad scale beyond the Andrews. The riparian management guide was intended to “provide guidance for implementation of the Standards and Guidelines of the Willamette National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan (1990) for Riparian Management Areas.” It was the product of the Willamette National Forest Task Force, including advice and technical review by representatives from the Willamette National Forest, OSU, PNW Station, the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, and the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Council. It was also translated into a guide for land managers in Japan. The guide overviewed riparian resource values, and it laid out strategies for landscape management, basin management, harvest-unit management, riparian rehabilitation, and monitoring efforts. As a guiding principle at the landscape scale, the guide postulated, “Land use practices that maintain the natural patterns and dynamics of riparian communities across the Willamette National Forest can minimize long-term degradation of riparian resources.” It also suggested that “the array of interior old-growth forests can be continuously linked along the mature to old-growth forests within riparian management zones … [that] can also serve as corridors for the dispersal of plants and animals between harvested watersheds, roadless areas, wilderness areas, special habitat management areas, and designated recreational lands.”

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Leaders in the Andrews group participated more directly in management planning from the Willamette National Forest to the regional scale with the Northwest Forest Plan. The plan was a federal initiative spinning out of the debate over habitat for spotted owls. It originated with a presidential directive from William Clinton, who convened a forest conference in Portland, Oregon, on 2 April 1993, in the first year of his administration. The Clinton directive charged participants in that conference, including members of his White House Cabinet, with the mission of devising a science-based forest management plan that would protect and enhance the environment, provide a sustainable timber economy, support people and communities in the region, and ensure interagency cooperation. Between 1993 and 1996, that effort consumed the time and energy of many scientists in federal agencies, including many people in the Andrews group.38

The group’s involvement in the Northwest Forest Plan tested their ability to translate the ideals of ecosystem management beyond the relatively supportive leadership of the Willamette National Forest. It was purportedly a regional planning strategy balancing scientific theory with economic, political, and cultural constraints in the Pacific Northwest. By the end of the decade, the group’s leaders pointed to the Northwest Forest Plan as among the most significant efforts to which they contributed, but they also noted that their work on that initiative drained their energies, diverted their focus from ongoing efforts at the Andrews, and required personal and professional sacrifices.39

Despite the work that went into creating the Northwest Forest Plan, some people in the Andrews group believed that ongoing research into alternative models of landscape planning and management could lead to a quite different, workable approach. Cissel, for example, admits his personal bias for a project in which he was personally involved, but he argues the Augusta Creek Project was a more important contribution than the Northwest Forest Plan: “We really pioneered a different way of thinking about how [the] landscape should be planned to meet multiple, integrated, ecological [and] commercial objectives.” The group’s Augusta Project, he argues, showed that linkage at the landscape scale of implementation. At Augusta Creek, the group developed a management plan for a large landscape that considered those objectives in both spatial and temporal contexts. They modeled specific management objectives in a context that showed how other people

39 Interview with Stan Gregory, 19.
could implement the same ideas at a landscape scale. The approach, Cissel observes, differed significantly from the Northwest Forest Plan, which called for a mosaic of reserves and corridors in a matrix of land where some logging could take place. This was an approach largely driven by conservation-biology concerns, but the Northwest Forest Plan, in effect, directed the group to further develop the ideas in the Augusta Creek Plan through their work as the Central Cascades Adaptive Management Area.

The group’s involvement with the Northwest Forest Plan originated with their earlier work on the Willamette National Forest Land Management Plan of 1990, when the Forest Service began to change the way it operated on the ground. The principle of good public relations also supported innovations in the Willamette National Forest Guidelines of 1990. Forest Supervisor Kerrick exemplified the trend in an op-ed essay he wrote for the Eugene and Corvallis newspapers in August that year. Noting that managing a large and valuable federal property like the Willamette National Forest was “really managing nature,” Kerrick asserted his belief in the basic paradigm that “humans can live in harmony with nature, and we need to continue to learn how to do so.” Toward that end, he argued, “We are fortunate to have the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest…. Much of what we know has come from this priceless research property.” He also credited the “citizen owners” of the Willamette National Forest with “shaping a new future for the forest” that, he suggested, was enshrined in the Forest Plan that his office had recently devised. Promising both a “New Look” and a “New Way of Doing Business,” Kerrick focused on “special places” on the Willamette National Forest representing 53 percent of its land base and 50 percent of its “old-growth inventory” from which “there will be no scheduled timber harvest.” He emphasized efforts to incorporate “the best available scientific information into our standards and guidelines” with the goal of ensuring that “while producing a significant output of needed forest products, our projects will be more environmentally sensitive.” As examples of new standards for the Willamette National Forest, Kerrick announced plans for “leaving standing live and dead trees and large woody debris in harvest areas to provide diversity in wildlife habitat; protecting riparian zones; and designing projects from a larger landscape perspective.” Conceding that he was announcing these new guidelines in controversial times, Kerrick promised that it would

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40 Interview with John Cissel, 14.
“provide stability as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service develops a recovery plan for the spotted owl.”

The management plan for the Willamette National Forest that Kerrick announced in 1990 was, in part, the product of 2 years of collaboration in the Andrews group. Gregory, who played a central role in that effort, recalls a somewhat serendipitous process that presented him with unexpected influence in the planning effort. The group’s riparian studies in the early 1980s disclosed problems with existing Forest Service guidelines. Then, when the Forest Service was required to develop a new Forest plan in the late 1980s, the agency recruited people in the group to draft riparian management guidelines for the Willamette National Forest. When the committee bogged down, District Rangers Herb Wick and Steve Eubanks asked Gregory if he would complete the initial draft himself. He recruited Linda Ashkenas, and together, they drafted a complete set of new guidelines. Gregory was surprised to find the Willamette National Forest “really open” to their proposals. Contrary to his expectations, the national forest staff had surprisingly little criticism of the standards he and Ashkenas drafted. Their Guidelines called for no harvest in any riparian management zones, and included all flood plains within those zones. They called for substantial buffer strips, even on ephemeral, tributary streams. When they sent those proposals out to the ranger districts for comments, Gregory “expected the timber beasts to just go crazy.” The only comments, however, were suggestions on how to strengthen the proposal and give it “more meat.”

Established traditions of collaborative relations with Eubanks and ranger district staff at Blue River smoothed the way for Gregory and Ashkenas and laid the foundation for extending that precedent beyond the Willamette National Forest. The most potentially volatile criticism they confronted, Gregory recalls, was defused by an informal exchange during a field demonstration. The guideline they expected to draw the most fire from timber-oriented managers was the prohibition on harvests in the riparian management zones. When that point came up for discussion during a field excursion to explain the proposed guidelines, however, the timber operations leader for the Blue River Ranger District spoke in support of the guidelines. He told his peers in other districts that until they knew for sure what adverse effects their actions would have, they “shouldn’t be messing around in there.”

[^41]: Corvallis Gazette Times, 27 August 1990.
[^42]: Interview with Stan Gregory, 18.
The group’s involvement in the Northwest Forest Plan was a logical expansion of their collaborative work and their success with landscape-scale studies.
research-management partnership. The Augusta Creek Demonstration Project, well underway by that time, was an important manifestation of that partnership, and it was a self-confident expression of the group’s determination to continue those collaborative efforts. An early statement of the project’s goals and priorities emphasized the diversity of land use designations and research activities on the 20,000-acre area of Blue River District allocated for the Augusta Creek study. The area encompassed general forest land, wilderness, scenic river corridor, and other “special” designations. Activities included efforts to compile data characterizing vegetation and disturbance history (especially wildfire), in an effort to identify “natural processes and patterns” with the intent of defining “desired future conditions” for the area. This effort would provide the base for devising “alternative management scenarios” that would be “tested through public participation, modeling, and other techniques” with the ultimate goal of arriving at “a management plan embodying New Perspectives principles.”

Looking back at the evolution of the Augusta Creek Project 7 years later, Cissel considers it “really unique.” The project was a synthesis of the various threads of research at the Andrews Forest and the planning and modeling experience that Cissel brought to the group. Most models of forest planning revolved around the timber harvest: how much, at what rate, and in which patterns. The Augusta Creek project included that concept of modeling timber harvest over time and space, but applied it to “more of an ecological point of view.” Cissel explains the concept as “scheduling to meet the sustained flow of timber harvest that meets … sustained-flow of desirable ecosystem conditions.”

Through the late 1990s, the collaboration of forest managers and scientists linked through the Cascade Center provided a focus and purpose for a disparate collection of more specialized studies. The emphasis on technology transfer and breaking down barriers between theory and practice, in itself, became an integrative force for the Andrews group. Their work at Augusta Creek, from 1991 to 1998, for example, pulled together several different threads of research and management interests. The Augusta Creek Project, however, was just one of several landscape-scale projects underway during the decade of the 1990s. The group ethic of applied research and collaborative engagement among forest managers and scientists was institutionalized in the briefing documents for the Cascade

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44 Minutes of the LTER-Cascade Center meeting (1 May 1992).
45 Minutes of the LTER-Cascade Center meeting (20 September 1991).
46 Interview with John Cissel, 2.
Center. That concept, and the projects that built on it, apparently bonded people to the Andrews Forest as much as it encouraged them to participate in broader regional initiatives.

Warren Cohen, for example, had joined the group 2 years earlier as research forester and remote sensing scientist for the PNW Station at the Andrews LTER site.47 By 1991, Cohen was already leading a landscape-scale study of forest dynamics with National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) collaborators. Together, this interagency group analyzed landscape changes over previous decades for a range of federal and private ownerships, with particular emphasis on cutting and regrowth rates and changes in landscape and habitat structure. Cohen also worked with Harmon and Ferrell in a NASA-sponsored project with a regional focus and with multiagency support from National Science Foundations (NSF), PNW Station, OSU, and the National Forest System. Together, they explored relations between land use and carbon sequestration and release to the atmosphere in chronological context. Other regional-scale and landscape-scale projects involving people associated with the Cascade Center by that time included studies of forest distribution and change for the state of Oregon, regional biodiversity as characterized through data collected for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s “Gap Analysis” project, riparian network studies, and forest dynamics research. Among the many principal investigators and cooperators working on these regional- and landscape-scale efforts, leading figures guiding the Andrews group in these studies included Cissel, Gregory, McKee, Swanson, Grant, Jones, Harr, Lattin, Moldenke, Franklin, and Spies. Forest dynamics research included biodiversity studies of plant and invertebrate species in aquatic, riparian, and upland systems across spatial and successional scales; analysis of forest-opening edges to evaluate effects on microclimate and vegetation; and landscape modeling to examine effects of alternative cutting patterns over several rotations for areas of 10,000 to 30,000 acres. Riparian network research included studies of riparian-zone structure, function, and management for water quality, wildlife, and other values; studies of the hydrologic effects of forestry practices in large basins on peak and low flows from long-term streamflow records in basins with contrasting cutting and roading histories; and a

multibasin study on the effects of forestry practices on stream and riparian resources in a sampling of large basins, including inventories of fish, geomorphology, and other variables.\textsuperscript{48}

By the time the Northwest Forest Plan initiative got underway in 1993, scientists and managers with the group had aggressively linked previous work at the Andrews with studies that took a broad-scale approach. The people leading those efforts could inform but not control the administrative effort to develop a regional response to the land use issues and socioeconomic concerns relating to spotted owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest. Although some of them invested a disproportionate amount of their time, energy, and professional reputations in that administrative effort, others continued ongoing studies on and off the experimental forest. Andrews group alums Franklin, Sedell, and Meslow participated in the President’s Forest Conference in Portland on 2 April 1993, and other scientists and managers affiliated with the group—notably Swanson, Grant, Spies, and Cissel—reported later that week at the regular LTER-Cascade Center meeting that they had begun working on postconference activities. Those attending that monthly meeting of the group also discussed the results of a workshop on ecosystem management that attracted more than 200 participants from the Willamette and Siuslaw National Forests, and they planned improvements for a similar meeting scheduled the following week for participants from the Gifford Pinchot and Mount Hood National Forests.\textsuperscript{49}

Those working on the Northwest Forest Plan in the spring of 1993 may have initially expected a 60-day commitment to follow up on the results of the President’s conference, but the process predictably stretched far beyond that optimistic timeframe, culminating in a forest management plan completed on 13 April 1994. The grueling process produced a document that claimed to incorporate “nearly 110,000 public comments.” No single voice, consequently, could have prominent, or even dominant authority in that context. Given the diversity of concerns that produced the presidential initiative in the first place, the final report could not take the form of an idealized and pristine scientific proposal and still remain true to the principle of collaborative engagement across diverse political interests. For

\textsuperscript{48} For a more complete listing of participants, see the Cascade Center Briefing Documents appended to the meeting minutes. Minutes for the LTER-Cascade Center meeting (20 September 1991).

