

Resources and Strategies of Interest Groups and Industry Representatives Involved in Federal Forest Policy

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This study analyzes the resources and strategies of public interest groups and industry representatives involved in federal forest policy in the state of Oregon during the early 1990s. While many studies have examined the role of interest groups in the policy process, few have compared empirically the resources available and strategies pursued by industry representatives and public interest groups in a particular policy domain. Utilizing survey data from 133 business representatives and 326 public interest groups involved in federal forest policy, the study argues that public interest group influence derives primarily from the ability to mobilize human resources; the financial resources of these groups tend to be modest. Industry and industry-supported groups, in contrast, possess considerable financial power while enjoying less support from the public. Consequently, industry interests tend to focus their efforts on more traditional forms of influence such as the persistent lobbying of natural resource agencies and elected officials. Public interest groups, in contrast, tend to devote considerable efforts to building public support in urban core areas to build the capacity to pressure governmental decision-makers.

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INTRODUCTION

In the twentieth century, timber has been the primary product extracted from forested areas in the Pacific Northwest. However, management for timber production over other forest values has become a subject of increasing controversy and litigation as the effects of timber primacy on wildlife, fish, and the long-term sustainability of forests and their associated human communities have become evident.¹ Local, regional and national interests and policy advocates from the research/academic realm urge a varied and often contradictory set of policy recommendations on federal and state governments and natural resource agencies. "The timber crisis" solutions offered range from proposals to continue near historic levels of timber cutting to those which would drastically reduce human intrusion into forests, particularly on federal lands.

In response to this policy quandary, the Clinton Administration formed the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) in 1993. FEMAT's purpose was to assemble the most pertinent scientific and socioeconomic information available about late-successional forests on federal lands within the habitat range of the northern spotted owl; it also was to develop alternatives for resource management that would assess the extent of forest reserves needed for habitat protection and adapt the rules for management of them to achieve a balance between species protection and human population needs. The group issued a draft environmental impact statement that identified a range of general management alternatives, each of which estimated risks to late successional species, ecosystems, wild fish habitat, timber harvest, and regional economic development.² One of the alternatives identified by the team (Option 9) was ultimately selected as the preferred management approach by the federal government. However, the team's plan has become the subject of continuing controversy, and it has been submerged in the continuing political debate about old growth forests and endangered species protection.

One might argue that decision-making processes used to allocate forest resources are inherently incapable of fostering the long-term sustainability of forests and forest communities.³ These adversarial processes encourage commodity interests and nature protective citizen groups to struggle with each other and natural resource planning agencies over the disposition of timber, wildlife, fish, and human resources. A wide array of such groups exists, and their methods of analyzing resource alternatives and of influencing forest policy are quite diverse.⁴ Not only do these groups tend to frame ecological and social problems differently, but they also tend to use organizational personnel, financial resources, and time in different ways to achieve their policy objectives.

Historically, a tight community of forest policy makers, natural resource agencies, and commodity interests largely determined the direction of federal natural resource policy.⁵ This policy process has been described as an "iron triangle" or a "subgovernment."⁶ In recent years, however, new groups and interests have entered the process, often challenging the status quo and sometimes leading to considerable policy unpredictability.⁷ An outcome of this development in the Pacific Northwest frequently has been virtual paralysis in the implementation of traditional harvest-oriented forest policy, and the introduction of considerable inconsistency in forest management practices.

All of this political change and continuing dialog over policy direction for the future suggests a policy area facing continuing flux and unpredictability. Because of this continuing uncertainty over ultimate outcomes, it is important to understand the strategies and resources likely to be used by industry and public interest groups in the forest resource policy process in the coming years. It has been noted quite properly that disequilibrium in society or in a specific policy arena is typically a stimulant to interest group formation and heightened group activity.⁸

Some observers have suggested that under disequilibrium conditions public interest groups, such as those organizations composing the environmental movement, often serve as important mechanisms for pressing the public's concerns in scientifically and technically complex policy areas such as natural resource management.⁹ The advocacy role taken by public interest groups is frequently framed in the context of the information sharing function interest groups perform in modern, postindustrial democracies¹⁰—activities which Paul Pross characterizes as “communication”¹¹ and Jeffery Berry labels “educating the public.”¹² Industry organizations, on the other hand, often command substantial financial resources at their disposal to influence the policy process. According to some observers,¹³ this often gives business a privileged position in the American policy process:

...both legislators and the administration in power are especially eager to please those in the business community because they don't want to suffer the electorate's wrath after an economic turndown.¹⁴

To be sure, industry also influences the public by providing information and communicating its policy preferences. This is especially true in the policy area of public lands featuring national forests. With approximately three-fourths of the public now identifying themselves as “environmentalists” and 44 percent opposing harvesting of timber on federal lands,¹⁵ the natural resource industry has a vested short- and long-term interest in taking its case for continued access for harvest to the public.