\textsuperscript{49} Minutes for the LTER-Cascade Center meeting (9 April 1993).
scientists and managers engaged in that effort, the process required personal and professional commitment that mushroomed well out of proportion to their actual influence over the final product.\footnote{50 Tuchmann, Connaughton, Freedman, and Moriwaki, “\textit{The Northwest Forest Plan: a Report to the President and Congress},” 2, 116.}

People working on the Northwest Forest Plan brought new insights back to the Andrews group. At the group’s September 1993 meeting, Swanson and Bormann, together with District Rangers Don Gonzales (Hebo Ranger District) and Burditt, presented the concept of adaptive management areas (AMAs) as proposed in “option 9” from the presidential planning process. This planning alternative was eventually adopted as the primary basis for the Northwest Forest Plan in its final form early the next year. Those who attended that meeting learned that the Central Cascades AMA, a 155,700-acre zone centered on the Andrews and Blue River Ranger District, was one of 10 proposed areas in the plan. Subsequent discussion at that meeting left some “general impressions” that no one was really in charge at the higher levels, that the rules for the AMAs were unclear, and that the entire concept could be “rendered useless by legal-judicial or other higher-level decisions.” Those concerns fit perfectly with the group’s earlier strategy of taking initiative in a zone where lines of authority were still in dispute. The conclusion of the group’s discussion was a succinct “go for it.”\footnote{51 Minutes of the Cascade Center-Andrews LTER meeting (10 September 1993).}

Those who attended the Cascade Center-Andrews LTER meeting of 4 March 1994 planned an agenda that demonstrated the group’s activist approach to shaping the local course of pending implementation of the Northwest Forest Plan. Anticipating the final report on a presidential planning process with which leaders of the group were intimately involved, people in that regular meeting discussed plans for an “adaptive management workshop” for “scientists, citizens, OSU students, and state and federal agency folks.” They compiled and presented a list of studies connected with the Andrews-Cascade Center “that involve analysis of ecosystems and social systems at landscape to regional scale.” They also discussed plans for an NSF proposal to “Regionalize” LTER work with an emphasis on areas of landscape dynamics in response to wildfire and land use, changes in carbon stores, hydrology, and biodiversity.” The group planned the proposal to include areas ranging from the central Cascades study area to the western halves of Oregon and Washington.\footnote{52 Minutes of the Cascade Center-Andrews LTER meeting (4 March 1994).}
In the 20 months after the Northwest Forest Plan was finalized, the Andrews Forest and the Blue River Ranger District buzzed with efforts to implement the 155,700-acre Central Cascades AMA mandated in that document. That work preoccupied many people in the group, and it substantially increased the administrative burden confronting Swanson, McKee, Burditt, and Cissel. Field trips, interagency communication efforts, a research and learning assessment, watershed analyses, community strategic planning, watershed council collaboration, and implementing an ecosystem workforce demonstration crew linked with the Jobs in the Woods program were among the accomplishments the group reported for that year in the Central Cascades AMA.\footnote{Tuchmann, Connaughton, Freedman, and Moriwaki, “The Northwest Forest Plan: a Report to the President and Congress,” 118.}

The plan placed the Andrews Forest at the center of a larger network of AMAs and, in that way, refocused attention on the experimental forest as an arena for collaborative engagement among scientists and forest managers. Cissel cites this development as among the most significant turning points for the group during his tenure at Blue River. He suggests, however, that the Northwest Forest Plan embraced a planning structure with shortcomings that became evident shortly after it was adopted: “The Northwest Forest Plan put matrix [lands] and riparian reserves all over the landscape.” The problems apparent in the reserve system, Cissel argues, are more than academic. Regional concerns are more seamless than the neat categories suggested by the mosaic of different use areas laid out in the plan, and that reality cracked the edifice of the Northwest Forest Plan almost before the ink dried on the agreement. The reserves were based on a strategy of partitioning the landscape to set aside some lands while managing other lands for timber production. By contrast, the landscape management concepts in the Augusta Creek Plan began with the premise that the landscape functions as an integral whole, it could be managed on a more integrated basis, and the history of landscape change can guide management of future conditions. The Northwest Forest Plan adopted watersheds as the fundamental building block of the proposal, and it designated conservation and reserve areas based on watersheds with the most valuable old-growth forests and salmon stocks. Activities were to be carefully circumscribed on the reserves, where the primary purpose of any thinning or salvage activities would be to “accelerate the development of old-growth conditions.” In addition,
the plan designated 10 AMAs of 78,000 to 380,000 acres open to “intensive ecological experimentation and social innovation to develop and demonstrate new ways to integrate ecological and economic objectives.”

The Northwest Forest Plan imposed significant constraints on forest lands outside the AMAs, but in doing so, it also tended to refocus the group’s attention on the Andrews Forest and the Central Cascades AMA centered there. Landscape studies at the Augusta Creek site, for example, were outside the boundaries of the AMA. When proposed management activities related to those studies conflicted with guidelines from the Northwest Forest Plan, the obvious solution was to move the studies back to Blue River, within the AMA, where the additional benefits of long-term monitoring would also enhance the effort. The district was ready to do a timber sale at Augusta Creek, but it was managed according to a strategy different from the Northwest Forest Plan, including “intensive timber management.” The group rapidly adapted to that decision, redesigning the study as a landscape plan for the Blue River watershed. It had taken years to get the Augusta Creek Project “tuned” to the point where the group “felt pretty good about it.” The Blue River watershed was three times the size of the Augusta Creek drainage, but the group took concepts from the Augusta Project and used them to develop a landscape plan for the Blue River watershed in 2 weeks.

Ecosystem Management and the Andrews Group

The Blue River landscape management strategy was still the focus of discussion for Andrews group participants who attended the monthly meeting in March 1998. Briefing materials for that discussion described the Blue River Landscape Project, beginning 17 April 1997, as an “untested approach to meeting the objectives of the Northwest Forest Plan.” The project, according to this discussion, was based on the premise that productive ecosystems and native species likely would be sustained if ecological processes followed historical patterns. As that briefing document cautions, however, “the degree to which management activities, such as timber harvest and prescribed fire, can approximate historical disturbance regimes is not yet clear.” Citing the advantages of working on a landscape subject to continuous study for nearly 50 years, the briefing laid out the theoretical framework of a monitoring effort organized along a “hierarchy of spatial scales.” It cited the

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55 Interview with John Cissel, 17.
mission of the Andrews Forest as a site supporting research and educational purposes, with a humanized landscape of experimental watersheds, plots, monitoring stations, and control areas that collectively “cover virtually all of the Andrews.” It noted more than 100 projects currently active at the Andrews Forest, with major support from the LTER program. It characterized the place as one of 18 LTER sites representing different ecosystems throughout the United States and Antarctica, and it noted project-specific grants linking the Andrews Forest with the National Forest System, NASA, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Physical improvements emphasized in this briefing document included 3 dormitories capable of housing up to 60 people, a new office and laboratory building, and the pending completion of a new class and conference room “suitable for groups of up to 100 people.”

Those who attended the group’s March 1998 meeting received a short history of the “emphasis and scope of the research program on the Andrews” as part of their briefing materials. According to this document, research at the Andrews began with an “initial emphasis [in the 1950s] … to learn how to convert old forests to new forests in an efficient manner,” then “shifted in the 1960s to look at the effects of forest cutting,” while the 1970s “ushered in a new era of ecosystem science, focused initially on old-growth forests.” That emphasis on ecosystem science, the 1997 briefing document asserted, “continues today.” Following that assertion, the document listed a catalogue of study themes: structure and composition of forest communities, vertebrates and invertebrates inhabiting the forest, aquatic ecology, decomposition, nutrient cycles, long-term ecosystem productivity, disturbance patterns, fungi, lichens, and relations among these features of the ecosystem. Finally, the proposal laid out three landscape areas in the landscape management strategy with the goal of developing different densities of trees, and identified priorities for monitoring at the scale of the entire watershed, subwatersheds, small streams, and local sites.

In addition to the close focus on the attributes of the Andrews Forest, the Blue River Landscape monitoring strategy also emphasized the broader context of the facility in relation to surrounding administrative units. It noted the linkage of the Andrews Forest and the Three Sisters Wilderness as a Biosphere Reserve, and proximity of the Andrews to matrix and riparian reserves designated under the Northwest Forest Plan. It also emphasized the proximity of the experimental forest

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56 “Blue River Landscape Monitoring Strategy, 4/18/97” as presented at the 6 March 1998 LTER/Cascade Center meeting.
to “large blocks of industrial forest lands … a short distance to the west of Blue River watershed.” It was just one among many examples of the drastically fragmented and partitioned, forested landscape of the Pacific Northwest. Rather than emphasizing the relatively pristine characteristics of the Andrews Forest that predominated in earlier depictions of this facility, the briefing document emphasized the “made” landscape of the place in the context of other managed landscapes in the Pacific Northwest. The group perceived these “second nature” characteristics, by the late 1990s, as attributes exceeding the importance of the “pristine nature” previously emphasized in promotional materials and proposals centered on the Andrews Forest.

Conclusion

Leaders of the group during the late 1990s retained the diffuse traditions of earlier years, while adapting their focus to more contemporary issues. The Cascade Center provided an administrative identity for collaborative efforts among people affiliated with the Willamette National Forest, PNW Station, and OSU. Monthly LTER/Cascade Center meetings, meanwhile, provided an ongoing venue for individual engagement with the group and for encouraging marginally involved participants to work more closely with that community. Beyond these structural issues, however, people associated with the Andrews increasingly identified with a common philosophical outlook. They synthesized and restated earlier, often unarticulated traditions of collaboration, long-term commitment, and applied theory. The concept of ecosystem management emerged as a critical, integrative theme. Members of the group advanced the concept as they conscientiously contributed their time to the process of devising the Northwest Forest Plan. By the end of the decade, it was a more carefully articulated philosophy shaping the self-identity and community priorities of the Andrews group. Leading scientists affiliated with the group described ecosystem management in a 1997 paper as an “emerging concept … [that] carries with it a gestalt of holism rather than reductionism, a subordination of human desires to ecosystem health, and recognition of a broader range of values in ecosystems than past practices have acknowledged.” Although the group’s work largely focused on forest lands, the authors emphasized that ecosystem management also works with landscapes other than forests. They explored the relation between concepts of processes perceived as “natural,” such as disturbance

events, and the concept of ecosystem management. They cautioned, however that ecosystem management requires more than simply attempting to mimic such “natural disturbance” events, noting the relatively “fine-grained mosaic of older, often uneven-aged, forest patches.” Rethinking earlier notions of “scientific forestry” they concluded that ecosystem management is “more than science,” and they restated an apparently obvious, but frequently ignored point: “Social responsibility, economic feasibility, political acceptability—all will shape the management paradigm that leads to ecological sustainability. Land management is not a scientific process. Though it should incorporate scientific ideas and information, it inevitably reflects substantial elements of consensus and compromise. …” Ultimately, Swanson and his coauthors suggested, ecosystem management builds from the philosophy that ecosystem scientists “must be prepared to create and accept roles in the management process.”

Chapter Eight: Managing Data and Building a Collective Memory of Science Through Time

By the end of the 20th century, the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest) was as much an idea as a place. Scientists and forest managers went there to look for answers to problems they found in other landscapes. As one scientist explained in a 1997 interview, “Ultimately we would like all the work at the Andrews to … [say] something about fundamental processes rather than processes at the Andrews.” The Andrews group tended to attract and recruit people who similarly viewed the forest as a place to seek answers applicable elsewhere. For more than 50 years, scientists and managers idealized that place as a setting where they could test their ideas about science in relation to management policy. Over several decades, the Andrews group carefully integrated years of carefully maintained data into shared information management systems. In that way, they linked individual effort with broader themes and networks that bridged local, regional, national, and international boundaries. During the 1990s, people in the group worked to integrate this continuous stream of scientific data from multiple threads of research into focused, collaborative action. That process built on several decades of innovation in information management that transformed the way scientists communicated ideas, insights, and results. In that context, the group combined insights about ecosystem dynamics with principles of adaptive management to attempt ecosystem management on a landscape scale in neighboring drainages.

Their effort to implement ecosystem management on a landscape scale was more an act of self-realization than of sudden inspiration for the group. What seemed natural in the group eventually became their preferred strategy for managing the landscape centering their community. The place inspired new ideas, but ideas also inspired human actions that transformed the Andrews. In less than 50 years, the forest Roy Silen once perceived as a “forest primeval” was roaded and logged more intensely than neighboring drainages. In the last third of the century, however, the Lookout Creek drainage was relatively isolated from timber production on nearby slopes. As a result, by the end of the century, the Andrews once again seemed “pristine,” at least by comparison with clearcut slopes on the surrounding national forest and private forest lands. The group’s perceptions of the

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7 Interviews with Gordon Grant by Max Geier on 6 and 10 October 97 at the FSL, Corvallis, OR, as transcribed by Elizabeth Foster, 26-27.
place moved through three distinct phases in less than 50 years: virgin timber, managed forest stands, and pristine ecosystem. In the late 1990s, the group introduced a fourth stage: managed ecosystem and managed landscapes. They expected that human activity would, thereafter, regulate that forest’s ecological processes.²

Data Management: Institutionalizing a Collective Memory of Research and Community

The Andrews community attracted many different people for reasons unique to each individual, but at the end of the 20th century, it acted as a group that was more than the sum of its parts. The ongoing effort to manage five decades of data from the Andrews Forest reinforced that characteristic of the group. That data represented the collective memory of the Andrews, and it was an important component of the community. It attracted people to the group, it inspired new ideas, and it enticed people to stay with the Andrews. Julia Jones, for example, joined the group in the 1990s because she was convinced those data were “the best records” available for exploring “how hydrologic systems really work in practice.” During the last two decades of the century, the group systematized and professionalized its stewardship of long-term records from the Andrews. The person who headed that effort was Susan Stafford, who joined the Oregon State University (OSU) faculty in 1979. Her accomplishments perhaps best represent the aspirations of the group for long-term stability and continuity. She guided an evolving system for maintaining and analyzing data, beginning with just one programmer in 1979. By 1998, her data management group had developed a Forest Science Data Bank that was a prototype for Web-based data sharing among the various Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) sites. Stafford’s central role in building this prototype system also demonstrates the importance of OSU as an institutional framework for faculty and staff whose work as university employees and in campus facilities had supported the group effort at the Andrews Forest over the long term, since the early days of the International Biological Programme (IBP).³

The Andrews group of the late 1990s was a data-based, science-oriented, place-centered, and people-friendly community. People made it work, and the data

³ Interview with Julia Jones, 6; interview with Susan Stafford, 15; communication from Logan Norris to Fred Swanson 9 September 2003.
Figure 52—Data management at the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest was a continuing legacy and established foundation, but with the technological boom of the late 1980s and 1990s, the Andrews group transformed the concept of data management into an organizing principle of the research community. This series of photographs illustrates the rapidly evolving, technological framework that the Andrews group adapted to their purposes in those decades. New technology also created problems of long-term archiving of records collected in multiple, mutually incompatible formats, ranging from computer punch-cards, to computer tapes, to zip disks, to digital memory sticks. Gaging stations and other field equipment generated continuous, graphical output in hard-copy formats that varied over time. These multiple formats challenged data managers, who constantly innovated new approaches to making the ever-growing mountain of data accessible and secure as an ongoing legacy of the Andrews group.
system that helped them work together followed the organized principles of its founder. Stafford, who decorated her well-ordered office with sailing paraphernalia, often used nautical terms to explain a system for managing data that represented ecological processes on a forested landscape. Like many others active in the group near the end of the 20th century, she is a native of the Northeastern United States. She graduated from Syracuse University in New York (SUNY) in 1974, with an undergraduate degree in biology and an emphasis in mathematics. She earned a masters degree in quantitative ecology from SUNY in 1975, producing a thesis that tested computer models of commercial fishery stocks against archival records of fish populations on the Great Lakes. Stafford’s thesis for the Ph.D. in applied statistics at SUNY in 1979, involved a model she developed for determining land values of forest and vacant lands in three counties in upstate New York. She explains of her graduate work, “I like to figure out how to bring an organizational arrangement to something to make it facilitate and expedite what we’re all about.”

Stafford’s philosophy of applied statistics guided the forest science community in Corvallis, Oregon, through nearly 20 years of evolving sophistication in thinking about the way they generated, used, and stored research data. She applied for an opening at OSU in 1979 on the advice of her major professor at SUNY, and continued in that position through 1998, when she left to accept an appointment as Chair of the Department of Forest Science at Colorado State University. In the intervening years, the Andrews group generated a mushrooming volume and variety of data, and demands from scientists for access to those data increased exponentially. Stafford’s unit grew in tandem with the research program. Technology, as well as ideas, shaped the direction of the group’s collective memory. They started with a mainframe computer, and then made the transition to personal computers (PCs) not connected to each other. As the group struggled with that atomized computing environment, Stafford linked them together in a local area network (LAN), and in 1987, she drafted a proposal for National Science Foundation (NSF) funding to develop a data management system for the LTER.

Stafford’s proposal to NSF, which she wrote in collaboration with Sollins, Swanson, and Gregory outlined a strategy for creating an “integrated science workbench for ecosystem research.” It proposed to provide online access to the

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Stafford’s philosophy of applied statistics guided the forest science community in Corvallis, Oregon, through nearly 20 years.
group’s data, including high-resolution graphics and computing power. Stafford’s unit began with one workstation, and expanded to a system of 44 workstations and a local area network linking the PCs to the Forest Science Data Bank. One year later, Stafford led a collaborative effort that involved Bill Ripple, of the Environmental Remote Sensing and Application (ERSA) Laboratory, and many other people in the Andrews group on a proposal to link geographical information system (GIS) with remote sensing. That effort eventually connected the ERSA Laboratory to the Forest Science LAN. The proposal also secured “seed money” for hiring Barbara Marks as a support programmer. That funding was the first time Stafford was able to secure money from NSF to fund a person, rather than purchase hardware or software. The funding from NSF to support expenditures on staff and equipment for managing data generated by the LTER program set a precedent that helped Stafford secure other funds.  

The move to Web-based technology placed the group at the leading edge of some critical LTER initiatives. As a prototype site for the LTER, the Andrews group accepted the responsibility for testing new ideas and sharing the results with other sites in that network. Stafford approached data management at the Andrews with an appreciation for the group’s potential for growth and its role as a model for other LTER programs. Beginning with the 1988 grant proposal, Stafford designed a system of data management that assumed the group “was always going to be growing.” Growth accelerated during the 1990s, and computing needs grew accordingly. By 1994, people in the group were working with about 180 PCs. A year later, they had 280 PCs, and by 1998, about 500 PCs. The technology of data management also changed rapidly in that period, moving from paper documentation on data-entry forms to a tape library with automated access, to the LAN that included the Forest Science Data Bank and Web-based access by the late 1990s. The group’s status as a flagship program in the area of information management helped them assemble a critical mass of technical experts more quickly, and act as an integrated unit. The Forest Science Data Bank also expanded beyond the Andrews program, providing data management services that supported other programs within and beyond the university by the late 1990s.

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6 Interview with Susan Stafford, 3-5.
7 Interview with Susan Stafford, 6; communication from Fred Swanson October 2003.
Sidebar 8.1: Data and Information Management

The Issue: Good management of data and information is essential to long-term research and management efforts because without that information and data, a long-term study can lose significance as time passes. Environmental and research data collected with public funds are public data. Data can have unexpected uses and values, if the data are well-documented and available for use by others. The long-term nature of the LTER program makes it a highly suitable place to develop information management and sharing protocols. Good data management is critical to effective monitoring and adaptive management.

![Diagram showing the loss of information generated by a science study. Good information management, including data conservation and good metadata, minimizes information loss. Modified from Michener et al. (1997).]

The Roots: The tradition of scientists collecting and managing their own data took on new character in the "big science" days of the International Biological Programme when the National Science Foundation insisted on developing centralized databanks. Researchers have come a long way since those days in the early 1970s. Science carried out by large teams collecting long-term environmental measurements must be supported by a corporate data management system. The advent of Web pages and the Internet, other technological and cultural advances, strong pushes to conduct intersite science, and the sheer volume of data accumulated over years of ecosystem research have led to major advances in both expectations and accomplishments in information management.

The Approach: Good data and information management is as much a matter of culture and attitude as it is technology and staffing. In the early days, staff hired as data managers often had difficulty getting scientists to invest the effort to document and submit data to the databank. The Internet and Web pages gave data managers and scientists common, public ground to work together to represent the accomplishments of the research team. The core of data and information management in the Andrews Forest program is the Forest Science Data Bank and the strong cadre of information managers who, although they work for different institutions, work as a single unit. The makeup and operations of this enterprise are constantly evolving in response to new opportunities and responsibilities for information management and sharing.

Results: Major commitments to data and information management are important parts of the foundation for conducting ecosystem science and management at the scale of the Andrews Forest program. As long-term data sets grow in length and number, and as spatial data grow in resolution and complexity, strong data management grows in importance for both research and land management. Web pages are proving to be a powerful medium for managing and sharing information on land management decisions, actions, and monitoring. The scope of information managed in a centralized, electronic form has grown from simple text and tables of numerical data to linked collections of photographs, spatial data, bibliographic data sets, personnel directories, and many other forms.
In funding Stafford’s grant proposal, the NSF required the Andrews group to “be a prototype in this regard,” and that edict transformed the Andrews LTER workplace. It became, thereafter, a site for exploring new methods of data management, and the effort to maintain a Web presence opened those methods to scrutiny by people at other LTER sites and at other research organizations in the United States and in other countries. That reality forced the group into the arena of international relations as their research, and international interest in that research, brought them into contact with people making policy decisions and leading research initiatives around the world. Stafford and the group developed mechanisms for data sharing, storage, and analysis, to make data from research projects at the Andrews available more rapidly and to more people outside that community. Stafford balanced the NSF mandate to “have as much data online as possible as quickly as possible” against the rights of scientists to protect their intellectual property. Some sites in the LTER network made a distinction between their core data sets from the five major areas of work assigned to scientists in the program and the work assigned to their graduate students. The Andrews group, however, minimized that distinction and emphasized the importance and long-term potential of the work assigned to graduate students. Stafford’s unit, therefore, designed a form to standardize the structure of their data, and worked with graduate students as well as program scientists to prepare their data in a format compatible with the Forest Science Data Bank. By the late 1990s, the group had either placed its data online in that format, or placed abstracts online for data that were only available in other

Stafford balanced the NSF mandate to “have as much data online as possible as quickly as possible” against the rights of scientists to protect their intellectual property.
formats. These accomplishments only partially achieved the goals Stafford and others in the group intended, but they were nonetheless “pioneer” or “test cases for new ways of doing science.”

The effort to manage data was an integrative, adaptive strategy that linked university and agency scientists in the group with each other and with a global network of colleagues. The Quantitative Scientists group and the Forest Science Data Bank joined the emerging global network, and that linkage further blurred the distinction between Forest Service and Forest Science data and people in the group. It also blurred the distinction between scientists and data managers. People who worked in Stafford’s unit served in a consulting, collegial role rather than as gatekeepers to the world of data management. Everyone who worked with Stafford in the Quantitative Services group had at least some training in the biological sciences or in natural resources in addition to their technical skills in data management. They participated in the monthly LTER meetings, and they worked as

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8 Interview with Susan Stafford, 3-4; communication from Fred Swanson August 1999.
9 Interview with Susan Stafford, 1.
collaborating consultants who understood the science goals, the potential implications of the data, and the importance of the work to the lives and ambitions of the scientists.\textsuperscript{10}

The Andrews group worked to build its philosophy of “breaking down barriers” into the structure of data management. Stafford’s goal was to “foster the idea that data management might be integrated into that whole research process.” Toward that end, her unit devised a systematic procedure that specified distinct phases for designing and implementing a research plan. In the first phase, the Principal Investigator (PI) and associated researchers met with a statistician to identify and define the objectives of the research. They next met with a data manager to plan a format for the data that would be appropriate for long-term, archival storage in the Forest Science Data Bank. Then they implemented the study and began collecting data according to plan. Subsequent steps in the data management process required working with researchers on documenting and editing the data records, then analyzing, interpreting, and synthesizing the data. At the synthesis stage, field workers met with a statistician who helped them interpret the results to ensure statistically sound reasoning. The prominent nature of work at the Andrews in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century encouraged the group to adopt this model of structured data management because the potential for controversial findings or critical audiences was so great. Statistical rigor was a refuge from politically inspired criticism. The structured approach also supported and sustained the group’s efforts to initiate and continue long-term scientific research. The systematic procedures that Stafford devised helped scientists structure their studies so that the boundary conditions, or limits of the work, were clearly stated up front—before the conclusions. In that way, they attempted to defuse some potential criticism by anticipating and acknowledging the limitations of their work. This front work also promoted more efficient study designs that ensured research efforts would generate data in formats useful and relevant to the concerns that prompted the work.\textsuperscript{11}

The Human Variable: Fitting In and Winnowing Out at the Andrews

Stafford’s unit supported efforts to systematize the work of the Andrews group, but human resources followed a more complex and less formalized logic than data

\textsuperscript{10} Interview with Susan Stafford, 2-3.

\textsuperscript{11} Interview with Susan Stafford, 3-4.
sets and computer networks. People were, nonetheless, an introduced and managed variable on the Andrews Forest by the end of the century. The group usually did not consciously select people who could join them in that place, but everyone who came to the Andrews survived an unconscious process of social selection, following a combination of personal and institutional decisions. Some, like Roy Silen in the earliest years of the experimental forest, had virtually no control over the process that brought them to or wrenched them away from this place. Others participated more directly in the decisions leading to their association with it. In more recent years, people associated with the Andrews commonly express their belief that “self selection” mostly determined who joined and stayed with this community. Actual mechanisms of recruitment, however, were often more complex than that phrase might suggest. Gordon Grant, for example, secured his permanent position with the Forest Service Research organization in the mid 1980s after working with the group for several years as a graduate student on soft-money funding. From his perspective, he simply “showed up” as a graduate student and worked his way—through his own actions—into a permanent position in the group. When a search opened, Dennis Harr asked Grant what he thought the person hired should do, and Grant responded, “Well, I don’t know, something about mountain rivers.” That roughly described Grant’s emerging specialization. He explained his engagement with the group as an example of natural selection in a human context: “When you’re early on in a group, a lot of your struggle is … to define that turf or define that domain. … There is a lot of niche selection going on, … it’s an ecosystem.”

One characteristic of belonging to this group, by the 1990s, was to speak of how it functioned as if it really were an ecological, or natural organism. Whether or not the analogy to evolutionary processes accurately described how things actually worked in this human assemblage, people found their niche in the group by fitting their skills to the needs of the community, as more established members defined those needs. Sometimes that meant the new member alerted the group to a previously unrecognized need. In the five decades after the Forest Service established the experimental forest, people drawn to the place typically followed a route through several distinct stages of personal development related to their eventual role with the Andrews group. Those stages included (not necessarily in this order)

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12 H.J. Andrews LTER-Cascade Center for Ecosystem Management meeting notes (1 May 1998); interview with Gordon Grant, 12-13.
personal inclination, academic and career training, professional experience, discovery (of the place), inquiry (into opportunity), funding (locating and securing), mobilization (personal and professional), and socialization into the group. Individual will was not necessarily sufficient for involvement.

The particular pathway by which each member of the group came to the Andrews was unique, but most people were attracted to the community and its accomplishments more than the place. Personal relations and professional networks were especially important during the stages of discovery, inquiry, funding, mobilization, and socialization, and they were often contingent on earlier stages of training and experience. Some experiences and affiliations were especially crucial. People like M. Gordon “Reds” Wolman, Jerry Franklin, Art McKee, and Fred Swanson, for example, mentored or otherwise influenced many people who eventually converged at the Andrews Forest in the last three decades of the 20th century. Experiences at major research centers like Oak Ridge, Woods Hole, Luquillo, and Coweeta helped people develop contacts with other scientists and managers who traveled in the same professional circles as those who worked at the Andrews. Experiences at particular universities, notably including the University of Tennessee, Pennsylvania State University, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Georgia, or OSU served a similar function. Access to these networks of affiliation increased the likelihood a person would eventually become involved and secure long-term tenure with the group. People who developed a long-term involvement with that community, however, also needed a local network of support among people already working at the Andrews.