In the context of policy area flux and the high level of environmental awareness among the American public, public interest groups exercise substantial influence upon public natural resource decisions despite fewer financial resources because of their grassroots support organizations and because of greater “value congruence” with the general public. Environmental groups tend to succeed in the policy process because of their “elite challenging” orientation and their ability to gain passage of laws which maintain avenues for citizen involvement and legal challenge to how forest resources are being managed on public lands. We hypothesize that industry, in contrast, focuses much of its effort on traditional forms of influence such as lobbying agency personnel and elected officials.

The following sections explore in greater depth the social, political and economic forces leading to the current context within which natural resource interests now operate. That exploration begins with a discussion of the growth of elite challenging politics and its implications for natural resource policy processes. Next, we discuss the organizational resources and strategies pursued by industry and public interest groups and explore the potential implications of these resources and strategies for the natural resource policy arena. Data utilized in this study are from an interest group and indus-

try survey conducted in 1992. Industry and interest groups involved in the federal forest planning process in at least one of Oregon's thirteen national forests were included in the study.

ELITE CHALLENGING POLITICS AND NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY

Recent studies of public participation in advanced industrial societies have suggested that a new style of politics has emerged over the course of the last several decades.¹⁶ This new style of politics is characterized in major part by an expansion of the parameters of appropriate political action beyond reliance upon conventional political channels. Some commentators argue that support for new modes of participation arise out of sociopolitical changes occurring in the postwar period.¹⁷ Economic growth, prosperity and political stability have given rise to new demands on government by an increasingly knowledgeable public. It has been further argued that contemporary grassroots citizen organizations and social movements are more likely than those of older generations to engage in "elite challenging" political activities such as demonstrations and boycotts.¹⁸

Contemporary political conflicts arising over increasingly complex issues have generated many new interest groups which draw citizens into the political process via single issue concerns. One such policy area featuring this type of political conflict is the domain of natural resource management.¹⁹ Traditionally, in the U.S. the management of natural resources was a process largely insulated from public examination.²⁰ By the 1970s, however, widespread concern regarding the proper management of natural resources was in evidence.²¹ Environmental organizations proliferated in the U.S. and many postindustrial democracies, and their activities entailed mobilizing citizens, challenging traditional natural resource management practices, and presenting new proposals for public debate.²²

The process by which democratic societies confront complex and technical issues involving the broader public interest is an important consideration given the difficulty the ordinary citizen has in dealing with those complexities. To a certain degree, the formation of environmental groups is indicative of this concern. The environmental movement has been characterized as an eruption from "below,"²³ with demands for increased citizen input in the decision making process.²⁴ Environmental groups have demanded increased democratization as a fundamental component of natural resource issues and federal forest policy;²⁵ in doing so, the activities of environmental interest groups illustrate the tensions between a politicized segment of the electorate and "expert" decision-makers in the realm of natural resource policy.²⁶

Inglehart argues that there are two distinct forms of political participation.²⁷ The "elite-directed" mode of political action is represented by sociopolitical institutions (e.g., political parties, bureaucrats and industry) which are hierarchical in nature and mobilize citizens into action. In the realm of forest policy, Mather has characterized the situation as follows:

...many professional foresters, like engineers and physicians, do not welcome advice and criticism from persons not trained in their discipline...foresters looked

upon themselves as the custodians of the community interest in forest management, and as the appropriate judges of where that longtime interest lies.²⁸

In contrast to this type of political behavior and policy making is the “elite challenging” mode of political action, a pattern of activity which is more issue-specific, operates outside traditional political channels, and often utilizes unconventional, sometimes disruptive tactics as a means to influence public policy.²⁹ Elite-challenging activism represents a form of political action which addresses specific policy goals.