New recruits could choose to participate in any of several structured opportunities for communicating with other scientists and managers in the group. The monthly LTER meetings and the annual field gathering, HJA Daze, for example, encouraged precisely those kinds of linkages. People learned to recognize subtle signs that they were accepted in the group: they were invited to participate in events, they were accepted as legitimate participants when they showed up in group venues to which they were not directly invited, or they were given time on the agenda at field demonstrations or at the regular monthly meetings. That “face time” demonstrated their status in the group more than it offered an opportunity for gaining acceptance. Informal exchanges during field events were more important than going to formal meetings for those who hoped to elevate their standing with the group. People talked to each other while riding to and from the Andrews Forest.
and during excursions on that landscape. Acceptance, for some, also meant giving up habits learned in graduate school: they had to think beyond their own research and consider their personal and professional responsibility to the group.¹³

The emphasis on community was an important factor determining success at the Andrews and in the group. The experimental forest both attracted and repelled people, depending on their personal disposition toward the community culture of the group. Waring, who led the Andrews effort during the IBP, later distanced himself from that community because he was no longer comfortable working in a group context. A few people left because the group informally rejected them. In the words of one leader, some people “tried to get into the group” but failed to gain acceptance because others in that community considered them money hounds who wouldn’t participate in meetings or other functions of the group. People who “just wanted the money,” and “didn’t want any strings attached to it” just “didn’t work out.”¹⁴

The point in their career at which people joined the group was also a factor in their decision to stick. At various times, Forest Service professionals, university professors, postdoctoral research assistants, technicians, graduate students, and undergraduate assistants found the group supportive and welcoming. It was a community of structured instability: many short-term associates ebbed and flowed around a smaller core of more secure, longer term associates. Their involvement with more-transient people who contributed new ideas and skills also helped people with more-permanent tenure link their work with more-contemporary ideas and insights. The makeup of that less-mobile core also changed with retirements, transfers, and new, permanent hires. The small cohort of long-term associates anchored core values for a group that studiously avoided defining itself, even as it earned a reputation for principled innovation and responsiveness to the shifting tides of public interest and management needs.

The characteristic fluidity and informality of the group was also a response to the limits of institutional funding through PNW Station, OSU, and the Willamette National Forest, and it demonstrates how the group’s close connections with the NSF and its institutional culture began to affect how people interacted at the Andrews. By the late 1990s, Andrews-affiliated scientists who accepted short-term appointments at NSF were infusing insights from that experience back to the group. Entomologist Tim Schowalter, for example, was a tenured member of

¹³ Interview with Gordon Grant, 13-14.
¹⁴ Interview with Mark Harmon, 19.
the OSU faculty who worked with the Andrews group before and after his appointment as program director for ecosystem studies at NSF in 1992 and 1993. At that agency, he was one of many program directors who rotated through on short-term appointments. He observed how he and his temporary colleagues in Washington, D.C., introduced the smaller cadre of permanent NSF staff to current ideas and problems that researchers then faced in the field. From that experience, he learned how a small group of permanent staff could influence the decisions that more permanent colleagues made. He also learned, however, that people with short tenure, like himself, relied on people with longer tenure to supply continuity, stability, and a sense of what had been tried before.21 When he returned to Corvallis, those insights informed Schowalter’s actions in the group.

Personality and the Limits of Organic Community

People in the Andrews group tended to explain the functioning of that community in terms they borrowed from their studies of natural processes, and that tendency complicated their efforts to understand why they were successful. The group depended on people who could cooperate with other professionals while applying their own training and skills to achieve common goals. They needed people with adaptive and accommodating personalities, who also had relevant training, background, and experience. In the late 1990s, few people in the group could articulate a clear strategy for recruiting and retaining people with those characteristics. Many of them, however, embraced the ideal of a self-regulating, naturally adjusting, organic community. That concept suited their need to remain flexible, adaptive, and responsive in the tumultuous political environment of the 1990s, but it also freed them from the responsibility of critically examining their existing mechanisms of recruitment. It was, moreover, a vague and incomplete description of how and why new people typically joined and functioned in the group during that decade.

The group based its reputation and programs on an institutionalized system of structured instability: It relied on short-term, “soft-money” appointments to support long-term studies. That structure forced many people in the group to constantly consider other career options, and many of them left the Andrews community. Few of the people who helped plan and implement long-term studies remained with the group for more than a few years, but some did. It was a system that placed the burden of an uncertain future on individual people, and that uncertainty sometimes

21 Interview with Tim Schowalter, 2, 17, 19-20.
strained relations in the group. Recruitment, retention, and departure proceeded with little formal discussion about who or how to recruit or how to encourage long-term tenure. The group relied, instead, on a process with the outward appearance of unstructured informality. The result, intended or not, was that group leaders avoided taking responsibility for the scope, purpose, profile, and inner workings of the community. Things just happened “naturally,” and individual access to funding largely depended on each person’s ability to identify and occupy an unchallenged niche with functional utility to the group.

People who wanted to participate in the group had to secure a consensus of support from other people in that community, with virtually no help from a more systematic structure of authority. The ability to do that was a critical factor of what some people in the Andrews community termed “self-selection,” but in fact, it amounted to selection by an undefined group of people. In one example, Harmon recalls he disagreed with another scientist on how to develop an NSF grant to support water balance and nutrient studies at the Andrews Forest. That disagreement led to a personality conflict, and the two scientists “just did not get along.” Eventually, other scientists whose appointments depended on grant money “lost confidence” that the other alternative would continue their tenuous funding, and they expressed their support for Harmon’s ideas. Forest managers associated with the group also viewed this process as an example of natural selection. Eubanks, for example, observed that the “right people moved in and out of there to the point where you had the right chemistry.” Even if that “self-selection” process did not actively include everyone in the group, Eubanks concluded, “Everybody was welcomed,” and those who were left out of the loop often continued to participate in other ways.⁶

People who developed strong personal and professional ties with others in the group had a better chance of building a consensus of support for their projects. People who developed strong personal and professional ties with others in the group had a better chance of building a consensus of support for their projects. In that sense, personality could be as important as academic qualifications. The vague system of reaching a group consensus required people to trust an unspecified number of people who participated in that process, all without technically signing on to any bylaws or membership agreements. Accepting that system required a leap of faith, and that was an imposing barrier for anyone who previously experienced or feared discrimination. It was an especially important concern in those periods when people

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⁶ Interview with Steve Eubanks, 15; interview with Gordon Grant, 12-13; interview with Mark Harmon, 24.
could opt for career opportunities in other programs with more structured policies defining authority and career ladders. The Andrews system required people to trust the intentions of colleagues, and it tended to attract those with an a-priori reason to trust others already in the group, either through previous experience or mutual involvement. However attractive or unattractive the place may have been for professional reasons, personal relations were critical components of recruitment and retention in the Andrews community.

Some people first established a place for themselves in the group by demonstrating an ability to “fit in” with a particular person in that community, thereby earning a chance to develop a niche for themselves. Gabriel Tucker demonstrated that ability early in his career, establishing connections that enabled him to rejoin the group at several different points over the span of three decades. His participation spanned various roles and eras, from undergraduate assistant to cooperating faculty on permanent appointment, and from the IBP through the young-stand studies of the late 1990s. Throughout, Tucker was closely involved but not a leader with the group. His career illustrates the convoluted mechanisms that attracted people to the Andrews Forest, launched them on a career away from it, and brought them back to the group at a later stage in their lives.
A common characteristic that helped people fit in at the Andrews was a personality shaped by wanderlust, a broad but intense interest in science, and an outsider’s curiosity about the Northwestern United States. Tucker’s experience followed that common pattern, which in this respect resembled Dyrness’, McKee’s, and Harmon’s earlier examples. He set out with only a vague interest in pursuing a career in natural resources and a family heritage of scientific work. His father was a biochemist, and Tucker aimed to distinguish himself in a different scientific arena. Like Franklin, he initially saw himself as a forest ranger. He studied forestry at the University of Pennsylvania, where he did lab work for a professor who subsequently moved to the University of Arizona. He followed his mentor to Arizona, helped him set up his lab, and then transferred to OSU, where he enrolled in the forest science option in the Department of Forest Management. In 1974, his junior year at OSU, Tucker linked up with Bill Ferrell, who had guided Franklin’s master’s thesis nearly two decades earlier. Ferrell recommended Tucker for an assignment with Chuck Grier, who worked with Franklin and Waring on the IBP. Tucker was technically qualified but had little relevant experience when he interviewed with Grier for a position as a research assistant. He won the job with his answer to the question, “Do you fly fish?” Tucker, who was not a fisherman, responded “I can learn fast,” and Grier assigned him to assist Steve Running, a technician working with Waring.\

Some people were less willing to adapt to the Andrews group than others, and those with a more independent disposition often sought opportunities elsewhere. Tucker’s personality suited Running, a loner who avoided the transient research community centered on the temporary housing known as Gypsy Camp, near the entrance to the Andrews. Running headed a component of Waring’s work on the primary production segment of the IBP. That work was intended to develop simulation models relating plant productivity and photosynthesis to the physiological state of the plant; specifically, to determine whether the plant’s stomates were open or closed. Tucker spent 2 years (1974-1976) working closely with Running, and eventually wrote an undergraduate thesis based on his work at the Andrews Forest. That effort largely focused on Watersheds 6, 7, and 8. The first two of these watersheds were logged in that period, while the third was left uncut as a “control” in keeping with the paired watersheds research model. Tucker’s field work with Running on that changing landscape included a series of brief, but focused and

\[^{17}\text{Interview with Gabriel Tucker, 1-2.}\]
intense, 15-minute intervals of hard work, interspersed with nearly 2 hours of waiting for the next period of activity. Wherever possible, Running spent that downtime fly-fishing. He largely avoided contact with other scientists in the group, and he left near the end of the IBP to earn his Ph.D. at the University of Colorado. He eventually secured a faculty appointment at the University of Montana, and by the 1990s, he was a leading national and international expert in remote sensing and large-scale modeling.\footnote{Interview with Gabriel Tucker, 2-3; interview with Waring, 3.}

Like many of his contemporaries, Tucker traced a circuitous career path that followed professional networks and funding opportunities back to the Andrews Forest in the early 1990s, first as a postdoctoral research fellow seeking a funded position, and subsequently as a cooperating scientist with a faculty appointment at Evergreen State College in Washington in the latter part of that decade. His meandering course had much in common with others who joined the group in the second decade of the LTER. He began with generalized goals, struggled to find a focus, maintained his personal networks, and ultimately found himself at the Andrews Forest. He spent 6 years with the Peace Corps in Africa, followed by 5 years in a Ph.D. program at Cornell University. He returned to the Andrews in 1991 a married man with kids to support. He needed work, and he applied for a postdoctoral appointment at OSU. During his hiatus from the group, Tucker kept in touch with McKee and Running at national meetings of the Ecological Society of America. Those contacts drew him back to the group, and they continued after his appointment at Evergreen State College, in 1995. Ultimately, they led to his cooperating role in the uneven-age management study at the Andrews through the end of that decade.\footnote{Interview with Gabriel Tucker, 8-10, 12.}

Many people who joined the group during the 1990s had previous experience with other scientists in that community, even if they were not involved in the Andrews community at the time they met. The ability to initiate and develop close friendships with other scientists and sustain those relations for long periods and across great distances was a personality trait common in the group. Julia Jones, who joined the Andrews community in the same year Tucker returned to OSU (1991), had similar, pragmatic reasons for that move. She also had previous experience with key people in the group. Her initial involvement at the Andrews Forest, however, was relatively later in her career, by comparison with Tucker. A native of Maryland, Jones grew up spending summers at her family’s lakeside...
camp in the New Hampshire woods and later earned a bachelor’s degree in economic development at Hampshire College. It was an experimental college, with no grades or credits. Students completed degrees by negotiating a series of contracts with individual faculty members. That self-directed experience was good training for her eventual role at the Andrews. She went overseas to earn a master’s degree in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy, and completed a Ph.D. in geography and environmental engineering at Johns Hopkins University with a study of deforestation in Tanzania. At Hopkins, Jones worked under the tutelage of the famed geomorphologist, “Reds” Wolman, and shared an office with fellow graduate student, Gordon Grant. That association, remote from the Andrews Forest, ultimately linked her with the group.

A few people with no direct role at the Andrews Forest had a major impact on the character of the community centered on that place. Wolman was one of those people. Jones and Grant brought common graduate school experiences, and the insights they drew from Wolman, to their association at the Andrews Forest. Those insights included a philosophy of encouraging self-directed, independent work with minimal oversight, as well as concrete theories about hydrology and geomorphology. Jones taught at the University of California at Santa Barbara from 1983 through 1991, holding a joint appointment in geography and environmental studies. Because of her acquaintance with Grant, Jones included examples from the watershed studies at the Andrews in her course on watershed science at Santa Barbara. Jones discovered that long-term research at just a few places, including Hubbard Brook and the Andrews Forest, “dominated” the literature on hydrologic response and other general watershed topics.

Family and professional networks brought Jones to Corvallis in the early 1990s, and the promise of funding to pursue research at the Andrews Forest subsequently brought Jones into the group. Working at the Andrews Forest or the group, in other words, was not an initial goal leading Jones to this involvement. She abandoned a tenured appointment at the University of California Santa Barbara and accepted a soft-money appointment with the Andrews group primarily because her husband had already secured a position as research assistant in the soils department at OSU. A chance meeting in Edinburgh, Scotland, with Logan Norris, the

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20 Interview with Julia Jones, 1, 2, 8, 9.
21 Interview with Julia Jones, 1, 9.
Department Chair of Forest Science at OSU, then alerted Jones to the potential for NSF funding. Grant subsequently hired her as a research assistant working on streamflow studies until her own grant came through. She gained visibility in the Corvallis Forestry Sciences Laboratory when Norris assigned her a temporary office in that building, and Swanson, thereafter, invited her to attend LTER meetings. Later, when a position opened in the Geosciences Department at OSU, Jones landed a tenure-track appointment.\textsuperscript{22}

Relatively few Andrews associates landed secure, tenured positions after coming to the group on soft-money appointments. The protective umbrella of a tenure-track position was generally more elusive. Bob Griffiths and Andy Moldenke, for example, built successful careers without the long-term security of a tenured appointment. Others, like Running and Tucker, found tenured positions elsewhere, while either curtailing their involvement with the group (as with Running), or devising elaborate strategies whereby they could hold those positions while continuing remote cooperation at the Andrews Forest (Tucker). Still others, including Sherri Johnson, became deeply involved with the group but faced the initial likelihood that their long-term career prospects lay elsewhere. Johnson eventually was able to convert that initial, tenuous appointment into a more permanent appointment as a Forest Service employee assigned to work at the Andrews Forest. Many others in similar circumstances were less fortunate, and only a very few, such as

\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Julia Jones, 4-5.
Susan Stafford, stepped directly into a tenure-track niche tailored to the growing needs of the group, or secured a tenure-track position at OSU after beginning their association with the Andrews community, as did Jones. The path did sometimes go the opposite direction. Some scholars who secured tenure-track appointments at OSU in positions unrelated to the Andrews community, like Tim Schowalter, later began working more closely with the group while pursuing their own research agendas. In Schowalter’s case, those interests eventually led him away from the group and into a new Department Chair position at Louisiana State University. In short, different people had divergent, even contradictory motives for becoming involved with the group and the group viewed this complexity as a source of vitality.

Personality was an important variable determining how long a person was willing to work on a series of short-term appointments. Some people thrived under that arrangement, whereas others found it a strain. A few actually found it liberating, by comparison with the constraints and demands that university faculty faced on the road to tenure. Moldenke and Griffiths illustrate the combination of personal sacrifice, professional productivity, collaborative enthusiasm, and adaptive opportunism supporting science efforts at the Andrews in the 1990s. Both of these scientists worked on soft-money appointments for three decades at OSU, made critical contributions to the group in leading and supporting roles, and enthusiastically advocated the collaborative accomplishments of that community. In short, they exemplify the spirit of self-selection as two scientists who “caught the vision,” held their focus through a sustained period of uncertainty regarding future funding for their positions, and built successful careers on that tenuous foundation.

An early exposure to the world of grant-funded research and a family heritage of doing world-class science helped some people adjust to a career with the Andrews group. A life funded with soft-money appointments, in such cases, offered a freedom that tenure-track appointments often did not. A person’s past experience writing grant proposals built confidence and dispelled concerns about what would happen at the end of each new project. Moldenke, for example, grew up in a household accustomed to weekly visits from world-class biologists. Both of his parents were scientists, and his father was a “world-famous” botanist. The younger Moldenke followed the family bent through an undergraduate degree in biology from Wesleyan University in 1966 and earned a Ph.D. in biological sciences from Stanford University in 1971, working under the direction of Paul Ehrlich.
Moldenke’s connection with the Andrews began with his work for the IBP at Stanford University. He first met McKee at an IBP meeting, and that link with McKee eventually led him into the group. After he left Stanford, Moldenke continued with the IBP at the University of California, Santa Cruz, until he moved to Corvallis to accompany his spouse, who had found employment at OSU. Moldenke’s freelance status and spirit freed him from bureaucratic constraints at OSU, where he found “tremendous bureaucratic pressure” that otherwise impeded collaborative work by many of his colleagues with tenured positions.

The attraction of the Andrews group, for a long-term, soft-money associate like Moldenke, was unquestionably people, not place. He found “nothing unusual” about the experimental forest apart from the fact that it had “a little more old growth than most other places.” It was convenient relative to other useful field sites, but more important, the group offered Moldenke an intellectual home and opportunities for interdisciplinary exchange. He participated in that community, and he joined efforts to educate other people about the group’s work. He spent 7 years as co-principal investigator on an NSF grant with McKee developing the Research Experiences for Undergraduates program. He also collaborated with McKee and others in the group on a sustainable forestry program administered through Chemeketa Community College, in Salem, Oregon. He secured another 5-year grant from NSF to provide teachers at high schools and middle schools with hands-on training in ecology during the summer, in an effort to instill cutting-edge science into teaching curricula in secondary education. That effort embodied the collaborative spirit of the group. People, Moldenke argues, are an enormous, under-used asset with “tremendous potential” to assist agency scientists by gathering data that otherwise would never be collected. His ultimate goal is to “get more people in the public involved in ‘science.’”

Some people who participated in the science of the Andrews group during the 1990s worked nearby for many years before they were even aware of that collaborative community. Griffiths, for example, began a series of short-term appointments with the group in the early 1990s, after a long, previous history working on soft money at OSU. He adapted his skills to fill a specific niche the group identified

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23 Interview with Andy Moldenke, 1-2, 4.
24 Interview with Andy Moldenke, 2.
25 Interview with Andy Moldenke, 5, 15.
and encouraged him to occupy. Originally from Ohio, Griffiths followed a circuitous path to the Andrews Forest. He attended Oberlin College as an undergraduate in pre med and earned a degree in zoology-chemistry in 1961. After a 3-year stint in the Navy, and a brief career working for a pharmaceutical company, he entered the graduate program in biology at San Jose State University and finished his MA degree in 1968. At San Jose, Griffiths linked up with a marine microbiologist who was a protégé of the OSU microbiologist, Dick Morita. That connection brought Griffiths to Corvallis for his doctoral research, building on his earlier work with marine micro-organisms. Marine microbiology was a far stretch from studies of forest soils, and the group had to actively recruit Griffiths. It was not a case of self-selection.\textsuperscript{26}

Incidental contacts between colleagues at OSU sometimes led people to invite a third party to participate in a project related to the group. An OSU colleague who knew Griffiths mentioned his work to some other people in the group, and that conversation led to a meeting with Griffiths. Kermit Cromack approached Griffiths with the suggestion that the group’s work on nutrient cycling indicated some potential for interesting studies of mycorhizal mats of forest soil. Waring reinforced that initial contact with an invitation for Griffiths to evaluate a thesis for one of his students. By that time, Griffiths, who completed his Ph.D. in 1972, had been working at OSU for nearly two decades, mostly in oceanography. Funding in that field, however, was tight in the early 1990s, and Griffiths made the move to the Corvallis Lab to work with the group, beginning in 1992. By 1998, he was still contributing to long-term research efforts at the Andrews Forest, although he was officially retired after nearly three decades on soft-money appointments at OSU.\textsuperscript{27}

Access and acceptance were not difficult for someone who the group actively recruited, but for people who did try to “self-select” themselves as members of the Andrews community, it was tricky. At the opposite end of her career from Griffiths in the mid 1990s, Sherri Johnson secured a soft-money, post-doctoral appointment with the LTER group in Corvallis after actively pursuing leads through her professional networks. By the time she joined the Andrews community, Johnson was already well acquainted with their work, the LTER, and leading scientists in the Andrews group. She also had direct links with the people and programs at the Andrews. Her academic career stretched from Kansas

\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Robert Griffiths, 1, 2.
\textsuperscript{27} Interview with Robert Griffiths, 1, 2, 5-6, 9.
to the University of Montana, in Missoula, with a detour into the business world and conservation work. At Missoula, she developed an interest in water, ecology, and geology, and she pursued graduate studies at the University of Oklahoma, earning a Ph.D. in 1996. Johnson’s major professor at Oklahoma was Alan Covich, who was a principal investigator on a study at the Luquillo LTER site in Puerto Rico, and he subsequently chaired the Fish and Wildlife Department at Colorado State University, where Susan Stafford later accepted an appointment to chair the Forest Science Department.

The LTER connection at Luquillo was a venue for Johnson to broaden her range of professional contacts while gaining field experience working on a major NSF grant. She met Swanson at joint LTER meetings in the early 1990s. By that time, she had already heard about the program at the Andrews, and her meeting with Swanson generated real enthusiasm for that place. She was impressed with his “gestalt feeling” about landscapes and streams, and she was drawn to the idea of studying them in association rather than as isolated components of the ecosystem. At the 1993 All Scientists LTER meeting, Johnson shared a room with Jones. The next year, while attending an intersite meeting of LTER hydrologists, Johnson encountered Grant. She connected with Jones and Grant on the basis of her own studies of ecological disturbances from a hurricane at the Luquillo site and those connections motivated her initial efforts to join the group.\(^{28}\)

Multiple contacts in the Andrews group attracted Johnson to that community, but even so, acceptance was elusive. Johnson initially contacted Stan Gregory about the possibility of “doing a postdoc” with him, but despite some vaguely encouraging words, she discovered that “following through was hard” because “people here are so busy.” Then, at the 1993 All Scientists LTER meeting, she “hit up” Jones with the idea of securing a postdoctoral appointment with the group. The results were hardly encouraging. Jones initially responded that she was “not ready for a postdoc” and had too many other pressing demands on her time. At a later meeting of the Ecological Society of America, nearly 2 years later, Johnson suggested the idea to Jones a second time, with more promising results. She followed up with a written proposal, and Jones suggested a few ideas she “might be interested in.” Johnson was particularly interested in working with Jones to learn her techniques of spatial analysis, to “take stream research to more of a landscape scale.” Johnson also approached Grant with similar ideas. Despite encouraging

\(^{28}\) Interview with Sherri Johnson, 1-3.
comments from both Jones and Grant, and despite Johnson’s contacts with some of the more prominent scientists in the group, they didn’t have a “specific project” for her and “nothing was really coming up.” Johnson, subsequently, wrote her own proposal to fund an independent position with the group, and concluded, “Persistence plays a big role in trying to work with a group like this, because they are so busy.”

The group had come a long way from its early years when Franklin and Dyrness searched for ways to attract more people to the Andrews Forest in a desperate bid to keep it open. By the time Johnson began sending out feelers in 1996, the phenomenon of someone seeking access to the group was so unremarkable that she had difficulty attracting attention. Even her direct contacts and ability to bring in her own funding did little to smooth her way or generate active support from leaders in the group. The Andrews, by that time, was an established, reputable, and enviable site with facilities that Johnson describes as “plush,” even by comparison with Hubbard Brook or Coweeta. It had a reputation for interdisciplinary exchange and collaborative relations with forest managers that was unique and particularly appealing to Johnson. The setting in the Northwest, and the potential for strengthening the link between basic and applied research also were major attractions. States in the Midwest, for example, offered more direct support for research and education, but Johnson wanted to be in the Northwest badly enough to move there on a soft-money appointment. Universities like OSU, she observed, “take advantage” of the attraction the region holds for people from other parts of the country. In Corvallis, she found other people, like herself, willing to build a career on a series of soft-money appointments. Johnson had not encountered that kind of enthusiasm in other places where she had worked. In that city, she found an environment, people, and community that encouraged a “more interdisciplinary” outlook. The work was “leading edge,” it was bigger than any one person, and the interaction between state and federal agencies on the OSU campus made it “interesting.” She also discovered a “physical environment” that encouraged people to interact in public spaces: “In Oklahoma no one was ever interested in what I was doing in streams. People [here] see me down in the stream and they go ‘What are you doing down there?’”

She also discovered a “physical environment” that encouraged people to interact in public spaces.

29 Interview with Sherri Johnson, 8.
30 Interview with Sherri Johnson, 9-10, 12-14, 20.
Community Concerns About Significance, Scale, and Focus, in Retrospect

Shared data, and the integration of new data with previous records, gave new meaning to earlier work at the Andrews Forest during the 1990s, and the group became more conscious of its history. Few of the people who worked there in the first few decades after it was established had expected their work to be the focus of controversial public debate. They certainly hoped, however, that it might inform management decisions. More than a generation after the first research studies were implemented at the Andrews Forest, those hopes were realized. Stafford’s unit integrated those and subsequent studies into the data-sharing network the group assembled in the last two decades of the 20th century. By the second decade of the LTER, the fundamental characteristics of the site, the people, and their research and management priorities were closely interrelated. It was a place transformed by a community. People there perceived the landscape through the lens of a constantly changing set of shared values. The changing face of that landscape inspired them, and their actions changed the place. They imposed a series of management templates on the Andrews Forest while documenting changes in that landscape. Their efforts produced a stream of data they openly shared with people beyond their own community. The group remade itself and the Andrews Forest in a process of coevolution that seemed natural to the changing membership of that community.

New scientific theories, management initiatives, and funding priorities, influenced the group’s perception of the place and the potential for research there. Even the ideal of appropriate research and its significance changed over time, along with the people and the place. By the end of the 20th century, the group was a prominent and influential community of established researchers and managers. It had a reputation that attracted people who expected their work to influence management decisions on regional, national, and global scales.

People interacted with each other and with the landscape of the Andrews in ways that helped them break down barriers among people from different agencies and academic disciplines. Scientists used the place to help them explain and demonstrate their ideas to forest managers. The place also helped forest managers explain their concerns and priorities to the research community and to the public, and to help them understand the practical implications of their ideas. People tested their theories in the real world of the Andrews Forest, in the company of other people who documented and analyzed the results. It was also a place where scientists could go to explore questions other people posed about natural processes, and it
was a place of education where people shared ideas with students at all levels. As more people became concerned about the possible effects of logging on streams, they demanded answers to those questions from public agencies. That political pressure encouraged scientists to study a broader range of issues. Some of the issues could be explored at the Andrews Forest, but others had to be examined on a larger landscape or across long spans of time. As a result, the group began exploring archival records and other research sites. The boundaries of their work expanded in time and space. The group’s studies, consequently, generated data that spanned greater distances and more years. Scientists scrambled to develop the tools they needed to handle the greater amount of data generated by that work and to understand and represent processes that worked on spatial and temporal scales so large that most people could not easily grasp their significance. Computer-generated models were especially appealing. The trend toward computerized manipulation of data, however, distanced the people who analyzed the data from the people who did the field work. The group tried to bridge that gap by developing a systematic procedure to encourage collaboration at an early stage, but that formal
process could not fully replace the physical experience of living and working under field conditions. Few scientists who began working at the Andrews Forest in the 1990s experienced what one scientist described as a 3-month field season living in a “stinky trailer” with clothes that never dried out. Gordon Grant suggests that without that visceral, physical experience, new recruits might miss out on something that helped forge the group’s character and emotional attachment to the Andrews as a real and unique place. “This,” Grant explains, “is where the science meets the river.”