Indeed, citizens may achieve a sense of “self actualization” in their effort to have personal influence over the policy-making process. Environmental activism can be characterized, therefore, as a form of elite-challenging activism in which a citizen opposes the existing political agenda and seeks to impose constraints on policy-makers.³⁰ Mather has characterized forest management in postindustrial society as being driven to a considerable extent by public opinion in conflict with government being viewed as “would-be exploiters of the timber resource.”³¹

According to David Truman,³² groups that perceive threats to existing values and which are put on the defensive, such as the timber industry and industry-related/supported groups, tend to increase group cohesiveness and facilitate political activity. Consequently, in response to the elite-challenging behavior of the conservation and environmental movement, industry groups would be encouraged to network and provide a common front against changes in the way federal forests have been traditionally managed. Instead of concentrating on market competition, the wood products industry was moved to focus on the lowest common denominator of interest and agreement and work in concert to take advantage of “...the many opportunities for delay and obstruction inherent in the American legislative process” to oppose the environmental movement.³³

ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES

Environmental groups and other grassroots organizations concerned with natural resources are variously designated as “public interest groups,”³⁴ “citizen groups,”³⁵ or more generally an example of a “social movement.”³⁶ These terms are used to distinguish among environmental groups, which generally differ in their goals from groups representing either business interests or professional interests. According to Mancur Olson’s work *The Logic of Collective Action*,³⁷ such groups would have difficulty organizing due to their seeking collective, often immaterial benefits—such as preserving old-growth forests and endangered species. In reality, however, these groups have grown dramatically in number and size in recent decades and are very important players in the federal forest policy debate.

Although interest groups of all types differ in their human, financial, and organizational resources,³⁸ environmental and conservation groups are generally viewed as being poorly financed and understaffed vis-a-vis organizations that represent private sector interests.³⁹ Many environmental groups are managed by a paid staff and claim very few official members;⁴⁰ others develop large memberships and/or long lists of generous financial contributors. Whatever their structure, there has been a noticeable growth in the number and size of environmental groups in recent decades.⁴¹ Among

groups that focus on maintaining a large number of members, Milbrath postulates that two primary motives account for the growth in group memberships—the widespread perception of serious threats to the environment, and a desire on the part of many to be out in nature with others sharing similar interests.⁴² Interest groups, moreover, can have two fundamentally different types of memberships—one composed of individual citizens, and another which consists of aggregations of “representatives of large institutions, business firms or state and local governments.”⁴³

Some observers of interest groups also note that there is an increasing use of professional agents such as consultants and lawyers who are often adept at influencing policy processes and mobilizing support or opposition to policy initiatives.⁴⁴ In some cases, according to Andrew McFarland, it is the skill of such agents which determines group success rather than the size of a group’s membership or depth of financial resources.⁴⁵

Another source of influence and success in the policy process would be coalitions of interest groups, such as the *Oregon Natural Resources Council* for environmental groups and the *Northwest Forestry Association* for industry, which have smaller groups or businesses as affiliates rather than individual members. While the presence of such groups is not predicted by Mancur Olson’s theory of what pressure groups are, such composite groups pose a formidable political force due to their pooled financial resources and lack of dependence on individual membership dues.

Another source of group strength identified by Jack Walker is the role of patrons which are located outside of the group, but which provide important financial and possibly networking resources.⁴⁶ The support of foundations, wealthy individuals and government allows groups to reduce their reliance or even bypass altogether individual memberships dues.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES

Various strategies for influencing public policy have been identified by social scientists.⁴⁷ Central among these strategies are lobbying elected officials and bureaucrats, grassroots organizing to mobilize public opinion, building coalitions with other like-minded groups and organizations, and making economic contributions to the political process.⁴⁸ The strategy used by an organization may be influenced by various factors, including the types and amounts of resources available and the perceived effectiveness of the strategy in question. Large memberships may give interest groups an advantage in letter-writing, public demonstrations, and volunteers to carry out activities. On the other hand, organizations with few if any members but possessing large budgets may wish to focus on influencing the election of key decision makers or lobbying such decision makers after the election. This has been a strategy used by industry, which often benefits from government programs or subsidies.⁴⁹ Regardless of budgets and memberships, however, Berry argues:⁵⁰

Interest groups have strong reasons to convince people at the grass roots of the righteousness of their arguments, believing that changed public opinion will eventually lead to changed elite opinion...