The intimate link between people and place eroded as the program reached beyond the Andrews Forest and assumed a scale beyond the capacity of direct experience. Fewer of the people who joined the group in the 1990s spent as much time in the field as was common in earlier decades. A greater proportion of the group spent more time working with computers and archival records, writing papers, and going to meetings. Even those people who spent the majority of their time in the field often had limited firsthand knowledge of the projects others in the group had installed at the Andrews Forest or at other, remote sites. The Andrews was still a place where ideas encountered reality, but the group spent more time developing structured opportunities to take people out to that Forest on programmed tours. People in the group and other visitors, increasingly, had to be shown where the science met the river (and the forest) because for most of them, the science had grown beyond their own personal experience.

As the group adapted its tools and methods to the demands and possibilities of the computer age, people in the Andrews community worked to reconcile their professional lives with their personal experience. The experience of Gordon Grant illustrates the paradox of a place-centered community comprised of people who spend much of their time distant from that place. He is at once native and alien to the region and the Andrews Forest. Although he was born in New York, Grant’s childhood experiences in Oregon shaped his perceptions of Northwest rivers. And, although he grew up in Oregon, Grant headed east to learn new ways of thinking about rivers in the region he left behind. As a Forest Service scientist, he built intricate computer simulations from data describing processes across a matrix of time and space that no longer existed, except in human concept. He, nevertheless, eloquently articulates an ethic of personal experience in pursuit of scientific abstraction. He expresses an appreciation for the bond between people and the

31 Interview with small watersheds group, 12.
32 Interview with small watersheds group, 12-13.
landscape while acknowledging an innate sense of personal alienation and a lifetime quest for reconnection. During his childhood, shortly after Grant’s family moved to Oregon, they went to see the McKenzie River White Water Parade, held the weekend before fishing season opened. At that parade, Grant sat on the shore watching “drunks” go through the rapids, and thinking “how much I wanted to be on the river.” He found the whole experience “so different” from his background growing up in “very much an East Coast family,” and he was the only person in that family who “bonded” with the western landscape and the traditions linked with that region.33

Privilege, Access, and Authority in a Science-Based Community

The Andrews community was a welcoming environment for people with family backgrounds that encouraged a scientific bent but established difficult standards of accomplishment for their children. By the 1990s, that community included many people who had spent much of their lives learning to feel comfortable with their own heritage, and they found a home in this group. Like Moldenke, Waring, and many others in the group, Grant came from a family of high-achievers and academics, and he felt the pressure of their expectations. In an effort to step out from the shadow of his father, a developmental biologist at the University of Oregon, Grant sought his own level in the hydraulic West. After a brief stint at Reed College, a prestigious private school in the Willamette Valley, he dropped out to pursue a meandering career as a handyman and river guide in Oregon, California, and Idaho. After 5 years of introducing other people to nearby rivers, Grant found his calling. He returned to college at the University of Oregon and wrote an honors thesis exploring the people and ecology of the Willamette River. As he interviewed people on and about the river for that project, Grant also explored related science questions. In that context, he encountered Swanson during a campaign to establish an environmental studies program at the University of Oregon. Swanson later drew Grant into an association with that group.34

A prominent characteristic of the LTER cohort of the Andrews community was personal and professional mobility through high-profile academic programs and research facilities.

33 Interview with Gordon Grant, 1.
34 Interview with Gordon Grant, 2-3.
contacts that linked them directly or indirectly with the Andrews group. Grant joined that science community in the first decade of the LTER era and remained with the group through the end of the century. He spent 2 years after graduating from the University of Oregon presenting his thesis in a series of public slide shows in the Willamette Valley and then began graduate work at Johns Hopkins University, in Baltimore, Maryland. He admired the academic traditions of the Northeastern United States, and he “really wanted to go to the East Coast” to “test” his “affinities” for the academic lifestyle. He initially considered Yale and Cornell, but this child of a biochemist was an experienced river guide who had studied geomorphology with Swanson, and Swanson had links with the U.S. Geological Survey. Grant learned “through the grape vine” that Johns Hopkins was the place to go if he was interested in working with rivers at the U.S. Geological Survey.  

The elite academies of higher education on the East coast were an obvious place to build professional networks, and by the late 20th century, the Andrews Forest attracted people from those networks. At Hopkins, Grant worked with M. Gordon “Reds” Wolman, who “wrote the book” on the science of rivers. Grant’s connection with Wolman, and his chance encounter with Gordie Reeves, who worked at the Corvallis Forestry Sciences Laboratory, helped Grant renew his acquaintance with Swanson. These connections ultimately helped Grant secure funding and office space in the Corvallis Forestry Sciences Laboratory, where he worked while completing his doctoral degree from Johns Hopkins. He met Reeves at a barbeque after a run on the McKenzie River with a commercial rafting company, and in the course of their conversation, Reeves suggested Grant should look at some papers Swanson and Lienkaemper had written. Grant later wrote to Swanson, asking for copies of the papers. Swanson sent back the papers, asking, “What’s the Wolman group doing?” The “group,” to which Swanson referred, included Grant’s office mate at Hopkins, Julia Jones, who joined the Andrews community about a decade after Grant began his work at the Corvallis Forestry Sciences Laboratory. Grant later met Swanson at a symposium on the Mount St. Helens event, and during that encounter, Swanson suggested that if Grant wanted to do something in Oregon, Swanson would help him secure funding to support that work.  

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35 Interview with Gordon Grant, 4-5.
36 Interview with Gordon Grant, 5-6.
Transitioning into the Andrews group, for any new recruit, was more than a simple matter of securing funding. It was a mentoring process that introduced the new associate to other scientists in the community on terms that encouraged their interest and collaboration in his work. In Grant’s case, Swanson invited him to join a group of students on a field excursion to the Andrews, where Franklin, Waring, Sollins, Fredriksen, and Harr joined them to talk about their research projects. They assembled in a circle at a parking lot in Blue River, and they went around the circle introducing themselves to the group. Grant was particularly struck by the relative ease with which they welcomed him into their circle as a “walk-on from the East Coast.” The bewildering number and variety of people, personalities, and scientific interests at the Andrews could be disconcerting, but for someone who could identify a niche, it was also inviting. Grant spent most of his first day at the Andrews bouncing around logging roads in a van filled with other scientists and graduate students. He came away impressed with the variety of academic disciplines there and with an idea that he could find a niche as a river specialist. He quickly identified Gregory and Sedell as people with similar interests, but they tended to focus more on the habitat functions of the stream, whereas Grant was more focused on the “physical structure and dynamics of mountain streams.”
was interested in rapids, and how and why they formed, but he tried to link that interest to the habitat issues that concerned other people in the group who were ecologists, not geomorphologists.\footnote{Interview with Gordon Grant, 6-7.}

The expanding scale of the group’s research created new niches for people who joined the group in the last two decades of the century. Grant had previously considered the Andrews a place that focused mostly on small-scale, small-watershed issues. Sedell, Swanson, Gregory, and others, however, had taken their ideas beyond small watersheds with the river-continuum concept, and that shift created an opportunity for Grant to find a place in the group for his studies of the physical characteristics of larger rivers.\footnote{Interview with Gordon Grant, 7.} People like Grant found a place in the Andrews community by establishing rapport with others in the group who shared similar or compatible interests. They wove those individual relations into a web of interlocking affiliations. The assembled group functioned as an assortment of individual affiliations that were joined together from the bottom up, not from the top down, but they were not a random, or even self-selecting sample of the available talent in the broader scientific community beyond the Andrews.

**The Paradox of Structured Informality and the Myth of Accidental Community**

At its root, the group was a set of informal relations that combined into an ordered community capable of acting in its own, collective self-interest. Informal connections were more important than formal introductions or positions in the group. For some people, as with Johnson, only a concerted, determined effort enabled her to seize onto one of those threads of individual affiliation and use it to weave a fragile niche of belonging in the group. For others, such as Grant, access was a more simple, almost “natural” transition, in which the structured informality of their initiation seemed, from their perspective, virtually un-orchestrated. The informal tone of the monthly LTER meetings, the HJA Daze, and similar “pulses” fostered that illusion of unstructured ease, but these efforts required hard work and diligent commitment to the group. Leaders in the group held innumerable meetings behind the scenes, and many people spent much of their time on committee work, demonstrating a willingness to follow through, even at the sacrifice of personal goals. That leadership core succeeded largely because they were able to build the illusion of a self-regulating community, relatively shorn of bureaucratic trappings, wherein
individuals could pursue their own interests and freely collaborate, with impunity. The next cohort of Andrews associates, however, faced the difficult task of learning how to sustain this apparently unstructured, yet oddly permanent community. Most agreed that the Andrews Forest was the key ingredient to what made things work.

The group had constructed a dual identity for the Andrews Forest by the end of the 1990s. On the one hand, it was a developed place with urban amenities that could support a large population of scientists and staff. A developed system of roads linked dormitories, laboratories, meeting rooms, and conference halls with a mapped, plotted, surveyed, and documented outdoor laboratory. On the other, they promoted the “pristine” character of the place as a setting for spiritual renewal, mystical and professional inspiration, and reconnection with nature. They gave tours of the place that typically began at the headquarters site, where members of the group guided visitors through a maze of buildings, offices, meeting halls, and laboratories, then loaded them into vans and chauffeured them along developed roads to various points of interest and study sites, culminating in a lunch break at Carpenter Saddle. From there, guests could look down the Lookout Creek drainage to the west, and compare that landscape with the view of recently logged units on the Willamette National Forest to the east. By the late afternoon, they returned to the headquarters site for a barbecue or catered dinner in the outdoor pavilion. Students and other workers temporarily living in the surrounding dormitories often joined the festivities, and trails tempted visitors away from the headquarters site to explore stands of timber and riparian settings along the lower portion of Lookout Creek. It was a constructed landscape at once accessible, impressive, developed, and interpreted. It was a forest where carefully cultivated myths served a scientific purpose. Little in this place happened by accident.

Conclusion

The purpose of the Andrews Forest and group, by the late 1990s, was to provide a venue in which scientists could work collaboratively with forest managers to inform public policy and to promote the ideal of ecosystem management. Even as the group worked to sustain basic, long-term research, it was also working to demonstrate that ecosystem management could work on a landscape scale. The people involved in that effort often used the language of ecosystem management to describe how they became involved and why they stayed. They encouraged the idea among their visitors that the group was “self selecting,” had “naturally
evolved,” and that any effort to consciously manage people in that community would likely “wreck it.” Mechanisms of authority in the group were subtle, often hidden, and seldom openly discussed. Much happened behind the scenes, while loosely structured monthly meetings maintained the climate of informality, openness, and inclusiveness. Personal networks made it work, but as the number of people involved in the group increased, along with the amount of capital invested in the infrastructure projects at the Andrews Forest, people outside that community scrutinized those mechanisms more closely. The group was responsible for a site that served as a prototype for other parts of the LTER network. As one product of their involvement in that science-based network, the group promoted collaboration between managers and scientists, leading to policies that applied the most current concepts of ecological research. The useful fiction that people in the Andrews community were themselves an example of “natural” selection, ultimately conflicted with the idea that other sites could be managed along similar lines. The place was more prominent than in previous decades, and the political implications of ecosystem management forced the group to reexamine its own history and consciously plan its future.
Chapter Nine: An Ecosystem of Ideas Grounded in a Place of Inspiration

Throughout the history of the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest), applied studies were an important, sometimes dominant element of the research accomplished at that site. Since the early 1970s, however, people in the Andrews group tended to focus more on how the ecosystem actually functions and less on how foresters might maximize timber production or even manage forests for multiple uses and environmental protection. Broader issues and institutional priorities continue to inform, limit, or encourage people who worked at the Andrews Forest, and people in the group often express the hope that their work will inform public policy. Those concerns, however, do not sufficiently explain the group’s struggle to understand forest ecology and related ecosystem processes in that setting. These people were largely motivated by the firm conviction that they were doing necessary, interesting, and rewarding work.

A deep respect for the beauty of the Andrews Forest encouraged each person to believe that their work in that place mattered, and that sensibility grounded their science in the real world of that particular, forested landscape and the streams that coursed through it. Gregory observes that a visit to that place is an aesthetic and intellectual experience that motivates and rejuvenates people: “It has a diversity of old systems and young systems, and wet systems and dry systems, and has lots of pieces, but they’re also really valuable. They’re beautiful, aesthetically beautiful. They’re scientifically intriguing.” This character of the place, he argues, “stimulates us. Every time we go back, it charges our batteries.” The place, he suggests, contributes to the reputation of the group: “Reviewers come out and they see the Andrews … and they give it a nice look and then say, ‘Boy, this is so beautiful.’” That characteristic, he concludes, helps account for the group’s ability to attract people to soft-money appointments: “If you’re sitting in Blacksburg, Virginia, you don’t get many opportunities to sit next to a creek in a 500-year-old forest.

On the landscape of the Andrews, people developed long-term working relationships and partnerships that facilitated work across disciplines and in partnership with people in different administrative structures. Those relationships helped the group weather the ups and downs of funding that were constantly in flux. They promoted a sustaining outlook that merged persistence on key research themes with attentiveness to the issues of the day. In similar ways, those long-term, working relationships supported the consensus-oriented, leadership style that
the group embraced as a cultural ideal and attempted to implement as an operative reality. Perhaps most importantly, those continuing attributes were punctuated by periods of recruitment, when new people joined the group, infusing it with new energy, enthusiasm, and creative ideas in a community that idealized, and attempted to realize, an ethic of respectful, shared leadership, careful stewardship, and collaborative decisionmaking.

The Andrews Forest and Community, in Retrospect, 1948 to 1998

Scientists learned from their early experiences at the Andrews Forest that as long as they depended on support from just one institution, their programs were vulnerable. Silen, for example, built strong personal and professional ties with local residents in the vicinity of Blue River while installing long-term studies he intended to continue through the end of his career. In the end, however, the Forest Service summarily reassigned Silen, and discontinued many of the studies he began there. His successors, Rothacher, Franklin, and Dyrness, seldom engaged the local community in Blue River as they battled agency proposals to undercut or terminate support from the Pacific Northwest Research Station (PNW Station) for the Andrews. They lived in proximity with district staff at Blue River, but they kept their distance from those national forest colleagues and focused, instead, on marketing the place to scholars at Oregon State University (OSU). They promoted its potential for significant research and they invited anyone who was interested to join their group. They hosted brown-bag seminars in Corvallis to encourage interdisciplinary exchange, but they found stronger common ground at the Andrews. In that place, they built a sense of shared community on a foundation of volunteerism, enthusiasm, personal connections, and commitment to scientific research. People participated because they “caught the vision,” but individual enthusiasm wasn’t enough to sustain the group. They needed funding and other resources. To sustain their science goals, the group built links with national and international associates.

Funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF) strengthened the group during the International Biological Programme (IBP), but that infusion of resources favored basic research over applied studies. The NSF support attracted new people to the group and strengthened its ties with other IBP sites and academic programs. The IBP funding structure, however, was not sustainable, and it included NSF oversight that required a more structured framework for coordinating the group’s work at the Andrews. The IBP project also attracted a new cohort of scientists
accustomed to working in more-established and formalized research programs. Waring, who emerged from that cohort, helped the group link its community traditions with the more structured lines of responsibility that were required for managing projects funded through NSF. Under his leadership, people who failed to “catch” the revised vision of efficiency and productivity lost access to funding. Professionalism was more important than volunteerism by the early 1980s.

The late 1970s and early 1980s were years of retrenchment, winnowing, and renewal that centered on the problem of upgrading facilities to support ongoing research at the Andrews Forest. Franklin and McKee led a smaller core of Andrews collaborators in this effort. Under their leadership, the group emphasized the need for long-term commitment to productive science. They fostered a group ethic of personal sacrifice and interdisciplinary collaboration that maximized the utility of funding secured through various grants and programs. Their initial “facilities” proposal to the NSF emphasized the group’s earlier research accomplishments with only skeletal facilities and the trademark virtues of volunteerism, minimalism, and efficiency at the Andrews.

The Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) and related programs attracted a new cohort of associates to the Andrews who arrived in the 1980s, often without prior experience. With their help, the revitalized group built a paradoxical system: they established long-term programs of research with short-term funding and staffed them with fixed-term, “soft-money” appointments. They also struggled to define a new model of leadership more appropriate to their evolving identity. The group included people with a more diverse assortment of specialties and training than in previous years, and they pursued multiple threads of research too diverse for any one person to direct. Several new leaders assumed more authority, and several former leaders either left the group or continued in less dominant roles. Those who led the group through this period continued Franklin’s concept of periodic “pulses” of scientific energy focused on a specific landscape in an effort to promote a collaborative environment for intellectual inquiry. They also transformed the monthly LTER meetings into a regular touchstone for their increasingly dispersed community of cooperating scientists and forest managers. They encouraged a group ethic of concerted, self-conscious community-building: collaborative community was hard work, but it was also necessary and rewarding work.

The group’s structure of long-term research supported with short-term funding depended on cooperative relations among the Willamette National Forest, PNW Station, and OSU. Station scientists, staff, technicians, university faculty, and
students in Corvallis supplied the critical mass of forest and stream science expertise, academic credibility, and access to physical resources. The Willamette National Forest staff at Blue River supplied management expertise vital to accomplishing LTER and other research goals. Scientists at the Andrews Forest began to seek opportunities for working more closely with forest managers, and Kerrick encouraged those efforts as forest supervisor for the Willamette National Forest. The result was a more confident and assertive scientific community that enthusiastically embraced applied research and collaborated with forest managers.

Many people who joined the group in the 1980s came from other LTER programs where researchers had access to more well-equipped field research facilities than were available at the Andrews. The place attracted people interested in the work the group was doing there, rather than people who were impressed with the creature comforts of the place. Their connections with leaders at other LTER sites helped the group integrate programs at the Andrews with related work at those other research facilities. These factors, and the eruption of Mount St. Helens, helped the group expand its geographic focus. Swanson personified the new profile of the group, with a broad-ranging, interdisciplinary background and experience with a variety of collaborative programs of research from the east coast to the tropics and in the West. Together with McKee, he merged the enthusiasm of the IBP experience with the spirit of open inquiry, the mission-focused professionalism of those who joined the Andrews group to begin the LTER work, and the place-grounded science and localized identity that had anchored the group since 1948.
As national leaders debated various strategies for securing habitat for the northern spotted owl, Andrews associates moved their discussions beyond the owl to include broad landscape themes. They rapidly coalesced around a more diffuse assortment of leaders, notably including Swanson, McKee, Burditt, and Cissel, who added a broader, national perspective to the management side of the collaborative group at Blue River. These leaders managed the group’s transition from studiously vague and informal traditions to a more formalized framework of interaction more closely aligned with what the cohort of scientists recruited to the Andrews during the 1980s had experienced at other LTER sites.

Capital projects transformed the headquarters site and the group during the 1990s. People who joined the group in this period worked for an established program with a visually impressive, physical infrastructure of lab facilities, dormitories, meeting rooms, roads, plots, reference stands, flumes, gages, and well-documented, long-term experiments. They could draw on a half-century of continuous records from monitoring, intensive mapping efforts, experimental studies, prolific publication, and photographic collections. The group also had a sophisticated system for managing data and for seamlessly integrating new studies with previous work. It was an influential group, with members on presidential advisory panels that shaped federal policy for regional application (the Northwest Forest Plan) and with national and international implications.

At the local scale, the group waged a campaign to secure a tenured appointment for Mark Harmon and established him as a prominent leader of the Andrews community. Harmon subsequently gained appointment in 1999, making a professional leap from soft-money, postdoctoral funding to an endowed position as a tenured full professor and Richardson Chair in Forest Science at OSU. Harmon’s appointment was not assured, despite his record of professional success and the full support of the group. Minutes from the monthly LTER meetings also indicate the search was “exceptionally competitive.” The appointment positioned Harmon to “fully take over” leadership of the LTER as principal investigator for the NSF LTER grant, replacing Swanson in that role in 1999.1

By the end of the century, the group managed real assets of human and physical capital capable of arousing envy and resentment. Critics included the writer, Alston Chase, who prominently featured people associated with the group in his

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Necessary Work: Discovering Old Forests, New Outlooks, and Community on the Andrews Forest

Figure 60—An annual gathering of associates of the Andrews group took on the appearance of a large family reunion, as evident in this group photo of “HJA Daze” participants in 2000 at the headquarters site on the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest.

polemical attack on the concept of ecosystem management.\(^2\) Closer to home, Sherri Johnson, who joined the group after prior experience at the Luquillo Experimental Forest in Puerto Rico, had to cope with envious, if admiring colleagues at that LTER site who insinuated she was joining a group of well-funded “elitists” at the Andrews Forest.\(^3\) The group struggled to reconcile its idealized past of virtuous self-sacrifice with its real character in the 1990s, when it enjoyed an almost embarrassing wealth of resources by comparison with earlier years and with many other research sites. Amidst programmed celebrations commemorating the 40- and 50-year anniversaries of the experimental forest, most people in the group continued to espouse the ideal of a self-selecting, naturally adjusting, organic community, and one member, whose involvement dated back to the IBP years darkly warned, “If we look too closely at how this thing works, we’ll wreck it.”

Scientific Method and the Spirit of Inquiry

The group’s effort to understand its own past, despite some uncertainty about how that effort might affect the functioning of this science-based community, was part of its long-term planning process. In the late 1990s, the group commissioned a community history, scheduled conferences to commemorate the forest’s 50\(^{th}\)


\(^3\) Interview with Sherri Johnson, 23.
anniversary, and convened a “futuring” session. In these ways, people in the group explored the intersections of their past, present, and future in an effort to define and understand the character of a community that had consciously avoided formal definition. That effort demonstrated the group’s collaborative style of leadership and its shared sense of stewardship for the Andrews and the legacy of prior work there. By the end of the 20th century, people who worked together at the Andrews joined a community of scientists and forest managers with a shared commitment to research with an applied purpose.

For more than 50 years, people sought inspiration and validation for their scientific and policy ideas at the Andrews Forest. In this place, scientific hypotheses inspired experimental manipulations that changed the landscape, and the group monitored the results. In the process, people in that group articulated their separate visions into collaborative action. They combined scientific insight, managerial initiative, and personal networks. They gained insights about how ecosystems function, developed theories about adaptive management, and applied them on a landscape
scale. In a sense, it was an act of self-realization. The Andrews group, like the ecosystems they studied, functioned as a complex system of dynamic interaction among interdependent networks. It was an ecosystem of ideas and actions, and what seemed natural within the group also seemed like an obvious strategy for managing the landscape centering their community. Together, they linked scientific inquiry at the Andrews Forest with people, place, and community. Their efforts contributed to the emergence of “ecosystem management” as a guiding policy in the Forest Service before the end of the 20th century.

The Real World of the Andrews Forest

A shared commitment to the real world brings everything home for the Andrews Forest and group. The group is built around a shared body of knowledge that is linked with a particular place. With unprecedented resources and an expanding network of qualified expertise, the group constructed a dual identity for the Andrews Forest at the end of the 20th century: It was a developed place with urban amenities that could support a large population of scientists and staff in dormitories with kitchens, onsite laboratories, meeting rooms, large conference halls, and a developed system of roads linking these facilities with a mapped, plotted, and carefully surveyed and documented outdoor laboratory. As Fred Swanson observes, however, the group provides a context that amounts to more than the sum of these parts. It is an organic community that collectively sustains and builds on a body of knowledge that is the product of thousands of scientist-years of work encapsulated in writings and oral traditions. That body of knowledge includes countless informal exchanges—stories told in hundreds of field trips, in classrooms, and in student advisement sessions that survive largely in oral traditions and memories of face-to-face conversations. The Andrews Forest is a physical reminder of those conversations—a totem of sorts with multiple faces. For many people in the group it was a “pristine” setting for spiritual renewal, mystical and professional inspiration, and reconnection with nature. It was, however, also a constructed landscape at once accessible, impressive, developed, and interpreted. Most importantly, it was a place where pragmatic and thoughtful people frequently congregate to test their ideas against each other and in a real-world setting. The Andrews Forest is a real place, but it is also an idea and an ideal that transcends that place and encourages people to think more critically about the world in which they live, and the ecological processes of which they are a part.
Acknowledgments

Many people provided support, assistance, guidance, and access without which this book would not have been possible. In addition to the numerous people who agreed to sacrifice a significant amount of their time to make themselves available for the oral history interviews, as cited throughout the text, many other people provided significant behind-the-scenes support and encouragement. The project originated with the group’s decision in 1996 to commission a history of the Andrews Forest to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the experimental forest. A steering committee comprised of Fred Swanson, Art McKee, Al Levno, Ted Dyrness, Martha Brookes, and Cindy Miner provided invaluable guidance during early meetings that framed the focus, structure, and approach of the work as based on oral history interviews of various, representative voices. A subset of that committee, notably including Swanson, McKee, Dyrness, and Brookes, reviewed an initial prospectus and preliminary outlines for the book and suggested needed revisions and possible alternatives. Swanson, McKee, and Dyrness were especially helpful in facilitating early communication with potential interview candidates and secured office space and funding to support the project. Swanson, McKee, Dyrness, and Brookes also provided detailed edits on multiple drafts of the manuscript, suggesting many useful insights and details that helped flesh out murky discussions, and tactfully suggesting areas in which the manuscript was veering off into confused terrain.

Fred Swanson also brainstormed and authored the sidebars that accompany each chapter, with the support of Kathryn Ronnenberg, who converted ideas and text into a visually integrated reality of graphics and explanatory materials. Theresa Valentine put together maps and revised into a more printable format (see inside the front cover of this book) the complex timeline that the Andrews group collaboratively generated, graphically depicting the chronological development of work at the Andrews Forest and the different players who related to various themes of research at that site, over time. Al Levno and Ted Dyrness were indefatigable in locating and identifying a wide range of relevant photos to support the work, and Martha Brookes and Don Henshaw also tracked down photos from their personal collections and donated them to the Forest Science Data Bank for publication in this work. Suzanne Remillard pulled together widely scattered photographs selected from various formats and collections into a more systematic, CD-based collection that facilitated final photo selection, placement, and crediting. Tami Lowry coordinated final preparation of the manuscript, and facilitated communications with
production staff at PNW Station. Carolyn Wilson skillfully shepherded the manuscript through final production stages. A staff of 12 transcriptionists, whose names appear in the footnotes in connection with the particular transcripts on which they worked, supported early efforts to move the interviews from the original tapes into a more accessible form for review and analysis in a timely and efficient manner. It would be impossible to list all of the other people who supported this project in innumerable ways over the past few years, but I am especially grateful for Cindy Miner’s unwavering support for this project, and for supporting the history series at PNW Station. It is also impossible to exaggerate Fred Swanson’s unwavering support and enthusiasm for the project, and I am especially grateful for the many thoughtful insights and tactful comments that he has provided over these past 9 years. Our innumerable, casual conversations over that time, have advanced my understanding of matters that go far beyond the scope of this book. I have, therefore, incurred a debt in the course of this project that would be impossible to repay. In a project lasting more than 10 years, finally, I am deeply indebted to my spouse, Gilda, and my daughter, Mitra, who have sacrificed much to this effort.