This is especially the case in public forest policy, according to Mather,⁵¹ because federal forest policy has become increasingly salient to the public. As a result of active group advocacy a far larger proportion of the general public has become involved in the public policy process than ever before. And according to Schattschneider's observations, increased visibility and broader social acceptance often translates into increased salience in the policy arena.⁵²

Based upon the discussion presented here, the following research findings are expected in the empirical analyses:

1. Industry and industry-supported groups have greater financial and infrastructure resources to influence policy than environmental and citizen groups which are more likely to have a greater human resource base.
2. Environmental groups will rely more upon membership dues and contributions for financial resources while industry supported groups will rely more on business funding.
3. Industry and industry-supported groups rely more upon traditional forms of influence (e.g., lobbying) while environmental and citizen groups rely more upon elite-challenging and nontraditional forms of influence (e.g., political protests, letter-writing campaigns).
4. Because of policy stalemate (i.e., no resource extraction) and/or increased protection of federal forest resources (at the time of this research), environmental groups will perceive greater success in their efforts at influencing and informing the public and natural resource agencies than industry and many recreation groups (who have had many of their activities recently restricted or curtailed).

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

The data employed in the forthcoming analyses are derived from mail surveys of officers of interest groups and industry representatives who have been involved in federal forest policy in at least one of Oregon's thirteen national forests.⁵³ During the spring of 1992 each national forest provided its public participation list, which contains names and addresses of individuals, interest groups and industry representatives who have participated in the forest planning process. After the elimination of duplicate listings, surveys were sent to industry representatives and public interest groups claiming memberships. Because industry does not have individual memberships,⁵⁴ questions concerning memberships, volunteers, and membership fees were not asked of them. In all other respects, however, the survey instruments sent to the two groups were identical. Survey development and implementation followed Dillman's *Total Design Method*.⁵⁵ For the industry survey, four-waves of 176 surveys were delivered and 133 were returned, for a response rate of 75 percent. For the interest group survey, 415 groups were sent up to four waves of surveys and 326 were returned, producing a response rate of 78 percent.

Measurements: In order to determine the organizational resources and strategies utilized to affect policy, interest group officers were asked to indicate the number of

full-time and part-time staff employed, the number of volunteers available, the number of individual memberships, and their annual budget. Groups also were asked if they were affiliated with other local, state, regional or national organizations.

In regard to the strategies used to influence federal forest policy, membership groups and industry representatives were asked to indicate if they use the following methods and if they considered them to be effective: testifying before legislative committees, appeals to government personnel, filing lawsuits, building coalitions with other groups/industry, organizing political protests, filing briefs or appeals by outside experts (lawyers, scientists, etc.), instigating letter-writing campaigns, and releasing information through mass media channels.⁵⁶

Another question asked of organizations was intended to have them evaluate the relative impact of various organizations and individuals on federal forest land policy in the Pacific Northwest.⁵⁷ While the data generated by this question are only perceptual, they do allow for the actors involved in the policy process to assess the success of themselves and their various policy advocate counterparts.

In the forthcoming analyses, organizations will be categorized into five groups according to their interest in the management of federal forest lands. Group goals and interest in the federal forest management debate were identified using the *Directory of Oregon Forest Interest Groups* which had all of the surveyed organizations self-identify their purpose and interest in natural resource management.⁵⁸ Often these different types of groups are at odds over the management of public forest lands—e.g., timber production versus wildlife habitat preservation, hunting versus wildlife watching. In previous research, Steel et al. found strong policy regarding the management of public lands between hunting and fishing, snowmobile/mechanized vehicle, and wildlife watching groups in Ontario and Michigan.⁵⁹ Passive recreation (e.g., bird watchers) and environmental groups preferred a preservationist management approach to public lands while hunting and fishing groups and mechanized vehicle groups preferred a multiple use approach.

Data for the first four categories are from the Oregon federal forest interest groups survey, while data for the fifth category are from the Oregon forest industry survey. Group categories and examples are as follows:

1. *Environmental Protection/Conservation*: individual membership groups interested in the preservation or conservation of federal forest lands.
2. *Intensive Recreation*: membership groups representing, for example, fishing, hunting, snowmobiling, power boating, interests. These groups are interested in intensive use of federal forest lands.
3. *Passive Recreation*: membership groups representing, for example, hiking, cross-country skiing, mountain climbing, and wildlife watching interests. These groups are interested in more passive and potentially less environmentally damaging activities.
4. *Industry-Supporting Groups*: membership groups representing natural resource extraction interests on federal forest lands. Examples of these groups include mining groups, logging groups, woods products unions, and wise use groups.

While none of these groups are directly involved in commodity production, they represent worker, community and industry interests involved in commodity production on federal forest lands.

5. *Industry*: non-membership commercial organizations engaged in natural resource extraction from federal forest lands. Industries in this category, for example, include sawmills, logging companies, millworks, mining companies, timber trucking companies, and helicopter logging concerns.

RESULTS

Group Resources: The findings displayed in Table 1 indicate that environmental groups, as expected, rely much more upon human resources while industry-supported groups have greater economic resources. *F-test* results indicate statistically significant differences between all four types of membership groups examined. The median membership of environmental groups is over four times greater than that for industry-supporting groups. While environmental groups have but 60% of the economic resources that industry-supporting groups have, they have nearly twice as many volunteers. The volunteer base and membership base in contrast to the size of budget suggest that environmental groups will likely seek to use public involvement as a channel of influence. Elite challenging groups characteristic of postindustrial societies typically do not have the resources to compete with economic

Table 1. Natural Resource Interest Group Resources in Oregon

	<i>Environmental</i>	<i>Passive Recreation</i>	<i>Intensive Recreation</i>	<i>Industry-Support Group^a</i>	
Full-Time Staff					<i>f-test</i>
Mean	6.3	8.1	8.6	8.4	
Median	1.0	4.0	3.0	4.4	7.26***
s.d.	26.9	19.9	10.7	8.2	
Part-Time Staff					
Mean	1.7	3.3	1.1	1.0	
Median	1.6	1.8	1.0	1.0	3.37*
s.d.	6.3	4.2	2.2	1.4	
Volunteers					
Mean	76.7	12.6	26.8	41.0	
Median	38.1	20.0	24.5	20.0	5.46***
s.d.	136.8	30.7	31.6	35.7	
Members					
Mean	795	210	206	108	
Median	657	300	95	157	5.36***
s.d.	261.0	174.1	282.8	179.2	
Annual Budget					
Mean	\$374k	\$227k	\$307k	\$924k	
Median	\$380k	\$145k	\$580k	\$625k	12.38***
s.d.	675.1	375.0	730.1	5271.0	
	n=126	n=28	n=142	n=32	

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

^aOnly membership groups supporting industry are included in this category.

Table 2. Sources of Interest Group Annual Budget and Tax Exempt Status (by percentage)

	<i>Environmental</i>	<i>Passive Recreation</i>	<i>Intensive Recreation</i>	<i>Industry-Support Group^a</i>
Membership Dues or Contributions	57.1	46.3	49.4	35.0
Foundations	11.6	4.6	2.3	0.7
Government Sources	1.3	14.9	3.4	4.9
Private Corporations or Businesses	2.9	4.1	13.0	29.9
Other Funding Contributions	27.1	30.1	31.9	29.5
Tax-Exempt? Yes	67	71	50	37
No	33	29	50	63
	n=126	n=28	n=142	n=32

^aOnly membership groups supporting industry are included in this category.

strength, but they do have the capacity to involve their supporters among the public in their influence seeking activities. The recreation groups tend to have fewer members and volunteers when compared to environmental groups, but have larger full-time staffs.

The data in Table 2 reinforce the findings presented in Table 1. Over 57 percent of the average environmental group's annual budget comes from membership dues or contributions as compared to only 35 percent of industry-supporting membership groups. Both types of recreation groups also heavily depend on membership dues and contributions as would be expected. In regard to industry sources of funding, approximately 30% of industry-supporting group budgets derive from business sources, compared to less than 3 percent for environmental groups. In addition, most of the environmental groups included in this study (67 percent) have tax-exempt status for contributions while over 60 percent of industry-supporting groups are not tax-exempt.

Group Strategies: Table 3 provides some insight into the strategies used by interest groups and industry to influence federal forest policy. The strategies listed in the table range from traditional forms of influence such as testifying before legislative committees to elite challenging forms such as organizing political protests and instigating letter-writing campaigns. All organizations were asked to rank-order the effectiveness of each method.

Mean scores indicate that, as expected, environmental groups rely much more on elite-challenging tactics such as letter-writing, political organizing, and releasing information through the media than do industry or industry-supporting groups. Only in building coalitions are the strategies of environmental and industry groups similar. As discussed earlier, this is a growing strategy of all groups according to Salisbury.⁶⁰ Interestingly, all the different types of groups find building coalitions quite effective. Industry-supporting groups find testifying and appealing to government agencies most effective; this entails, of course, using their traditional access to the power structure.