**Metric Equivalents**

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**Note on Sources**

As documented throughout the text, this book is largely based on oral history interviews conducted by the author during 1997 and 1998, and on a large collection of primary, unpublished documents, including administrative memos, letters, and other uncatalogued, manuscript records to which the Andrews group provided the author open access. These records are currently held in the Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) library room at the PNW Station Forestry Science Laboratory in
Corvallis, Oregon. In addition to this collection of primary materials, the LTER library room also houses a large quantity of “gray literature”—official reports and records—generated by members of the Andrews group over the years. Some of these were published as internal reports by various agencies and organizations. Others were simply unpublished papers and reports filed for administrative purposes only.

Beyond these primary collections, this study relied on several published bibliographies of research associated with the Andrews Forest, which provided a helpful, chronological summary of significant publications linked with the people whose names surfaced in oral history interviews. The published articles and monographs listed in those bibliographies were also available in the Forestry Sciences Laboratory storeroom, and they documented, from the authors’ perspectives, the purpose, results, and significance of their research.


On the same Web site for the Andrews Forest (the Andrews Forest Home page), the “Data” link http://www.fsl.orst.edu/lter/data.cfm?topnav=8 provides access to the Forest Science Data Bank (FSDB). This FSDB link includes, among other resources, a link to the “Image Library” http://www.fsl.orst.edu/lter/data/cd_pics/cd_lists.cfm?topnav=116 and provides ready access to the photos that were selected for use in this book. They are listed by the 3-letter CD reference code (e.g., AAC, AAD, etc.) that forms the prefix for each photo cited in this work (e.g., AAA_001). The site also includes a link to the data-use policy for data posted on the FSDB: http://www.fsl.orst.edu/lter/data/access.cfm?topnav=98#CITATION.

The Web site includes a cross-referenced system of searchable links. Records and files generated in the course of this oral history project are also scheduled to be deposited in the Forestry Sciences Laboratory Library with links to the FSDB.

The sidebars, which appear in each of the main chapters, were authored for this book by Fred Swanson, with graphics developed for this book by Kathryn Ronnenberg. The citations in those sidebars refer to the following publications:


Afterward (by Fred Swanson)

This book examines the history of the community of scientists and land managers working at the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest (Andrews Forest) though its first 50 years. Since the 50th anniversary of the Andrews Forest in 1998, the context and composition of the Andrews Forest community and program have changed in major ways, yet retain their essential mission and character. The summary themes in the “Conclusions” of Max Geier’s history of the research and management communities of the Andrews Forest provide useful dimensions for charting how the program, the Andrews Forest group, and the larger contexts in which they function, evolved in the 1998–2005 period.

The place

The Andrews Forest itself remained a compelling, charismatic landscape. The towering Douglas-fir forests, with lush drapery of lichens and moss and the fast, cold streams reminded scientists and land managers why their work was important, and why to continue even in periods of bureaucratic and other struggles. From the time of Roy Silen there remained a sense of, “We do this work in this place for this place.”

The people

The Andrews Forest remained a seedbed for discovery built on the foundation of long-term working relationships among scientists and land managers. Continuing overlap of generations of scientists and managers working at the Andrews Forest sustained the core culture of the program. For example, the spread of years in which the signatory principal investigators (PIs) on the Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) grant for 2002-2008 first began working at the Andrews Forest spanned nearly three decades: Swanson (1972), Harmon (1981), Jones (1989), Johnson (1996), and Barbara Bond (1999). Processes, such as preparation of the LTER renewal grant proposal, were important opportunities for collaboration and for evolution of a team’s work culture.

Over the 1998-2005 period, leadership of the research program shifted from scientists whose roots with the Andrews Forest began in the International Biological Programme (IBP) era of the 1970s and in the early years of LTER to those whose first contact with the forest began in the early 1990s, or even more recently. In this period, the duties of forest director passed from Art McKee to Kari O’Connell; those of LTER PI passed from Fred Swanson to Mark Harmon to
Barbara Bond (starting in 2006); and those of lead Pacific Northwest Research Station (PNW Station) scientist passed from Fred Swanson to Sherri Johnson. New Oregon State University (OSU) scientists and science leaders stepped forward to direct important areas of research, such as Roy Haggerty (geosciences), Kate Lajtha (botany and plant pathology), Jeff McDonnell (forest engineering), and Elizabeth Sulzman (crop and soil science). In the Willamette National Forest, where change in leadership is typically more frequent than in science positions, John Cissel and then Jim Mayo passed duties as research liaison to Cheryl Friesen; Mary Allison assumed duties as ranger of the McKenzie River Ranger District (the combined Blue River and McKenzie Ranger Districts) from John Allen, and Dallas Emch became supervisor of the Willamette National Forest.

Despite all this change, the main partnerships among workers in a given field, among disciplines, and between research and land management remained strong and productive.

Leadership and Organization

As the scope and complexity of the Andrews Forest facilities and operations has grown over the history of the forest, leadership roles for the various parts of the program were distributed across a core group of Forest Service and university leaders making decisions on a consensus basis. This pattern persisted in the 1998-2005 period, but the players shifted. Under the leadership of Mark Harmon as LTER PI, the science team conducted business in a consistent series of meetings scheduled over each year. The Executive Committee, composed of signatory PIs plus the forest director, dealt with core management issues for the LTER program. A “PI Powwow” of all investigators who manage research budgets was held twice a year to cover budget planning (November) and research planning (May). Regular, monthly meetings, open to all interested participants, continued to be the main venue for conducting general business and for the Executive Committee to hear from the group. The group continued other important opportunities to communicate internally and externally, including the annual June field day for sharing findings in the forest and the annual, day-long symposium on campus in the winter. In addition, the research liaison managed quarterly meetings to guide the work of the research-management partnership. Representatives of the leadership of the Willamette National Forest, Eugene office of the Bureau of Land Management, and the research community took part in these sessions.
The Andrews Forest LTER program has demonstrated its importance as a training ground for science leadership. Such a program attracted people who like working in interdisciplinary groups and addressing larger, socially-relevant questions. Work in this environment encouraged an intellectually and fiscally entrepreneurial spirit and collaboration across wide-ranging networks of colleagues. Participants in the Andrews Forest program built on the spirit and leadership experience there to become leaders in other programs, such as a new, OSU program in Ecosystem Informatics (applications of math and computer sciences in the ecological sciences) funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the university, and new national science initiatives to develop networks of ecological and hydrological observatories.

**Shifting Context**

The major regional and national science, management, and policy themes at the time of the 50th anniversary of the Andrews Forest persisted through 2005, but with notable developments. Science and policy issues related to global change, especially climate and land use change, remained dominant. Federal forest policy was still governed by the Northwest Forest Plan, which entered its second decade with a series of retrospective assessments revealing low rates of forest cutting, continued decline of the northern spotted owl despite increases in the extent of old-forest habitat, and other expected or surprising findings. Thus, topics with roots in basic science in the Andrews Forest in the 1970s reemerged as focal points of public debate and policy in 1998–2005. This historical perspective raises the question of what current work may have major impact on science and policy in the future. The Blue River Landscape Study, based in part on use of natural disturbance regimes in landscape planning, for example, may contribute an approach that complements planning that emphasizes the needs of individual species. This work may influence future policy decisions with impact similar to the 1970s work on old growth and northern spotted owls.

But the future of forestry in the region remains quite uncertain: What will be the level of harvest from federal, state, and private lands in the context of a shifting global marketplace, changing attitudes of citizens of the region, and other factors? How will disturbance regimes of fire, insects, and other processes adjust to a changing climate? How will altered disturbance regimes affect forests and watersheds? How will these aspects of changing social and environmental conditions affect the relevance and usefulness of different research paths? The uncertainty enveloping these questions seems to grow rather than diminish with time.
Large-scale planning and science programs with a footprint that includes the Andrews Forest and Andrews Forest scientists provide a context for exploring new research themes. For example, the Willamette River Basin Futures Project (Baker et al. 2004), led by David Hulse (University of Oregon) and Stan Gregory, examined the history of ecological change in the watershed over the past few centuries and projected the consequences of three policy scenarios 50 years into the future. Major programs on the horizon that have already engaged scientists who work at the Andrews Forest include the National Ecological Observatory Network, Hydrological Observatories of the Consortium for Advancement of the Hydrological Sciences, Inc., and revision of management plans for national forest of the region and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon. Participation in such large-scale programs shows the relevance of the Andrews Forest program as a source of concepts and technical knowledge. This work in large-scale projects provides opportunities to extend and test concepts broadly, and it stimulates thinking about new topics and new terrain.

Study Themes: Persistence–Flexibility

As of 2005, the Andrews Forest program continued to balance persistence on perennial themes with attentiveness to the socially and scientifically relevant issues of the day. In terms of persistence, the dominant research themes of the LTER grant renewed in 2002 had been major themes at the Andrews Forest for several decades: water; forest dynamics; disturbance by fire, floods, and other processes; cycling of carbon and nutrients; and biological diversity. Applied research in 1998-2005 focused on continuing the Blue River Landscape Plan and Study and silviculture studies initiated earlier in the 1990s.

Several new science and education programs originating in this period built on the foundations of earlier work; highlights included:

- Barbara Bond and Mike Unsworth secured NSF funding to take a fresh view of small, experimental watersheds with more than 50 years of hydrology research. They are investigating the watersheds as airsheds by sampling the chemistry of cool air draining out of the watersheds in order to measure respiration in the entire forest ecosystem of the watershed.

- Sherri Johnson, Stan Gregory, and Linda Ashkenas have led the Andrews Forest component of the Lotic Intersite Nitrogen Experiment (LINX), involving many natural ecosystems across the United States and sites of intensive land use, even cities. Isotopically labeled nitrogen is introduced to
Necessary Work: Discovering Old Forests, New Outlooks, and Community on the Andrews Forest

streams and its fate is tracked downstream and into the adjacent terrestrial plant and animal communities. The LINX study revealed high rates of nitrogen uptake in streams and also transfer of nitrogen from streamwater into terrestrial vegetation and animals rather far removed from the stream.

• Julia Jones, Mark Harmon, and others capitalized on the long, strong history of information management in the Andrews Forest program to initiate a new graduate education program in Ecosystem Informatics, which brings together math, computer sciences, and earth and ecological sciences from a dozen departments in OSU. This new program, funded by NSF through an Integrated Graduate Education and Research Training grant and the university, will train dozens of Ph.D. students and pioneer cross-disciplinary work among faculty.

• Fred Swanson and Kathleen Dean Moore (Philosophy, OSU), Director of the Spring Creek Project for Ideas, Nature, and the Written Word, developed a new collaboration between the Andrews Forest ecosystem group and nature writers. This program, termed Long Term Ecological Reflections and conducted in parallel with Long Term Ecological Research, engages the practical knowledge of environmental sciences, the clarity of philosophical analysis, and the expressive power of the written word to find new ways to understand our relation with the natural world. Just like scientists, writers visit the forest, collect observations, and publish their findings. The writers visit long-term ecological reflection plots, such as a site in Mark Harmon’s 200-year log composition experiment. In that setting the first writer in residence, Robert Michael Pyle (2004), wrote that taking the long view in ecological research and reflection requires “faith in the future—even if you won’t be there to see it for yourself. … Maybe looking to the future is a way of hoping there will still be something to see when we get there. Maybe it’s the only way to make sure of it.” A fitting description of the spirit of work at the Andrews Forest.

Financial Picture

The funding picture for the Andrews Forest program has a long history of ups and downs, relying on base-level funding from the principal partner institutions, but new initiatives and even many ongoing, long-term projects have relied on the uncertain world of competitive grants. During the 1998–2005 period, budget crunches affected each of the partner institutions—PNW Station, Willamette
National Forest, and OSU. The national forest substantially reduced staffing and services, mainly as a consequence of the reduced amount of timber cut from the national forest after 1990. Funding of OSU and the PNW Station also tightened in general because of stable or declining budgets and increased costs. Perhaps the most tenuous funding situation was the research-management partnership, particularly for the adaptive management area, which supported several long-term studies of management of landscapes and young forest plantations. Despite the sometimes gloomy financial climate, leaders of each institution continued to express strong support for the Andrews Forest program.

Accomplishments

The Andrews Forest program was highly productive in the 1998-2005 period in both traditional ways and in addressing themes new to the group. A constant stream of journal articles and communications to a more general readership emerged from the Andrews Forest. Jon Luoma (1999, 2006), a freelance writer, published *The Hidden Forest: The Biography of an Ecosystem* describing the process of discovery about forest ecosystems using work at the Andrews Forest as the dominant example of how the work is done and what has been discovered. Leaders in the Andrews group were major players in regional, national, and international efforts to synthesize and communicate state-of-knowledge ideas on diverse themes, including wood in rivers of the world (Gregory et al. 2003), the social and ecological history and potential futures of the Willamette River basin in western Oregon (Baker et al. 2004, Hulse et al. 2002), road ecology (Forman et al. 2003), and use of bioregional assessments in the Pacific Northwest and elsewhere in the United States (Johnson et al. 1999). Studies in the research-management partnership, especially the Blue River Landscape Plan and Study (Cissel et al. 1999), which explores the use of forest history to guide management, continued to draw interest in terms of possible influence on future approaches to forest landscape management.

The Future

Clearly the traditions of the Andrews Forest continue, beginning with the inspiration drawn from the beautiful forest landscape itself, which remains a strong physical and intellectual rallying point that nurtures and stimulates the community. The tradition of balancing long-term persistence in basic research with the need to address science and management issues of the day has been sustained through several
generations of researchers and land managers working in close partnership. The many benefits of working in this close partnership and the significance of the Andrews Forest LTER program as a training ground for science leadership have become more evident over the years. Openness to exploring new approaches in science and education, and new linkages with the humanities, have enlivened the program over the years, and recent developments are in keeping with this tradition. The successes achieved through these aspects of the Andrews Forest program reinforce the importance of keeping them a part of standard operating practice in the Andrews Forest group in the future. In sum, the Andrews Forest program continues with the necessary work.

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