Perceptions of Influence: Now that we have examined the resources available and strategies pursued by public interest groups and industry representatives in federal forestry policy, an examination of perceived influence is warranted. Perceptual data

Table 3. Natural Resource Interest Group and Industry Strategies to Influence Government Natural Resource Policies

Strategy	Environmental Mean ^a	Passive Recreation Mean	Intense Recreation Mean	Industry- Support Group ^a Mean	Industry Mean
Testifying before Legislative Committees <i>F-test</i> = 2.73	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.2	3.5
Appeals to Government Agency Personnel <i>F-test</i> = 3.10*	4.9	2.4	2.2	2.5	3.2
Briefs of Appeals by Outside Experts (lawyers, Scientists, etc.). <i>F-test</i> = 3.98*	4.8	3.4	5.7	3.6	3.9
Building Coalitions with Other Groups <i>F-test</i> = 1.76	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.0	2.0
Filing Court Suits <i>F-test</i> = 4.81**	3.4	3.0	5.6	4.0	5.4
Instigating a Letter-Writing Campaign <i>F-test</i> = 4.98**	1.4	2.7	2.2	3.8	4.1
Releasing Information through the Mass Media <i>F-test</i> = 4.57**	2.6	3.7	3.8	3.2	3.8
Organizing Political Protests <i>F-test</i> = 4.03**	2.1	6.0	5.0	3.0	5.1
	n=126	n=28	n=142	n=32	n=133

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

^a1 = the most effective method used; 2 = the second most effective; etc.

cannot tell us who is actually “winning” in the policy process, but does allow for self-evaluation of success and the estimation of the impact of other groups in the process. The results displayed in Table 4 provide some insight into each group’s perception of their own success in transmitting information to various parties.

With regard to legislators, 50 percent of the industry-supporting groups considered themselves successful, followed by environmental groups (42 percent), industry (35 percent), intensive recreation (33 percent) and passive recreation (12 percent). Almost 70 percent of environmental groups considered themselves successful at informing natural resource agencies, followed by 57 percent of industry-supporting groups and 43 percent of intensive recreation organizations. Only 31 percent of industry and 37 percent of passive recreation groups rated themselves as being successful in their advocacy.

As for informing the general public, fewer organizations considered themselves successful. Industry-supporting groups (46 percent) and environmental groups (45

Table 4. Self-Assessed Success of Interest Groups and Industry to Influence the Federal Forestry Policy Process

Question:	<i>On matters affecting federal forest policy, how successful would you say your organization is in its attempts to inform legislators, natural resource agencies, and the general public?</i>				
	<i>Environmental</i>	<i>Passive Recreation</i>	<i>Intense Recreation</i>	<i>Industry-Support Group</i>	<i>Industry</i>
Legislators					
%Successful	42	12	33	50	35
%Uncertain	34	50	33	21	29
%Unsuccessful	25	38	34	29	36
Natural Resource Agencies					
%successful	69	37	43	57	31
%uncertain	24	37	36	21	32
%unsuccessful	7	25	21	21	37
General Public					
%successful	45	25	22	46	31
%uncertain	34	37	40	38	36
%unsuccessful	21	37	38	15	33
	n=126	n=28	n=142	n=32	n=133

percent) were most likely to consider themselves successful as compared to only a third of industry and 25 percent or less of recreation groups.

In order to determine which resources and strategies are associated with perceived success, ordinary least squares estimates for influencing *legislators*, *natural resource agencies*, and the *public* are presented in Table 5. The independent variables for these models were presented in Tables 1 and 3 (i.e., organizational resources and strategies). For the resource independent variables, predictors were included in each model as coded in Table 1. An additional resource dummy variable was included assessing the use of affiliates to influence legislators, agencies and the public (1=use of affiliates; 0=no use of affiliates). The four strategy independent variables utilized are presented in Table 3 and include *traditional* strategies (1=above average effective use of one or more traditional tactics such as testifying or appeals; 0=non-use or below average effective use); elite *challenging* strategies (1=above average effective use of one or more challenging tactics such as letter-writing campaigns or protests; 0=non-use or below average effective use); the use of *courts* (ranked effectiveness of filing court suits); and the use of *coalitions* (ranked effectiveness of building coalitions with other groups). Organizational type is controlled for in each model through the use of dummy variables (e.g., 1= environmental or industry group; 0=other). Because it is necessary to omit one dummy variable for each model to be estimated, the category representing recreation groups (both intensive and passive) is omitted. The *F-test* results indicate that all three models are statistically significant, and adjusted R²s range from .15 to .17.

For the resource variables included in the models we find that having a large number of members is associated with perceived success with legislators and natural resource agencies in federal forest policy. Clearly, having a large membership would indicate a

Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Self-Perceived Success Influencing Legislators, Agencies and the Public Concerning Federal Forest Policy

	Targets of Natural Resource Policy Influence:					
	Legislators		Agencies		Public	
	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta	<i>b</i>	Beta
Resources						
Members	.14**	.19	.06*	.10	.04	.07
Staff	.01	.02	.01	.02	.05	.06
Volunteers	.02	.02	.03	.04	.02	.03
Budget	3.41*	.11	1.55	.05	1.71	.05
Affiliates	.19*	.10	.11	.05	1.34**	.15
Strategies						
Traditional	.26**	.35	.17**	.26	.15*	.10
Challenging	-.04	-.05	.05	.07	.13**	.20
Courts	.01	.03	.32*	.13	.21*	.10
Coalition	.03	.02	.12*	.10	.12*	.11
Group Types						
Environmental	.26*	.12	.19*	.10	.36**	.17
Industry-Support	.17*	.10	.16*	.09	.28**	.15
Group & Industry						
$R^2 =$.18		.16		.16	
Adj. $R^2 =$.17		.15		.15	
$F =$	7.36**		15.09**		14.90**	

substantial power base to elected officials and agencies, along with the potential for organized letter-writing campaigns and public participation in the policy process (as mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act, 1970). Neither the number of staff nor the number of volunteers available for organizations, however, were found to be statistically related with perceptions of success in the federal forest policy process.

The size of an organization's budget was related only to success with legislators. Perhaps this is an indication of the ability to contribute money to PACs or directly to candidates for office who may support an organization's goals. Being affiliated with other organizations at the local, state or national level is significantly related to perceptions of success with both legislators and the public. The presence of affiliates would certainly increase the ability of organizations to publicize issues, raise money, and to organize a response to policy. The most powerful voices in Oregon for environmental and natural resource issues are the *Oregon Natural Resources Council* (environmental issues) and the *Northwest Forestry Association* (natural resource extraction interests) which are affiliated with many if not most of the environmental and industry-supporting groups active in the state.

In regard to the strategies associated with perceptions of success, we find that those groups using traditional forms of influence (e.g., testifying at hearings, appeals to agency personnel, briefs/appeals by outside experts) are likely to perceive their own success in influencing legislators, agency personnel and the public. Elite challenging strategies such as political protests and letter-writing campaigns are significantly associated with perceived group success with the general public. Many of these strategies are meant to attract media coverage, and thereby generate public interest and build support for causes. Filing court suits and building coalitions with other groups are

additional strategies significantly related to perceived success with natural resource agencies and the public.

The final set of variables included in the three models assess the impact of organizational type. For all three models, environmental groups and industry-supporting groups are significantly more likely to perceive success influencing legislators, agencies and the public than recreation groups (the omitted dummy category). The large economic resource base available to industry and the large membership base available to environmental groups when compared to recreation groups may be part of the reason for their perceived success in the federal forest policy process (see Table 1).

The results presented in Table 6 provide insight into public interest group and industry representative perceptions of the impact of the various types of groups on federal

Table 6. Industry and Interest Group Evaluations of the Policy Impact of Groups, Government and Individuals on Federal Forest Policy^a

	<i>Environmental Mean^a</i>	<i>Passive Recreation Mean</i>	<i>Intense Recreation Mean</i>	<i>Industry- Support Group^a Mean</i>	<i>Industry Mean</i>
Government					
U.S. Forest Service	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2	3.8
<i>F-test=2.65</i>					
Bureau of Land Management	4.1	4.2	3.9	4.2	3.8
<i>F-test=1.33</i>					
U.S. Congress	4.4	3.6	3.9	3.8	4.1
<i>F-test=6.97***</i>					
Federal Courts	4.4	4.3	4.1	4.1	4.7
<i>F-test=1.89</i>					
President	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.7
<i>F-test=3.34*</i>					
Economic Interests					
Timber Companies	4.4	4.6	4.0	3.9	3.1
<i>F-test=6.33***</i>					
Business or Industry Rep.s	3.8	4.2	3.5	3.4	2.9
<i>F-test=6.12***</i>					
Labor Unions	2.9	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.6
<i>F-test=3.36*</i>					
Other Interests					
Voters/Public Opinion	3.1	2.8	2.8	3.1	3.1
<i>F-test=1.71</i>					
Mass Media	3.5	3.1	3.5	3.9	4.1
<i>F-test=4.13**</i>					
Envirometalists	3.9	3.8	4.0	3.6	4.5
<i>F-test=1.86</i>					
Recreational Groups	4.4	3.6	3.9	3.8	4.1
<i>F-test=1.86</i>					

^aScale used: 1=no impact on policy to 5=great impact on policy.

forest policy. Not surprisingly, the one actor uniformly ranked highly by all four types of interest groups and industry are federal courts. Given the timing of the study in 1992, federal courts had stopped most timber harvesting on public lands in the Pacific Northwest in order to protect spotted owl habitat. Federal natural resource agencies (USFS and BLM) also were considered to have a substantial independent impact upon policy by all organizations surveyed.

Environmental groups considered the following particular actors/interests to have the most impact (in descending order of impact): USFS, Congress, Federal Courts, timber companies, and the BLM. They ranked their own impact slightly lower than these five groups. Industry, on the other hand, considered the federal courts, environmentalists, Congress, and the mass media as having the most impact. *Both industry and environmental interests rank each other as having more impact than themselves.* Perhaps this is a reflection of disequilibrium in this policy area. While the direction of federal policy concerning forests has shifted from a commodity focus to what has been called "ecosystem management,"⁶¹ there is still much uncertainty about future management orientations among these participants.

Passive recreation groups, which have much in common with environmental groups, rate timber companies, USFS, Federal Courts, BLM, and industry representatives as having the most impact. Intensive recreation groups, which are at times in conflict with environmental and passive recreation groups, rank USFS, Federal Courts and the BLM as having the most impact on federal forest policy. Industry-supporting groups identified natural resource agencies and the courts as having the most impact.

CONCLUSION

This article has presented evidence from a study of the advocacy groups active in the management of Oregon's 13 national forests. It has investigated the resources and strategies of public interest groups and industry representatives involved in Oregon forest management decisions in the early 1990s. On the basis of survey data collected among 133 business representatives and 326 interest groups involved in federal forest policy, the argument has been developed that environmental interest group influence derives primarily from their capacity for mobilizing human resources. Industry and industry-supporting groups, in contrast, possess relatively substantial financial power, but enjoy far less support and confidence from the public. As a consequence of these differentials in resources and related strengths and weaknesses, industry interests tend to focus their attention on and direct their efforts toward more traditional forms of influence such as lobbying natural resource agencies and elected officials.

In the current context of American politics, public interest groups such as those involved in the environmental movement are a product of urban areas and the advent of postindustrial values and attraction to the New Environmental Paradigm.⁶² In contrast, the primary area of support for industry-supporting interests is the periphery—those rural and sparsely populated nonmetropolitan forested areas where the natural resource extraction culture is strong. Given the combination of resource base and national enclaves of support among the public, the differences in strategies employed and tactics used by public interest groups and industry-oriented groups seem

quite understandable. The volatility of forest policy in recent years will surely continue into the future as the changes occasioned by a shift in partisan control in Congress come into sharper focus. Groups such as those studied in the Oregon context exist throughout the country, and it is likely that the differences in how environmental and industry groups operate are present elsewhere. Such groups will without question play a prominent role in how forest resources are to be used in the future. Elite-challenging activity is likely to continue, and a struggle between environmental and industry values also is likely to be a strong feature of public natural resource management practices and policies in the coming years.

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57. Organizations were asked: "In general, how would you evaluate the relative impact of each of the following groups or individuals on federal forest land policy in the Pacific Northwest?" The response index provided ranged from 1=no impact to 5=great impact. The groups to be evaluated included: USDA Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Congress, Federal Courts, the President, timber companies, business or industry representatives, labor unions, energy companies, developers/construction companies, voters/public opinion, mass media, environmentalists, college/university researchers, hunting and fishing groups, and recreational groups.
58. Group categories were formulated using the *Directory of Oregon Forest Interest Groups* published by Oregon State University Extension (Corvallis, OR: April, 1993). For purposes of this article, Berry's op. cit., ch.1 definition of interest groups was used to identify organizations involved in federal forest policy: "...an interest group is an organized body of individuals who share some goals and who try to influence public policy." Berry argues that industrial organizations, such as specific timber companies, fall outside this definition and should be examined separately from interest groups. Consequently, we

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